Journal of International Organizations Studies

VOLUME 11, ISSUE 2, FALL 2020

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The *Journal of International Organizations* Studies is the peer-reviewed journal of the United Nations Studies Association (UNSA), published in cooperation with the editorial team at Georgia State University. JIOS provides a forum for scholars who work on international organizations in a variety of disciplines. The journal aims to provide a window into the state of the art of research on international governmental organizations, supporting innovative approaches and interdisciplinary dialogue. The journal's mission is to explore new grounds and transcend the traditional perspective of international organizations as merely the sum of their members and their policies.

Details on Submission and Review

JIOS is published twice annually, in spring and fall, online and print-on-demand. Submission deadline for the fall issue is 1 May each year and for the spring issue is 1 November of the previous year. JIOS publishes three types of articles:

- Research papers (8,000–10,000 words, including footnotes and references)
- Insider's View (3,000–7,000 words, including footnotes and references): contributions from practitioners illuminating the inner workings of international organizations
- Reviews of literature, disciplinary approaches or panels/workshops/conferences (single book reviews, panel or workshop reviews: 800–1,200 words, multiple book or subject reviews: 2,000–3,000 words, including footnotes and references)

Please send submissions to editors@journal-iostudies.org. For submissions and formatting guidelines, please see www.journal-iostudies.org/how-submit-your-paper. All papers will be reviewed by two or three external reviewers and then either accepted, rejected, or returned to the author(s) with the invitation to make minor corrections or revise and resubmit (medium to major changes). The final decision on acceptance of submissions rests solely with the editors.

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LETTER FROM THE EDITOR

The UNSA and I are thrilled that we are publishing the fourth issue for JIOS which features articles whose publication has been pending for quite a while now. UNSA, as the responsible publisher, wishes to apologize to all the authors for the backlog caused by organizational constraints. We thank you all for your patience and understanding and hope that you enjoy the reading. With this said, please note that nearly 5M people are fighting for their lives in Haiti; gang violence has increased dramatically, spurred by political unrest and thousands of people have been displaced. Circumstances have now prompted intervention from other countries and placed Haiti on the precipice of further collapse. The fallout will cause generational damage, yet most Haitian families suffer in relative silence because much of the world is unaware of their dire situation. All of the topics covered in this special issue on Haiti are relevant, and the issues studied are timely. JIOS is extremely grateful to all the authors that have contributed to this special issue on Haiti.
Reflecting on JIOS's mission, this issue covers a wide range of topics, methods, and perspectives regarding the study of Haiti. Institutions matter; they influence norms, beliefs, actions and shape outcomes; however, their functioning depends on the conditions under which they emerge and can endure over time and remain stable. Through Haiti's past and present, our authors examine the challenges to Haiti through its people, its culture, society, conflicts, and institutions through topics such as the rule of law, gender relations, peace projects, peace journalism, natural disasters and structural vulnerabilities, international human rights law, transitional justice mechanisms, tourism development, reciprocity in agrarian labor and UN missions in Haiti.

This special issue on Haiti is dedicated to Bernard "Bernie" Diederich; he was a New Zealand-born author, journalist, and historian. Bernard's career as a reporter and historian spanned seven decades. He was a longtime journalist in the Caribbean region; Bernard became a freelance correspondent for the *Associated Press*, *The New York Times*, and *The Daily Telegraph*, among others. In 1961, he covered the assassination of Rafael Trujillo in the neighboring Dominican Republic. In 1963, after having displeased Haiti's dictator François "Papa Doc" Duvalier, he was briefly imprisoned and expelled. In the Dominican Republic he established himself as a staff correspondent for *Time-Life News*. In 1966, Bernard moved to Mexico working for *Time* magazine covering Caribbean affairs. He was honored in 1976 with a Maria Moors Cabot award from Columbia University for coverage of the Americas. In 1981, the office was moved to Miami, and he worked there until his retirement in 1989. Bernard continued to publish after retirement with a focus on the political and historical developments in the Caribbean, notably in Haiti. In recent years, Bernard, who also mentored younger journalists, focused on writing books about Haiti that were translated into Haitian Creole as a way to preserve his knowledge of the country. He died at his home in Frères, Port-au-Prince, on 14 January 2020, aged 93.

Leading this issue is Bernard Diederich's personal memoir *Blan,* which reviews his youth post WWII amid his arrival in Haiti, and the beginnings of the *Haiti Sun*, his English weekly, with reflections while in solitary confinement after his arrest following the bloodiest day of the Duvalier dictatorship. It is a great memoir covering his life in Haiti in the 1950s and shows his love of Haiti and the Haitian people. In this vein, in *The Many Faces of Peace: Rule of Law, Justice of the Peace, and Everyday Life in Haiti,* Marco Motta examines the concept of peace at work in the everyday lives of the Haitian people he has met and exposes the discourse of Haiti's "culture of violence" and rhetoric on peacebuilding in Haiti. Motta's research exposes the prior

discourse on Haiti and acknowledges the connection between foreign meddling and the devastating disappointment it can bring. He shows the discrepancy between the ideology promoted from above and the daily reality that the people live in and how it should inspire us to reflect on how such a mismatch actually enables forms of violence.

In *Not so much absence, not so much contract: women, men, and the production of familiarity in Jacmel, Haiti*, Flávia Freire Dalmaso utilizes extensive ethnographic research within the commune of Jacmel, in Haiti's Southeast Department. This research seeks to understand how love relationships are constructed and experienced by women in their daily lives. Based on a dialog with the literature on the cultural specificities of Afro-American and Afro-Caribbean families, Flavia observes that gender relations are ambivalent, crossed by moral expectations, frustrations and conflicts, but also marked by interdependence and solidarity. Institutions and the Rule of Law are important topics as concerns Haiti throughout its history.

In *Peace Journalism in Haiti,* Leara Rhodes suggests that UN peacekeeping should have provided a space for institutions within Haiti to transition into keeping the peace for themselves and to offer a process that would incur a change of mindset rather than financial support. Through philosophical logic, existing constitutional guarantees, and the functions of three major institutions: political, economic and communications, Rhodes reasons that through each of these institutions, especially in peace journalism, Haiti can create its own peacekeeping policies.

In *Building on International Law and Diplomacy to Explore a Legal Policy for Change in Haiti,* Mulry Mondélice exposes the increasing interest of international society in the promotion of the rule of law and the legal foundation of this doctrine in international law, as well as concrete expressions of the promotion of the rule of law in Haiti, while underlining their limits. Analyzing the role that international human rights law plays in today's diplomacy in the quest for social change, Mondélice asks how such a trend can help Haiti improve the domestic legal and institutional landscape in cooperation with interested states and international organizations in order to empower the people.

In researching some of the factors that leave Haiti vulnerable from disasters, Patrick Sylvain addresses the intricate complexities of natural disasters and structural vulnerabilities within the context of post-colonial governance and dictatorial regimes in *Haiti's Structural Vulnerability at the Juncture of Ineptitude*. Sylvain's goal is to establish a new topography of the prevailing effects of *structural vulnerability* on the Haitian people. Sylvain also demonstrates how social factors such as poverty, political instability, rapid urbanization, and the fragility of the state constitute the causes of sustainable underdevelopment in Haiti. The corollary effects of natural disasters not only expose the weaknesses of the State, but irrevocably compromise the future of the Haitian people.

In What Difference has the Government of Haiti Made for Tourism Development? Ludmilla M. Anglade examines the actions that the Haitian government has taken to develop and sustain tourism within their borders. Anglade's premise is that governments, through state institutions and policies, can implement branding strategies that impact and change existing country image perceptions. Expanding on the determinants of tourism demand literature, she presents a theoretical framework for how government institutions collaborate to create a favorable country brand by investing in the development of functional benefits {public safety and infrastructure quality}.

In Leveraging the Power of the People, Isabelle Clérié presents a detailed account of the three-year process undertaken between Haitian civil society and the United Nation's Office of the Human Rights Commissioner to determine if and how Haiti can address past crimes through transitional justice mechanisms and tools. She found that Haiti's dysfunctional government and judicial sector made investigating past crimes an unrealistic undertaking, however, community organizations within civil society are an overlooked and highly valuable conduit for reshaping narratives about the present by shedding light and insight on the truths of the past.

In *Rank versus Normative Commitment among Haitian Peasants: A case study of Reciprocity in Agrarian Festive Labor,* Yves-François Pierre finds that contrary to descriptions found in the previous literature on agrarian labor, the existence of a stringent norm of reciprocity in a non-reciprocal labor event redefines the Haitian *konbit* as a work party exchange among cultivators with both food and labor as currencies; this research discloses the existence of a stringent norm of reciprocity in konbit, unlike what has been described in previously literature.

Finally, in *Misguided Multilateralism? The Saga of UN Peacebuilding in Haiti,* Henry F. Carey and Alla Manukyan analyze the United Nations active involvement in Haiti since 1990, by focusing on the legacy of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) 2004 - 2017. There have been various international actors with a long presence in Haiti, however, their complex effects have not been systematically studied. This research explains MINUSTAH's limited effectiveness and discusses its consequences for Haiti in the context of the political, security, and humanitarian situation in the country after the mission ended. Moreover, MINUSTAH is interpreted through the lenses of seven theoretical frameworks on peacebuilding. Although there have been various international actors with a long presence in Haiti, Carey and Manukyan provide a more nuanced and focused study of MINUSTAH's impact and its implications for Haiti now and in the future.

These special studies on Haiti reflect the changing landscapes of our time, yet they all reflect how important the issue of Haiti is for the future through studies and current events. Lastly, the UNSA and I wish to thank our Editorial Team; we are so grateful for all the great work this team has done for us for over a decade. At the same time, our heartfelt thanks to Alla Manukyan, and Deborah Cotton; without their tremendous effort, this special issue would not have been possible.

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Ludmilla M. Anglade is a Principal-Business Consultant with Infosys Consulting where she leads global delivery of complex and high-value business solutions for financial services clients, leveraging her education in governance and business, PMP certification, CRM and digital transformation expertise. Ludmilla's educational background is diverse: in 2018, she earned a M.A. in Political Science (International and Comparative) from Georgia State University. Her thesis project was titled, "What Difference do the Government Institutions of Haiti and the Government Institutions of the Dominican Republic Make for Tourism Growth?" In addition, Ludmilla received an M.B.A. in 2017 and a MIB in 2014, after completing her B.A. in International Relations and Affairs in 2005, at Georgia State University. Her Project Management Certificate was earned in 2018 at the Georgia Institute of Technology. Born in NY to a Haitian family, in her downtime, Ludmilla is a fitness enthusiast who loves to travel and appreciates global experiences filled with art, culture, food, and music. She is passionate about motivating & coaching others to break past limitations to fulfill self-empowering goals.

Henry (Chip) Carey is a professor of political science at Georgia State University. He is the author of dozens of academic articles on Haiti's instability and unending democratic transition. He is author and editor of a dozen books, the editor of *Peacebuilding Paradigms* (Cambridge University Press, 2021) and co-author of Legalization of International Law and Politics: Multi-Level Governance of Human Right and Aggression (Palgrave, 2023). He is editor and co-editor of two forthcoming books on Haiti and the Dominican Republic. He is currently the outgoing chair of the International Law section of the International Studies Association and was chair of the Haiti section of the Latin American Studies Association and the founding co-chair of the Haiti-Dominican Republic section of LASA.

Isabelle Clérié is a Haitian anthropologist whose work is focused on claiming local narratives by leveraging the power and assets of communities in Haiti. She holds two Master's degrees in nonprofit management from Florida Atlantic University and Applied Anthropology from the University of North Texas. She has worked with a variety of organizations including community-based organizations and agricultural co-ops, large multi and bi-lateral institutions, impact investors and more across diverse fields such as small business development and microfinance, climate justice, food security, and human rights. From 2017 to 2019, she worked with the UN's Office of the High Commission for Human Rights to lead an entirely civil society led process to design Haiti's first national strategy for confronting past crimes and impunity. This work culminated in Haiti's first ever UN Peace Building Fund award.

Flávia Dalmaso has a master's and doctorate in social anthropology from the National Museum of the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro. Between 2008 and 2016, she spent several seasons in Jacmel, Haiti, where she researched topics such as family, gender relations, vodou and mobility. Her main interests are related to the dynamics involved in the construction of what she calls "familiarity" between friends, neighbors and relatives, their ties to the lands of family occupation and the vodou religion. More recently, she has sought to understand how local narratives around blood and history can combine in the production of what is conceived as kinship in Haiti. Flávia Dalmaso is currently a visiting professor at the Federal University of Mato Grosso do Sul, working on a research project about the pottery developed by women of the Kadiwéu ethnic group.

Alla Manukyan holds a PhD in political science from Georgia State University and MA in human rights from the Central European University. She was a lecturer at Drake, Iowa State University, and Des Moines Area Community College. In 2023, Alla joined the research team of the Nebraska Center for Research on Children, Youth, Families & Schools at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln.

Mulry Mondélice teaches public international law, international human rights law and diplomacy. He taught at York University, Université Laval, UQÀM, *Ecole de la Magistrature d'Haïti* and was a SSHRC Post-doctoral Fellow at the McGill Centre for Human Rights and Legal Pluralism. He researches new trends in the promotion of the rule of law in international relations, humanitarian aid diplomacy, and focuses on EU-Caribbean relations. He has authored articles, book chapters and lectured in Canada and abroad. As a Graduate in law and philosophy, Mulry is a member of several learning societies, research centers and is a distinguished member of the Quebec Society for International Law's Board of Directors.

Marco Motta is an anthropologist, senior researcher (SNSF grant holder) at the University of Neuchâtel. He is currently conducting research funded by the SNSF on the transition to adulthood and the impact of reception conditions on the health of unaccompanied minors. Prior to this, as part of postdoctoral research, Marco Motta was affiliated with Johns Hopkins Universities in Baltimore, Toronto and Bern. Between 2016 and 2021, he conducted research in Haiti on informal modes of conflict regulation and political violence experienced in ordinary life.

Yves-Francois Pierre is a sociologist who lives in Haiti.

Dr. Leara Rhodes received her doctorate and master degrees from Temple University in Philadelphia and her bachelor degree from the University of Georgia. She is an Associate Professor of Journalism and International Communication in the Grady College of Journalism and Mass Communication at the University of Georgia. Dr. Rhodes' teaching interests are magazine management, magazine article writing, magazine editing and design and international communication. Dr. Rhodes has conducted study abroad programs to Haiti, Trinidad, Italy, London (U.K.) and Tanzania.

Dr. Patrick Sylvain is a multidisciplinary scholar whose generative research is primarily based on theories of colonialization and decolonization. Dr. Sylvain focuses on race and piracy, island theories, zombie studies, poetry and philosophy, as well as democratic theories. Creatively, Dr. Sylvain is the author of several poetry books in English and Haitian, and his poems have been nominated for the prestigious Pushcart Prize. Dr. Sylvain has degrees from Harvard University (Ed.M.), Boston University (MFA), and Brandeis University (PhD). Dr. Sylvain is an Assistant Professor in Global /Transnational / and Postcolonial Literature at Simmons University, and also serves as a member of the History and Literature Tutorial Board at Harvard.

Blan

Bernard Diederich †

In memory of those who disappeared on April 26, 1963
A memoire

April 27, 1963

My head is bursting; sweat pours down my naked body and my hands fill with pain as I tighten the grip with all my force on the iron bars of my cell door. Will they come soon? They usually do. A beating, breaking of my bones, will be a relief. This mental torture of not knowing what is happening to my young wife and newborn son is driving me insane. The anguish is terrible. I keep visualizing those sadistic Tontons Macoutes, led by Lucien Chauvet, returning to my home and seizing them. My wife, I know, will resist and she will be beaten… or worse! They could join the legion of "disappeared." Under Papa Doc one did not die, you simply vanished and your name was added to the legion of "disappeared." No one was executed or died. They simply "disappeared." Many of my friends have disappeared. For my family I have disappeared. No one knows where the Macoutes have taken me from my home in the early morning hour. When the Macoutes came, my wife had already left to learn from her sister on her nearby chicken farm the news of the night. Our baby was in his crib. As Haitians, my wife and our baby have no recourse. "Disappeared" could be a horrible death. As a Blan, foreigner, and journalist, my embassy will eventually take up my case but I know both the U.S. and British embassies had warned their nationals that they could do very little if seized because this was a government that respected no laws.

My fear was not for myself. I know that they had seized me to prevent my filing reports on their day of bloody mayhem, the day Papa Doc unleashed his Macoutes. Like rabid mad dogs they rampaged killing innocent men and women and covering the streets with blood.

My whole being is filled with anguish and fear for my loved ones. I blame myself. Terror and remorse well up, it's a crippling physical pain. It saps my body. I feel weak. I move against the wall of my small bare cell for support. Long ago I had learned the ability to dominate my own fear. My generation went from age 16 or 18 to being shot or killed or mutilated in WWII. Under Papa Doc, it is worse. The absence of justice has gnawed away at my soul; yes, my soul is stolen by injustice. Detesting violence-hating, even boxing, I am faced only with the violence of a madman.

Every second, is eternity, in solitary confinement in Haiti's ancient National Penitentiary, cut off from my world, not knowing what is happening to them. And I have reason to fear for them. Damn it, my Kiwi heritage makes it impolite to be pretentious or show emotion.

My work has endangered the lives of the ones I loved most in the world. If they had not existed and I was single, I would have laughed at my jailers and taunted Papa Doc. I was not a CIA agent as one of the arresting Tontons Macoutes told his comrades. I am simply a newsman.

Ginette holding our son Jean-Bernard at his christening

They didn't want an eye-witness account appearing in The New York Times or the Associated Press world wire service.

Brutal and sadistic they are, and I remember how they beat to death poor Eric Brierre, my typewriter repair man accused of plotting against Papa Doc. His fathers had been arrested and listened to his son's death screams from a neighboring cell. The Army chief had vomited when he saw what was left of the young man; human pulp. For unbecoming weakness (vomiting), the general, Papa Doc said, needed a change of climate and sent him to Paris as ambassador. You must give up your claim to dignity and lie to survive.

I feel feverish. I am mentally exhausted. I lean my head against the cold iron bars of my cell and close my eyes. "Ginette," I whisper, my lips parched and dry. I can see her, her soft bronze skin, the gentle curve of her cheekbone, and her eyes, dark and beautiful and alive with youth.

Not for myself, but for them I appeal to my old God, Jesus Christ, but I realized I have forgotten the prayers of my childhood. Vodou Prayers are more familiar. I have repeatedly made appeals to Papa Legba, louv ri baryé pou mwen... and save them.

I read the names carved on the heavily whitewashed concrete walls of my cell, a list of unfortunate players in the lethal game of Haitian politics who sought to leave a trace as they were taken out of the cell and executed or moved to Fort Dimanche from where there is no return. There is a Gillette razor blade on a cross bar. Is it used to write names, shave or perhaps cut a vein? I cannot for the life of me retain one name on the wall. My brain is no longer functioning. It is messed up, saturated with nightmares.

As a cockroach I have crawled through six years of Papa Doc's tyranny wearing a mask. Papa Doc had shown us how to wear masks. I feel completely naked without my mask. What madness. Pretending, going around smiling and saying nice things to killers! No longer. My mood is suddenly changing. My fighting Irish ancestors laugh at me. They tell me to stand up like a man. I swear that if they so much as touch the hair of my wife and child's head, I will seek revenge. This must end one day and if I survive I will seek justice. The thought that these bastards will one day face justice brings relief, but only for a moment. I had succeeded, and now they know that I had filed reports for six years reporting their crimes in dispatches to the world.

My gut can't take it and I turn away trying not to think of anything; but my mind keeps turning back to that day, fifteen years ago, when Sir Philip made the announcement that would change my life forever and set me on the collision course with Haiti's brutal dictator François (Papa Doc) Duvalier.

I had seen some of the wasted survivors of the notorious Changi Japanese prison camp in Singapore, at war's end and it is worse in Papa Doc's Fort Dimanche…

The end of Ft. Dimanche, Papa Doc's killing machine

My mind wanders to when I served on two U.S. armed T2 oil tankers during the war under the U.S Coast Guard, Semper Paratus (Always ready). I had witnessed enough in the "Pacific Theater." It was no theater for those who didn't return. It turned me into a pacifist. No more wars! Yet I hated boredom. The sea would now be dull and too confined. My real love was the Pamir, the large, four-masted barque at the bottom of the Atlantic having been sunk in 1957 during hurricane Carrie taking 90 young German cadets with it to a watery grave. We youngsters, a total crew of forty, sailed from New Zealand to San Francisco across the war torn Pacific weathering hurricanes and the fighting.

On the tanker, the Republic, the war had ended in August 1945, while we were in the Indian Ocean and we were ordered to liberate Singapore with our load of Persian oil, originally for the war in the Pacific. In Singapore, I had a strange wish. Would it be possible to return and join the staff of the Strait Times? Newspapers fascinated me since I sold the Evening Post in the early evening on the streets of Wellington and we published a shipboard newspaper. I liked Singapore. It was not until 1946 that we returned and were demobilized in the U.S. and I flew from Houston, Texas, to New York where three of us motored across the U.S. to San Francisco. Then I took a bus to Vancouver. En route I spent two weeks in Chico helping the father of a friend harvest his almond crop. We competed with a group of ex-Marines in row after row by knocking down the nuts through hitting the trunk of the trees with a heavy sledgehammer with part of an auto tire wrapped around its head to make sure the tree was not damaged. When I left, the farmer handed me pay for two weeks work and I gave it back to him asking that he deduct my board and lodging. He kept the whole check and said, "Have a good trip laddie!" He had not lost his Scottish brogue.

In Canada several of us veterans worked on the docks waiting to crew the first voyage of the M.V. Waitemata to return to New Zealand. I don't recall how many times we were fired from the Vancouver docks as suspected unionizers as at the time the Canadians had no unions. We did tell some harried workers that unions were indispensable to the progress of the working class… It was work and fun and we were threatened with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. We finally sailed during the coldest winter on record and loaded paper for New Zealand at mills in Powell River and Ocean Falls. What a change our first port of call, Papeete, Tahiti was! We had returning Tahitian service men aboard who had been secretly taken off the Vichy Island by a New Zealand warship to serve in the Free French forces during the war. They taught us their Tahitian songs.

However, I did return to Tahiti with a cargo of live animals from New Zealand farms calling ourselves Noah. The Tahitians had eaten their animals during the war. The balsa raft, Kon Tiki, was a pile of wreckage on the beach and the man who made the trip across the Pacific, Thor Heyerdahl, had a lovely Tahitian on his suntanned arm.

It was July 14, Bastille day, and I was fascinated by the U.S. Consul who said the State Department had overlooked his existence. He invited me to his house for bloody Mary's the day after the French Island celebrated. The raft that had been towed from the Tumotu Island of Raroia where after a three month trip from Peru it had ended up wrecked on a reef. The journey was to prove that the Polynesian on these islands could have come from South America such as today's Peru by raft.

Holidaying with my precious family in post-war New Zealand, I got itchy feet and sailed off to rationed starved England with a cargo of prime lamb, to further my education. I thought I might attend The London School of Economics, but quickly learned I did not meet the requirements since I had quit school at sixteen to go to sea on the 4-masted barque Pamir which was the best navigation school in the world. Still, I was not disappointed. The war had changed me. I knew I could not bring myself to return to my old life in New Zealand. It was a beautiful country, but it was socialist and dull. A man could chart his life from cradle to grave worrying only about the price of wool.

On a brisk spring morning in 1947, I arrived "home" as New Zealanders in the antipodes called England. From Liverpool I took a train to London and felt I was living my school poems. One that came to mind in the late afternoon, as I watched the ancient country churches fly by, is Grey's elegy … the hedges and green pastureland excited me and I recited to myself;

"The curfew tolls the knell of parting day,
The lowing herd wind slowly o'er the lea,
The ploughman homeward plods his weary way,
And leaves the world to darkness and to me…"

I took a room in London at The National Hotel on Russell Square, paid my dues at the National Seaman's Union near Tower Hill, and found work. The first job was to take an old minesweeper from its moorage at the bottom of the Thames around the coast to Bristol.

The trip began in a little village on the lower Thames. I lodged in an ancient Elizabethan Inn where Dick Turpin, the highway man, had surely drunk his full. I had to bend to enter my room with a low ceiling and wash in a colorful period hand basin.

In an effort to shorten our trip we cut corners and tried to round Land's End far too close to the rocky coast and when a storm caught us we had to fight like hell to reach the Irish Sea. In need of substance after our sea battle we decided to put into Cork for some un-rationed Irish fare and Guinness. Attending a dance in Cork (our Grandmother Margaret McCarthy was born not far from Blarney's Castle), the lass I walked home made the sign of the cross as we passed churches. We finally delivered our vessel to Cardiff and, as it was Sunday, I climbed a street and picked out the Catholic Church. It was when they passed around the wine I realized I was in the wrong Church and asked my pew neighbor the direction to my church. "You are welcome here," the lady said and told me the Catholic Church was further up the hill. Uncle Brian McCleary, a 1924 "All Black", on a world rugby tour told us how it also happened to him and when the wine reached him he said, "Father Tis empty." His fellow teammate fighting a hangover had swallowed the last drop of the altar wine. The Welsh I discovered were wonderful singers so I joined them on a bus singing through Wales and back to London.

The old Welsh Inns were warm and friendly and at meals we were all seated together at a long table. The singing on the bus changed my opinion of the Welsh. Evans a "Boy" with me on the Pamir was street smart and hearing that I had won the heavy weight boxing championship at St. Pat's College in 1942 picked a fight and he was a dirty street fighter. It was the only time I drew blood on the Pamir.

My next job was quartermaster (helmsman) on a Harwich ferry sailing back and forth to Antwerp, Belgium which opened a window on the continent for me. I purchased a heavy new BSA bicycle in Harwich, put it aboard the ferry, and toured the lowlands. Being in my religious period I visited Churches filled with painting by Paul Rubens and in Burgee I visited St John's Hospital to marvel at the work of Hans Memling. I met a fellow my age who was entering a Trappist monastery near Brussels and not far from Waterloo, sight of Napoleon's (Boney we called him) defeat by the British. Would I follow my eldest sister Stellamaris into the church? She prayed I would. But as a sailor I had picked up the vice of a girl in every port. However, I did question my faith.

I treated my job with the ferry as a paid vacation. I wanted to see more of the continent. In Antwerp I met a beautiful young dancer- singer at the KVL opera, and whenever I was in town we would rendezvous at a cafe near the old opera house. She helped me with my Flemish. In England we lived on ration cards and lacked just about everything. Belgium was rich with gold from their colony, the Congo. I remember riding my bicycle to Brussels and sitting in a restaurant ordering the cheapest item on the menu for lunch. Around me were fat, overfed, bourgeois families feasting on more food than they could eat themselves. It was disgusting and unfair. It made me think of how everyone in England could easily become Marxists.

Finally, I found a line of business that was not smuggling, the Flemish custom officer told me. In Harwich I purchased live lobsters put them in a barrel of sea water and sold them to shops in Antwerp for a handsome profit. My Flemish was improving and the day I sold my British bike I drove a hard bargain with the café owner who paid me and said, "ik zie je later." I did see him later. He introduced me to another tough looking fellow who said they had a profitable job for me. In the back room they pulled the tablecloth off the kitchen table. It was covered with small, stamped gold tablets. I was asked to deliver them to an address in London. So shaken by the smuggler's suggestion, I forgot how much they were to pay me. I was to pick up the gold the next day. I agreed. Wanting to get free from what was obviously a nest of gold smugglers, and spluttered, "vaarnel…welge- komen" and held my breath until I reached the ferry and sailed away. I decided it was best not to return to Belgium and upon arrival in Harwich I signed off and reported the smugglers to the His Majesty Customs who were still excited about snaring a major smuggler on my ferry who traveled with his automobile that had thousands of chronometer watches hidden in the upholstery. It worried me that the sale of my bike had made me appear hungry for money and led to a proposition with their bloody gold. And it was certainly not the road I wished to travel, even for all the gold in the Congo.

One foggy evening back in London I ducked into the Prince of Wales, a small pub on a dead end street in Soho and ordered a black and tan. I struck up a conversation with a couple of blokes and before I knew it, we had grown to a large group, arguing loudly about the war and the future of mankind. I became a regular at the pub. My new friends were interesting, friendly and enthusiastic about art and literature and life. There was at least one good looking Sheila among them. Post war England was bleak. People were unable to travel because of the government's tight fiscal controls. We lived on rations. At the Prince of Wales, we were all searching for meaning. During the summer months we moved our discussion group to the outdoors at the Spaniards on Hampstead Heath. Perhaps, I thought, I would get my education at the pub over beer and cider. After my regimented Catholic education at St. Patrick's College in New Zealand, our freeform discussions at the pub were refreshing. Someone loaned me The Critique of Pure Reason by Immanuel Kant, a philosopher very much in vogue with the group, and I spent endless hours trying to make sense of his writings.

It was a time and a place so distant and so different; it feels like a dream now. I can remember Sir Philip sitting at the head of the long table during that formal Christmas dinner at Bridehead in England and giving the startling news that would change my life...
There is a lot of power in nostalgia…

Bridehead Revisited

A few weeks later, I received a message at my hotel from Sir Philip Williams, a friend of my uncle Tad in New Zealand. I had heard the story several times. During the Great World War, on the first day of the landing at Gallipoli in an effort to seize the Dardanelles my Uncle, Tad Morpeth, made a valiant effort to save the life of his friend, private Nat Williams. Sadly, Nat Williams died in his arms as a Turkish sharpshooter's bullet struck Uncle Tad. Sent to England to recover from his wounds, Tad was sought out by the late Private Williams' father, Sir Robert Williams, a Member of Parliament. He wanted to hear the details of his eldest son's death from the soldier who tried to save him. Tad was invited to the family seat at Bridehead in Dorset before returning to the front in Turkey. However, he contracted Enteric fever on his return to Gallipoli and was sent back to England. During his second convalescence, prior to going to France where he was wounded again, Tad spent a lot of time at Bridehead and became particularly close to Nat's younger brother, Philip Williams, who inherited the baronet upon the death of Sir Robert.

Uncle Tad and Sir Philip had kept a close correspondence ever since, and when Sir Philip learned from my uncle that I was in London, he sought me out. I closed the circle.

For days I had been putting off calling Sir Philip. But one afternoon, after downing a few pints of Summerset Cider at the pub, I finally worked up the nerve to telephone him back. I found him at his Pall Mall club. I thanked him for his call and apologized for not having called him sooner myself. Sir Philip was very kind, telling me not to be concerned; and invited me to a ball at the Savoy, one of London's most exclusive hotels, to celebrate his daughters, Joy and Honor, being received at Buckingham Palace. I panicked. I begged off in my best British accent Americanized during the war, but happily accepted his invitation to visit his home at Bridehead over the Whitsun holidays. I preferred my Bohemian way of life and besides, I didn't even own a tuxedo. When I rejoined my friends at the pub, and they learned I had turned down an invitation to a ball at the Savoy, they moaned and lamented my decision. They could not believe I had thrown away such an opportunity. "But, I've never met them," I protested. "They're friends of my family." "Bloody fool," a professor cried. "We're all living on bloody rations and you throw away an opportunity like that. Feasting on caviar. What a waste!" They all volunteered to go in my place. I refused to say more. I ordered a round of cider and offered my cheese ration to whoever wanted it in order to change the subject. The issue of the Savoy was quickly dropped, and we were all back to Kant and the true meaning of knowledge. We sat, shoulder to shoulder in the crowded little pub, the smoke of Woodbine cigarettes rising above our voices. It was time for my barroom philosophy class. I loved it.

Indeed, I was very nervous about meeting Sir Philip. This was all new territory to me. In New Zealand my uncle Tad had often described Bridehead as high up on the society ladder, rich with extensive farmlands, a bank, a train line and a factory in Bristol. But a few days later, when I met Sir Philip at the train station in Salisbury, my apprehensions were put to rest. I recognized him right away: gray hair, a trimmed mustache and very dignified. He looked like a true English country gentleman, even for the tweed coat with worn elbows.

Sir Philip drove me to his club in Dorchester in his small, ancient Austin. We ordered gin and lime, and when I heard him fussing with the waitress about the price of the drink, I was sure my family had been putting me on about his wealth. After the drinks, he told me he had business to attend and instructed me to wait downstairs at the curb. He said the "ladies" would be picking me up to take me to Bridehead. I stood by the curb with my suitcase and ignored a black Daimler that drove up with two young ladies in white tennis outfits. I was expecting another small, unassuming car. Finally, Joy, one of Sir William's pretty daughters, became impatient and poked her head out the car window. "Well come on, Bernard," she commanded. "Jump in."

We drove out of Dorchester on a narrow country road that dated from Roman times and passed the small village of Winterbourne Abbas where most of the houses had ancient, thatched roofs. As we crested a hill, we drove through a grove of large trees and suddenly below there was Bridehead; beautiful, manicured lawns and a lake - the spring from which flows the River Bride. The manor was just the way my uncle Tad had described it: two stories with large windows and castle-like towers, its origin lost in Norman times. Part of the estate was the ancient village of Littlebredy.

The butler took my suitcase and showed me what would become my room when I came to Bridehead during the next year and a half. They called it the blue room. It had a large, luxurious and comfortable four poster bed with a large feather mattress. There was a very strict order at Bridehead. Breakfast was always served buffet style in the dining room. Lunch was at midday, and there was always sherry before dinner. The dining room had an air of formality all its own with a long oblong table that could seat a rugby team. The walls were covered with life size oil paintings of the Williams ancestors. Dinner, always a formal affair, and usually with guests, required a suit and tie. After dinner, the women retired to the sitting room while the men remained at the table drinking Portuguese port and smoking Jamaican cigars. To my amazement, whenever I was there, it never felt like there was any rationing in England. My first morning I discovered to my embarrassment my shoes, left outside the door for the butler to shine, were not there. Finally, I appeared at breakfast in my stocking feet to have Sir Philip jokingly say, "Bernard, you look shorter today." Thank heaven mother had taught us never to wear socks with holes. In fact, she made sure our table manners would be good enough to allow us to dine with the King. Years later I made my mother proud, lunching with Queen Elizabeth at President Luis Echevarria home in Mexico City.

I kept being reminded how strange it was that this friendship had had been forged on the battlefields of the First World War. The ghosts of the murderous blunder that was Gallipoli still haunted this corner of Britain in 1948. In the little stone church on the grounds there hung a framed dedication plaque:

"Private John Nathaniel (Nat) Williams of the 6th Hauraki Company of the Auckland Battalion of the New Zealand expeditionary force, killed in action at Gallipoli [Turkey] on April 25, 1915."

Tad wounded again in the Somme in France managed, incredibly enough, to return to the front for the fourth and last time. He was back on the Somme when on Nov. 10, 1918; the last shell of that terrible war was fired.

There was a dairy farm operated by Mark, a brother of Sir Philip, who lived with his family in a house apart. The neatness of the rolling land with old narrow roman roads were not spoiled by modern structures. There was a gig pulled by a docile pony that took up the back roads that were great to explore as one seldom met any motor traffic.

The 'Walheathens' from Waihi

Pvt. J (Nat) Williams, Pvt. Moore Morpeth , L/Cpl .Gerald (Tad) Morpeth, Lt R N (Nick) Morpeth
At Epsom Camp Auckland September 1914 prior to embarkation a month later
All were casualties on the 25 April 1915 (First day landing at Gallipoli.)
Nat and Moore were killed and Tad and Nick wounded.

Courtesy of Allen Morpeth

I quickly adopted the library, a dark room with books from floor to ceiling. I suspected many had been bought for their beautiful leather bindings. Sir Philip was a deeply religious man and a Tory, and the majority of the books reflected the family's conservative nature and politics. After a while, I found myself escaping to the large kitchen to borrow the popular newspapers from the staff.

Never in my life had I been surrounded by the real life of British aristocracy. The place was like a museum. There were even little bells in every room and the garden with which to summon the staff. It was truly a holiday from the National Hotel and my friends at the pub. I loved living these two very different lives.

I spent much of my time at the stables that were built like a petit medieval castle. Joy was a good horsewoman and we saddle up the horses and spend the whole morning riding all over Bridehead and down the Bride valley to Bridgeport. Happily she pointed out the large manor houses of the nouveau riche –18th century arrivals.



Afterward, Joy and Honor, neither of them drank at lunch, always suggested I fetch a jug of beer or cold cider from the cellar at lunch, for my refreshment. I came to enjoy Joy's company, there was a flirtation, but it quickly ended for reasons I didn't learn.

Maybe it was my liberal politics that intervened and after all I was a colonial boy without a vocation, rootless in England, and certainly with no solid future.

I often wondered how things were during Lady Williams' time. As the matriarch, she was the glue that kept hold of her large family and was strict to the point divorced persons were not welcome in their home and after her death, the year before my first visit, I was told that Sir Philip also had a pathological dislike of divorce. Lady Williams was an aristocrat from an old family and, I assumed, held tightly to Victorian values.

One Saturday morning, Honor had me join a traditional fox hunt. I saddled Joy's beautiful chestnut mare and met the hunting party outside a village pub. I was the only rider out of formal attire. I didn't even have riding boots. The other riders looked at me with curiosity but said nothing. The master of the hunt made a brief speech about the wonderful tradition of fox hunting and the bugle signaled the start. The hounds began to bay and we were all off, galloping after them through the countryside. I was not in the first rank of riders, but I kept up nicely. Joy's mare was a graceful jumper. She could clear every fence and hedge grove in Dorset, or England for that matter. Personally, I was not concerned about the poor fox we were after, but the ride was exhilarating.

A few days later, Sir Philip said he had business in London and asked me if I could escort the ladies to a reception aboard the aircraft carrier HMS Illustrious at anchor off Weymouth. The minute we were piped aboard, I felt ill at ease. The reception was in honor of the ship's admiral who was being transferred to a desk job in London.

He was the only officer I saw wearing a monocle. The reception, which was set up on the flight deck of the carrier, was crowded with Dorset dignitaries, their wives and naval officers dressed in their whites. Clearly, this was an event for Sir Philip and not for me. I was embarrassed. After brief, formal introductions, the ladies mingled with their friends and I receded into the background. I fetched myself a gin and lime, and admired the ship while the guests enjoyed their canapés and crowded around the admiral. Joy had chosen to remain at Bridehead. There was no way I could leave until the

ladies were ready to go. I walked to the side of the deck and looked out at the ocean when I was approached by one of the officers.

"I say old chap," he said in a condescending tone, "what did you do during the war?" "Well," I said quietly, "I began as a cabin boy on a four masted barque."

"You don't say?" he said surprised, "that sounds bloody interesting. What was the name of the ship?" "Barque," I corrected.

The Pamir

The barque Pamir under full sail en route to San Francisco, California.

"THE PAMIR."

"My jove!" he exclaimed. "We spoke that ship sailing the channel. What a magnificent vessel. Magnificent. It must be the last of those ships. There can't be anymore left." Then he placed his arm around my shoulder and turned me to face the group. "Hey chaps," he cried, "listen to this, this chap served aboard that beautiful ship we saw. You know that barque we saw sailing the channel." Many of the officers walked away from the ladies and crowded around me. "What was it like?" one of the officers asked. "What kind of crew did you have on board?"

"We were forty, mostly youths."

"You don't say. How many sails?"

"Thirty four only we used thirty-two"

"I don't believe it! Thirty four sails and only forty men? What kind of speed did you get out of her?"

"We averaged between six to twelve knots, but once, on full sail, we managed seventy eight miles in four hours."

"Bloody good show!"

"I say, did you have any close shaves during the war?"

"How about weapons? Did you have any on board?"

"We had four rifles," I said, and explained I had been the one placed in charge of cleaning them since I

belonged to the school cadets and the Home Guard. "But they were only used by the officers. They used them to kill sharks."

"Well, go on then." "We ran cargo from Wellington to San Francisco," I said, "my first trip took eighty days."

"I say, it must have been grand."

"We were wondering what the devil the New Zealand flag was doing flying on that ship, remember?" one of the officers said to the group.

"Oh, it was a magnificent sight," the officer said, "magnificent."

"How about another drink?" someone asked and the reception became a little more animated for me, but I could tell it had gotten less so for the ladies who, I noticed, were becoming a little bored. I felt embarrassed, but it didn't last long. Soon, the event began to wind down and we returned home to Bridehead.

When I returned from a trip to continental Europe I was shocked to find Joy married to a banker. I rode to her new home to offer my congratulations. As I waited, still in the saddle, an unreceptive Joy appeared at the door and her anger made my horse bolt. I had mistakenly taken her horse from the Williams family stable. Joy's horse was a fine jumper and cleared nearly every hedgerow back to Bridehead before I finally reined her in. Joy appeared estranged from Bridehead and I didn't see her again. It could have been another romantic puzzle in a Thomas Hardy novels. After all this was beautiful Dorset, Hardy's beloved home and that of Tess of the d'Urbervilles.

Sir Philip and daughter Honor who took over Bridehead duties after Lady William passed away

My friendship with the rest of the family has lasted ever since. However, consistent with the British upper-class sense of propriety, what no one mentioned at the time was that Nat Williams had been sent to New Zealand as a "remittance man" by his father, Col. Sir Robert Williams, in order to curb his high living style at Oxford. When war broke out in 1914, Nat Williams joined the Army with his friends, Tad and his brothers.

It was at that stately old Dorset home that a decision was made which changed my life. How would I ever forget the Yuletide holidays with the Williams family at Bridehead? The fine old manor house, the family owned from 1735, sat in spacious grounds not far from Dorchester and the tall obelisk to Dorset's famous son the writer, Thomas Hardy[2].

I had luck at the National Seaman's shipping office and found the ship I wanted. It would be calling at every port around Spain, Portugal and North Africa and even Gibraltar. Since it would not sail for a few weeks, I decided to check out of the National and return to Bridgehead.

A few days later I joined Sir Philip in the sitting room for a glass of sherry. The butler prodded the fireplace with a poke so the flames cracked and intensified.

Sir Philip poured two glasses of sherry from a crystal decanter. "So, Bernard," he said and handed me a glass. "You'll be off to Spain, will you?"

"Yes, Sir Philip. My ship leaves in two days."

"It should be an interesting trip for you. You haven't been to Spain, have you?" he asked and he raised his glass to his nose, but didn't take a drink.

"No, but I'm looking forward to it," I said. There was a long silence. "Sir Philip, may I ask for your advice on something?"

"Certainly, Bernard, what is it?" Sir Philip had become like a father figure to me. He had opened his home to me and treated me like one of the family. He knew of the trouble I was having trying to find direction in my life. I kept floating between jobs, Bridehead and my friends at the pub. Sir Philip was very tactful. He never interfered but was always willing to listen.

"Do you remember Alex, my shipmate from the Pamir? I believe I've mentioned he's been looking for a ship."

"Yes, of course," Sir Philip said and he puckered his lips and took a taste of his sherry.

"Well, you see, I received a letter. It looks like he and his brother, Peter, have found the ship. They want me to join them and run cargo in the Pacific," I said referring to a letter I got from Alex a few weeks earlier. It was postmarked from Fiji and he asked me to contact friends in New Zealand and the islands for cargo. He said Peter had found a ship in the Canadian port of Halifax and went on to describe it as a 128 foot ketch with a twenty-nine foot beam and a deep draft of thirteen feet. He said it was rigged with two suits of sail that were old and holed and a hundred horsepower Thorneycroft diesel engine that needed repair. He said it was built in Calcutta in 1913 of four inch Malabar teak. It was dirty and needed a lot of work to make it seaworthy. But he also explained that unlike the other ship deals that had fallen through, Peter promised this one looked solid. He warned me not to get too excited, but to stand by and be prepared to come over the Atlantic. Alex, born in Australia to an American sea Captain father went on to advise, "if you can get some cabbage [money] it will always come in handy and it may be a while before we start making anything." He believed we three could initially sail the vessel and later pick up some help as needed. He was full of optimism and signed off, "So long old shipmate."

[When I learned that the remote Tokelau Island—three atolls, Fakaofo, Nakumono and Atafu, which formed a New Zealand dependency in the South Pacific—were literally cut off from the world and seeking a shipping link with Samoa some 300 miles away I wrote to Alex that we had found our first potential cargo run.]

"I see," Sir Philip said. He rubbed his chin and contemplated the fireplace for a long while.

"If I should stay at sea," I explained, "I have the sea time and my time before the mast so it is only a matter of taking the time to sit my second mates' exam."

"Is that what you want, to stay at sea?"

"I really don't know," I said. "I'm not too sure it's the right thing. It's an extremely difficult choice."

"I can see that," Sir Philip said, and then he moved to the side of the room and took a seat on the armchair by the fire. "What about your schooling?"

"Well, that's another matter. I still think I should give it a go, don't you?"

Sir Philip was quiet for a long time. I took a drink of sherry and placed my glass on the table by the decanter.

"How old are you now, twenty four?" he said at last.

"Twenty-one."

"You're still very young," he said.

"But shouldn't I be doing something? Shouldn't I be working towards a foundation for my future?"

"Listen, Bernard, you survived the war, you've had a great advantage. You've traveled, you're well read. You know, some of us have not had the luxury of floundering. Our futures were laid out for us before we were even born."

"I see."

"I envy you Bernard."

"How do you mean, Sir Philip?"

"I wish I were twenty-two with my whole life ahead of me, and an entire world calling for adventure. With the war finally over, we're coming into a new age. The times are changing, and you're in there in the center of it." Then Sir Philip once again talked of the Labor Party's decision to nationalize the railways. It was his pet beef as the family had their own rail line and the Labor Party, he felt strongly, would never be able to make the trains run on time.

After dinner, when everyone else had gone upstairs to their rooms, I poured myself a tall glass of wine and sat in the library and wrote Alex, telling him I was still unsure as to joining him and Peter, but to let me know as soon as they secured the ketch. Then I put my feet up and opened the book I was reading in preparation for my trip to Spain: Homage to Catalonia by George Orwell. Buried in the feather mattress, sleep was difficult. I realized I had no role model. My father, grandfather Jim McCleary and Uncle Brian all great rugby player and my early models and I made the First Fifteen at St. Pat's. There was writer Jack London who was killed by booze and war correspondent Ernie Pyle by a Japanese bullet on Okinawa. Along with FDR, they were among people I admired, and of course the Pamir, my first love.

It was December 1948 Bridehead, evoking an earlier era, was aglow with all of the traditional Christmas trimmings down to the Yule log. All that was needed was for Queen Victoria to arrive in her horse-drawn carriage. She would have felt totally at home. For me the evening provided a glimpse of the genteel life which, in spite of war and deprivation, still obtained among England's upper crust. Post-World War II rationing was still in effect in Great Britain but one would not have known so at Bridehead as the cellar was well stocked with pre-war Spanish wine, port and sherry, and there was no lack of game on the estate. Christmas dinner was festive indeed, and after the traditional dancing, Sir Philip, the head of the family, arose and gently tapped his wineglass. Unlike some of us at the table, Sir Philip was a moderate drinker. His familiar throat clearing "hmmm" was needed to attract everyone else's attention, so liberally were we enjoying Christmas cheer. Believing Sir Philip wished to offer a toast we turned our gazes to him, straightened our formal black ties, and happily prepared once again to raise our glass. I noticed he was looking directly at me. The spitting image of Sir Cedric Hardwick, the movie actor, Sir Philip was a wonderfully affable man with a warm sense of humor despite being a Tory and a stickler for tradition.

"Bernard," he announced in solemn, formal tone, "will soon be off on the adventure of his life! Yes, he is going to sail off to sea again with two companions and may God bless them." "Good show, Bernard!" my neighbor, who had served as a colonel in the Indian army, exclaimed a little too loudly as he slapped me on the back. The ladies clapped and the men chorused, "Here! Here!"

All present appreciated that my decision was no joke, for the Williams family was serious about adventure. They themselves had begun as pirates in the East Indies, a brother of Sir Philip had explained. The dining room walls were bedecked with life-size portraits of elegant family ancestors, none of course in pirate regalia. Turning away from the sea, the family forbearers had gone into London banking, railways and then industry.

In truth. Sir Philip made up my mind for me. However, I still had work ahead. I was happy to report aboard the M.V. Pinto, a shiny, white-painted freighter that stood out like a virgin at her berth in the old London docks surrounded by barrels of imported wine, sherry and port. It was a thrill to visit the old wharf and see the ancient warehouses where the wealth of the colonies had helped make Mother England so rich and lately visited by German bombers.

It had been over a decade since the end of the Spanish Civil War. As Catholics, our family followed church propaganda to back the Nationalists against the atheist Republicans. I usually backed the underdog, and in this case, it was the Republicans. I was curious to see what ten years of General Francisco Franco's fascist dictatorship had done to the country that had at one time been the richest and most powerful empire in the world.

Spain turned out to be a very powerful experience for me. It was my first insight into life under a dictatorship. The poverty shocked and angered me. I didn't believe it was possible, especially in a European country. In disbelief, we motored up the Guadalquivir river to Seville, the same river Christopher Columbus sailed up to meet the Spanish monarchs after discovering the Americas; and where great Spanish galleons had been built and launched. Now, there were large abandoned concrete drainpipes strewn on the side of the port with whole families living inside them. The locals referred to them as, "Franco's prefabricated houses."

In Tarragona I climbed above the town to view the statue Mussolini had sent Franco and found caves with people living inside. I was astonished. I raised my camera to take a photograph and scores of families emerged from the caves. I could not believe my eyes. I put my camera down and walked away. In Barcelona my black beard brought stares as if it was still a sign of an anarchist.

When I returned from Spain I skipped the Prince of Wales and the National hotel, instead, I took the train to Dorchester to spend the last days in England before going to Southampton to take passage to Halifax. It was sad to leave my English family.

How could I ever forget that Christmas? Yule log, wreaths a Christmas tree in the dining room and a nativity in the chapel. But my experience in Spain had transformed me. I kept thinking of the families living in the cement pipes and the caves, and the soiled children dressed in rags, begging for food. I couldn't stop thinking of the children in Spain. The little girl in Malaga by the fountain with her soiled face, barefoot and wearing only a torn wool sweater.

The telegram from Peter Bolton, confirming the deal for the Ketch in Halifax finally arrived and on August 3, 1949, I boarded the old four-funnel Aquitania [Sister Ship of the Titanic] in Southampton for Canada. A priority telegram was handed to me aboard ship and it read: "Diederich Aquitania, Southampton-- "Good luck. Bon voyage on all of them and many happy returns to Bridehead--Love Williamses, Weber's, Crawfords (head of Dartmouth Naval College) Luttrell's and Schmidt [Other extended family names and a friend]." Clearly Sir Philip had not forgotten the importance of the decision he had made for me. That night (almost every night) I drank to their health in the first-class section thanks to a romantic young Canadian lass who invited me up from steerage where I shared a cabin with young Irish immigrants. It would be my last romance for a long time. Our new ship needed all our love.

Finally, in August. 9, 1949, the Aquitania arrived at Pier 21 in Halifax concluding one of the last voyages of the legendary ship across the Atlantic. I was traveling light, having left a suitcase of clothes at Bridehead. It would be years before I returned to pick it up.

How vividly I remember Sir Philip vicariously enjoying what my future would hold for me. Could he possibly know where I am now? How did I get here? Where am I going? Where is my beloved family? Is this the end for me?

Sleepless hours are no screams no torture victims, only silence. I hear the ominous sound of boots approaching my cell. They stop, recede. More silence.

My God. How many people have crossed my path? I recall someone saying that everyone you meet, everywhere you've been and every experience you've had ultimately lead you to where you are now.

How far away I am from Antwerp and the strains of a Puccini Opera fill my mind with memories. Where is she? Where is the girl whose voice I fell in love with, that Belgian beauty who seduced me with her music? Our erotic and passionate affair, did it really happen? Where is she now? In this small concrete box, it all seems surreal. How could that long ago experience be responsible for my being here?

I feel like I'm going mad with this incessant fear for my family. How far away is tomorrow? How long ago was yesterday? How can I die without knowing the fate of my wife and son?

It was a frosty, cloudy autumn day in 1949 when I first sighted our new ship tied to a wharf in the Halifax shipyard. The tide was out and all I could make out were her bare masts popping over the pier. But as I came closer, I could see the Culver sitting in the water, looking more like a pile of floating debris than a ship. It was truly an eyesore in the beautiful Halifax pier. It had none of the majesty of the Pamir or the comfort of the two U.S. wartime Kaiser-built T-2 tankers I had served aboard under the command of the U.S. Coast Guard. She was in a terrible, filthy state.

The ketch Culver at dock side in Halifax

"Ahoy there, I called. "Permission to come aboard!"

Alex climbed out from the cabin and spread his arms. "Took you long enough to get here. Come aboard then."

"Time hasn't been kind to you," I joked as we shook hands. I had not seen Alex in three years when we drove from New York to San Francisco in a shipmate's '42 Buick.

"It's good to see you again, Bernard," Alex said and tossed my bag in the cabin. "Come on. I'll show you around."

Alex described everything he and Peter had done to the ship and everything that still needed to be done. He said the ship had been used as a pilot boat on the Hooghly River in India, and later as an antisubmarine tender in Bermuda during the war. "It's only natural," he said, "that we turn her into a cargo ship, hey?"

"Where're you planning on putting the cargo?"

Alex looked at me and smiled, "You're standing in it."

It seemed a shame, but we had to tear out the Burmese mahogany interior. We stripped the entire salon and dining room and turned it into a cargo hold. We kept a small galley in the fo'c'sle

and kept two cabins at port and starboard. The Culver flew the British flag and was registered in Bridgeport, Bahamas.

A week later, we met Dave and Bob, a couple of sailors looking for work, adventure, anything. They gladly joined our effort and Dave, who had a good knowledge of machines, got to work on overhauling the old diesel engine. Alex and I tightened the standard rigging and repaired the thick red canvas sails.

We worked night and day. Every cent we had went into making the Culver seaworthy. We had little to eat, but the fishermen who harvested Cod in the Grand Banks shared with us their dried herring and "hard tack," (a hard biscuit you need strong teeth to break and eat).

As a lady who visited us with her son asked, "Do you like apple pie? If you provide the apples I'll bake the pies," she promised". As kids, we raided orchards. It was the rites of passage of youngsters in New Zealand and Aussie. One night four of us snuck into an orchard and filled burlap sacks with apples. The noise attracted the owner whose flashlight failed to detect four grown men swiping his apples. We delivered our bounty to the lady who lived near the docks and baked us delicious apple pies.

The Culver attracted odd sorts and the oddest was Ben Carling a gifted Aussie married to an American who visited us in their floating jeep, which they called, "Half Safe". A wartime jeep was riding on a pontoon with the wheels underneath that allowed land travel too. On their first attempt to circumnavigate the globe they got as far across the Atlantic as in the vicinity of the Canary Islands when they had motor trouble and were hoisted aboard a tanker that dropped them in Halifax. Ben towed a small supply barge stocked with gasoline and when I asked where the toilet was he lifted the jeep's passenger seat. What sparked my interest was the fact he had been interviewed by Life magazine and the reporter left an envelope with $10,000 for an exclusive story if they made it. We shared dinner with them as the jeep was moored to the Culver. And they made it.

When Peter went aboard he explained his dream of building a trading business in the South Seas. As a captain, his Navy friends said prospects for Micronesia were good as the Navy was ending administration of the Trust Territories

We would never have made it without the help of those around us. The Scotsman in charge of the shipyards, who had run a submarine base during the war in Great Britain, forgave our debt at his machine shop, mainly to get rid of us. As we left he pointed to an anchor at the end of the dock. "You see that," he said in his Scottish brogue, "I don't know who owns the damn thing." He knew we had our eye on it, and pretty soon it found its way onto the Culver.

There were several Canadian warships in the yard, and the shipyard managers would simply charge Culver's supplies to each of them. The Canadian Naval authorities must have been mystified why destroyers needed so much manila rope and canvas.

Dry-docking is very expensive, but we finally managed to get some time for our ship to patch up a wartime hole in the teak hull below the waterline. We were lucky the people at the shipyard were sympathetic and intrigued that we were headed for the South Seas. They also placed bets that we wouldn't make it to our first port of call: Boston.

Winter was approaching as we set sail for Boston. It was calm but soon storm clouds arrived from the arctic and the wind increased to gale force and from two knots the Culver reared its old head and galloped along at 12 knots. The ship loved heavy weather and rode the swells beautifully even exciting a school of killer whales that swam up diving under as if… eye to eye with us.

We made Boston in a storm and a welcome rest in the Italian section of the city. I took advantage of our stop and took the train down to Georgetown, Connecticut to visit Harold Connery and his family. I had met the Connery's in early 1945 when I was in New York City to exchange tankers. The ANZAC Club, (an Australian and New Zealand social club in Manhattan) had arranged for me to stay with the Connery while I was there on leave. Harold Connery owned the local general store and lumber yard. We became good friends and I taught myself how to drive an automobile. He gave me the keys to his car and told me to take the kids to the movies. Their fathers were flying bombers over Germany. One thing I was not getting aboard the Culver was a good meal, and Mrs. Connery was a wonderful cook. On the train back from Connecticut I was reading the newspaper and noticed a drawing of a Russian policeman with a large snarling dog on a leash chasing what appeared to be an innocent civilian. I thought how only a few years earlier, during the war, it was the Nazis who were the real evil enemy. It made me wonder about what Sir Philip had said about the world coming into a new era.

After a few days we left Boston and sailed close to the shoreline all the way to New York City. The trip was uneventful, but as we chugged along the East River, our vintage diesel engine suddenly quit. The river current dragged us toward an outcrop of rocks. I called back to Peter who was standing at the helm.

"I know, I know," he cried as he turned the wheel. "Dave, get that engine started."

Alex joined me at the prow. We could see the outcropping of jagged rocks getting closer and closer. "Peter!" I yelled.

"Yes, I see them," he cried back. But the current was too powerful and the boat was drifting sideways out of control.

"What about the sails?" I said.

"There's not enough time." Alex ran back to the helm to help Peter. I could hear Dave and Bob working on the engine. The starter turned but the engine wouldn't spark.

I went back to the helm. "Turn her. We're getting bloody close."

"We can't." Peter said putting all his weight on the wheel.

"Dave!"

"Hold on," Dave cried out from the engine room. "I can't get it to spark."

"Well you bloody well better do something," I said and looked over the prow. We were moving quickly now toward the rocks. I could already see the people at the shipyard in Halifax collecting on their bets.

I heard the engine starter turning again, and then Dave called out for Peter to give it throttle and try again.

The starter turned but nothing happened. "Bloody hell," Peter said and tried it one more time, but nothing happened.

"Try it now," Dave called out.

Peter pressed the starter, but nothing happened.

"Again!" Dave yelled.

The starter turned. The engine sparked and coughed back to life. Peter gave it throttle and we made a quick turn to starboard just barely missing the rocks.

We came into Manhattan and tied up to the public pier on East 34th Street across from Bellevue Hospital. We hadn't been docked five minutes when a large station wagon pulled up alongside the dock. A man stepped out and opened a bar he had set up in the back of his vehicle.

"I bet you fellas need a drink," he said. "I was watching you from my penthouse up there. You're lucky. If that engine hadn't turned back on, you'd be swimming right now."

"Believe me," Peter said, "We know." Then he patted Dave on the back.

We stepped off the ship and the man poured us gin tonics. "I have bourbon, too, if you prefer," he said.

We were the lone craft at the pier. I had let my beard grow again when we were in Halifax. Now it causes me to miss out on the free meals at Bellevue, across the street. My clean-shaven shipmates posed as male nurses and got free hospital food at the cafeteria.

I was still very much affected by the poverty I had witnessed in Spain. I didn't see how the enterprise of a cargo ship would benefit humanity. I kept seeing the same little girl begging for money by the fountain in Malaga. I wanted to do something useful with my life. I just didn't know what. I decided to visit St Patrick's Catholic cathedral. Perhaps sitting in an old, quiet church would allow me to sort things out.

While riding the bus to the cathedral, an elderly lady looked at me with my black beard and my long navy coat closed around my neck and said something I didn't understand.

I shrugged my shoulders and looked away. New York, the intensity of the big city, so loud and aggressive, was very intimidating. All I wanted was to get to St. Patrick's.

"He's not a Rabbi," a man across the aisle said, "He's probably with one of those Indian cults, you know the ones..."

Someone else said, "He's a Rabbi, just look at him. He has to be a Rabbi."

I said nothing.

"Look at his coat for Christ's sake," someone said. "He's a sailor."

"He ain't no sailor."

"I'm telling you, he's a Rabbi," the one across the aisle laughed.

"If he's a Rabbi, why won't he talk?"

"He only speaks Yiddish, that's why."

"He's a sailor."

"A sailor..." a man laughed. "A pirate is more like it."

I looked out the window and noticed we had passed my stop. I finally got off near East 57th street and had to walk half a dozen blocks back to the Cathedral.

That night, reading an old copy of Life magazine, I had an idea. Recalling how generous Life was with Ben, handing him ten thousand dollars for an exclusive story if he circled the globe. The next day I went to the Time-Life building and timidly made my way to the office of an editor, an adventure specialist, where I proposed a photo-essay on the old U.S. bases in the Pacific. It had been three years since they had been abandoned. In particular, I suggested Manus in the Admiralty Islands, and showed him copies of the Naval Base's The Admiral Tee, a daily press bulletin that I had saved from the war. Also, there were relics of the war to photograph at Guadalcanal, site of the war's most ferocious battles and so on. The Life editor, a heavy set man in his late forties, gave me some film for my Zeiss Icon camera and said he would be happy to look at my work when I returned and wished me good luck.

The evening before we set sail, an elderly couple strolling along the East 34th Street Pier paused alongside our ship. I was pacing back and forth on deck trying to keep warm.

"Hello, my friend," the old man called out, "Are you headed for Palestine?"

I paused and walked to the starboard side to get closer and told him we were headed to Panama and the South Seas.

"What?" the man cried, "Why do you want to go there?"

"We're a cargo ship," I explained.

The man, who looked well into his late fifties, seemed to consider this for a while, and then he asked if we had a radio.

"No," I said.

"And how about medical supplies?"

"Well," I said, "no, not really."

"How can you sail off without a first aid kit? What's the matter with you?"

I had not given it much thought, and then the woman asked if we had food.

I smiled and said we had some.

"Whadda ya mean some," the man cried. "What kind of food supplies do you have? You know this is not a holiday trip you're taking. You need plenty of food to get to Panama, and then to the South Seas. Oy!"

"We have some potatoes... and turnips," I said proudly.

"What... potatoes?" The man grunted in disbelief and the two of them walked away. A while later, a large object flew through the air and landed with a loud thud on our wooden deck. Then there was another one, and another.

"What's this?" I said picking one up.

The old Jewish man came forward from the darkness. "Salami," he said. "I own a delicatessen in Brooklyn."

"But we can't pay for this."

"Who said anything about paying?" he said, his right hand gesturing wildly in the air. "Listen, my wife says you can't sail to Panama without any food. If my wife says you can't, you can't. Do you understand? Now you have some food. Have a good trip my friend." And he disappeared into the night.

The winter storms were upon us as we sailed off from New York. As we came to the open sea we had to fight large waves, sometimes up to ten feet. Peter felt it was too much and turned us back to seek shelter at the dock on Brooklyn's Sheepshead Bay, but the seas were relentless. The hull of the Culver kept slamming against the pilings of the pier.

Every wave raised us up, and then we would go down for a few seconds until the next wave came and hammered us again like a battering ram. It was no good. The Culver was a strong ship, but the hull was made of wood. Eventually, the beating would prove too much and she would break up.

Peter ordered us to cast off. "We'll ride the storm out at sea."

But before we reached the open sea the waves became too much for our engine. Peter handed me the helm. "We need to raise the after sail."

I watched Peter and Alex move behind me. The waves raised the ship up and down, while the wind pounded freezing rain on us.

Dave and Bob were down in the engine room, keeping the old diesel from quitting. I looked back and saw Peter unleash the spar. It was too soon. It sprung and swung across, catching him on the side and knocking him overboard.

I had ridden out hurricane winds on the Pamir, but I had never seen a man go overboard. Until that point I thought we were doing well. A storm at sea is just a storm at sea and all you can do is your best to ride it out. The Culver was a sturdy vessel, and after the seas we experienced out of Canada, I was confident of what she could get away with. But the sight of Peter flying off into the open sea was frightening.

"Peter!" Alex yelled. Dave and Bob ran out and joined Alex on the starboard.

Alex, frantic, cursed up a storm, but he kept his head. "Bernard, idle the engine." Bob and Dave threw lines out to Peter. All we could see of him was his red pompom beret bobbing in the swells like a Champagne cork.

The Culver was not a ship to maneuver in rough seas. We were running on sails and had to keep our head in the wind. If I turned her in the storm, we would flounder and lose control. The waves would slam us against the shore. I knew hypothermia would set in pretty soon if we didn't get him out fast. Alex and Bob were cursing and towing in the lines and throwing them out again. Then we noticed a couple of pleasure crafts heading into port and we all called out to get their attention.

One of the boats spotted Peter and they turned and made a pass. I watched it wobble and bob in the high waves and almost swallow Peter with its propeller. Alex called to them to attempt a pass on the other side.

They came around again and got him. They motored alongside, but getting the vessels side by side became another challenge. The tall waves kept one boat up while the other was down. We ran the danger of smashing into each other.

Finally, Bob and Alex pulled in the ropes the other craft had tossed to our side and they pulled them in. With the boats close together, we rode the same waves making it easier for Peter to jump over. He was blue from the cold and we slapped his body to motivate his circulation. Alex and Dave took him below to warm up, while Bob and I steered the Culver out to the open sea. I could not believe we had almost lost Peter. I was still in shock that our adventure had almost ended in such an early tragedy. I looked at Bob, but he was staring ahead, braced against the movement of the Culver, both of us soaked with rain and sea.

For over a week it was constant winter storms, rough seas, cold rain and wind. The Culver rode out the mountainous waves of a storm off Cape Hatteras. We had little to eat. The entrance to our galley was under water much of the time as the Culver's bow bucked through the huge waves. In reinforcing our new cargo hatch, we had closed off the galley from below deck, but food had lost its importance in the storm.

Finally, on the seventh day we reached the Gulf Stream. It had a rejuvenating effect on all of us. We could cook again, and I saw to it that it was a well spiced and hearty stew with potatoes, and beans, and of course, salami. Eight days later we could see the lights of Miami on the 16th day glowing on the horizon.

In order to avoid paying for a harbor pilot--as we were classified as a cargo-carrying vessel--we decided to sneak into a yacht anchorage during the night. Unfortunately, we were unaware of a sandbar at the entrance to Biscayne Bay and the Culver went aground.

To pull the Culver off the sandbar we decided to use the old method of kedging. We lowered our Nova Scotia dory into the water, and then carefully put in the anchor. It was simple. The idea was to "row" the anchor out a distance and drop it into the deeper water. With the anchor firmly caught on the sea bottom, we could return aboard, and all hands would heave in the anchor and free the Culver. But the anchor proved too heavy, and Alex and I sank a hundred yards from the Culver. We fought to untangle ourselves from the towrope. When we surfaced, we heard Peter howling at us. The incoming tide had freed the Culver. The long and difficult journey from New York ended in laughter and a midnight skinny dip in Biscayne Bay.

There were some slick yachts anchored at Dinner Key. One in particular, the Constellation, was a great deluxe affair, and I rowed our dory to take a closer look at it. I was surprised when I

was invited aboard for a closer inspection. They gave me an extensive tour of the yacht. Afterward we sat in the "living room" and I played the part of the sea dog, stroking my black beard and smoking a thick Cuban cigar while telling sea stories.

My beard and the sea stories of my time aboard the Pamir circulated around the yacht club and pretty soon I was getting dinner invitations every night. Unfortunately, the heat of the tropics was too much for me and I was forced to shave my beard. It's strange about appearances. When I shaved off my beard, the dinner invitations ceased.

Our green-painted hull and red sails made us conspicuous among the clean white pleasure crafts moored on the Dinner Key yacht basin off Coconut Grove. Within days rumors began to circulate that we were smuggling Chinese into South Florida, the illegal aliens of the day. Peter, who was the captain, gave an interview to the Miami News explaining the purpose of our freelance voyage. In response to the article in the newspaper, we were offered our fist commission: $400 to carry a cargo destined for a place called Haiti.

We moved the Culver to the Port of Miami docks. The cargo was marked: "Glass, Silvera, El Rancho." We found the cases suspiciously heavy and requested they be opened to make sure they were not guns. They were glass window jalousies. A monsieur Albert Silvera needed them delivered in Port-au-Prince immediately as he was rushing to complete El Rancho, Haiti's first luxury hotel.

As we sailed away from Miami with our cargo of glass jalousies, Haiti was to be only a stop en route to the Panama Canal. I was anxious to get to the Pacific.

A week later, just after dusk, the large mountains of the Haitian shoreline appeared like a sharp, black silhouette etched against a deep purple sky. I felt a peculiar excitement in my gut and I moved to starboard to get a better look. I could feel something in the air. I could see small flickering lights from the peasants' cooking fires. They seemed to float like thousands of fireflies against the dark shoreline. The breeze carried the tangy perfume of gayak, a precious hardwood burned slowly into charcoal under mounds of fresh earth.

I also recall the rhythmic beat of drums, their magnetic percussion drifting out to sea. Those drums from the coastal darkness of the Caribbean republic proved mysteriously bewitching. (I mistakenly thought that, as in Africa, they were a medium of communication. I later learned that the drumbeats were dedicated to Voodoo.)

I had only recently read the historical novel Lydia Bailey by Kenneth Roberts. The story was set in the time of Henry Christophe, King of North Haiti, during the nation's bloody birth from the only successful slave revolt in history. In a 13-year war Haiti's slaves had wrested control of France's richest colony by defeating Napoleon Bonaparte's legions. For me, not only were the drums a magnet but so were the people whose ancestors had accomplished such a seemingly impossible feat.

Looking back to that night in December 1949, I like to think that the drums' hypnotic beat was beckoning me to Haiti. I felt an instant kinship with the island, an island like no other I have ever visited.

Slowly, the sound of beating drums came and went with the breeze. At first it came low and distant, like a soft heartbeat, and then it grew louder as the magnetic percussion drifted toward us from deep in the darkness of the Caribbean Republic.

The tin roof of the penitentiary absorbs the midday sun, turning my cell into a sweltering cubicle and causing the stench of urine and feces to rise and permeate the humid, stale air.

I sit on the bare floor and rest my head in my hands. The cells on either side are silent, a sign

that many of those I had seen arrested the day before having not been brought here but to Fort Dimanche. But there are too many to be imprisoned there. Meaning one thing: summarily executed.

I hear the rattle of keys and boot steps on the concrete floor. A chill runs up my spine when I hear the lock on the door of my cell. A soldier steps in with a plate of rice and kidney beans, while an officer watches from the small peep hole in the door. I refuse the food.

"Eat it, blan, it's good food, you have to eat something," the soldier whispers, and then walks away.

During the time my sister-in-law had been in prison for funding an anti-Duvalier bomb plot, I had gotten to know prison guards who supplemented their minuscule salaries by performing small favors for prisoners. When the soldier returned to pick up the untouched food, I asked if I can go to the latrine. Perhaps I will meet someone on the way with some news of what is going on outside.

The soldier says nothing and walks away. A short time later I heard a loud grating noise. It's the arrival of the latrine, a 55-gallon drum cut in half. It is smothered with flies and the incredible stench of human waste.

There is no one I can ask for help. I call out for the guard to take the latrine away, but no one comes. I am left alone with the unbelievable stench of the latrine while thousands of flies buzz all around the cell and land on my naked body.

I find a rusted Gillette razor blade resting on the crossbar of my cell door. I carefully take it between my thumb and forefinger and consider etching my name on the wall, but it seems useless. What's the point of any of it, I think.

I close my eyes and try to think. I run scenarios over and over in my head. I try to convince myself that by now my wife has learned of my arrest from the local peasants and has gone into hiding. "They must know," I say to myself and wonder if they have gone to the residence of the British ambassador or somewhere else. But my son does not have a passport, only a Haitian certificate of birth. Perhaps, I think, they are hiding at her sister's home. Perhaps... and my mind wanders in circles, trying to find hope. Then, a short burst of gunfire startles me back to the real danger of the situation.

I stand and make an effort to see out the cell, but the door of the cellblock is made of flat iron with only a peep hole from which I occasionally noticed the eye of the guard checking in on me.

I think of all the contradictions of Haiti, and how it seduced me with its beauty and charm of its people, despite the danger that lurked in the shadows like the bitter aftertaste that hides behind a shot of Dominican rum.

On the morning of December 21, 1949 we docked in Port-au- Prince. It took us most of the day to clear customs and begin unloading our cargo for the El Rancho Hotel. I couldn't wait to go ashore and explore this strange, colorful land. Finally, in the early evening I stepped off the old wooden wharf and into a world of grace and poetry. Haiti, I would find, was like a work of art.

From the sparkling blue bay, the city stretched like a mosaic of color against the green hills to the tall, majestic mountains. From the wharf I could see the twin-towered, peach-colored cathedral and the glistening white National Palace standing out against old, heavy commercial buildings that lined the seaside road. Behind them, colorful houses and small wooden lean-to's rose up the hill, half-hidden among almond and mango trees and palms and bougainvillea's that covered the gardens so that at times all I could see was just lush greenery and the rust colored corrugated tin roofs of the houses.

The distant sound of music led me down the new great seaside boulevard where I was quickly surrounded by half a dozen youth gesticulating and bursting with enthusiasm, telling me I was standing on the hallowed ground of the United Nations plaza. They were all well dressed and groomed for an evening out in the town. They were high school students testing their English, all of them proud of their country and its beauty. My German name was too intractable to them, so I was referred to simply as Blan. "Blan, look at this. This is Le Pavillon d' Italie," one explained, "They have a bar with an express coffee machine." And he invited me to have a coffee.

"Blan," another young man asked, "What do you think of it?"

"It is good Haitian coffee, Blan," another said.

"It's wonderful," I said and they all laughed and applauded.

"Mezanmi, Blan," one of them cried out, "it is good to have you in Haiti."

"How long are you planning on staying here?" One of them asked.

I sipped my espresso and told him I would be leaving within a few days.

They all expressed disappointment. "I don't know why anyone would want to go anywhere else," one of my new friends declared.

"You know what I think, Blan?" one said shrugging his shoulders and following me out to the street. "I think if you, or anyone else, came to Haiti and stayed for enough time, you would never leave. I know if I came to Haiti," he said poking his chest with his finger, "I would never leave. I love my country."

We walked together, following the sound of the music; and the deeper I went into this bizarre, colorful metropolis, the more I realized Haiti was not like any other place I had ever been in. It was not Tahiti or any one of the other Pacific islands I had visited, where the isolation kept them apart from the rest of the world. Those were only small islands after all. Haiti was an independent nation, and it felt that way. Just off the boat I could feel the pride and individuality of the people. The youth were not throwing stones like in Abadan, Persia; or picking our pocket as in Casablanca or Tangiers. Nor, despite the poverty, were people suffering in quiet humiliation like in Franco's Spain.

We headed up the new boulevard, which my new friends explained had been named after U.S. President Harry S. Truman. Each clamored to be heard, speaking English and French, but always falling back on their own language, Kreyol, challenging each other's description of the new buildings.

"This is a World's Fair," one of them said. "It is the biggest in the world, too. President Dumarsais Estime built it."

Then another spelled out the name for me to make sure I understood: "E- S- T- I- M- E."

"Blan," one of them said, "you look at this place. President Estime has turned this into a beautiful place. Before, this was very, very ugly fetid, trash."

"Blan," another of the youths said and pulled away his friend so he could take his place beside me. "Tell us, what do you think of Port-au-Prince?"

"I think it's fabulous," I said and they all applauded enthusiastically.

"There is nothing like this in the world," one young man said. Then we all paused and joined a large group of Haitians, young and old, transfixed by the colors and music of a synchronized luminous fountain. An elderly Haitian broke our trance and proudly announced the fountain was called, Fontaine des Nymphes d'ébène.

I left my young friends at the fairground where the Chicago Company Ross-Manning had set up a circus with a freak show and fair rides.

The excitement of the city was palpable. The smell of cooking, grillot, fried pork and rice, and something sweet like fruit and rum and sea salt, all blended with a pleasant ocean breeze.

Just down the road, I could see the place for me: a giant barrel of rum the size of a small house. I took a seat at the bar inside the barrel and drank the best rum I had ever tasted for only 5 cents a shot. Right away the young attendant made me feel at home and was soon refilling my glass for free. He explained this was the Barbancourt Rum contribution to the "Exposition." He said work had started in July of the previous year and deeply regretted that I had missed the grand inauguration two weeks ago. "The Cité Dumarsais Estimé," he said, "had a magnificent opening. It was blessed by a Roman Catholic Cardinal, and we had a large Military parade, even U.S. Marines joined in and the big military airplanes, (B29 bombers), flew overhead." Then he extended his arms out to mimic the airplanes.

As I made my way back to the Culver, I crossed the tracks to Croix des Bossales, adjacent to La Saline, where there was a large open air market. It was full of life and color. The market women wearing white Pillsbury flour sack dresses kept calling me "chérie" and offering tropical fruit and vegetables they had arranged in neat pyramid shaped piles. I bought bananas, oranges and mangos, and told them in my halting French that I would come back soon. They all screamed with laughter.

It was nighttime when I made it back to the wharf. As I approached the Culver I could see Alex standing on the deck. As I came closer, I noticed the expression of deep concern on his face.

"Shit, Bernard, some fucking thieves managed to make off with some of your stuff," He said, his lisp almost a whistle in the night. "I'm sorry, mate."

I dropped my bag of fruit, jumped onto the deck and raced to my cabin. I immediately reached into the space next to my bunk where I kept my clothes and few valuables, all the while saying to myself, "please don't let them swipe my camera, please let me find the camera..."

But it was gone, and so was the Longine watch I had purchased in Chicago after the war. I did not have much, but what little I had was gone. I didn't ask who was on watch. I blamed myself and cursed my own stupidity. I knew seaports were home to water rats – thieves – it was my fault. I remembered the Gurka soldiers in Abadan guarding the Anglo-Persian oil refineries during World War II. They sliced the heads off thieves with their kukris knives.

I didn't know why, but the thieves had only hit me. Alex kept apologizing for what happened. I told him it was all right. They had only taken my camera and watch. But later, I thought of the photographs I was going to take. I could see the rusting hulks of warships at the entrance to Eniwetok in the Marshall Islands, the carcasses of war all over the mighty U.S. bases: Manus in the Admiralty Island and Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands. And maybe the Caroline Islands, and Marianas and even Iwo Jima. The public would want to know what happened to these bases. But the Life magazine photo- essay I had been dreaming of was not going to be, unless of course, I found my camera. For some reason, it didn't occur to me that I could buy another camera, perhaps even a better one than that old Zeiss Icon.

That night I lay awake in my bunk, thinking of ways I might retrieve the camera. My head was full of plans. I didn't care about the watch and the other small items the thieves had taken. I was lucky they hadn't found my emergency cash and passport. I decided that as soon as I had the opportunity, I would go into Port-au-Prince and look for the camera.

The following day we finished unloading our cargo. Our harbor duties and wharfage fees were exorbitant and quickly swallowed up our profit from the $400 cargo fee.

In the evening we moved the Culver away from the old rotting wharf and anchored on the bay directly across from Captain Ace's seaside restaurant.

We kept the 26-foot Nova Scotia dory in the water and used it to go ashore.

The next day I went ashore to look for my camera. There didn't appear to be a thieves' market. The landmark Iron Market on the Grand Rue was a bustling bazaar that appeared to sell everything. I also learned that the Haitian word for all cameras was Kodak, so I spread the word as best as I could that a blan--foreigner-- wanted to buy old Kodaks. I was shown an interesting collection of ancient unworkable cameras, but my Zeiss Icon was not among them.

I was extremely demoralized. Things did not appear to be working out. Without the camera I had no story for Life Magazine. Once again, I felt restless. The scenes of poverty in Spain kept coming back, every time more vivid than the next. It seemed to me, that after the horrible devastation of the war, people would find a way to come together and make a better world. Perhaps I was naive or too idealistic. But I honestly felt that I needed to do something that would help make a difference.

Back on board the Culver, Peter was leaning over a large pot in the galley. "You boys are in for a real treat," he said, "I bought this turtle from a fisherman outside Captain Ace's".

He placed the pot on the center of the table and filled our bowls with a foul green soup. "This turtle soup would cost a pretty penny at the best European restaurants," he said.

"Oh yeah," Dave said, "Welcome to Chez le Culver."

"No luck with your camera?" Alex asked.

I shook my head and tried the soup. It tasted horrible, but I wasn't hungry.

"Don't worry mate," Peter said, "we'll wait for an out bound cargo and sail off again. In a few months you'll be able to afford a better camera, you'll see."

I knew Peter had a wife at home and that he was concerned with the cargo carrying business. But now that I saw it as such, I felt discouraged. Perhaps it was my old fear of being tied down to a job, or perhaps it was the green, god-awful soup; or the loss of my camera. I did not want to continue on as a sailor. I was yearning for something more meaningful.

"I'm leaving you," I said without looking up.

"What?" Alex cried, "What are you talking about, Bernard?"

"I've decided not to go on," I said and cited the loss of my camera as a reason to stay, but I very well knew it was more than that.

I had made my decision. In the morning, with the furry taste of the horrible green soup still in my mouth, I bid goodbye to my friends and the Culver. I took a bumboat to the wharf where Haitian youngsters offered to carry my sea bag. It was light with only the few belongings I had left. It had been a great adventure, but I had decided to return to England and admit failure to Sir Philip. In the meantime, I thought I should remain in Haiti for a few days and learn more about this intriguing country.

I walked to the British Consulate where we had registered upon our arrival and waited almost until noon to plead my case.

"Shan't be a problem, my dear chap," the consul said, "You'll need a Haitian visitor's visa, of course. I can fix it for you." But he had no suggestions as to where I should look for my stolen camera. "I don't think you'll find it, quite honestly. It's probably been sold by now."

Upon the recommendation of the Consul, I found lodging at the small Pension, Mon Rêve next to the Paramount Movie house on the Champ de Mars, not far from the National Palace. I wired my family in New Zealand for money only to learn that Haiti was a dollar country. My country, like Britain, was a sterling country and under strict monetary controls. No money would be forthcoming from home, and cabling friends in the U.S. entailed a long wait.

At least for the time being, I didn't have the money for a boat ticket to Europe. I was marooned in Haiti.

I soon learned that Haiti was experiencing a renaissance of sorts. Port-au-Prince was celebrating its bicentennial. The Haitian capital sparkled with the festivities of its World's Fair. There was magic in the air, not only because of the excellent rum, the country's distinctive culture permeated the entire city. There was a poet's corner's, bar with a stage. Ti Roro, a famous Haitian drummer, provided a background beat at the Theatre de Verdure, which featured the country's National Folkloric troupe, dancing and singing in traditional Haitian colors.

I relaxed and enjoyed five-cent shots of rum while listening to members of Haiti's bourgeoisie discussing why their country's president should be dumped. I quickly learned that politics was a major preoccupation of every literate person. Their very lives seemed to depend on politics, which was divided along class lines. The upper class, or aristocracy, referred to itself as the elite or bourgeoisie. The middle-class was simply La Classe. It was small and searching for its place in the Haitian social scene. And finally, there was the peasant class, as they were called, which made up the majority of the country's population, which at the time numbered around four million.

I found Haitians were universally friendly. People were always smiling, greeting me with, "bon jour blan." I walked everywhere, and the more I saw of Haiti and Haitians the more I became infatuated with the place. Despite the imbalance in their society, I did not detect any anger or envy as I had experienced in other poor countries like Persia, Aden and Spain. The passivity of the poor was offset by their dignity. Their capacity to laugh at adversity made them even more special. Such qualities among the peasant class made it easy for them to shrug off the arrogance of those at the top of the social ladder. In the countryside there was something deeply spiritual about the people. Their salutations, "honor, respect" were those of an equal in the divine scheme of things. I was to hear "Bon Dieu bon" - "God is good," so many times that I thought it was a daily prayer instead of a familiar excuse.

At night, Port-au-Prince was bewitching. Marchandes sat with their wares before little flickering oil lamps that gave off a wonderful mystic atmosphere. The Palmistes section of the World's Fair exploded with people. The setting was enchanting, with hundreds of tall royal palms and small fountain-like canals, lit by electric lights. There were very few automobiles, and it was safe to walk the streets at any time of day or night. Haiti was a place where I felt truly free.

The fact was that the country was seducing me. I soon gave up the search for my camera and settled into the laid back tropical atmosphere. The Mon Rêve was a lovely, 15 room gingerbread. It was what the Grand Hotel Oloffson later became a place full of happy- go-lucky American artists, bohemians, shady businessmen and lost souls. The pension was $5 a day with meals and the rum was mostly free. Members of the U.S. Embassy - it was on the other side of the Champ de Mars - would habitually drop by after work for a rum punch in the little garden after work.

By the following week, I found it financially beneficial to move to L'Avenir, a much smaller, rickety gingerbread mansion squeezed between two larger houses at the bottom of Avenue John Brown. The price was a dollar a day with meals. My room was just the basics with a good bed and an outdoor shower in the back yard, but the corpulent owner, Kè Popoz, was a wonderful host.

And the food, not just at L'Avenir, but everywhere I ate, was a gastronomical delight. The crisp and crunchy grillot, turkey tassot, pumpkin soup, sweet fried plantains and donjon mushroom rice was an exotic journey into something African and French and entirely unique.

And there was always an overabundance of fresh fruits and vegetables. Even the food at the street market stands was an improvement over the bland food of London's Lyons Corner House Restaurant where steak was whale and "chip butties" was a French fries sandwich.

In the late afternoons the few tables on the verandah of L'Avenir filled up with professors from Lycée Alexandre Pétion. I would sometimes sit and listen to these interesting characters discussing philosophy, politics, history, and Greek and Latin while Kè Popoz waved and identified the drivers of the few automobiles that drove past, most of them members of Haiti's bourgeoisie, making their way up the mountain to their homes in Pétion-Ville.

From L'Avenir it was only a brief walk to the Mon Rêve where I made my headquarters, and where one evening the U.S. Embassy's commercial attaché invited a group of us to a Christmas party at his residence just off the road to Petion-Ville at a placed called Bourdon.

Unlike the old gingerbread and French colonial architecture of Port-au-Prince, many of the houses above the city in Petion-Ville were modern structures built of concrete and a pink stone that was quarried in the mountains. They were designed with open balconies and large windows to allow the air to circulate.

The commercial Attaché's house was built onto the side of the hill, and cocktails were served in the large living room. Despite the casual atmosphere, servants in white jackets walked around with trays of canapés and drinks. I made my way out to the balcony and looked down at the city in the mystical Haitian twilight. The smoke from charcoal fires gave the place a peculiar haze that partially covered the twinkling of the few electric lights of the city. Again, I heard the rhythmic drumming in the distance and the faraway conversations and laughter of the Haitian peasants. Then a pair of little white poodles found my ankles and began barking and circling around me, breaking my trance and bringing me back to the party.

"They like you," the commercial attaché's wife said and picked up one of her poodles.

"I have a way with animals," I said.

"Yes, I'm sure," she laughed. "And they have a way of annoying our guests." She held the dog in her arms and fed it a small morsel of a canapé.

"They're not a bother," I said, "I like dogs."

"So do I," she said, "They were a gift from Eva Perón, you know."

"Really?"

"My husband was posted in Argentina before we came here," she said and put her dog down and now the two poodles licked each other's faces trying to eat the remaining crumbs of canapé.

"So how do you like our little tropical paradise?" she asked.

"It's charming," I said.

She gave me a strange look, like maybe I was not supposed to find Haiti that way. "You're staying at the Mon Rêve?"

"Well, no," I said. "I just moved down the road to L'Avenir. I'm trying to conserve my funds."

"My," she said and covered her mouth with her hand. "How exotic."

Just then her husband stepped up and joined our conversation. "Hello," he said and put his arm around her waist.

"Dear," she said, "you must do something to help Bernie. Do you know where he's staying?"

"Of course, at the Mon Rêve," he said.

"Oh, no, dear. He's moved down to L'Avenir. You must do something to help him."

"But I like it fine there," I said honestly.

A servant paused carrying a tray of martinis. We each took one and I took a long sip of the cool gin. The conversation was making me a little uncomfortable.

"Well," he said and raised his glass. "Your luck's about to change, Bernie. Meet me at the Mon Rêve tomorrow evening."

Our glasses touched and his wife winked at me, "Isn't Haiti wonderful?"

The following evening, I met the commercial attaché at the Mon Rêve and we drove out in his Studebaker to the new, part government owned, Casino National on the seashore and Harry S. Truman Blvd, across from the big yellow arch of the Rond Point of Liberté.

The casino had a sheltered entrance and a spacious gaming room. There was a nightclub area with a big open-air dance floor, a bandstand and plenty of seating. On Saturday nights it was the "in" place where the city's well to do flock to dance the popular Méringues and Mambos under the stars.

I followed the attaché across the smoke-filled gaming room to a back table where two elderly men dressed in gray, pinstripe suits and sad, difficult faces were looking over papers between sips of scotch. Right away I recognized the men as characters from the Damon Runyan books I read during the war. Italian-American gamblers from Brooklyn and the Bronx. They spoke with heavy accents and low, raspy voices. On the table was a deck of cards, a pack of Pall Mall cigarettes and a pair of spectacles.

"Hello, Tony," the attaché said and shook hands with one of the men. "This is the fellow I told you about. He's a good sort."

"Bernard Diederich," I introduced myself and shook hands with both men.

They asked us to sit, and Tony motioned for a waiter. He stroked his chin and looked me over for a moment, then glanced at his partner. "Whatta ya think, Joe?"

Joe pulled out the short, fat cigar from his mouth, and in a heavy Italian American accent asked me if I spoke French.

"I get along all right," I said without thinking that perhaps I was exaggerating.

"That's good," Tony said, "and I like that limey accent."

"Sure, but what's he gonna do?" Joe said and he replaced his cigar between his lips and moved it from one side of his mouth to the other.

A waiter served us rum punch. Tony opened his pack of Pall Malls and offered them across the table. He fished one out for himself, then paused and pointed at me with the unlit cigarette. "You got any skills; you know anything about gambling?" he asked.

"I'm sorry, I really don't," I said, but added that I was honest.

Joe glanced at Tony. "He could take care of the booze," he said. Tony stared at me for a moment. "You like to drink?" he asked. I looked at the commercial attaché and back at Tony. "Yes, some." "He's honest," Joe laughed and offered me his hand across the table. "You got yourself a job kid." The commercial attaché patted me on the back and we all shook hands. Tony finally lit up his Pall Mall. "You start tomorrow at eight," he said blowing a cloud of blue smoke across the table.

"Great. But what's my job?" I asked.

"Never mind your job," Joe said. "It's a good job."

"You got a suit?" Tony asked.

"Well, no," I said. "It was stolen in Miami."

"That's all right kid," Tony said. "Go over to Coles and get yourself an outfit. Tell them to bill the Casino. Now go walk around and get to know the place. You're gonna be the casino's maître d' booze."

The commercial attaché and I walked around the casino sipping our rum punch.

"Things are looking up, eh?" he said.

"Yes, thanks," I said. "But what's a maître d'booze?"

"Ah, Bernie, you just landed the best job in Port-au-Prince and you don't even know it. You're in charge of the casino's booze."

My friend was right. I had accidentally landed an almost perfect job. I worked at night, so I was free to explore the city during the day. And the night club attracted the capital's beautiful people. It was impossible to ignore the lovely young women who arrived in parties for an evening of fun and dance. Whenever I took a break from the smoke-filled gaming room, I would stand and watch the dancing. The casino had its own full-size orchestra. Unfortunately, I couldn't join the dancing because I was working.

Tony and Joe had their hands full training Haitian croupiers. They had brought in a group from Havana to help them, but Joe couldn't seem to get away. He was always keeping a close watch over the games and his trainees.

Tony, who was older and well into his fifties, was more relaxed. He took time to show me who the new arrivals were. He pointed out the regulars who would sit at a table all night long, and the government people I needed to watch out for.

And I loved all of it. Port-au-Prince was like a small town. The casino allowed me to become acquainted with the community's movers and shakers at the top of Haiti's strange, color-coded social pyramid. I also learned that the upper class was not rich by American or British standards, and that most of the habitual gamblers were not Haitian, but resident Syrian textile importers.

My job offered me a lot of liberty. I cruised around the blackjack and roulette tables greeting the regulars and dispensing free alcoholic beverages to the high stakes rollers; big time gamblers who flew in from New York, Miami and Havana, and to my new friends. I wrote to Sir Philip Williams and my family back in England telling them the job had frightened me at first, but soon I realized its advantages.

I leaned that French was of limited use in Haiti so I enrolled in Creole classes at the American Institute where I befriended the American and Haitian teachers who became my guests on weekends at the Casino. With authority to dispense drinks to select customers free of charge, I soon had a lot of new friends who didn't even gamble.

When the Casino closed in the early morning hours, Tony, Joe and the other owners, professional gamblers all, would take off their jackets and sit down to play poker.

After work I usually took a cab back to the L'Avenir. Haitian cabs were a communal thing, and always an adventure. You got in and told the driver your address. The driver, who already had two or three other people in the car, decided on the best route. Inevitably you had to trip around town and the suburbs while he dropped off the other fares before being dropped off at your own destination. All the taxi drivers had the habit of switching off their engines to save gasoline, and not only when they were going downhill, they often went uphill too. Still, the service was cheap, and if you were not in a hurry it could be a real learning experience.

One night I decided to walk home. The sun had not come up yet and the city had a soft, predawn darkness. I walked up the Rue des Casernes. There was no one about. It was very quiet, even the drums were silent, only the occasional rooster crowing in the distance.

I walked past the ministry building and marveled at the ghostly image of the National Palace which seemed to glow in the darkness. Then I heard a loud voice call out behind me, "En nou we, Blan."

"Let's go Blan," the voice ordered.

I was startled, but before I could turn, I felt something jab in the middle of my back. "En nou we!"

"Let's go," the voice called again and pushed me forward. I stepped ahead and turned to see it was a soldier pointing an M-1 Garand rifle at my back. Blood rushed to my head and shock quickly gave way to anger.

As the soldier prodded me on, I thought of turning on him. He was strong, but only half my size. I was sure I could knock him down with a good right. But as we crossed the street, I noticed another soldier standing behind a bush, his rifle raised and pointing in my direction. Then I saw two other soldiers looking at me from behind the green iron fence of the National Palace. I quickly gave up any thought of escaping and allowed the soldier to lead me to the police headquarters. The old wooden building had a large holding cell at the entrance where thieves were held behind iron bars. The place stank of shit and urine. Soldiers and police were busy rushing in and out and checking their weapons.

Lieut. Lanor Augustin, a lanky man who knew me from the casino, was the duty officer. When he saw me, he dismissed the soldier who brought me in, and patted me on the back.

"Ah, Blan," he laughed, "what are you doing out here in the middle of the night?"

"I was just walking home from work. What's going on?"

"Ah, well," he interrupted, "you know Haiti. We have a report that opponents of Estimeé are plotting some trouble. We've been put on alert."

"Is it serious?" I asked. This was my first encounter with Haitian guns and politics. The easy-going place I had come to know had a quiet, unsettling current running under its surface.

"We don't know," Augustin said, "but we have to be prepared." He walked me to the entrance and pointed in the direction opposite the National Palace. "Take some advice from me, Blan. Don't walk near the palace at night, compran?"

I nodded and walked away having learned a valuable lesson.

The following night when I saw Lt. Augustin at the casino, I poured him a glass of the casino's best Scotch.

"On the house," I said.

"You know the threat was very serious," Augustin said. "Really, what happened?"

"We found out that Trujillo, (the Dominican Republic's dictator, Rafael Trujillo Molina), was helping a group of Haitian exiles. He gave them guns and passage through the border. They had plans to assassinate Estimé and all the top military officers. Even me, perhaps."

"Did you get them?"

"Unfortunately, we did not. It's over for now, but you know, that is the Haitian cycle," he said and turned his index finger in the air.

Strangely, this incident did little to dissuade me about Haiti.

To the contrary, I was more intrigued with the little country. I knew I had a lot to learn, so I began to frequent La Caravelle, a bookshop on the Rue Bonne Foi, and read everything I could about Haiti, its history and its politics.

Unfortunately, just as things were beginning to feel right, my time ran out. Lt. Lucien Scott, the officer in charge of immigration, stopped me in the street one afternoon and warned me about my situation. "Blan," he said, "your papers are not in order. Yesterday you had 24 hours to leave the country, but I could not find you. Now your time is up. You have to go."

I had been in Haiti five weeks without a visa. The British Consul had done nothing for me.

I went to see Jean-Claude Léger, a young lawyer I had been introduced to a few weeks earlier and told him about my predicament. He said the easiest thing for me to do was to apply for a Haitian visa in Jamaica. My Casino bosses were sympathetic and paid me what they described as a travel bonus.

I took Jean-Claude's advice and flew to Kingston on February 2, 1950. I checked into the small Melrose Hotel at the top of Duke Street. I was so infuriated about being kicked out of Haiti; I was determined to return.

The following morning, before heading out to the Haitian Consulate, I walked out on the small verandah of the Melrose and ordered a cup of tea. I sat on one of the rocking chairs beside a well-dressed, elderly man whom I greeted with a nod.

"Ah, good morning," he said, "You're not with customs, are you?"

"Sorry, I'm not. I'm a guest."

"My apologies, I didn't know there was anyone else staying here."

"I arrived last night," I said and stirred milk and sugar into my tea.

"I've got some boxes for my son. They're tied up at the port. I'm waiting for them to clear customs," he said. Then he looked at me again. "Did I detect an Australian accent perhaps?"

"No, but you're close," I said, "New Zealand."

"You don't say. I'm from Tasmania," he said and stretched out his hand. "Theodore Flynn."

I introduced myself and apologized for my gruff behavior. "I just got kicked out of Haiti," I explained.

"Nothing criminal, I hope?"

"No, no. I overstayed my visa. Bloody British Consul never arranged it like he said he would."

Mr. Flynn laughed. "They never do, do they? I've been waiting on the customs office for three days."

"Not a bad place to wait," I said.

"No, not at all," he said, "but I wouldn't mind getting on."

"I know what you mean. I've dealt with customs people all over the world."

"Really? What line of work are you in?"

"I'm a sailor," I said and explained to Mr. Flynn about my leaving New Zealand on the Pamir, serving aboard a tanker during the war and my stint with Alex and Peter aboard the Culver. "But for some reason, I decided to stay in Haiti."

"You sound like my son," he said. "He was just as restless. He and some friends sailed around New Guinea for a while, and then he worked at a Tobacco farm and went prospecting for gold. Of course, that was all before he got into acting."

"He's an actor?" I said, and just as I said it I realized I was talking to Errol Flynn's father.

"Yes, in Hollywood. You know Errol Flynn?" he said matter of fact.

"Yes, of course. I've seen his movies. Interesting. Are you in the movie business as well?"

"God no," he laughed, "I'm a biologist. I just retired as chair of Zoology at Queen's University in Ireland."

"Are you retiring in Jamaica?"

"No, no. I'm visiting my son. He's got a plantation east of Port Antonio."

"I see," I said. "Do you have plans to return to Australia?"

"No, I don't get down that way anymore," he said. "How about yourself?"

"Not really. It's a long way down," I said lightheartedly. "I've been kind of drifting after the war. It's odd though, what I really want is to get back to Haiti."

"You like it there, ey?"

"Yes. There's something about the place," I said, "And they have the best rum I've ever tasted."

"Yes, indeed," Mr. Flynn laughed, "you sound just like my son."

We laughed and I finished my tea, then I glanced at my watch. "I better go. The consulate should be opening soon. It was a pleasure meeting you, sir."

"Indeed, it was. Good luck to you, lad."

I took a taxi to the Haitian consulate. They telegraphed my request for a visa and much to my surprise; it was approved within forty-eight hours. The following day I wired my family in New Zealand for some money before flying back to Port-au-Prince by Pan American Clipper. As the plane prepared to land at Bowen Field I could feel my heart racing. At that moment I knew I had fallen in love with Haiti.

It was all so long ago. How could this come to be my end? What would Sir Philip think if he knew of my plight? What if I had stayed aboard the ship with Peter and Alex?

How many hours, days, weeks, have I been here? This horrible terror I feel for my beloved Ginette and our little boy is wrenching my gut. My body is trembling with thirst. My mind drifts. Why the hell did I stay in Haiti? Why didn't I return to England?

I am aware of only one breath at a time. How many are left in me? The interminable silence fills me with dread. The isolation is unbearable.

Thoughts race through my weary mind. At which time could my life have taken a different path? My beautiful New Zealand life, my family, my friends; how easy they lived. How far it all is from the political upheaval here.

And Papa Doc. I always knew there were two sides to him. My God, at what point does a leader become so obsessed with power? Are the Haitians right, is there really a spell cast on the presidential seat?

I spent so much time with Duvalier, talking about his beloved Haiti and all his idealistic goals for the people and the country. He was so mild mannered, so polite. He appeared at my bedside after my appendix operation. He summoned me to the Palace to brief him on Fidel Castro after I returned from Cuba in fifty-nine. At times he appears genuine, but he's guilty of such incomprehensible evil.

Haiti was booming. Tourists from all over the world were experiencing the beauty of this tiny nation despite the political upheaval and the growing violence. I remember Marlon Brando trying to come here incognito with his underage girlfriend. Irving Berlin, Arthur Miller, Truman Capote, Noel Coward, Martine Carol and so many more.

And I'll never forget Anne. She came to Haiti to take a break from her performance on the New York stage in "The Miracle Worker." Of course, I knew none of this when I first saw this beautiful dark haired, dark eyed young woman on the patio of the Splendid Hotel. She was admiring the exotic flora in the garden. I greeted her as I walked up, and she asked me if I knew the names of the flowers. Anne Bancroft, she introduced herself and the days and weeks that followed were some of the most glorious and passionate times of our lives.

And here I am because I wanted to come back. I wanted something, I wanted Haiti.

As soon as I got back to Haiti, I stopped in at Jean-Claude Leger's office to thank him for his help. Jean-Claude was sitting behind his desk, talking with a tall, well-built American whom he introduced as Allan Benson.

I took a seat next to Benson, and Jean-Claude told him my story.

Benson, a likable man in his late twenties, explained he had been medically unfit for service during the war, so he became a shoe salesman. Now he had plans to launch a newspaper in Haiti.

"I was thinking of an English-language newspaper," he said and added that he had the funds to support the venture. "It'll be simple. We can get news from the States from the wires and reprint it." He had ten thousand dollars in cash which he deposited with Jean- Claude.

"I told Allan it was a very good idea. What do you think, Bernie?" Jean-Claude said. "Sounds great," I said and turned to Benson. "There are plenty of Americans coming and going. And Haiti is a fascinating place. I don't think you would lack for colorful stories."

Jean-Claude laughed. "Bernie's crazy for Haiti."

"The Port-au-Prince Times," Benson sang, "How about that?" "Look," Jean-Claude said, "why don't you and Bernie work on this together." He turned to me and smiled. "Or are you going back to work at the casino?"

"Well, I don't really know..." I said, intrigued by the idea of running a newspaper. It was certainly more to my liking than dispensing libations to the casino's favorite patrons.

Benson clapped his hands and leaned forward on his chair, "How about it, Bernard. It won't pay much, but I can offer you room and board in my house and the use of the jeep."

So that afternoon I moved into the large, two story gingerbread house that Benson had rented in the Pacot neighborhood. Every morning I rose before dawn, traveled across town in the wartime Jeep to Le Matin where we job-printed the new Port-au-Prince Times. I loved the work and Benson loved to relax at the El Rancho hotel and date pretty tourists.

The newspaper business in Haiti was cluttered with dailies and weeklies that came and went depending on the politics of the moment. Compared with other countries I had visited, I found Haiti's dailies a sad reflection of the country's high illiteracy rate.

Despite their limited circulation, most newspapers had a considerable impact on Haitian politics. All the dailies were well read by the politicians and the business community, as well as local intellectuals. I soon found out that newspaper publishers didn't become wealthy from their newspapers, but from Haitian politics. Government assistance, and often a government sinecure, supplemented their advertising revenue.

What the papers printed and didn't print was important. They were essentially journals of opinion, or as the French say, "engagé." Aspiring writers, poets and politicians begged and some even paid to have their opinions published in their pages.

Early one morning I was sitting at the print shop proofreading the day's edition of the Port-au-Prince Times when I felt the rumbling of a human avalanche. I ran outside and saw a large mob, chanting and gesticulating down the Rue Americaine before Le Matin. It was my introduction to a Haitian mob in action.

I stood on the front step of the building with the linotypist, who told me this wasn't the famous, organized rouleau compresseur, (steamroller) of loyal partisans of opposition politician Professor Daniel Fignolè.

This sea of prancing protesters was defenders of incumbent President Estimé. They sang the Creole song of the moment: "Kimbe- o-pa lague," (hold on tight, don't let go) followed by the chant, "God in heaven sent us this president."

I hopped in the jeep and followed the mob to the stately gingerbread mansion that housed the Senate. The preceding April 18th, the Haitian Senate had rejected the Lower House's motion to change the constitution and permit Estimé to succeed himself as president. Now, the political invective had moved to the streets.

As I maneuvered the jeep through the mob, I was mistakenly recognized as a diplomat. The protesters parted and courteously made way, allowing me to enter the once stately mansion. Looters carrying desks and chairs paused and looked at me, then went on about their business. But this was not considered looting. It was called dechoukaj, (uprooting) a tradition older than the Republic itself.

By the afternoon, President Estimé publicly congratulated his mob for its "eloquent attitude" and "political maturity." Then he formally dissolved the now furniture-less Senate, which had refused to do his bidding.

Early the next morning, I drove Allan Benson to the offices of Franck Magloire, the proprietor of Le Matin.

"Wait here for me," Benson said, "I'll be right back."

I leaned back on the seat and watched a couple of shirtless boys running barefoot down the street trying to fly a small paper kite. They were not having much success but were having a great time running up and down the street. Farther down, a group of peasant women riding donkeys loaded with produce rode in line on their way to the market. The sun had just cleared the mountains. It was getting hot.

About fifteen minutes later Benson appeared carrying a brown envelope.

"Let's go," he said. "Where to?"

"The Caserne Dessalines," he said, and then he leaned his head down out of the wind and lit a cigarette.

"What's up?" I said. I could tell something unusual was going on. Benson had been uncommonly quiet, and I wanted to know why I was driving him to the army barracks. This was not routine.

"Nothing, Bernie. We're just running a newspaper, you know."

It was only a few blocks to the Caserne Dessalines. I pulled up in a shady spot across the street and watched Benson walk right past the guards like he owned the place. Five minutes later he came out and walked back to the Jeep smiling. "Good," he said and slapped me on the back. "Is it time for a rum punch yet?"

"What's going on Alan," I said, "what was in the envelope?"

"Relax, Bernie, relax."

"Come on, Alan, don't tell me to relax. What's going on."

Benson leaned back on the seat and crossed his arms over his chest. "It was just a copy of Le Moniteur," he said.

Le Moniteur was the official government gazette which had published President Estimé's damming decree in its entirety.

I became angry. I knew people associated me with Benson. Whatever he was doing, I would be automatically involved. I was beginning to distrust the former shoe salesman, if indeed that was what he was. It didn't make sense for him to be running errands to the barracks at a time when the political situation appeared so fragile.

"Tell me what's going on, Alan."

"Jesus, Bernie, relax. I was just delivering the paper to Col. Magloire," he said.

I knew Paul Magloire, no relation to the publisher of Le Matin, was the leader of the impatient military group. I didn't know what Benson was up to, but it was no good.

"Why, what for?" I asked.

"For nothing," Benson said. "I was just doing a friend a favor, okay?"

I looked at Alan. I knew he wouldn't tell me more.

"Look," he said after a while, "let's just forget about it. It's nothing. Maybe after you're done delivering the paper we can meet at the El Rancho and have a drink, eh?

I said nothing.

"Come on, how about it Bernie?"

Within days of our little delivery the army began to move against Estime. The mob was back in the streets; but this time their chant had changed to "Abas Estimé!" ("Down with Estimé") It was an important lesson in Haitian politics: Don't believe everything you hear or see. Although, there was nothing spontaneous or menacing about this mob because they had been paid in advance to orchestrate the protest.

The only way any ordinary Haitian could rationalize his country's politics was to place it, like most things, on a religious plane under the fatalistic philosophy: "What God gives, God takes."

And on May 10, 1950, God took. Estimé was overthrown by the military and forced into exile. U.S. Marine trained army Col. Paul Eugene Magloire, a black member of the military junta, stepped in to replace the president. And for the moment, the Caribbean Black Republic of Haiti appeared aglow with promise. Hope for the country soared as Colonel Magloire vowed to continue Estimé's important structural changes - bringing his fellow blacks into the bureaucracy and fostering the nascent tourist industry.

This question of color puzzled me. If this was the Black Republic, I thought, shouldn't blacks of every hue - dark, mulatto, light - be considered equal?

A few days later, after printing and delivering the Port-au-Prince Times to the usual hotels and tourist centers, I stopped in at Emmanuel (Mano) Ambroise's appliance store on Grand Rue to sell an advertisement and catch up on some gossip. Mano was a good friend, and as I walked in, I found him and our mutual friend, Roger Dorsinville, leaning over the sales counter talking animatedly about the recent changes in the government. Roger had been Estime's chief of cabinet and consul in New York. Like most Haitians he was consumed by politics.

When Mano saw me walk in, he interrupted Roger and raised his hand in greeting. "Bam nuvell ou, blan," he said. "Are you here to interview me?"

I laughed and told him it was time to renew his advertisement in the Port-au-Prince Times.

"Wait a moment," Roger said, "why should Mano advertise with that newspaper. You think the tourists who read that newsletter will come here and buy a sewing machine or a stove?" Roger loved to incite a good discussion.

"I have a special for the summer months," I said.

We all laughed and Roger said he had read the last copy of the Times and did not find a single story of interest in its pages. "I want to know what is happening here, in my country," he said.

"Come on, the Times is a good paper. All the tourists read it," I said.
Mano laughed, "Even you don't believe that, Bernie."

Mano was right. I did not believe in my own product. It was just a newsletter with reprinted wire service stories from the States. I always thought the Port-au-Prince Times could be so much more.

"I think if someone went through all the trouble of starting a newspaper, they would at least put out a good product. Something interesting and stimulating." Roger said.

"I know," I said. "You know what I was thinking? Haiti could use a newspaper with a lot of illustrations and photographs so all the people who can't read can still get the news."

"It's a good idea, Bernie, but it won't work," Mano laughed. "At least from a business standpoint. I mean how would you print all the illustrations?"

"Besides," Roger said, "You're a writer, no?"

"Well," I said, "what Haiti could use is a newspaper that contributes to the community. It could do a lot of good. Imagine a newspaper that can bring the classes together, or at least help them communicate, understand each other. I don't see why there should even be a question of differences in color and class."

"Ah, Bernie. You're too idealistic," Roger said.

"You keep talking like that, my friend," Mano laughed, "And people are going to think you're a communist."

We all laughed.

"It's not communism," I said and looked at Roger. "I'm only talking of being fair. Why can't you have a free press and the kind of journalism that deals with issues that affect all Haitians, not just the upper class? This is a fascinating country, but all I ever read in the newspapers is politics and business."

"Listen, Bernie, if you really feel that way, why don't you start your own newspaper. You talk and talk. Why don't you do something about it," Mano said.

There was a long silence. Roger could see I was being challenged. And I knew Mano was right. This was not the first time I got on my soap box and went on about what the best newspaper for Haiti should be like. We talked about it every time we got together.

"You should do it, Bernie," Roger said after a moment. "Or would you rather work for Benson and his little tourist newsletter?"

I walked out of Manos' store without selling any ads, but my mind was full of ideas. If I truly believed in an honest English language newspaper that covered Haiti instead of just reprinting the wires, I should do something about it. And if I started my own paper, it could be whatever I wanted it to be.

It was only a matter of time before I became fed up with Benson and quit the Port-au-Prince Times. As soon as I quit I was offered a job by a retired American admiral who invited me to his experimental kanaf plantation in the Artibonite Valley. (The cultivation of kanaf, a plant that produces a fiber used for rope-making, collapsed when nylon came onto the market.)

I loved the Haitian countryside. I had traveled to a banana plantation in Jean-Rabel a few months earlier, to look over a job offer. Now, the admiral and I took a long, one-day drive in a jeep through the gravel and dirt roads where Haiti's major river, the Artibonite, cut down from the mountains, across the large flat valley and out to sea in Gonaives. The valley was yellow and dry and covered with thorny Bayahonde trees. Scattered around the plain were lakou's, (family compounds similar to the ones in Africa).

The lakou's had about a dozen kay pay (straw and mud huts). Chickens scratched the parched earth, black pigs slept in the shade and goats chewed the leaves of bayahonde bushes. Along the river, topless women washed their clothes and tossed them over bushes to dry, while the men tended their small plots of petit mil or corn.

One evening I heard drumming in the distance. I walked out of the admiral's plantation and followed the drumming to a lakou's near the river where the peasants were involved in a Vodou ritual. I was quickly welcomed and passed a bottle of trempe, a raw rum spiced with herbs that tasted clean and strong, and burned my lips all the way down my throat and into my bloodstream so that I could feel it tickle the tip of my fingers.

Every bone in my body could feel the intense, raw power of the seven drummers, their hands wailing against the stretched goatskin. Everyone moved to the rhythm, sometimes just swaying back and forth, lifting their arms, waving, rocking, singing; sometimes they danced, gyrating their bodies, hopping and pouncing and howling and crying, "Ayibobo!"

As the night wore on and more trempe was consumed, the dancing became more frantic. It was beautiful and very natural for those who allowed themselves to be consumed by their own emotions, surrendering their bodies to a higher power. I knew little about the ritual, but nothing about it appeared evil. Indeed, it looked like a joyous occasion. I was able to discern that this was not an actual ceremony, but a family affair honoring a member of the lakou who had died. Vodou, I learned, was still as essential to the lakou as were the wooden pylon, and pestle used to crush corn and coffee.

Upon my return from the Artibonite, I became determined to start my newspaper. During lunch hour and in the evenings, I went to the Thorland Club, a chic small hotel four miles south of the capital, where I was joined by architect Albert Mangonès, who was working on renovations at the Thorland, and artist Roland Dorcély who was painting a large mural at the Club's entrance.

We met at one of the bungalows and worked on making the Haiti Sun a reality. Dorcély designed the layout and masthead of the newspaper. We created a social column named The Beachcomber to entice the literate rich, announcing their birthdays, baptisms, receptions, and weddings. Their travels would be noted and scandals would be carefully hinted at to satisfy the community's born gossips. A page would be devoted to book and art reviews and commentary, while Personality of the Week would be a column about people--common people and the well-known, their trades, their misfortunes and their glories. The Haiti Sun would interview them, let them speak in their own way, give them a voice, present their biographies and publish their photograph. The column "Down Every Rue," would depict all 40 trades, and Vodou would be featured with tutorials from legitimate Oungans. I made a conscious decision not to include any editorials. As a foreigner, I didn't wish to be so presumptuous as to tell Haitians how to run their lives and their country.

I was now a publisher. I moved into a small, two-room concrete house that clung to a hillside at the sparsely populated end of Fifth Avenue, in an old residential section of Port-au-Prince called Bolosse. My new abode was a cut above the neighboring kay pay (huts) of the local peasants. The rent was an affordable fifty gourdes ($10.00) a month.

I placed my bed against the open window which gave me the feeling of floating above the city. At night I could hear the drums beating so close, it felt as if a vodou ceremony was being performed outside my window. My neighbors were deeply concerned with my well-being and repeatedly warned me to shut my window at night because the "move le ape antre" (the bad air will enter). When I didn't take their advice they whispered that I was foolishly inviting the nocturnal lougawou (werewolf).

The crowing roosters and barking dogs woke me before sunrise. Mornings in Haiti were cool and fresh and full of the wonderful aromas of tropical plants and moist earth mixed with a hint of burning charcoal. Before the sun rose over the mountains, I was graced by the melodious singsong of a pretty pratik (street vendor) who came by my door every day selling fresh fruit: "Men bel chadek, zoranj, bannann, cheri," she sang, then gracefully swung the basket off her head and smiled at me as I picked out my breakfast.

There was no electricity or gas, and like most of the other houses in the neighborhood I also lacked running water. I had a krich (clay water container) which I filled every day with fresh water from a spring in a nearby park.

In those early days I did most of my own reporting and searched for news every day. Every morning I would stop at the police headquarters Criminal Research Bureau. In a far corner of the old wooden two-story building was the suspect-holding room where I checked in to see who had been detained the previous night. The whip had been outlawed since independence, so interrogations were aided by the liberal use of a cocomaque, a monkey-wood baton. Most of the nights catch, accused of burglary and other petty crimes, were lined up and made to stand for hours facing the wall. If anyone raised or turned their head, the cocomaque came down swiftly on their skull.

From the police headquarters I would go to Bowen Field airport to check on the list of arriving and departing passengers. There was always someone coming or going; celebrities, businessmen, artists and intellectuals from all over the world. I also picked up whatever newspapers the cleaning crew had collected for me from the cabins of the arriving aircraft. The Centre d' Art was always a good place to find a story. And I covered special criminal court sessions. Occasionally, I would travel to Cul de Sac and Arcahaie and visit Oungans to learn about the rituals and traditions of Vodou. I spent many afternoons selling advertising while looking for interesting features. And Haiti had its good share of peculiar stories. Mostly, I wrote about the common people like the stone seller, the charcoal maker, the bottle merchant, the coconut vendor, and the 4 cent shower. I wanted to show the Haitian elite how poetic and indispensable the peasant class was to the identity of Haiti. I spent a lot of time seeking out artists, most of whom were poor peasants with great talent whose work was heavily influenced by Vodou.

At the end of the week I would buy newsprint at the grocery store as I prepared to print the week's edition of the Haiti Sun. If I ever had the opportunity to finish early, I would go to the Thorland Club for a game of tennis and a swim. Or go and talk with the rice marchande from Ti Rivière who arrived at the market on Saturday.

One evening I was visited at my home by Gary Davis who had declared himself a citizen of the world. He and his young wife were given my name by a friend and said they needed a place to stay. I welcomed them into my modest home, but after a few days the place felt a little crowded so I left it to Davis and moved into a bungalow at the Grand Hotel Oloffson.

The atmosphere at the Oloffson was pure Somerset Maugham. The rambling, white, two-story gingerbread was built onto the side of a hill near the center of Port-au-Prince. It had a large, elaborately ornate verandah and a pleasant long bar. There were a few bungalows around the lush gardens and a comfortable pool. The old place, which dated back to the 1880s, was in perpetual disrepair, and if there wasn't a breeze I could smell the sharp, overriding odor of termites feasting on the ancient wood. The place was populated by large hairy tarantulas, colorful lizards and occasional tourists that could not belong anywhere else but here.

On my first evening at the Oloffson, Maurice de Young, who ran the hotel and was Haiti's undisputed White Hunter, had just returned from Lake Saumatre, on the border with the Dominican Republic, with a group of tourist-hunters. They bagged a single caiman, so naturally, dinner that night was caiman soup.

"It tastes like chicken," an old waiter kept repeating to each of the few guests as he went around ladling out the mysterious concoction from a battered silver urn.

One morning I arrived at my office to find a small group of people looking at an object at my front door. It was an ouanga (Vodou spell). The red and white bags, chicken feathers and beads were obviously meant for me.

I knew the person casting this bad spell was a young man I fired for pocketing Haiti Sun subscription money. I had reported him to the police. They had administered the cocomaque and allowed him to go free.

An ouanga before any office was definitely not good for business. I took an old broom from the office, broke it in two, added it to the unsavory package and put it all in the back of my Jeep. I drove to the man's little house in the Bel Air neighborhood, and in full daylight and before an audience of curious onlookers that had gathered to watch the Blan, I deposited the oungan. I had no idea what kind of ceremony if any I should perform, so I just mumbled and circled around the package a few times. Then I slowly bowed to the three cardinal points, my Catholic religion's Trinity, took a deep, dramatic breath and walked away backwards. My audience remained quiet through the entire performance.

As I drove back to my office, I smiled thinking I had finally become a Haitian.

No hint of a breeze, the heat remains unbearable. The silence is damning. I wipe the sweat from my brow with the back of my hand, then lick my hand. I must be dehydrating. My throat is dry and swollen. My head aches. I squat on the floor, and then stand again. Why was it so quiet?

I rub my eyes and all the names carved on the wall come back into focus: Joseph, Jean, Ti Franck and Marcel. Someone had tried to carve something over a surname making it illegible. It didn't make any sense. Haiti didn't make any sense. I didn't make any sense either.

I had expected my venture with the Haiti Sun to last six months, perhaps less. Somewhere in the back of my head I imagined myself going back to Bridehead and sipping sherry with Sir Philip and his family. But time had passed. I had been in Haiti for six years and the newspaper, as well as myself, had become a part of Haiti. The Haiti Sun was well established. I had a good reputation as a reporter and had built up a decent client list stringing for the Associated Press, The New York Times, NBC News, and a few dailies in London. I had covered Cuba and the Dominican Republic as well.

I was addicted to my work, and I loved living in Haiti. I often thanked God for the decisions I'd made. And just like the peasants in the mountains who told me, "I am sorry for you working in Port- au-Prince," I felt sorry for editors working in New York City.

I had abandoned my Grand Hotel Oloffson bungalow to the termites and spiders and settled into an old house in Mont Joli which I shared with a good Haitian friend. Meanwhile, the good years (for some) of the Magloire presidency were coming to an end.

On the morning of September 5th, 1956 I was sitting at my desk, working on a story about Dr. Larimer Mellon who had just opened the Albert Schweitzer hospital in Deschapelles, when a man stepped into my office and announced that Dr. Duvalier was here to see me.

The presidential campaign was just getting started. I knew of Duvalier because the police had blamed a series of recent disorders and student protests on his followers. And I had heard a rumor that when president Estimé was going to be toppled by colonel Magloire, Duvalier went to Estimé and asked him to remove him as minister of Public Health and Labor and make him Interior Minister so he could crack down and fight the military. Estimé refused, saying he did not want to spill the blood of a black man. Duvalier had been in hiding for a couple of years and only last month had been given security guarantees by the government. Anti- Magloire sentiment was growing in Haiti and things were not looking good. There were accusations of corruption as well as uncertainty as to when Magloire's presidency was to officially come to an end. Things were heating up. There were occasional demonstrations, some of which turned violent while the candidates pointed fingers at each other and the government.

The man who announced Duvalier's visit at my office stepped out briefly and returned with a short man dressed in a thick black serge suit and bow tie, a black homburger hat, and thick, black rimmed glasses.

We shook hands and he took the seat across my desk. "Mr. Diederich," he said in halting English, his body very straight, his feet planted flat on the floor and his arms resting neatly on the sides of the chair. "I am Dr. Francois Duvalier."

I reached to the side of my desk for a pad to write on. I had quite a few questions for the little doctor. I wanted to know about his years in hiding, about his followers, whom some referred to as fanatical, and about his past; where he came from, his education and early career as a doctor.

But Duvalier raised his index finger. "No," he said calmly and smiled revealing a gold tooth. "I am not here to give you an interview, Mr. Diederich. I am only making a brief courtesy call to announce my candidacy for president of the republic."

His thick prism glasses made it difficult to read his eyes. I put my pad down and leaned forward, resting my arms on the desk.

"May I ask you, Mr. Diederich. What do the Americans think of me?"

I knew that by Americans, he meant the U.S. Embassy. I was a blan and therefore people assumed I was an American. I imagined Duvalier thought the Embassy could be an obstacle to his political ambitions.

"I don't know about the Embassy, but the people at USAID have spoken well of you and your work," I said referring to the Point IV's Inter-American Cooperative Public Health Service, (known by its French abbreviation initials, SCISP) where Duvalier had worked until he went into hiding.

I didn't mention that the U.S. Embassy looked kindly on the candidacy of Senator Louis Déjoie, but he probably already knew that. Déjoie had actively courted the U.S. embassy with his upper-class sophistication and charm, and it appeared his chic soirées had paid off. Personally, I did not understand why any of the candidates were campaigning in the first place since Clément Jumelle was the government's Dauphin. He was the chosen successor to the presidency and had full support of the Magloire government and the military.

Duvalier seemed to think about this for a moment. He glanced around my sparse, air-conditioned office, and at a small ivory statue of Mahatma Gandhi on a shelf behind me. He was silent. I waited. Then he stood and thanked me. "Tomorrow," he said, "my driver will deliver my political platform with a twelve-point program for my presidency."

We shook hands and I watched him walk out of the office. His driver held the door open for him as he got into the back seat of a gray shiny Buick. As they drove off, I leaned back on my chair and wondered about the little doctor. It was strange that he had not removed his hat. He had been uncommonly direct and to the point. I thought he lacked the charisma of Fignolé or the flamboyance of Déjoie. Yet I was struck by his confidence and quiet determination. He had been in my office for less than ten minutes and I had failed to get any information from him.

The struggle for the presidency intensified. National elections were set for January 13, 1957. When President Magloire returned from a trip to the United States for a medical checkup in mid-October, he was welcomed by a tremendous crowd. Inexplicably, he withdrew his support for Jumelle, and even accused him of being a mangeur de mulâtres (literally â mulatto eater, but colloquially a racist). Why had the onetime Bon Papa now opposed the capable Finance Minister? Jealously or maybe he had learned of Jumelle's promise to clean up corruption, including Magloire and his friends.

The peaceful, colorful country I had known for the last six years turned into a hotbed of political violence. There were persistent public disorders, and bombs exploded throughout Port-au-Prince. A favorite target was the old Iron Market where panicking market women would run wildly into the streets and merchants would bang shut their heavy, iron anti-revolution doors. Anti-Magloire pamphlets were distributed and stories were told to frighten peasants and prevent them from bringing produce into the city. They were told loupgarous (werewolves), were loose and that some of the marchandes had disappeared mysteriously while trying to enter the city.

It became too dangerous for candidates to go out to the provinces to tour. One November night Daniel Fignolé was almost ambushed on the road to Leogane. Police Chief Prosper accused Duvalier or his partisans of the attack on Fignolé and called it an attempt to eliminate an opponent while throwing suspicion on the government.

Yet, despite all the political mayhem, life in Haiti continued on at its usual surreal pace. The soccer season began with eight local teams participating in the Pradel Cup with evening matches at Magloire Stadium. For me, the games were the most uplifting events in the county. It was the one place where Haitians of all classes would join together and share the joy of the sport.

A Brazilian circus made a stop in Port-au-Prince with animal acts, an elephant, and a crazy monkey. A new seven story flour mill broke ground, and there were always embassy cocktail parties to attend-- an excellent source of gossip for the Haiti Sun's social column.

At the end of October the Haitian embassy in Havana, Cuba, was stormed by General Rafael Salas Canizares. The Cuban forces killed ten rebels who had been seeking asylum there. Students in Port-au-Prince demonstrated before the Cuban embassy which was conveniently situated across the street from the offices of the Haiti Sun. All I had to do was step out of my office to photograph and report on the Haitians protesting Cuba's violation of Haiti's sovereignty.

Between covering politics, social events, the courts, artistic performances, sports, and writing features on people like artist Jean Eguerrand Gourgues, who got rid of his nightmares by painting them, I had less and less time to go out to a nearly deserted stretch of beach I had leased with a friend. It was at Mer Frappée, past Carrefour south of the capital. Nothing could beat the heat like an afternoon swim there.

Meanwhile, the rainy season had arrived and it was costing the candidates a lot of money. Tropical downpours tore away their posters from walls, fences and coconut trees, and washed them away with the topsoil into the sea.

I tried to make a difference, to find a formula for helping, searching for ways to get people to read and envisioned Kreyol comics and a Kreyol illustrated weekly—however politics were far too powerful.

In late November, just as the hurricane season came to an end, British writer Graham Greene arrived in Haiti with Catherine Walston with whom he had ended his affair. She was the model for the lead character in Greene's book, The End of the Affair.

I had met him briefly on his first trip to Haiti in 1954. I became an avid Greene fan after reading "The Power and The Glory" back in England. I found his books easy to read, enjoyed his conflicts between good and evil, and how he brought religion's morality down to earth, giving them real humanity. And while reading "The Heart of the Matter" I felt I was there, in Freetown, Sierra Leone as a tropical downpour pounded on the tin roof of my house in Port-au- Prince.

So, when I came back to Haiti after a brief visit to Europe in August 1954, and heard that Peter Brook, Truman Capote and Graham Greene were staying at the luxurious El Rancho hotel, I immediately drove up the hill to try and interview the famous writer.

Brooks and Capote were preparing the stage production of Capote's House of Flowers which was set and named after a brothel in the south of Port-au-Prince, and Brooks had invited Greene to come along.

I found the author sitting alone at the hotel's circular mahogany bar. He was dressed in tropical tan slacks and an open neck shirt. He looked somewhat intimidating with his large frame leaning over the bar, his legs dangling over the high stool. His eyes were cold and blue.

I introduced myself and asked if he might give me a short interview. Greene shrugged and somewhat begrudgingly asked me what I wanted to know. I translated his aloof demeanor to starchy British snobbery. Still, I was determined to get something for the paper from one of the writers I most admired.

"What do you think of Haiti?" I asked.

"Well yes," he said, "I much prefer it to Jamaica. It reminds me of Indochina, but without the war, of course." And he explained that he had recently spent time reporting there.

Then he fell silent. He clearly disliked the press and I had the feeling he wanted to be alone. I asked him a few questions about his stay and he explained he had been to Cap Haitian with Brook's wife and had climbed up to the Citadel, visited the markets, and gone to a vodou ceremony where the oungan bit the head off a chicken. Then he fell back to that quiet, defensive posture. Then he drained the rest of his drink and walked away.

This time I found an entirely different person. Greene and Catherine were sitting by the side of the pool playing a game of scrabble. He appeared only slightly irritated by my interruption.

"Please sit down," she said. He did not introduce me to his lady friend, who I learned much later was Catherine Walston."

Greene leaned over the side of his chair to consult a small dictionary.

"I'm winning. Graham doesn't trust my spelling."

"Yes," Greene said. He looked at the word on the board and back at the dictionary, "which means I'm buying the drinks."

"Mr. Greene," I asked, "I wonder if I might take your photograph for my newspaper."

"Please," Catherine interrupted, "call him Graham."

Greene leaned back on his chair and looked at me. "I really don't like being photographed. I don't like publicity if it's just as well..."

"Oh, come on now, darling. Stand up like a man and be shot." Catherine laughed and waved at Greene.

Graham stood by the side of the pool. He was wearing a dark short sleeve shirt and linen slacks. As I looked down and focused my Rolleiflex [camera], he put his hands in his pockets and looked slightly away as I pressed the shutter.

I asked Graham about his visit. He thought about this for a moment and surprised me when he said he loved Haiti's public transportation: the ten-cent communal taxi called la ligne, which dropped passengers anywhere in the city for the same price; the taptap, a colorfully painted pickup truck written up with brazen sayings and biblical messages; and the camionette, an unadorned station wagon that plied the hill between the Port-au-Prince and Pétionville.

"I know that on your previous visit you had a chance to visit some of the regular tourist spots," I said. "If you like, I could take you to meet some of our new artists."

"That sounds wonderful," Catherine said, "how about it Graham? Let's do it."

"Sure," Graham said, "as long as we're not surrounded by all this," and he made a motion with his hand toward the pool area and the bar where loud sunburned tourists congregated.

"You know, if you're not into this scene, you should try the Oloffson," I said suggesting my favorite hotel. Since Roger Coster and his wife Laura had taken over the old gingerbread hotel, they had transformed it into an interesting bohemian hangout. Coster, a Frenchman who had been a photographer for Life, Paris-Match and Vogue, had succeeded in turning the Oloffson into the Greenwich Village of the Caribbean. But Graham said he felt obligated to stay at the El Rancho since they were Albert Silvera's guests. "I really don't want to insult him by moving to another hotel," he said.

The following morning, I picked them up and we drove out to a few art galleries and the Centre d' Art which was run by California artist Peter Dewitt. Dewitt told Graham and Catherine how he had quit painting so he could start the center and cultivate Haitian artists.

"They're naturals," Dewitt explained when Catherine asked why Haitians were so artistic. "I think it's the spirituality of vodou," he added and guided them through various paintings including some of my favorite works by the late Hector Hyppolite.

Dewitt said he had started the center over a decade before, but that the Haitian art scene was just getting momentum. "The Haitians who can afford to buy art still haven't come around. Most of our clients are tourists," he said, adding that the elite class in Haiti preferred traditional European art to the primitive styles and common scenes depicting Vodou and folklore in most of the current Haitian art.

One afternoon I took them to La Galerie Brochette an exhibition center for a new colony of artists in Carrefour. The artists there included Gérard Dorcély and Luckner Lazard who were modernists and Max Pinchinat. Catherine was very excited about the work.

"This is marvelous," she said, "have they had the opportunity to exhibit abroad?"

I said that they had not.

"Well, we must arrange it," she cried and looked at Graham and at me and at the smiling artists standing in the narrow gallery. "When I get back to London I'll see what I can do. We must show these to the rest of the world."

A couple of days after visiting the galleries, Graham suggested we visit one of the cafe-brothels that dotted the Carrefour road.

"Now, I'm not interested in the Dominicans," he said. The majority of Haitian brothels were staffed by lighter skinned Dominican women. "I only want to go to places with Haitians."

We stopped at the Paradise Bar, just opposite the Thorland Club. It had an open-air patio that was painted the bright red of the eyes of Erzulie Ge Rouge, Vodou's angry love goddess. Large bougainvillea's spilled over the walls and little colorful Christmas style lights surrounded the ceiling. The place was mostly empty, with a man sitting at a corner table eating grillot, fried pork and plantains; while a few of the young women, attired in tight colorful dresses, danced with each other to Perez Prado's Mambo Number Five blaring out of the jukebox.

The place reeked of fried food, cheap cologne and that distinguishable smell of popular bars that was stale beer and rum.

Catherine and Graham loved it. Graham in particular was smiling, leaning over his Barbancourt and soda, his eyes intently fixed on one of the girls.

"Just look at her," he cried and gestured. "She's an African princess. Simply exquisite. What a perfect profile. Look at that long, beautiful neck."

"Well," Catherine said feigning jealousy, "I suppose I'll leave you boys to your wiles. Can I get a taptap back to the hotel?"

Graham's eyes didn't stray from the girl on the dance floor. He waved at Catherine, "Yes,

fine," he said and we all laughed. We bought another round of rum and soda and Catherine said to me she thought writers were particularly interested in brothels because they were attracted to the world's oldest profession. "Of course, only as observers," she said. "It allows them to see and sometimes feel humanity in the raw."

Graham glanced at Catherine with a quizzical look.

"You know it's the male oppressor's workplace!" she laughed. And we went on like that, hopping from brothel to brothel, having drinks and laughing until two in the morning.

The next day I finally convinced Graham and Catherine to come to the Oloffson. "You have to stop in," I said, "even if it's just for a rum punch."

And the moment we walked up the stairs of the old gingerbread, Graham fell under the spell of the Oloffson's magic. Aubelin Jolicoeur, Roger Coster and a tribe of bohemian expatriates and Haitians were loitering about the hotel's wide verandah.

Graham and Catherine quickly changed hotels, even though it was only for the last two days of their stay. That same afternoon we sat out on the verandah, and César, the Oloffson's diminutive bartender, mixed us round after round with his celebrated rum punches. Slowly, the afternoon took on a soft reddish glow as the sun dipped out behind La Gônave bay. The palms waved gently in the breeze. In the distance the faint sound of drumming and the subtle hint of charcoal came and went the way it always did in Haiti.

"This is truly a beautiful place," Graham said and leaned toward me. These are the best I have tasted as another round of rum punch arrived. We were joined by Aubelin and Laura Coster and Graham continued to praise César's punches "What a wonderful place. You're very lucky."

"Yes, I know." I said quietly and glanced at him, his icy blue eyes looking out past all the glitz of Haiti's tourism and staring right into the core of the country's soul.

The editor I left in charge at the paper while I was in Europe didn't do any reporting. He had announced Graham's arrival the day he was leaving.

He had never seen the paper that had declared him winner of the Nobel Prize for literature. He had been denied the prize because he had a run in with the head of the jury

Less than a week after I dropped Graham and Catherine off at the airport, bombs exploded in various sections of the capital. A market woman was badly injured by a time bomb that shattered the concrete table at which she was seated in the Iron Market. A man carrying a shoeshine box was blown to bits when the box, which actually contained a bomb, exploded prematurely in the residential neighborhood of Bois Verna. Horrified spectators who had rushed to the scene stood staring at the man's entrails hanging from an almond tree. Another explosion damaged the water reservoir at Bolosse.

The following day, Thursday December 6, Magloire did what he had promised he would never do. In a radio announcement he declared that he had accepted the opposition's interpretation that his six-year term had ended that day. He said he was stepping down as president and was assuming the title of chief of the executive power and commander in chief of the army with special legal powers.

General Antoine Levelt, the army chief of staff, went on the radio and explained the fanciful scenario, "Both the vice-president of the supreme court and the elder member of the court have refused to take provisional power. Therefore, I have asked General Magloire to remain in power. He is sacrificing himself for the fatherland."

The auto-coup would have been laughable if it had not been accompanied by a decree ordering the immediate arrest of political leaders. Louis Déjoie and Duval Duvalier, François

Duvalier's father, and several opposition senators and deputies were imprisoned in the National Penitentiary. All were accused of subversive activities. The following day the government council composed of senators and deputies had been dissolved.

A spontaneous strike erupted and snowballed with amazing speed and totality. The capital became a ghost town as stores and businesses, many of whose owners were partisans of Déjoie, pulled shut their antiriot shutters. Typewritten flyers appeared in the form of chain letters requesting each recipient to type and distribute ten more, producing an endless supply of tracts. Students circulated a separate manifesto declaring they would not resume classes until Magloire renounced power.

I filed stories for the Associated Press and The New York Times. The coup became a major story in the U.S. and the rest of the world. Magloire's naked bid to retain power caught the U.S. Embassy by surprise. Washington recalled Ambassador Roy Tasco Davis for consultation. Staff correspondents for the major U.S. media began to arrive, including my friend Paul Kennedy whom I met at the airport with a bottle of Barbancourt from my own stash since all the stores were closed because of the strike.

I drove Kennedy to the Oloffson and briefed him on the events of the past two days. I showed him a copy of La Phalange, the Catholic daily, which had appeared that morning with a declaration, signed by the Supreme Court justices clarifying their position. They had refused to accept the executive power from the Army because the Army demanded that they agree to unconstitutional extralegal powers.

Kennedy and I drove around town the following morning. The city was still deserted, but as we came closer to the center of town, we found hundreds of women, most of them from the elite class, and thus supporters of Louis Dejoie, marching on the national penitentiary where Dejoie was being held. The guards looked on at the unusual spectacle of women, praying and chanting; "Je vous salue Marie".



Paul Kennedy of the New York Times with Joliceur

Back at the Oloffson, Kennedy hammered out his story on his battered typewriter. It was a fine report outlining Haiti's political situation. We drove out to the RCA cable office and Kennedy handed his type written article to the attendant, happy to have made his Times deadline. Then an Army officer reached over and took Kennedy's cable dispatch from the RCA man who explained the officer was a government censor. After slowly reading the story, the officer returned the copy to Kennedy. "What's the matter?" Kennedy said firmly, "where's the problem?"

"All of it," the officer said lazily and turned his back.

"Oh, bullshit!" Kennedy cried and banged the counter with his fist. "It's the truth, isn't it? You object to the truth you..."

"Hold on," I said and pulled Kennedy's arm.

"No, Bernie. He can't do that. I have to file my story!"

"Yes, he can," I said and pulled Kennedy out of the RCA office before things turned for the worse. I knew the censor would not relent. Instead, I drove Kennedy to the international telephone office of the little West Indies Telephone Company. It was the only place where we could call overseas.

Kennedy squeezed his large frame into one of the three stifling telephone booths, but as soon as he got through to New York and began dictating his story to the New York Times foreign desk, the communication was cut off.

Kennedy demanded an explanation from the operator, and then a large man in a Navy uniform squeezed behind the counter and gave Kennedy the thumbs down. I will not repeat Paul's reaction.

On Monday morning we drove around the city. Businesses were still shuttered and the streets deserted. We had not been able to file the story, so we drove out to Bowen Field airport and gave a copy to a passenger leaving Haiti.

As we made our way back to the city, I was flagged down by a police officer. "Is that Paul Kennedy?" he asked.

I nodded.

The officer leaned over and looked at Kennedy sitting beside me. "Mr. Kennedy, you have six hours to leave the country." Then he looked at me and added, "You make sure he leaves."

Kennedy leaned forward into the position of a boxer about to throw a killer punch and demanded, "On whose orders, why?"

But the officer ignored his question and walked away. "I can't believe it," Kennedy cried, "fucking bastards!"

We got back to the Oloffson and took at a table on the verandah. We ordered lunch and Kennedy leaned forward. "Why me?" he asked. "What do you think pissed them off so much?"

"Maybe he's afraid of you," I said and reminded him of a recent interview we both attended where Kennedy asked President Magloire whom he saw as his successor. Magloire made a sweeping gesture with his arms from a palace window and said every Haitian over forty aspired to his job. I later told Kennedy I thought that was one of the president's more profound statements. I pointed out that Magloire was a rich man, and it was not because he banked his meager salary. Many Haitians likened the presidency to winning the lottery. The winner takes all.

There was also Kennedy's story on the Peligre Dam which was to facilitate the irrigation of the Artibonite Valley. The original cost of the dam had been estimated at $14 million, however the total outlay reached $28 million, a one hundred percent overrun equal to the government's budget. The opposition treated the issue like a domestic scandal, although the contractors were Brown and Root, based in Texas.

As we ate our lunch, two policemen arrived and walked up to our table. "Mr. Kennedy," one of them said, "you are supposed to be at the airport. You have not made a plane reservation to leave."

Kennedy motioned toward his suitcase and portable typewriter on the floor by the table. "I'm all packed up," he said. "I don't usually do that just to have lunch. I have my ticket. You're welcome to make the reservation if you like."

The men took a seat at an adjacent table and waited for us to finish our lunch. Kennedy took his time and ended his meal with a healthy shot of his favorite rum. I drove Kennedy to the airport. The police followed us and watched him board the plane for Jamaica where he filed a front-page story for the New York Times from the Western Union office in Kingston.

Tuesday evening, president Magloire summoned thirty-two of the leading merchants of Port-au-Prince's 300 commercial and industrial enterprises to the National Palace. A communiqué stated that the businessmen had agreed to reopen their stores the following morning, but Wednesday came and the city was still shut down.

Magloire blamed foreign interests, claiming the Blans were behind the effort to oust him; however, by the afternoon the president announced in a radio speech that he was stepping down. Army chief of staff general Levelt declared that the army had accepted Magloire resignation and that in conformity with the constitution, chief justice of the supreme court, Joseph Nemours Pierre-Louis, would hold the executive power.

On Thursday December 13th, the capital was still strike bound. And once again, Pro-Déjoie women congregated at the Roman Catholic cathedral, circulating their mot d' ordre (continue to strike until Magloire leaves the country).

That afternoon I received a tip that Magloire was indeed leaving. Harvey Rosenhouse of Time Magazine and I raced out to Bowen Field airport and took positions at the control tower which provided the best view of the adjacent military airport. At 6:30PM we watched as General Magloire, his family and close aides climbed aboard the government's C-47 bound for Kingston, Jamaica. The nonviolent general strike had succeeded. Kennedy was there to interview him.

When the fight to fill the presidency got hot, I was officially expelled by the Déjoie forces because of a Time Magazine article they felt was hostile to them. It was a happy two-week sojourn in New York in May 1957.

A few years before Magloire went into exile I had the pleasure of meeting Jean Desquiron, an intellectual from Jérémie who had set up a business with a friend and advertised "Haiti Trading Company" in the Haiti Sun. One day I went to Pétionville to interview Jean's wife Ghislaine who had launched a chicken business. It was through Ghislaine I met her younger sister, Ginette, a schoolgirl at St Rose de Lima in Lalue. She looked pretty in her school uniform.

Ginette, it was Ězili Rouge and Papa Legba combined, who in the millions of people in New York that night of all nights made our paths cross. I had just arrived in Manhattan… I am sorry my love… you had the right to ditch me…

One afternoon in early September 1958 I had gone to the Hotel Splendid to meet with former hotelier (Oloffson) Maurice de Young, who had returned to Haiti to microfilm copies of Haitian newspapers for the University of Florida. I carried several volumes of the Haiti Sun to be given to the University's Gainesville library.

The Splendid had once been Port-au-Prince's top Hotel but time had passed by and Madame Maria Frankel and her administrator Alberti had grown old along with their hotel.

She was standing there amidst the Splendid's brilliant bougainvillea, sandals and gypsy-type flowing skirt and white blouse. As I passed her she smiled and asked me the names of the profusion of tropical plants. I loved the way she impishly screwed up her pretty face. Then I heard myself offering this young lady who had just checked into the Splendid, "would you like me to show you my Haiti?" She had arrived by Panama Line ship from New York.

In Vodou terms, credit goes to Papa Legba for having had my path cross with that of this interesting young lady from Manhattan. Then Ězili took over. It could have only happened in Haiti. We fell under Ězili's spell.

Her name didn't mean a thing to me. It was only as we began enjoying our time together that we began sharing our little histories. I learned she was a 27-year old actress, (I was 32) newly divorced and at a crossroads, similar to the one I faced in December 1949 when I arrived by

accident in Haiti. She was full of doubt about her career even though she said the two-character play she was appearing in on Broadway was a success. The more I got to know Anne, the more she talked wistfully of the things missing in her life because of her demanding career.
She made me forget the past and even the present. We made the best of the week we had together. Each day ended with an enchanted evening.

One morning we drove out to the Cul-de-Sac to welcome Doc Reser back from two and a half years in Miami. My old friend, an initiated Oungan, Vodou priest, was happily ensconced in an attractive new wooden house to replace his old Kay Pay on the highway next to the Pont Beudet insane asylum, 20 miles from Port-au-Prince. (Gwo Roche and other Oungans of the region had celebrated his return with special Vodou services.)

Anne was a good sport and didn't mind sharing Page One of the Sun's on Sept 21, 1958 with Papa Doc who was celebrating his first year in power on the following day. The photograph showed Anne standing at the gate with Doc Reser before his new house. The caption read: "Attractive Anne Bancroft , top screen and stage actresses currently the star of the Broadway play Two for the Seesaw." Also in the picture was Doc's long-time friend sugar planter Rudolph Dontfraid, who had built the house for Doc, and Stanley Mills Haggard, a leading TV art director who had escorted Ms. Bancroft to Haiti.

The following Monday, message after message arrived at the office of the Haiti Sun. Wally and Dave Talamas who advertised their Canapé Vert tourist emporium in the Sun needed to speak to me urgently. They revealed that they were star gazers, perhaps the only ones of their type in Haiti at the time and they were quick to spot the front-page photo of Anne Bancroft. They were ecstatic about meeting Anne and this led to the Sun featuring, the following week, photographs of Anne visiting their Grand Rue store.

"These two young enterprising businessmen have their ear to the ground and if a star should fall on Haiti even for a quite vacation they are quick to register their footsteps. Even when a star ... hidden behind sunglasses and wearing lowly zapates." (Anne wore sunglasses and sandals.)

We had great fun at Future and Pierre d'Adesky's Kyona beach. I warned her time and again about Ĕzili, the lwa of love that can stir hearts in magical Haiti. It proved more than just a romantic interlude in both our lives.

"…Wally and Dave who knew about the entire career of Anne Bancroft and laid a carved wooden head in tribute at the feet of the star." Unlike the Talamas boys I was completely ignorant of Broadway and who was playing. The following week French heart-throb Martine Carol glamorized the Sun's front page. The two actresses couldn't have been more different from each other. Ms. Bancroft preferred the old elegance of Hotel Splendid while Martine Carol was a guest at the ritzy El Rancho. To the delight of her Haitian fans Carol became the toast of Port-au-Prince, posing for photographers and public alike. Haiti's tourism's officially had Carol prove that the country was still on the tourist's map.

Anne was funny, a great adorable comedienne, and a born mimic. She was like a tidal wave washing Papa Doc out of our minds. I was impressed with her knowledge of French as well as Italian. Her real name, she said was Maria Anna Italiano. Anna talked of her Italian-American upbringing from singing on a neighborhood corner near her home in the Bronx. Then she sang for me and said she hoped with the aid of singing lessons to be able to play in a musical.

Bancroft was her stage name. Her heritage brought with it a downside in acting and a touch of bitterness would creep into her voice when she described how critics sought to type cast her. Anne was for me an education on the trials and tribulations and pit falls of a young actress. But as we got to know each other, I think, I took the place of her Freudian analyst, as I listened to her questioning her career as an actress. There was so much more to Anne but at times she appeared very frail and in search of a fuller family life, or so she believed. Bewitched by Haiti, she was truly a loving persons still filled with self-doubt about her career. As I got to know her I did my best to reassure her that she could make it. She had acted in so many Hollywood films, few people had ever heard of them. What really riled her though was the insinuation by some, she said, that she was just playing herself, as Gittel Mosca a bohemian gal from Bronx, in Two for the Seesaw a two-character play. Her leading man was Henry Fonda and she had liked to play with him much better than Dana Andrew who had taken over the role after Fonda moved on. Fonda, she said, was always so stable and secure and gave the play great dignity and stature which Dana did not. But she agreed, thinking it over, that Dana did give warmth and tenderness to the part.

Our parting was unlike the film Casablanca – Anne didn't disappear into the night on a plane but took off on a ship agreeing to see each other again, soon. A tourist couple we had befriended at Kyona Beach sailed off with Anna aboard the Panama liner SS Cristobal for New York.

Hardly was she over the horizon that a telegram arrived: Sept 25 1958 at 8.02 p.m. Bernard Diederich Press Port-au-Prince Haiti.

"I knew you were somewhere near bye, love. Anne."

Shirley Gumpley of Life En Espanol and her husband Len Gumpley of CBS were company for Anne on her return to New York. Shirley wrote describing their trip.

"…How we loved Haiti… short as the visit was, and we really hated to have to wave to you as we sailed off into the sunset! And what a dramatic, romantic sunset it was! I imagine Anne has written to you about it — but may I repeat… it was quite an experience. Port-au-Prince looked like a white shimmering jewel at the foot of the mountains, the sunset was lovely with the light it cast, and the dark glowing clouds with the streaks of heat lightening only accented the drama."

On September 26 I received the first of a dozen letters. I no longer recall what I wrote but I found that the small bundle of Anne's letters tucked away amidst recovered Haiti Sun files. Addressed simple to "Haiti Sun Port-au-Prince" the post office proved it remained efficient in spite of censorship.

On Oct 23, 1958 I finally got to fly to New York. I had a busy schedule and longed to see Anne. I was there to arrange to purchase printing machinery for the Haiti Sun, meet with my brother, Brian, on a yearlong world trip, who was coming down from Canada to see me. I had a lot on my plate.

The night of my arrival I picked Anne up after her habitual hour at her analyst. We were walking gaily hand-in-hand window shopping on Lexington Avenue, when suddenly out of the early evening, my Haitian life suddenly caught up with me. Hurrying to the subway from her part time work at the United Nation's post office — she was paying her way through college, (New York University-NYU) — was my most precious young Haitian friend.

It was, for me, one of the most embarrassing encounters. Ginette was somebody special and from 12 years old, she had grown into a bright University student. For her family it was a particularly difficult time back in Haiti. Her eldest sister Ghislaine, pregnant, had been in prison, as was her husband Jean-Desquiron for providing funds and building a bomb to blow up Papa Doc.

As I overcame my surprise Ginette spoke up. “When did you arrive; how come you haven’t come to see us?” When I found my tongue I tried to explain in Kreyòl but Ginette cut me off with “I speak English so don’t embarrass your friend.” I mumbled that I had just arrived and was going to call. Papa Legba was at it again. He had made our path cross. That moment, Ězili quickly deserted me. I lost not one love, but two, and it took time to regain one.

As Ginette bid goodbye and hurried off to catch the subway Anne watched her disappear and then turned to me with an understanding smile and said, “What a beautiful young lady, is she your girlfriend?” Anne was incredibly perceptive and noted the disappointment in Ginette’s voice. I blustered out that her family was my closest friends.

Ginette was later told by an American and his Haitian wife trying the sell life insurance that Anne and I were to be married. They wanted her address to sell her insurance. It became a truly miserable weekend. I saw the Seesaw and witnessed a great actress at work. I had too short a time to talk with my brother, Brian, whom I had not seen since he served in the New Zealand Army in Japan and later ran several successful businesses in Australia. We had a Chinese lunch together and then I had to rush off and pick up Anne.

I had promised to drive her to the Berkshires in a borrowed auto— it had bald tires and on wet road it was a danger to us both. It was nerve-racking. We spent the weekend with Arthur Penn, the director of “Two for the Seesaw”. Anne and Dana Andrew put on the play locally as a campaign favor for a woman democratic congressional candidate, whose name I forget. She lost. Besides Penn, an interesting visitor was historian James McGregor Burns. Everyone was talking about Lolita – the book had just come out. If you were not a New Yorker and not caught up with the fads or books of the moment you knew you were an outsider and didn’t belong. Vladimir Nabokov’s novel Lolita about a pre-teen love made me wondered if Anne believed that the young Haitian girl was my Lolita. James Macgregor Burns I admired for his book, Roosevelt: The Lions and the Fox. It had won him the Pulitzer Prize two years earlier. He was then working on a profile of John F. Kennedy. At least I was among Democrats. I don’t even recall our return to Manhattan but I do recall Anne didn’t own a good winter coat.

It was the end of our romance. I had always shunned sentimentality with disgust until prison which made me grieve for those who were not as lucky as I on April 26, 1963.

Ed Morrow had a TV program and was going to visit Anne’s brownstone house in Manhattan at 117 W 12th street, so I sent her my best Gourgue painting of my collection. It was of a Vodou service celebrated outdoors in the tropical night. It was to help her decorate her home for Morrow’s visit.

It was the end of our affair. I always liked to think that perhaps I helped Anne a little at a crucial time in her life. I know I recognized her as a great actress.

On Dec.21, 1959 Anne appeared on the cover of Time. The story was pegged to Anne’s tremendous success in the Broadway play, “The Miracle Worker” another of William Gibson’s productions. Anne was on her way.

In solitary confinement with a half drum of flies feasting on remains of the night’s toilet, the mind wanders. Whenever I faced danger, I recall the heroic sacrifice of Uncle Roy. It was perhaps because his father (my grandfather) was born in Germany that, on leave from his post as assistant Attorney General in the Fiji Islands, that he quietly enlisted in the New Zealand Army as a simple trooper, shunning officer rank. He fought in Italy and on the 14 of April, 1945 was killed in a German mortar attack. He died just before the Germans surrendered. Uncle Roy had coached the Fijians in rugby and they played in New Zealand. He was well equipped to teach rugby as at Victoria University in Wellington he had been an outstanding player and captain of the Varsity team.

Selden Rodman had written in his 1954 book, Haiti: The Black Republic, that “Doc Reser and I had contributed enough to the Republic, to be considered Haitians by adoption.” When Rodman reprinted the book, I was no longer an adopted son, in fact, he had bowed to the dictatorship removing my name. It was an omen of sorts making me a non-person. (See copy of the 1954 photo that disappeared from Rodman’s book on-page 176).



Representative Haitians
Fernand Pierre, painter of the ‘Visitation’ in the Cathedral, at work on a box. Milo and Odette Mennesson-Rigaud, authorities on *vaudou*, in their Pétion-Ville garden. Doc Reser of Pont Beudet and Bernard Diederich of the *Haiti Sun* have contributed enough to the Republic to be considered Haitians by adoption.

Without my mask I examined my own survival techniques. Whenever I interviewed a dangerous person, a rank killer, I was careful not to show my distain or dislike, hate or contempt. It was why I had not become another victim of Rafael Trujillo, although I came close to being bumped off by his agents. (His assassination in 1961 was my scoop.) Whenever I interviewed Papa Doc, I did not allow emotion to overcome the interview. It was difficult not to hide one’s utter dislike for Macoutes, such as Roger Lafontant, Lucien Chauvet and the sadist Jean Tassy. They were abominable brutes who would betray and sacrifice their own mothers. Ultimately their crimes would overwhelm them. During the 1961 student strike, I experienced Macoute’s savagery and witnessed their brutality in the National Palace while being

held there. When I had returned from Cuba in January 1959, I had angered Papa Doc by displaying my enthusiasm for Fidel Castro's revolution and he referred to me as a "vagabond". In 1962, Ginette was at the airport when I returned from another trip to Cuba and feared that there would be no wedding as she wrongly believed the police chief was waiting for the plane to arrest me.

At Saint Claire, Catholic Church at Frères standing before Father Monin, a French priest, I said, "I do" as did Ginette and me were married, Ězili saw to that. It was June 7, 1962.

The emptiness of the National Penitentiary with not a single audible cry of distress continued to send a bolt of fear though me. It is the knowledge that those not killed in the streets on April 26 must have been immediately executed. There was insufficient cell space in Fort Dimanche for the many that had been seized. I understood that Duvalier wanted to kill every retired Army officer, possibly in the hundreds. (Later the names of 65 killed that day were recorded.)

I draw to a corner transfixed like an idiot and watch the flies crawl over the latrine drum devouring the feces--kaka... The flies are alive. Death is everywhere, everywhere. I reflect bitterly that there will be no peace. What mockery dictatorship. People accept their misery living with false hope. Foreboding always of a violent death. Corpses everywhere. Even at high noon overcome by flies, and the stench is killing me. Disgusting! Dark demons are everywhere. Oh, for news from the outside of family and whether the mayhem set off by Papa Doc continues. Solitary confinement is hell and allows demons to take over the soul. Lies and evil are no longer covered up. Kill, kill, kill. How did Haiti reach this state...the oppression is total.

The keys rattled in the lock; a group of soldier stood there. One held my clothes and an officer ordered "get dressed". This sudden interruption disturbed the flies. I thought, I had not left my name on the wall…what if it's Fort Dimanche… In the prison office, Capt. Thomas, an old friend, with tired eyes from lack of sleep said softly… "You are leaving."

I understood exile. I tried to speak but I had, had nothing to drink, my mouth was parched… finally I told Thomas "I am not going without my family…I am not going…"

"They are alright, you are not. A plane is waiting…they have no problem. I have your passport…another officer nodded, "go, blan, go." He added, " If you don't go your family, all of you, will have serious problems, real trouble… go!"

I trusted Thomas and followed his orders and went. Alive on the outside I can help.

Mounting the empty Delta fight, an airport worker whispered, "Blan, ou gin chans," Blan, you are lucky. I didn't think so. I had lost everything that I had worked for during 13 years with the people I had come to love.

For two weeks that wrenching separation produced powerful bloody nightmares. In New York waiting for my family to escape the claws of Duvalier, silently. My story of that bloody day in April, 1963 had to wait for five years to be published, finally it appeared in Papa Doc; the truth about Haiti today. (Papa Doc was published in New York, Paris, London, Barcelona, Rome, Iran. In Farsi, Penguin, Santo Domingo and finally in Port-au-Prince.)

It took 50 years for a memorial Mass to be held for the victims of the Duvalier dictatorship. We were among the sea of grey heads that filled St. Pierre church in Petionville on that sad day. But was there any closure for the wives and children of the "disappeared?" No!

(I was among those saddened by Anne's death in 2006 at age 73. She had married comedian Mel Brooks and was also survived by a son. She always wanted a family and I was happy for her that she had one. The movie world will always remember her as Mrs. Robinson in The Graduate.)



Return on a visit after the people rose up against the dictatorship.

ENDNOTES

1. The Tontons Macoutes are equal opportunity thugs who attack and spirit away anyone accused of being an enemy of Papa Doc, along with their families. The Macoutes, with their intimidating dark sunglasses are the dregs of the population. There is even a Macoute squad made up of medical students under the command of the vicious and ambitious Roger Lafontant.
2. Thomas Hardy, the admiral, is remembered by British school boys because of the famous phrase uttered by Lord Horacio Nelson who lay wounded aboard the Victory at the Battle of Trafalgar:" Kiss me Hardy for I am dying." The heart of the other Thomas Hardy, the writer (1840-1928), is said to be buried close by in the Stinsford graveyard in a biscuit tin. His body is buried in Westminster Abbey. Writer Hardy, according to legend, told his doctor that he wanted to leave his heart in his beloved Dorset. He ordered him on his death to be buried in Stinsford. The good doctor is said to have removed his heart and then called for the housekeeper to find a receptacle to put the heart in. Overcome with emotion, the housekeeper, after some delay, produced a biscuit tin into which the good doctor is said to have placed the heart and had it buried as his patient had requested. Others say that the housekeeper was in a state of shock and took so long to locate the tin that the cat ate the heart. Dorset, I found at Bridehead, was filled with wonderful tales, especially about members of the Williams family itself. I often wondered if Lady Williams who had some extraordinarily strict rules allowed Hardy's books in the house.
3. Papa Legba, the initiator, opens the gates and is the communicator with the divine. There are a number of Ězili spirits but the principal Ězili, whom I appreciated, was the goddess of love as she is known to set up erotic liaisons and doesn't believe in rationing love.
4. Capt. Thomas was later among 19 officers Papa Doc executed by firing squad. It was the beginning of our new life. Ginette, and I went on to have two more children, I became a foreign correspondent for Time-Life News Service, and from my base in Mexico City I covered Haiti from afar. Ginette studied medicine, specializing in psychiatry and is still devoted to the poor; our children made us proud.

The Many Faces of Peace: Rule of Law, Justice of the Peace, and Everyday Life in Haiti

Marco Motta

In Haiti, Justice of the Peace (JP) courts are supposed to promote peace by mediating local disputes. However, Haitians often bypass the courts due to inefficiency and safety concerns. People look to community leaders or religious figures for help instead. The Haitian concept of peace ("lapè") is complex and carries the weight of a violent history. JP courts seem distant from daily life, both geographically and in terms of language and procedure. Judges and clerks face limited resources and potential bias within their communities. Despite these challenges, Haitians continue to seek peace in their everyday lives.

Keywords: rule of law, Justice of the Peace courts, concept of peace

A Goat, Theft, and Evidence[1]

It is December 14, 2018; a gathering is taking place in the shadow of a leafy almond tree, in the courtyard of the Justice of the Peace (JP) court in a communal section in the lower Artibonite Valley. Nowadays, the infrastructure is out of use. In 2012, the department that was tasked with justice reform of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) had "renovated" the existing buildings and built a few others in order to enhance the court's capacity: a hearing room that would accommodate up to 20 people, a reception room, and an office for the appointed judge, the deputy judge, and two court clerks. The UN peacekeepers described their mission in these terms: "to counsel and provide technical support … to enhance the capacities of magistrates, judges of the peace, court clerks, and bailiffs, and to accompany the modernization of the Haitian legislation."[2] Only six years have passed and the floors of the building have already collapsed. Some members of the public who were standing on it when it collapsed were wounded. Moreover, the equipment furnished by the UN, especially the four air conditioners and a 32 kW generator, are broken, out of use, or stolen. The buildings were haphazardly planned and made, with scandalous negligence, out of cheap, precast material. The damage is such that hearings can occur only outside, under the blistering sun, and must be rescheduled if it is raining. In the face of the failure of the joint work of the state and the UN, the court employees and a group of citizens had come together in a collective effort and, without any help from the state, and had invested their own time and money to repaint the walls surrounding the yard and make it look "good." They also bought a new generator.

When Frederic, my host and friend, and I enter the courtyard, about 30 or 40 people are standing in a compact circle around two wooden benches, on which the conflicting parties are seated. Behind each one, two armed policemen wearing bulletproof vests, obviously bored, are slumped in metal chairs with earphones inserted in their ears, looking at their phones. The judge and the court clerk are seated in front of the contending parties. At his side, two attorneys are handling their notes and wiping the sweat off their faces. The plaintiff, a woman in her late 20s

or early 30s, complains that one of her goats (*kabrit*) is missing. She explains that she had inquired with the CASEC (Conseil d'Administration de la Section Communale) of the zone. The CASEC is the communal supervisory board, the very end of the chain of officials. People usually call the board members themselves "CASEC," and often confer with the chief of the board if they have any issue or grievance before they go to the police or to court. During their inquiry, the CASEC had found witnesses who had told them that this man, the accused (sitting on her left-hand side), had sold it and that the people who had bought it had already butchered and eaten the animal. Thus, she accuses that man, who is of more or less the same age, of having stolen one of her goats. Her attorney goes on to explain that in order to sell the goat, the legal procedure requires that the man would have needed a pass for the animal, as well as his own ID or birth certificate, which he had said he had lost. The title of acquisition of the animal is called *lese-pase pou bèt* ("pass for animals") and is issued by the Ministry of the Interior and Territorial Communities and the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development. Every commercial, as well as non-commercial (gifts, inheritances) transactions involving animals is supposed to be formalized by this mandatory document, which specifies the characteristics of the animal: the sort of animal in question (cow, mutton, horse, goat, donkey, mule, or pig), its official register number, its sex, color, and tagging, and its origin and destination. The document is numbered, and it declares where the transaction took place: in which communal section of which commune and in which department. The owner (*mèt bèt la*) has to write down his name, national identification number, address, and signature, as well as a testimony (*temwen*). It is also mentioned which CASEC is in charge of the communal section (with his/her phone number); the document is dated, of course.

In this case, it seems the man had usurped or invented another identification number, either because he did not want to be identified or actually had no ID, as he had claimed (the judge checks the ID the man had used to sell the goat and finds it does not exist in the records). The police arrested the man after the woman filed a complaint. The accused provides a line of defense that the woman has no evidence whatsoever and no proof of what she purports; her accusation is thus said to be totally unfounded. His lawyer asks bluntly, "Where is the body of the offense? Where is the corpse of the animal? You said that your goat had been stolen, sold, and slaughtered [insinuating that she might be lying and using the court to take advantage of his client]. Are you at least able to show us the skin so that we can certify that it is indeed your goat? No, you're not." She replies that she obviously does not have it, because she is not the one who slaughtered it, and time has passed, and the skin is now lost. The man's lawyer proceeds, "but then what makes you say that it's your goat?" Her lawyer replies that she knows that it's hers because of her inquiry with the CASEC and the corroboration of witnesses.

The contention evidently revolves around the problem of adducing evidence—the pass, the skin, and testimonies—which are the missing pieces. The man goes on to claim that the goat was his, that he had bought it when it was small and raised it, but that unfortunately the title had been lost. He adds that he also lost his ID and his own birth certificate (one of which at least is required to lawfully complete the transaction). At the time of the investigation, the woman who had bought the goat from the accused had showed the police agent that she did possess a pass, but it turned out that the registration number of the animal inscribed on it did not exist in the official register; nor did it match the number the man gave to the court.

Given the contradictory claims and the confusion—which triggers some jokes from the attorneys and the judge, and laughter from the audience—the judge decides to keep the man in

custody while an investigation is conducted. He had previously orally requested some hearings with the witnesses and the buyer, but they had all refused to show up in court. So, he now instructs the clerk to produce a formal invitation letter (which is the official way of summoning someone to the JP court). If they still refuse, the judge says, he will issue a subpoena and give the order to the police to coerce them to come to the court. However, that is surely no easy job, because they first have to find them and make it happen.

After everyone has left, Frederic and I sit down in the shade with the judge. We had asked him if he would be kind enough to spare us a moment, and he was happy to oblige. He tells us that he is highly suspicious of the man, because it seems very unlikely that he has suddenly lost all three documents at once (the pass, his ID, and his birth certificate). He also mentions the attitude of the man, which is not quite trustworthy, whereas the woman seems to speak with outright earnestness. Nevertheless, he adds, he is a judge and does not want to rely on his own impressions. Still, he tells us, it is quite clear to him: according to the way both parties pleaded, it looks to him like a common case of theft and the usual strategies of exculpation. The case will be easily settled in court, he says; yet he adds that the settlement might well not be that easily accepted by the parties, and that further issues could arise. That is not his problem anymore, though, unless they come back to the court.

We are here at the core of ordinary matters. Goat theft and killing are major issues in this region. People still practice free breeding on a large scale, even though it is formally forbidden by the law. Goats freely go about with three long sticks hanging around their necks in the shape of a triangle to prevent them from going through bushes and gates into the gardens. They still manage to find ways and do enter the fields. When they damage the plantations, the owner of the plot often either kills the animal, which might trigger a contention with the owner of the goat or reports the incident to local officials. If the animal was slaughtered, an agreement is usually found informally by negotiating the share of meat each party is to receive. The aggrieved party might also capture the animal and call the CASEC, who will keep the animal in a gated yard that precisely serves this purpose until the case is settled. However, it often happens that goats are also stolen. People might seek reparation for the wrong, but they might also be prompted to seek vengeance, or both. Theft easily triggers fury and rancor, which might not be easily diffused.

In a previous paper (Motta, 2020), I was interested in the effects of a murder committed as the result of a dispute over the irrigation of pea fields. In particular, I paid heed to the thresholds of violence and the thin line that marks the difference between concepts such as "dispute settlement" or "conflict resolution" and the everyday efforts to maintain a sustainable life, which cannot be spoken of in terms of "settlement" or "resolution." Rather, the making of a livable life often means having to go on, despite unavoidable violence and without being able to "resolve" anything. This norm is epitomized in expressions such as *nap brase* ("we're struggling"), or *nap goumen* ("we're fighting"). The focus was on seeing some conflicts as the visible face of long-lasting silent wars simmering beneath the surface. Many people have a history with each other, as well as with the state—a history fraught with violence of all sorts.

In this essay, I would like to take the matter up again by looking, this time, more closely at the concept of peace at work in the everyday lives of the people I met, as well as in the discourses promoting the rule of law and peacebuilding projects. A tenacious prejudice about Haiti is that the violence perpetrated on the island is endemic and deep-rooted: in other words, violence is culturally specific (Trouillot, 2003). Such a view not only tends to naturalize Haiti as a violent place, but also eclipses the role played by unending political ostracization, massive foreign

meddling in domestic policies, and unquestioned paternalistic discourses that invalidate Haiti's capacity to govern itself, all of which serve to keep Haiti subordinated. Ironically, this perception prompts foreign funders to sponsor programs and reforms supposed to contribute to ending the violence, which ostensibly hinders the development of what is called a "war-torn" or "post-conflict" (or "failed") state into a democracy; yet, as I will show below, the violence is sometimes stimulated, if not created, by these same funders' policies.

Haiti is known to have endured the presence of one of the biggest and most enduring UN peacekeeping forces in world history. In particular, between 2004 and 2017, the MINUSTAH occupied the republic, in the name of peace, with no less than 10,000 soldiers. The first sentence of the UN Peace Operations Year Review of 2004 reads, "[t]he year 2004 witnessed an unprecedented surge in UN peacekeeping operations, widening prospects for ending conflicts and raising hopes for peace in war-torn countries." Seemingly galvanized by the 2001 Nobel Peace Prize attributed to the UN and Kofi Annan "for their work for a better organized and more peaceful world,"[3] the review praises the UN's success at bringing "peace and democracy to Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique, and East Timor." Haiti is next.

As I continued reading more documents produced by UN agencies and other organizations, as well as academic articles on the subject, it soon became evident that a certain rhetoric on "peacebuilding" actually not only reinforced the belief that Haiti's main problem was its own culture of violence, but also promoted the rule of law as the necessary and unavoidable means by which Haiti would attain sufficient peace (or "stabilization," which is another word of the UN lexicon) to enable a democratic transition. Since Haiti was pictured as incapable of doing so itself, it needed the "help" of foreign forces. Hence, one aim of this paper is to expose the underpinnings of such discourse, as well as its effects on the ground. First, I will provide some details of the Haitian justice system and the way the Haitian people relate to it, in order to show empirically how the concept of peace is lived out in practice in this context. Second, this view from below will enable me to shed light on the structure of the argumentation, as well as on the assumptions underpinning international discourses, in order to show how far such a view is from what actually happens. The discrepancy between the ideology promoted from above and the daily reality that the people live in should inspire us to reflect on how such a mismatch actually enables forms of violence. I would like to finish by depicting another conceptual landscape. People carry on even in the ruins left behind by foreign "aid" (Katz, 2013; Schuller, 2012). They do not give up. They still strive for something they call *lapè* ("peace"), searching for moments of calm and quietude between the spans of overwhelming tension. The search for the fragile equilibrium that makes life livable continues interminably (Beckett, 2019). However, the Haitians' hopes are also often dashed, which can lead to violence (Kivland, 2020). Here, I argue, we must acknowledge the connection between foreign meddling and devastating disappointment.

The Justice of the Peace in Haiti

JP courts are particularly important as somewhat intermediary spaces between the people and the state. They operate in a gray zone; they are neither fully in line with the promotion of the rule of law conveyed by the Ministry and the Council in charge of the judiciary, which partly espouse the UN's incentive, nor do they fully adopt an alternative, more informal way of handling local issues. The JP courts comprise a kind of privileged theater in which the tensions related to the various inflections given to the concept of peace become visible.

The official and primary scope of the JP courts are to maintain relative peace within the community by offering a space for conciliation and mediation in local civil affairs. Their function is to adjudicate civil cases, settle disputes, and mediate arrangements supposed to prevent the escalation of tensions into private vengeance. Their mandate is to ensure civil peace and prevent civil conflicts from turning into criminal cases. As one might suspect, matters are far more complex. What "peace" actually means here is unclear; thus, it cannot be as evident as some might think that the courts necessarily contribute to maintaining it within the community, nor that people go to the courts to find some kind of peace (Rubbers and Gallez, 2012). To compound matters, in Haiti *lapè* is also a word that bears the weight of a long and dark history of violence.

The French system of the JP courts (*tribunaux de paix*), also called "proximity justice" (*justice de proximité*), was adopted in Haiti by President Jean-Pierre Boyer, who ruled between 1820 and 1843. The administration of the newborn country required the adoption of codified laws and a judicial system capable of not only managing internal affairs, regulating agriculture, and enforcing nationwide order, but also of streamlining production. The JP system, in coordination with the constables, the rural police, and the military, enabled him to quickly organize property rights and rationalize agriculture in order to generate wealth. In fact, his country was under great pressure after he had ratified the decree of April 17, 1825, issued by King Charles X, which stated that the inhabitants of the French part of the Saint-Domingue island had to pay off 150 million francs in order to indemnify the colonial settlers against compensation for what they had lost. Thus, Boyer, having neither time nor the means to invent and elaborate his own codes, implemented the Civil Code in 1825, the Rural Code in 1826, and the Penal Code in 1835, all largely drawn from the Napoleonic codes and other precedents. He slightly adapted them, though without any major changes. They have been amended many times, but never fully reformed, with the exception of the penal code (Collot, 2007; Dayan, 2004; Maguire and Freeman, 2017; Paisant, 2003; Ramsey, 2011; Schneider, 2018).

The JP courts were created in France in 1790 and, notably, conceived to uniformly enforce the new Civil Code on the whole territory, apply standardized procedures, and manage small litigation that would not threaten public order: that is, to keep in check potential disruptive conflicts (Follain, 2003). Their mandate was to handle all sorts of ordinary contentions by attempting to mediate, negotiate, and arrange situations rather than imposing sanctions or using coercive force. This new jurisdiction was characterized by simplicity, rapidly executed procedures, gratuitousness, and an effort to treat all parties equally.

In Haiti, the JP courts are presently at the forefront of the judicial system and play an important role in communal life, along with other institutions or habitual ways of handling contentions. People primarily defer to kin, friends, and neighbors, but also to the local notables, depending on the issues (Montalvo-Despeignes, 1976; Motta, 2020). Notables are usually older and respected men within the community, more rarely women: a retired official, a schoolteacher, an *oungan* ("Vodou priest"), a *manbo* ("Vodou priestess"), or a *doktè fèy* or *pè savann* ("old herbalists" and "wise men" considered to be guardians of traditions and ritual formulas); a priest, a pastor, or any clergyman; a CASEC; or the court clerk, the bailiff, or the *jij de pè* ("judge of peace"). Litigants rarely file a complaint at the police station because the police are not only feared by many and known to be inefficient but are generally absent. In most communal sections with which I am familiar, there is no police station to which one can report, except in my example, where it turns out that the court is a block away from the precinct. What prompts people at times to appeal to the court rather than to settle dispute with the help of other community leaders is a

complex matter. Before I explain it, let me briefly provide a few details about the overall organization of the judiciary, and the operational principles at the end of the chain.

The JP courts are managed by two institutions. First, there is the Ministry of Justice and Public Security (MJSP), whose mandate—fixed by a decree issued in 1984 under Jean-Claude Duvalier's fading dictatorship—is mainly to submit bills, organize the judiciary system, and control the courts. Second, there is the Superior Council of the Judiciary Power (CSPJ), created in 2007 under the occupation of the MINUSTAH and the second mandate of Préval, whose task is chiefly to nominate the magistrates; manage the material and financial funds; receive the magistrates' grievances; and provide information and recommendations about the state of the magistracy. According to a document produced in 2015 by the CSPJ, national territory is organized into 18 jurisdictions, each administered by a lower court. There are four main judiciary offices: the JP courts, the lower courts, the courts of appeal, and the court of cassation. Additional courts exist with specific functions: a juvenile court, a chamber for commercial matters, two special land tribunals, a labor tribunal, the superior court for auditors and administrative disputes, and a military court.

The territorial authorities of the Haitian state are organized in concentric circles. The smallest administrative unit is the communal section, the district and, finally, the department. The commune, in which I mainly conducted my research, has six communal sections and two JP courts. At the very end of the chain of officials are the CASEC and the communal supervisory boards, which are usually composed of three men: a chief, an assistant, and a secretary-cum-treasurer. Communal sections are, in fact, the backbone of social, administrative, political, and economic life in Haiti, even though it is nowadays largely marginalized and left behind.[4] Communal sections paradoxically place the CASEC at the forefront. They are usually people from the zones, elected by residents, and have a deep knowledge of the problems plaguing the community. They work closely with the JP courts and police (if any) and provide essential help with investigations and arrests.

A Blurry Concept of Peace

One morning, roughly a week after the session in court described above, I was waiting out in the courtroom of another section of the same commune. It was quiet. The sun was already pounding down hard on the tin roof. A court clerk was reading some documents in the office. The judge had not yet arrived. A lone woman, waving a piece of paper in front of her face, was patiently waiting for her case to be heard. She eventually left when it became obvious that the other party was not going to show up. The head of the three court clerks working in that JP court was also lingering, obviously bored, so we started to chat. He told me that he had been working in that particular tribunal since 2005. The court was full during his first years of work. "Now," he said, "people don't come any more. There is too much insecurity, and trust has been lost." He went on to explain that people feared bringing their disputes before the court not only because the courts and the police could not guarantee their safety, but also because appealing to the judiciary might worsen the issue. "Settling" a dispute in court might not be settling anything. Once the court sessions were over, he said, resentment between parties usually deepened. People often attacked each other afterwards, in one way or another, even though the case was supposed to be resolved. The court could not prevent people from getting even, and it did not have the means to be coercive. The clerk told me the accused, even when found guilty, often resisted and refused to comply. The judge, the clerks, or sometimes the police, could do nothing to force them to cooperate. Some

litigants just walked away under the eyes of the officials, ready to use force or violence to escape the clutches of the judiciary. According to him, people had no respect for the laws because they did not fear the institutions and tended, more and more, "to dispense their own justice" (*bay tèt yo jistis*).

A couple of weeks later, Frederic organized a one-day seminar on the theme, Democracy and Social Justice. In fact, he had been active in the community for many years, mentoring adolescents and organizing occasional activities for children, public forums, and workshops of many kinds. His commitment to the community had taken a new turn since, a few years before, he had opened his *lakay pen an* ("house of bread"), which he called a "social bakery." Not only did he welcome many young people, who came to buy sacks of bread or pass the time and with whom he had time to chat individually, but with the money he earned and the reputation he acquired, he also organized events he perceived to be mutually educational and, thus, a contribution to a peaceful community. His conviction was that education, knowledge, and awareness would help appease some of the tensions that plagued the community. Hence, he seized the opportunity of my presence to invite teachers, nurses, lawyers, artists, notables, and community leaders, many of whom I had come to know more or less already, for a one-day seminar held in a classroom of the school owned by his wife Angeline's uncle. He asked me to conduct the seminar, which I did.

One of the points of discussion revolved around what the court clerk had told me: justice and peace were essentially dealt with outside the courtroom. This point was unsurprising since it was obviously the case in many other parts of the world. Another was the way in which the litigation was addressed, often by notable locals, such as heads of schools, elderly community leaders, retired officials, or religious leaders, in places like someone's courtyard (*lakou*), in churches, in schools, in Vodou compounds (*oumfò*), or near specific sources of water, some of which are the homes of certain spirits (*lwa*) who help people to reach settlements. The participants also mentioned that certain moments of social life were important, such as the *jèn*—a particular Vodou ritual—during which participants create a space called *temwayaj* ("testimony") dedicated to the expression of disputes. This is something I had witnessed myself. Participants also expressed their reservations and a certain anxiety about unofficial means of doing justice, because many of these means were viewed as dangerous, getting easily out of control, potentially and ultimately leading to injustice, death, and further war. This is the case, for instance, when mobs are created and the logic of deadly vengeance is at work or when people recklessly or malevolently manipulate *fòs mistik* (mystical forces). However, it appeared that such dangers and effects had to be reckoned with if the community wanted to handle disputes itself. In the end, all participants emphasized that justice, social order, and cohesion were the product of education, culture, and collective intelligence rather than of law. The court simply did not appear to be such a site at which to find peace.

Yet, the picture is darker than first it appears. Local communities know all too well that the discourse of "peace" is also an instrument of power and a justification of violence that works more often than not against their interests. This knowledge obviously generates much resistance among the population. Indeed, the codification of the law, by enabling the settlement of the standards for homogenization and the rationalization of conduct, served from the very beginning to consolidate the centralized power (Cabanis et al., 1996; Gélin, 2007; Petit, 2003). Historically, "law proceeds from the state, namely from the legislative sovereignty of a prince or a nation" (Supiot 2009, p. 27).[5] Not only is the codification of law intrinsic to the centralization of the administration of power, but it is also partly designed to serve the interests of a ruling elite against those of the poor and the peasants (Payton, 2018).

There are deep historical and internal tensions between centralized authorities—whose attitude is defiant, authoritative, and predatory—and the islanders. However, the turf wars have been fueled largely by the outside. Hence, in such a context, rural residents have often responded by thwarting the state and its allies' attempts at control by creating alternative livelihoods.[6] Plausibly, the JP courts could be used today to keep an eye on local affairs and potential dissidence in areas out of the control of the state. After all, the initial scope of their implementation by Boyer was to keep records of what happened in the countryside (Schneider, 2018, p. 123). People today are generally quite aware of such a possibility, even though many are unafraid of JP courts, since the whole state apparatus lacks the means to enforce control and since the police cannot guarantee the safety of magistrates. This state of affairs strongly conflicts with the JP court's role as a peaceful arbitrator and its position as an actor that is supposed to be close to the population. The so-called justice of proximity is actually often far from home, and peace is often close to war. The courts are not only far from the homes of many people geographically, especially those who live *nan mòn* ("in the mountains"), they are also distant in terms of their language (French) and rationale, which is often alien to the everyday language (Creole) and rationale of the people. My example at the beginning of this paper shows, notably, how potentially alien to the people involved are concepts such as the probative value of a document or the burden of evidence, or a specific conception of causation (notably determined by the appropriateness of criteria). Yet, Haitians are nonetheless subjected to such language and rationales. The strong impression of alienness that emerges in certain key moments when the magisterial (and esoteric) legal language is disclosed in courts adds to the already deeply felt impression of remoteness that is generated by the state itself. Yet, in the JP courts, the use of formal language (usually in French) alternates with colloquialisms, jokes, undertones, sayings, and so on (in Creole), showing that the JP courts, for all the seriousness and technicality of the language of law they convey, are perhaps not so far from the playfulness of ordinary language.

How close to or far are the judges and attorneys themselves from the language of the institutions they represent? I personally witnessed (but it is also systematically underlined in various assessments of the judiciary in Haiti) that jurists sometimes do not possess the codes of law to which they refer, and, if they do, they often do not have the official standard but copies of codes or, even more often, compendiums of codes in which not every law is to be found. This is no surprise since the official codes are sold only in the few big cities and at prohibitive prices. The majority can barely afford the compendiums; thus, even in law schools, the courses are based on the copies and compendiums, since the students will hardly ever have the standard code in their hands. To this must be added the fact that some magistrates have not been to law school. Even if today the superior authorities try to appoint judges who have been lawyers, there is a lack of professional lawyers, according to some observers. However, this state of affairs is not necessarily problematic from the point of view of the people. As long as the magistrates at the level of the JP court can translate the law into their own words (regardless of whether the translation is accurate), it is somewhat acceptable. Furthermore, if the judges consider the specific problems people have (in contrast to high magistrates originating from the bourgeoisie, who often lack sympathy or feel disdain for the poor and the peasants), then it is even better. Most people hardly expect more from the courts. This is why the courts are seen as a buffer zone between the state and the people, also working with the community to forge a common language regarding, for example, respect, theft, dissimulation, reparation, lying, cunning, and so on, that is neither fully the language of the law nor fully everyday language.

Most of the judges and clerks of the JP courts I met tried their best; their effort is not in question. They did strive for peace within the communities in which they often lived. However, they were also subject to enormous pressures. They were themselves citizens and sometimes residents of the villages and neighborhoods in which they worked (or close by), and they were thus part of the everyday life and relationships within those communities. They too were entrenched and bound to cope with many forces they could not contradict. The specific potential for violence embedded in some of the cases could scare off a judge, as mentioned earlier. This is, notably, because the police do not have the means to fulfill their mandate. Many disputes occur far from the precinct, and it happens often that the police never show up as they fear for their own safety. Sometimes they take sides and decide not to intervene for partisan reasons. Often, they just have no gas in their pick-up, so unless someone sends them money via a cellphone transfer system, they will not move, or else, as they themselves told me, they might just be unwilling to sweat in vain.

The pressures on the *jij de pè* come from all sides. They are intimidated by the parties or the people in their surroundings. The bullying can be verbal, but also physical to some extent. For instance, the judge might be unable to reach the place he is supposed to inspect because a few men are standing firmly in the way with hoes, shovels, machetes, and hammers. Some judges I spoke to told me that sometimes men even push them physically, such as malevolently knocking their foreheads with their rigid index fingers, to make them step back. A common kind of threat used in the Artibonite is deemed "mystical" (*mistik*), which can take many forms. It is actually extremely telling that on the official webpage of the CSPJ, in the section devoted to presenting the professions linked to the JP courts, the *hoqueton*[7] is said to be the one who is not only is the janitor of the court, but also the "one who makes sure that nobody puts *pwa grate* and other sorts of spells [*sortilège*] in the office of the judge."[8]

Magistrates are also intimidated by the lawyers, who are known to also use occult means to pressure them and to influence a decision or a judgment. *Yo sonde w* ("they probe you"), which means they are influencing the power relation "on another level." Then *yo fè bagay* ("they do things"), implying that they use occult forces. If the judges are not careful enough, or not protected, they can easily succumb to the pressure. These are not small matters in Haiti. In addition, a major menace for their integrity comes from the streets and the political circles of influence that leverage their position with either bribes or direct physical threats (at the hands of henchmen). In the communal section in which I am conducting my research, the CSPJ suspended the appointed judge from the bar for five years after he ignored pressure from an influential senator and went on adjudicating a case involving that senator's nephew. The CSPJ was quick to suspend the judge, and most of the other judges and court clerks were muzzled. In more-serious cases, it is not uncommon that judges, clerks, bailiffs, or lawyers are assaulted, wounded, or sometimes killed. No later than August 28, 2020, Monferrier Dorval, the President of the Bar of Port-au-Prince, was assassinated in front of his home by anonymous shooters. Earlier this year, on June 19, Fritz Gérald Cerisier, the substitute for the government commissioner at the Port-au-Prince lower court, was shot dead in his car while driving through Bel Air. On March 3, two unidentified bikers shot dead bailiff Jean Fenel Monfleury close to Petionville's court of the peace. On January 7, Deputy Judge Antoine Luccius was similarly shot dead in Tabarre. This happened exactly a week after bailiff Bob Dolcine was killed by several shooters in front of the gate of Port-au-Prince's courthouse on Bicentenaire.

On January 8, 2020, the National Association of Magistrates and the Professional Association of Magistrates called for institutional guarantees for safety and a harmonious functioning of the judiciary. However, it is not clear who could guarantee the safety of jurists when policemen

themselves attack jurists. On January 19, 2020, the offices of human rights activist Samuel Madistin were attacked, and six vehicles in the parking lot were burned by hooded and armed men who were part of a violent crowd of angry policemen demonstrating in the streets in favor of the creation of a police syndicate and demanding the payment of unpaid wages. On March 9, Durin Duret Jr., a judge at the court of appeal of Port-au-Prince and a member of the CSPJ, was assaulted in his car by armed uniformed policemen demonstrating again for a union—they shot at his car while he was inside it, violently hit it, punctured the tires, and took his keys.[9] These are only a few examples among the many that show how pressured the actors of the justice system are.

The oppressive and deceptive character of the state is something most people are aware of and contend with on a variety of levels. Their disillusionment incites some to simply avoid all contact with the judiciary as much as possible, others tactically use these institutions for their own purposes, and still others fight them violently. Nevertheless, many express a strong yearning for a functional justice system, equal rights, and democracy. The dream of and hope for peace and a fair justice system working on behalf of the interests of the poor and vulnerable, rather than safeguarding the power of the elite, are very much alive (Appadurai, 2007; Kivland, 2020). These people aspire to something other than a justice system in tatters.

Some Deeply Rooted Assumptions About the Rule of Law

The particular role the JP courts are to play in society is notably defined by a certain conception of "peace"—and thus of what constitutes an offense, a settlement, a punishment, and so on—which may be more or less ideologically inflected, depending on who conceives it. Official discourses usually take the form of a "philosophy" of the justice of proximity: the JP system is said to contribute to the peace within the community because it said to be close to the people (attentive to their particular problems), simple (there is little paperwork), rapid (the aim is quick resolution), rather inexpensive, and equitable. Yet, the long-lasting foreign presence in Haiti has had considerable effects on the Haitians conception of peace. The money and energy invested in Haiti, especially by the UN, profoundly modified national institutions. For example, under the UN's supervision, the Haitian National Police force was created in 1994, then armed, trained, monitored, and developed with the assistance of foreign agencies, as remains the case today. Another example is the penal code, disclosed on June 24, 2020, which is soon to be followed by a new code of criminal procedure; several UN and bilateral agencies have contributed substantially to drafting them. A final example is the Magistrate School, provided by the Constitution of 1987, but which acquired legal status only on December 20, 2007, essentially under the UN's guidance. Some of these changes have been, from a certain point of view, a remarkable step forward (Carey, 2001). For instance, the Magistrate School is for women's rights, and their progression within the profession is an important achievement. The outdated penal code no doubt needed to be adapted to the reality of today, although there are serious doubts about the new version's adequacy. Moreover, a modern state is certainly unlikely to function without an adequate police force. That these were important matters to take care of in a modern state is hard to contest.

Besides institutional changes, the vocabulary used to describe the issues at hand was also modified. In recent years, the notion of "rule of law"—be it in the documents produced by governments or private agencies, or in the tremendous proliferation of academic journals and books (even though critical)—has become unavoidable (See, for instance, Albrecht, Aucoin, and O'Connor, 2009; Carey, 2012; Donais, 2015; Greenburg, 2017; Hauge, Doucet, and Gilles 2015;

Humphreys, 2010; Krever, 2011; 2017; Marcelin and Cela, 2020; McPherson, 2012; Mobekk, 2017; O'Connor, 2015; Wilets and Espinosa, 2011). The justifications for "peace-building" projects increasingly took the form of a promotion of the rule of law, which is supposed to guarantee human rights, enable good governance, lead to democratic transition, and stimulate the market economy. One domain of reform privileged by this liberal view is the justice system. Today, the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH in French) "will work, in an advisory capacity, with the Haitian authorities and the United Nations Country Team in Haiti in the area of governance, in particular by… assisting in the reinforcement of the Haitian justice system."[10]

After the end of the Cold War, but above all in the past two decades, this lexicon of constitutional liberalism entered the language of mainstream political discourse and international affairs, abandoning, "in the same gesture, another key aspirational vocabulary of the postwar settlement: social welfare and an accompanying register of solidarity, economic equality, social justice, and so on" (Humphreys, 2010, xii). The United States Institute for Peace (USIP), which is active in Haiti, could not be clearer; subsection 7.2 of the "Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction: Rule of Law," is titled, "*Why is the rule of law a necessary end state*?" In Haiti, government agencies (e.g. the UN Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC]), international financial institutions (e.g. the World Bank), bilateral aid agencies (e.g. U.S. Agency for International Development [USAID]), private foundations (e.g. the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation), NGOs (e.g. CARE), and the main organs of the UN (e.g. BINUH), all speak with one voice when it comes to promoting peace and decent human existence: the only path towards it is the rule of law; there is no doubt about that. In order to achieve that end, the judiciary needs to be monitored and reformed, and the courts have to be buttressed (UNODC, 2011).

There is an optimistic tendency among advocates of the rule of law to view the judiciary as the first line of defense against mayhem. For instance, Wilets and Espinosa (2011), by relying on a conception of the rule of law defined essentially by the World Bank and the United Nations[11], perceive the law as being simultaneously predictable, transparent (thus legible), and coercive, which enables governance and promotes order. As these authors write, "the United States and the United Nations have begun establishing conditions to promote and create the rule of law in Haiti" (Wilets and Espinosa, 2011, p. 211). Their article ends on an enthusiastic note:

> "The United States has played a significant role as well in promoting the rule of law in Haiti, and the U.S. has provided the means so that international organizations can conduct seminars advocating the rule of law and reinforcing fundamental principles of governance" (Wilets and Espinosa, 2011, p. 206).

America's imperialism has not yet uttered its last word (Katz, 2013; Schuller, 2012).[12] Moreover, their article makes clear that the promotion of the rule of law accompanies the promotion of capitalism and liberal values so that, faithful to the World Bank's injunctions, investments are encouraged. In short, the implementation of the rule of law in Haiti appears as the Trojan horse that smuggles in the laws that stimulate international free trade and secure (foreign) corporate interests, however, this trend is not new.

U.S. meddling persistently favors U.S. businesses. A telling example is Bill Clinton's farm bill—the Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 (the FAIR Act)—that stipulated the shift from subsidies to direct payment programs, notably for rice crops. Among the effects was an increase of export to Haiti, where the rice coming mostly from Arkansas (Clinton's home state) was underpriced and took over the local rice market (Kivland, 2020, p. 234, note 28):

> "Since 1995, when [Haiti] dropped its import tariffs on rice from 50 to three percent as part of the structural adjustment program run by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank [and under the influence of the U.S.], Haiti has steadily increased its imports of rice from the north. Today, it is the fifth-largest importer of American rice in the world… Haiti today imports over 80 percent of its rice from the U.S." (O'Connor, 2013).

By contrast, in 1980, Haiti was still self-sufficient. The adjustment plan was called the *plan lanmò* (death plan) by Haitian farmers. Another example of America's profitable trade provision is the "Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement Act of 2008" or the "HOPE II Act," subtitle D, part 1, titled "Extension of certain trade benefits," of the Public Law 110-246 enacted on June 18, 2008, by the 110th Congress. What I am rather interested in here is why this kind of ideological perspective on the rule of law is also seen as "essential to building peace in post-conflict states" (Wilets and Espinosa, 2011, p. 186), as if without the rule of law, "the written words of the Constitution [would be] trumped by political practice" (Wilets and Espinosa, 2011, p. 191). Are the authors surmising that Haitians are incapable of self-government?

This idea that the (ex-)colonized populations are not yet mature enough for self-government, and thus need the "help" that is given to them through structural adjustments plans, humanitarianism, the training of administrators, and so on, is not as outdated as some might think; it underlies many of the writings promoting the rule of law and peacebuilding (Humphreys, 2010). This paternalistic promotion of rule of law is itself the product of precisely the political maneuvering it is supposed to keep in check. Interestingly, but unsurprisingly, Wilets and Espinosa's perspectives relies on Manichean dichotomies that oppose, on the one hand, the government and the judiciary (as well as the police) and, on the other, "criminal gangs" (Wilets and Espinosa 2011, p. 196) and "criminal enterprises" (Wilets and Espinosa, 2011, p. 200); or, if you will, the good and the bad guys. Of course, the rule of law is meant to keep the good guys in. The authors' simplistic view justifies and legitimizes the promotion of a certain conception of peace that derives directly from their imagining the rule of law to be the superior and necessary device that secures order against anarchy, a view consistent with the Hobbesian idea that what makes the Law supreme is its unsurpassable capacity to prevent dog-eat-dog warfare.

In slightly different terms, this is the line followed by the authors of two briefings sponsored by the United States Institute of Peace—which also hosts the International Network to Promote the Rule of Law Community of Practice (Albrecht et al., 2009; O'Connor, 2015). The purported characteristics of backwardness are roughly described as being "endemic poverty," "corruption," "malfunctioning and weakness of the justice system," "high level of crime," "drug trafficking," and "uncertainty about what the law is." In short, the picture is this; Haiti, being in a state of anarchy and chaos, is a "failed state," hence, Haiti needs foreign aid to bring some law and order to this mess (Benda-Beckmann, 2007; Comaroff and Comaroff, 2006).

Old habits die hard. These prejudices, at best, exhibit their deep entrenchment, but they say very little about the everyday hardships Haitians face and even less about the extent to which foreign intervention engenders such chaos, not to mention the crimes committed by successive UN peacekeeping forces and state officials alike. These crimes include corruption, rape and sexual abuse, summary executions, property violations, theft, abuse of authority, illegal weapon resales, arson, drug trafficking, and false testimony, among others.[13] An example is given by Wikileaks documents dating back to November 20, 2006, that target the senator of the Artobonite

Youri Latortue, who is highly suspected of being implicated in drug, weapon, and other contraband trafficking, to be in cahoots with illegal armed groups (notably the Cannibal Army gang), to own illicit businesses (nightclubs and movie theatres), not to mention theft (of telephone poles and utility boxes), unfair competition, embezzlement (notably during the large-scale flooding of September 2006, when he intercepted and stashed food supplies and then redistributed them on his behalf for political interests). Latortue was President of the Senate when I met him a few times in 2017 and 2018. I have testimonial evidence that he used to grant favors to women who slept with him, such as giving them cash or helping them to find jobs.

The logic of the discourse is quite clear: law is supposed to guarantee order, order brings stability and security that leads to peace, and peace facilitates the transition to a democratic nation, which is the prerequisite for beneficial trade (Carey, 2005; 2012; Fatton, 1999; Krever, 2011). "The expressed intent" of building the rule of law in Haiti, according to the one briefing, is "crucially" to "ensure that the justice system serves all the people of Haiti (rather than the rich and powerful)" (Albrecht et al., 2009, p. 5). Such an endeavor is consistent with the 17 global objectives defined by the UN for sustainable development in the world, but also with the necessary conditions to achieve the rule of law defined by the USIP.[14] Most of these objectives are those of the BINUH in Haiti, among which is the promotion of "Peace, Justice, and Efficient Institutions" (objective 16) to guarantee the access of all to the judiciary. Such a tendency to view the judiciary as a privileged and democratic site, where litigations among citizens are resolved rests on a few conventional assumptions about disputes that I would like to challenge here.

The main idea from which this tendency derives is that peace is the product of a "resolution" or "settlement." Thus, first, it is assumed that a dispute has a definable beginning and ending. Second, that it can thus be precisely characterized. Third, once clearly characterized, decisions can be taken, and judgments made. Fourth, that through decisions and judgments, the dispute can be properly resolved. Fifth, that once resolved, it is over. Sixth, that the courts are exactly the place where this happens. And finally, that the courts necessarily contribute to the establishment of peace and order in the community. Such a view is coextensive of the broader dogmatic, transcendental, and functionalist picture of the Law as that which is vital, and thus necessary, to the regulation of human society: without it, society would be gripped by generalized civil war (Supiot, 2009, p. 24). But, have we forgotten that this picture was imagined by Hobbes as a working hypothesis, a fiction meant to elaborate a theory—a myth? However, disputes cannot be that easily defined; they are often signs of deeper conflicts. In fact, a feud might have started long ago and might continue long after. Sometimes, internecine divisions have existed for so long that one does not even know anymore why the people are fighting, and sometimes the unending cycle of grudges has begun only recently. At other times, issues are not so serious and are resolved rather quickly. In my initial example, we do not know when the contention really began or when and where it will end. Did it start with the theft? Or with the complaint? Or did the parties have former issues? Is one of them really seeking reparation or preparing to retaliate? Or is it a warning? And how sure can we be that, after a judgment and a punishment, the fight will not go on or even worsen? How much do we know? There is no doubt that delimiting the boundaries of a case is a matter of authority. In everyday life, there are no such clear-cut boundaries.

The normative perspective on the rule of law is of little help to understand the issues at stake in concrete cases or the complexity of the intertwining of power relations. To be sure, there are many cases in which the attitudes and actions taken by courts do exactly the opposite; that is, they contribute to blurring the characterization of a conflict. Moreover, not only do they sometimes *not*

contribute to resolving disputes, but they actually feed the feud and participate in the production of inequality, disorder, and violence. In a case I describe elsewhere (Motta, 2020), the court performs by its absence; the judge's refusal to take up the challenge posed by the conflict—his "wimpiness," according to the people outraged by his defection—contributed to the escalation of tensions. The doors and windows of the courthouse were nailed shut with wooden planks by one of the conflicting parties, firearms circulated freely among litigants, and the police did not dare to arrive, even though they were insistently called upon (which imparted an additional layer of impunity to those ready to be violent). Although bloodshed was avoided in this case, the judge's inaction could have led to a disaster. Obviously, it happens that the so-called peace court triggers hostility, deepens differences and inequalities, and conflicts with local ways of re-establishing some sort of calm and ordered coexistence (Beckett, 2019; James, 2010; Kivland, 2020; Marcelin and Cela, 2010). Are we so sure that we know what peace looks like and where it is to be found (in JP courts)?

Alternative Peace-Making

Conceptual boundaries are not as clear-cut as people often believe (Brandel and Motta, 2021). At some point, it becomes difficult to distinguish formal from informal—or official from unofficial—laws and procedures. Even if we can, they do meet at some point and absorb each other in the ordinary (Das, 2020, ch. 8). As shown in the examples, the court partly integrates everyday language and habits and unofficial ways of handling conflicts, and the people learn and incorporate into their lives some official procedures and ways of conceptualizing law and conflict resolution. Furthermore, legal actions can have the face of crime, and crime can be viewed as fully legitimate, as much as the law can be used to suspend rights and even institute the suspension of rights (Agamben, 2005). Similarly, peace might at times become the physiognomy of violence and oppression (Armstrong, 2014; Branch, 2014). Kivland (2020) shows, with much delicacy, how much young men in the *geto* desire justice, peace, and emancipation. She equally shows how these aspirations can themselves become modes of aggression and oppression that work against their goodwill. In the name of peace, violence is often said to be necessary. How else does one imagine *defans lejitim* ("self-defense") and the achievement of *jistis*? As Roland, a leader and political figure of the Bel Air *geto* says, "politics has never been about peace. How can you be about peace when the majority of people live in hunger? This is an agent of misery, not peace! ... we are here to defend our right to democracy. In Haiti, that means not just what's on paper but also who controls the bayonet. And for us the bayonet is the force of the street" (Kivland, 2020, pp. 112-113). Indeed, many poor people's claim to democracy goes with a sharp awareness that force and violence might be necessary to contest an unequal social order partly fueled by international meddling. I fully agree with Kivland when she questions "the presumed separation of violence and democracy" and aims to understand "the manifold and conflicting ways in which violence—as sign and practice—has been part and parcel of imagining, making, and maintaining contemporary democracies" (Kivland, 2020, p. 114).

This is why we should not be too quick to consider the JP court as the locus at which peace is to be found. We should be mindful that, if people dare to venture into a courthouse, they do not leave their ordinary lives outside the door. Moreover, once the session closes, peasants hurry back to the fields to irrigate before dusk; the youth hang around the crossroads, make jokes to pass the time, and wait for job opportunities; mothers start the fire to get the next meal ready before the children come home from school; some men look forward to finding a drinking companion to sip

rum and play dominos within the shade of a flame tree while others nervously think of a plan to retaliate. Despite all the goodwill of the judges, lawyers, and court clerks, the answer to the question of what will in the end diffuse a conflict and bring some kind of peace, no matter how provisory or durable, is out of their reach. This does not mean, of course, that they do not play a role. Rather, I should say that peace is not so much the result of the enforcement of the rule of law, than the slow and unending work of the community, within the community. The enforcement of the rule of law, contrary to what is emphasized in the conventional discourses, harms the less advantaged people more than it helps them. Above all, it conveys a picture of the role and place of law in our human lives that is misplaced; we do not comply because we are threatened and do not obey because we are coerced (Shauer, 2015). In my example, the threat of punishment would not have prevented the man, if found guilty, from stealing the goat, nor would it necessarily prevent him from committing further infractions. The witnesses who are reluctant to show up in court might not be more willing to show up *because* they are suddenly coerced—some will, others not. Perhaps it is even the threat that encourages illegal behavior, and some will all the more be tempted to transgress or escape when they are threatened or coerced. That the correct application of codes of conduct and standards of procedures will lead to peace and order is just a story we tell ourselves. Things are different on the ground.

It is no surprise, then, that informal or customary justice, as was the case during European colonization in Africa, is often perceived as problematic by those who promote the rule of law, and that, in the end, it is perceived as what hinders democracy and the progress of a certain civilizational project (Humphreys, 2010; Greenburg, 2013). Whether we like it or not, extrajudicial means of handling conflicts and informal ways of safeguarding relationships between humans who have all sorts of reasons to express their indignation, wrath, grudges, and claims are nonetheless what makes it possible for them to ease their suffering and might lead to some kind of pacification. The people I met did aspire to live together in relative serenity, but they also knew that moments of calm alternated with moments of turmoil, upheaval, and havoc. Moreover, not all of them were ready to compromise in order to find peaceful solutions. Some will fight harshly.

Frederic, the litigants, and the judge all improvise in the face of unending hardships. Sometimes they succeed, sometimes they fail. Nevertheless, they keep on going. If they were applying predetermined criteria to solve their problems and progress in their ordinary affairs, as advocates of the rule of law argue they should, they would just not be able to live, simply because these *a priori* criteria could not have accommodated all possible projections in further contexts. They would stumble at every step over the hardness of reality. People know very well that no *a priori* criteria exists that can assist them and, thus, also how little they can rely on the judicial rationale to solve anything at all. The Haitians give us quite a different picture of peace when it is seen more as an aspiration to move forward and keep heads up. In everyday life, indeed, *nap brase* ("we're struggling"); *nap goumen* ("we're fighting"); *nap kenbe* ("we're still standing"); and *nap swiv* ("we'll see what happens").

ENDNOTES

1. I am indebted to Chip Carey for having encouraged me to take the bull by the horns and dare write a text about peace in Haiti. I also wish to express my gratitude to Grégoire Hervouet-Zeiber, Basile Despland, Marianne Tøraasen, Chelsey Kivland, and Chip Carey for their

perceptive reading of early drafts and their illuminating suggestions. Different versions of this paper have been presented at the Haitian Studies Association annual meeting on October 10, 2020, and at a workshop at the Institute of Social Anthropology at the University of Bern on October 19, 2020. I would like to thank kindly the respondents for their earnest engagement with the text, especially Julia Eckert, David Loher, Laura Affolter, Kiri Santer, Lucien Schönenberg, Nora Trenkel and Johanna Mugler. I am also thankful to the Swiss National Science Foundation for the financial support (grant n° P4P4PS_191023).

2. See https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minustah
3. See https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2001/summary/
4. Many factors contribute to hindering the functioning of the CASEC system. In particular, the combined effects of the political non-recognition of their competence and responsibility, and the systematic back wages (often of several months) not only preclude the CASEC from engaging fully in their task, but also prompt them to avoid doing their jobs (such as collecting taxes or taking care of the estate), if not squarely encouraging them to accept bribes. On January 18, 2018, President Moïse created a media spectacle by welcoming the CASEC at the presidential palace (in front of journalists), and promised to give them 570 motorbikes to facilitate their work; take care of the four-month payment backlog; make available the funds for the implementation of rural police in areas where there were none; build social housing; and distribute 171,000 food kits to the needy. Needless to say, most of these promises have not been kept, except the distribution of Chinese motorbikes, which had already been bought at the time of the promise.
5. A point perhaps better understood if one imagines that the canon Roman Law conceived the state as that which reflects the pontifical council; that is, as a legislator state.
6. The organization of the *lakou* is probably the most compelling example of a way of living that is at the same time a way of resisting the attempts on part of the centralized power to control them.
7. The name *hoqueton* in French ("acton" in medieval English), was originally a padded vest or jacket made of cloth or leather and worn under armor during the Middle Ages. It then became the name of a function and a profession: the caretaker of the court, who is also the doorman, or the guardian.
8. See the definitions on the official website: http://www.cspj.ht/index.php/les-cours-et-les-tribunaux/cspj-haiti-mnu-tribunaux-et-cours-personnel
9. The issues with police are complex matters, and I cannot go into details here. To make a long story short, this was the time when some police officers created a group called "Fantom 509" and demonstrated violently (and armed) in the streets several times. The nebulousness around this group, which actually looks more like an armed guerilla or a gang, worries many people, especially since February 24, 2020, when a massive gunfight erupted on the Champs-de-Mars (the city center) between Fantom 509, the newly constituted army, and other armed men (contributing to the cancellation of a carnival). In June the same year, a fired policeman (yet still in the professional circuits) named Jimmy Cherizier, alias Barbecue, who was known to be the head of an armed group in the areas of Delmas 2-6, and who was, according to several reports by FJKL (https://www.fjkl.org.ht/) and the RNDDH (https://web.rnddh.org/), involved in several massacres of civilians, notably in the slums of La Saline and Bel Air, created a federation of armed groups called the "G-9 *an Fanmi e Alye*" (the G-9 Family and Allies), ostensibly to enforce security and peace and to restore a decent life to the ghetto. Even if he publicly denied it, he was said by many to be close to the president's party, the Parti Haïtien Tèt Kale (PHTK); elections were near; and Jovenel Moïse, like other presidents before him, supported illegal armed groups to leverage his position through the political influence these heads of armed groups were capable of exerting (or to negotiate) in their neighborhoods.
10. See https://binuh.unmissions.org/en
11. Their main reference is the Working Paper no 37, 2006, of the network of the Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit in the Social Development Department of the Sustainable Development Network of the World Bank, as well as the UN's official position on the promotion of the rule of law. This is not surprising, given that the World Bank was the prime sponsor of this vocabulary from 1989.
12. Another component of American and international interventionism I cannot discuss here, but which is of utmost importance, is humanitarian aid.
13. Examples can be found in Beckett (2019), Coughlin and Ives (2011), Katz (2014), Kivland (2020), Lee and Bartels (2019), and Payton (2017, 2019).
14. See https://www.usip.org/guiding-principles-stabilization-and-reconstruction-the-web-version/rule-law

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Not so much absence, not so much contract: women, men, and the production of familiarity in Jacmel, Haiti

Flávia Freire Dalmaso

This research is the result of extensive ethnographic research in the commune of Jacmel, in Haiti's Southeast Department. It seeks to understand how love relationships are constructed and experienced by women in their daily lives. Based on a dialog with the literature on the cultural specificities of Afro-American and Afro-Caribbean families, I observe that gender relations are ambivalent, crossed by moral expectations, frustrations and conflicts, but also marked by interdependence and solidarity. Throughout the text, I argue that women, as the main people responsible for preparing and distributing home-cooked meals, end up being central agents in the creation, maintenance and expansion of the processes of relationality between people. At the same time, I return to the popular idea that associates Haitian women with the figure of the poto mitan –a pillar that in Vodou temples represents the connection between heaven and earth–to construct a native theory of matrifocality according to which the prominence of these women is linked to the conception that they are the maintainers of life in its fullest sense.

Keywords: familiarity, enthography, commune of Jacmel

Introduction

Since 2008, when I started researching Haiti, I have been interested in addressing the dynamics involved in the process of producing familiarity among relatives, neighbors, and friends in the nation. Understanding that we are facing a continuous and variable process, my interests have been focused on understanding how bonds between those recognized as family members are undone and transformed over time (Dalmaso, 2019). The “Caribbean family” became the subject of several studies in the 1950s-60s, when research began focusing more on the issue of relations between genders. As noted by Richard Price (1971, p. 24), discussions about the existence of different marital arrangements, as well as the apparent “anomaly in domestic organization” filled the agenda of scientists who sought to understand the family organization of the Caribbean region. The anomie theory, often used in relation to Afro-Caribbean or popular classes in Brazil (Marcelin, 1996), perpetuates the idea of family in its nuclear form as sustained by a legal, monogamous marriage, and under the leadership of husbands. Additionally, this theory rejects all other familiar formats as illegitimate, disorganized, and unstable.

Many studies employ anomie theory in order to create typologies or models that describe different types of love partnerships and residency patterns. With regard to Haiti, the example of Simpson (1942), is the most paradigmatic after highlighting the existence of two great alternatives for amorous unions in Haiti, mariaj (marriage) and plasaj (consensual union), the author loses himself in an inventory of terminologies used to define women who are under the label of plasaj. Although he does not directly mention Simpson's work, Lowenthal (1987, p.8) draws attention to the excess of formalism that surrounded studies carried out in the Caribbean.

These studies are characterized by "a proliferation of typologies and terminologies" that sought to account for loving partnerships, patterns residence, and empty "family systems" of substance.

On the other hand, at least two important ethnographic works written in the first half of the twentieth century – one by Melville Herskovits (1937), and the other by Remy Bastien (1985), were concerned with understanding the particularities of "black families" and pointed out the impossibility of taking as a normative standard the idea of the western nuclear family, composed of a couple and their children living in the same house. Organized around the principles of blood and affinity, the "Haitian family" has a wide range of relatives, its immediate nucleus being only part of a much larger group. Before being anomic, it had to be understood in its own terms, which meant taking into account the influence, or rather, the "survival" of African traits in its composition (Herskovits, 1971; 1937).

As Marcelin (2012, p. 257) points out, despite significant variations between urban and rural contexts, Haitians formulate the *fanmi* concept through the language of blood. Moreover, "the word [*fanmi*] in Haitian Creole … designates both the analytical concepts kinship and family." In the same way, among my interlocutor's kinship by consanguinity is constructed as a biological fact and natural fact. In the native conception, all people are born related to a network they call family, and blood is seen as the central substance. Blood has an ability to act as a trigger, initiating relationships in an involuntary and automatic way. Simultaneously, there is a possibility that bonds based on blood remain only as a potential because they are not always cultivated in daily practice - it is necessary that relatives be formally recognized (Dalmaso 2019, p. 67). This substance "confers the relationships density [...] and it remains very important, especially in what it is capable of transmitting," such as physical and moral similarities between people, lands, spiritual entities, and family histories.

However, as Marcelin (2012) draws attention to, it would be a great simplification of an extremely complex reality to assume that *fanmi* has the same meanings in all Haitian society. In this direction, even with all the centrality of blood, it is common for the word *fanmi* to be extended to account for relationships formed on other foundations. In the words of Marcelin (idem, p. 257):

> With variations from rural to urban, between classes and between Haiti and the diaspora, *fanmi* is the primary reference that defines the person's universe and identity. By extension, it also refers to various degrees of proximity and familiarity - in practice empowered to encompass particular forms of social relatedness, such as neighbor, acquaintance, friend, community, or even common humanity.

As I pointed out elsewhere (Dalmaso, 2019), in practice, the concept of *fanmi* is characterized by an open and flexible nature, making it possible to create relatedness (Carsten, 1997), based on other aspects that may go beyond blood. In my field of Social Anthropology, this is particularly evident from the daily use of the expression moun mwen (my people) and its variations (moun pam, moun yo, moun nou) in reference to those who can be trusted and counted on in the face of adversity. People who are familiar because they "lead a common life," share experiences, suffering, and joy, insofar as individuals "live each other's lives and who die each other's deaths" (Sahlins, 2013, p. 489).

In Jacmel, capital of the Southeast Haitian Department and where the ethnographic material for this research was collected, food plays a central role in the creation and maintenance of relatedness between people who live in the same house. Likewise, food maintains sponsorship, friendship, and relationships of those that are part of the same neighborhood. As Carsten (1997, p.127) observes, "food becomes blood" causing those who live together to have "a substance in common." Since women are the main ones in charge of preparing meals inside the homes, they prove to be fundamental agents in the production of familiarity among people (Dalmaso, 2014; 2019). A return to these questions frames the discussions that will be the subject of this article. As previously noted, literature on the forms and specificities of Afro-Caribbean or Afro-American families gave way to the so-called "gender studies" which in some cases means circumscribed research into the lives of women. As described in Braum, Dalmaso & Neiburg in Haiti:

> The term gender evokes questions relating to violence and extreme poverty, exacerbated by natural catastrophes and by a supposed cultural acceptance of women's inferiority to men, expressed in the large numbers of single mothers bringing up children and caring for the home alone. Female single parenting and matrifocality are identified as marked characteristics of Haitian families, especially in low-income urban environments (2014, p. 3).

Also according to the authors (2014, p. 5), Haitian women "take an active part in associations for various purposes alongside men, as well as setting up and promoting women-specific associations," and "the pursuit of gender equality has been a longstanding aim of Haitian women's movements." The relations between genders are ambivalent, articulated not only from conflicts and inequalities, but also from interdependencies and solidarities (2014, p.13). I seek here to understand how conjugal and loving relationships are built and experienced in daily life according to the values, expectations and points of view of men and women with whom I lived closely during the periods of field research in Jacmel. Inversely, the speeches of Lowenthal (1987) and Schwarts (2008) use the notion of contract to describe these relations in Haiti, and Momsen (1993) supports the idea that in the Caribbean relationships between men and women are structured on the basis of "patriarchalism in absence." Understandingly, my goal is to show a reality modulated by gradations that can either approach or depart from these formulations.

Finally, I seek to explore the associations made by my interlocutors between the images of the feminine and the figure of the *poto mitan,* a pillar that gives name to any central beam that supports a construction. Ironically, *poto mitan* happens to be the name of the pillar located right in the middle of the vodu temples and symbolizes the connection of heaven with earth. As explained previously, women are fundamental agents in the process of creating relatedness among people due to their position as the ones who prepare meals at home. Additionally, the female body itself is used as an allegory for the home and for food since they are responsible for the first food we receive - the blood that nourishes the baby through the umbilical cord - just like their belly is the first shelter of all human beings.

Absence

> We were at her house, located on the outskirts of the city, when Louise, a young acquaintance told me that she lived with her father, mother, and brothers. A few minutes later, observing a small area of gardens in his backyard, I asked if it was her father who took care of the plantation. Laughing, Louise replied negatively: My father has lived in São Domingo since I was a baby (Dalmaso, fieldwork notes - March 2011).

Situations like the one highlighted above, in which people who are physically absent from their homes, are common in Jacmel and have accompanied me throughout all the field periods. Moreover, one of my very close neighbors claimed that her husband lived with her even though

since their marriage they had never lived under one roof. This aspect is so evident that my interlocutors make jokes in which they question the fidelity of any information regarding people's places of residence. It is a fleeting universe often rebellious to the crystallizations desired by demographic experts.

When discussing the relations between men and women in the Caribbean, Momsen (1993) identifies the coexistence of two paradoxical principles: on the one hand, patriarchal ideology and logic; on the other, a profound economic independence of women. Despite being patriarchal, the conjuncture of Caribbean societies in which we find a high rate of domestic groups headed by women, led the author to call the patriarchy found in the Caribbean "patriarchalism in absentia." Throughout the 1980s and 1990s Bell, M'Zengou-Tayo, and Neptune-Anglade sought to address the absence of husbands or, on the contrary, their simultaneous engagement with various households and families, as well as the various forms of female resistance to these and other difficulties to which women are subjected (2001; 1998; 1986). Such studies yearned to highlight the different forms of exploitation that affect Haitian women who are responsible for the family, the home economy, the local economy, and culture, which are "the most defavorize, marginalized, within the klas defavorize, marginalized class" (Bell 2001, p. 18). The bibliographic production inserted in this context brings data that show the high levels of physical and sexual violence, the large number of single mothers, the lack of prenatal care, and the high rates of postpartum and child mortality among other problems that affect particularly the female population in Haiti:

> "In addition to this discourse of violence and oppression, there are others who explore more closely the idea of matrifocality and the strength of the bonds between mothers and daughters in Haiti created by the network of matrilineal relatives (Brown, 1991; Kerns, 1997) is critical of the idea formulated since the beginning of anthropology (Kuper, 1988) and perpetuated by structural-functionalist theories that the nuclear family, composed of father, mother, and children, is universal and necessary to all human societies."

Smith (1996) argues that Caribbean families should be thought of through the context of matrifocality. In matrifocal families, women in their roles as mothers would assume prominence in the domestic universe at the expense of the weak presence of men as fathers in the homes. Thus, according to Smith (1996, p. 6), Caribbean families are not "distorted forms of a basic nuclear family system, but a rich and viable system in its own terms."

Narratives regarding survival, oppression, and violence mirror the voices of my interlocutors who on a daily basis experience everything that the above-mentioned feminist literature denounces. The lyrics of several songs composed by the women's associations that I met in Lepwa, a rural village located on the outskirts of the city of Jacmel, illustrate the struggle, injustice, and harsh conditions to which women are subjected to on a daily basis. The excerpt transcribed below reproduces one of those letters:

> Men say they work harder than women / But they never say they are the source of life / Women are not a rag you wear to stay at home / Women are not a curtain that you wrap yourself around where passes / Women are not a broom that are supported in a corner / Women are the pillar of life.

During the various periods spent in the field I lived in two different houses. The first experience was a perfect example of what is typically portrayed by the literature cited above. My hostess' husband had many mistresses and spent many days without showing up which caused her enormous suffering. Every day she went to sleep without even knowing if he would be back

that night or not. Yet the house was taken over by his presence, wedding pictures hung on the walls, his clothes strewn around the rooms, and his plate of food on the table. In the second house, Mesyè and madam Lundi lived in harmony with each other stating in words that they never had problems with each other and all-important family decisions were discussed together and with mutual respect. For several years, prior to the time we met, Lundi experienced times of physical distance. Lundi spent many years as a merchant buying plastic bags in Santo Domingo, the capital of the Dominican Republic, and reselling them in street markets in Port-au-Prince. Meanwhile, Mesyè occupied a space in Belè, like the Jacmel market, where she sold jewelry, women's and men's underwear, and other accessories. This period is remembered by both as a time of longing, but also cooperation, understanding, and solidarity. When he returned to Jacmel, Lionel brought many things for Mesyè to sell as well as many gifts for her and her children: sandals, panties, and other items.

In this sense, ethnography revealed that the absence and presence of husbands/fathers are not completely separate dimensions in everyday life; nor are they characterized by a continuity. In other words, a present husband is not necessarily a physical presence or vice versa. Most importantly, what is seen as absence or presence ends up depending on subjectivity, a factor that is not always included in the analysis of the Haitian women's plight. Due to this reason, it is possible that men like Louise's father or Ivoise's husband in the above-mentioned examples (among many others that I could witness in the field), are considered to be residents of their homes in Haiti even though they live most of their lives elsewhere.

Contract

It was late afternoon when Gerard, one of my neighbors, told me about the countless possibilities he had of leaving Haiti and living in the USA. In fact, he is a man of many resources, both financial and cultural; he works as an agronomist holding an important position in the government of the Southeast Department. I asked: why didn't you go? Gerard explained to me that it could be very complicated to take his wife. Accustomed to the countryside and the plantation they cultivated; she had no desire to leave Haiti. After all, even if she was willing to leave, it could take a few years, complicating the dynamics of the couple's relationship. His main dilemma involved the difficulties of keeping the promises made in the marriage: would it be possible for both of them to remain faithful? Even if he sent money, giving material proof that he was not going to abandon him or his children, even considering that both he and she were people of the church, it would still be a great sacrifice for both of them, because the bodies need pleasure (Dalmaso, fieldwork notes - March 2011).

In contrast to the academic literature on women who denounce female conditions in the Caribbean and Haiti, some male researchers sought to portray more closely marital relationships in rural Haitian areas (Lowenthal, 1987; Schwartz, 2008). Although with different emphases, these two authors bring the idea that conjugal unions in Haiti would be permeated by the notion of "contract" through which men would exchange material resources (housing, agricultural production, and money) for sex and services – household tasks performed by women. They note that female sexuality is seen by both men and women as a capital that women exchange directly and explicitly for items that men can provide. Lowenthal, is keen to note that this idea is based:

> "on a false image publicly held by people of both sexes that women do not want sex and that it is more a job than a pleasure. Due to this false image, the author maintains that sexual gratification is never considered a reward for women, and

there must always be some related material benefit" (1987, pp. 74 and 75).

As noted by Richman (2003, p. 128), when analyzing a case of marital infidelity on the part of a wife whose husband had migrated to the USA, "all sexual exchanges between men and women, whether between friends or spouses, implies an exchange of goods." Richman analyzes the difficult situation from the perspective of women whose husbands do not send enough money to support their children and demand "respect" – sexual fidelity on the wives' part. It is in this context that female sexuality is considered by both men and women as a capital, "a resource that can be put to work to produce wealth" (2003, p.128).

Another fundamental trait, pointed out by both Lowenthal (1987) and Schwartz (2008), is the difference between men and women regarding their loyalty. Men, including married ones, are free to maintain more than one relationship; however, women must remain faithful. This logic, which guides the actions of my interlocutors (men), is supported by a very widespread idea that men need sex more than women. Many of my interlocutors find this point of view disagreeable even if they assume that men "because of their masculine nature" are more likely to be unfaithful. As pointed out by both Lowenthal and Schwartz, one of the criticisms of these interpretations involves the idea that conjugal unions lie on an ideal plane. This belief affirms that in everyday life cooperation between spouses does not work mainly because men and women disappoint one another's expectations. Often women are not as faithful as they are expected to be. Men that leave their families and may support them financially, but it can still leave their wives deeply hurt and disappointed. However, the contractual bias of conjugal unions is another issue that needs to be addressed. Such agreements make it appear that if the two involved parties are fulfilling their respective duties, there are no major problems. For example, such a belief endorses the sentiment that women's expectations of men correspond only to the material plane and not to the emotional plane. As if all the frustrations, fights, and disappointments of women were linked to a failure by men to offer support and resources. According to Schwartz, women do not have many options in the face of a husband who seeks to start a new romantic relationship but remain a provider, because if women decide to separate, they must return to their parents' home and thus, lose control over their own home.

Although assumed as a natural behavior of men, husbands' marital infidelities are a delicate subject in Jacmel. Many women feel frustrated by a breach of expectations regarding their partner's behavior. If these partners continue to provide for the home, especially if they continue to support their children, the end of the relationship does not make much sense. At the same time, this logic goes beyond the language of material resources. The idea that children can grow up with psychological problems because they have separated parents or that, following a certain Christian foundation, a couple must love one another till death do them part overcoming all possible problems are common convictions that guide daily actions. Close and prolonged interaction with my interlocutors in Jacmel ended up revealing the fragility of the contract theory. The authors themselves acknowledged the difficulties of sustaining daily routines due to the lack of cooperation between couples and continuous frustrations of expectations on both sides. In this sense, the interest in maintaining control of male resources is not the only concern of women who accept that their husbands are seeing other people. In addition to all the conformation translated into any contractual language, there are passions, complaints, sadness, hurt, and jealousy on both sides. After all, as Gerard taught me that afternoon on the balcony of my hosts' house, even though everything is going well and both parties are fulfilling the agreement, "our bodies need pleasure" (*kò nou beswen plezi*); in other words, the flesh is weak. However, to disagree with this

contractual bias does not mean to affirm that such a dimension does not exist, or that male financial resources have little importance in romantic interactions.

On the contrary, money is a central element especially among the young and single population. As a friend once said to me, "in Haiti, men need to have money if they want to date" (*an Ayiti gason yo bezwen monè si yo vle renmen*). According to him, it doesn't have to be much, just a "little money" (*ti kòb*) to spend on things understood to be characteristic of the female universe: hair extensions, lip gloss, or body moisturizers. Still, in practice there are no clearly defined limits on what or how much you can, or should, spend on a girlfriend. In some cases, buying medicine for one may be overkill, while in others, paying rent for a house is not seen as exorbitant. In any case, some of my interlocutors feel exploited and extorted by women who, in turn, tend to develop real expertise on how to negotiate and manage their relationships with men. In any case, money has been part of love relationships since its inception, and this is usually not seen as a problem. It is common to find young people who are financed by several boyfriends (*ti menaj*), with whom they have relationships that do not involve sex in the present but operate with the possibility that it will happen in the future. "Having many boyfriends" is an expression often used by young people in reference to themselves and manifests uncompromising relationships, experiences that may or may not result in more serious dating, almost always translated by the term menaj (boyfriend or girlfriend). When referring to women, it can indicate a non-affectionate relationship of extortion, in which the man is treated as a client (klyan). Understandingly, there are semantical differences regarding prostitution, with subjectivity playing a role in what an individual classifies as such. Especially from the perspective of the women with whom I lived, desire and love is just as important as financial stability, because without these ingredients one runs the risk of being seen as a prostitute.

Conclusion: The Native Theory of Matrifocality

In Haiti it is common to hear that women are the "pillar" (*poto mitan*) of the family and of life. "It is the woman who holds the house" explained to me by the people with whom I lived. The expression "women are the pillar" (*fanm se poto mitan*) has been repeatedly explored both nationally and internationally in campaigns that denounce the difficult living conditions of the female population in the country. These proposals seek to highlight society's lack of recognition of the efforts made by Haitians, whether in the field of economics, politics, or even literature.

Despite this idea echoing the voices of my interlocutors, as I have been suggesting and as was made clear in the excerpt of one of the so-called *mizik fanm* (women's songs) sung in Lepwa transcribed in the first topic of this text, it does not exhaust other possible associations elaborated at all times around the expression. For example, one of these concerns, is the connection between the image of women as *poto mitan* and the fact that all human beings are pregnant and are born from a female womb. More than being a kind of first home, women's bodies serve as a means by which everyone receives food – the first food of life, as already highlighted in the introduction. Following the native conception, the body of the woman, like the *poto mitan*, promotes, supports, and makes existence a viable and concrete possibility. The first time I heard these ideas being formulated was at a meeting of Our Lady of Perpetual Help Foundation, a civil organization better known as the "Lepwa women's group." At that time, the vice-president/spiritual counselor, made a brief speech regarding the fact that women are more than the just the pillar of the family, but that they are also the pillar and source of life. The spiritual advisor, who was also a midwife, explained that without women/mothers, no one would exist in the world. All inhabited a womb as

their first homes, and all received their first source of nutrition from a woman's body. This entire process does not end when people are born; women are still responsible for preparing the meals consumed inside the physical home.

It is in this way that *poto mitan* is linked to the very ability to generate people and to provided continued nutrition through the food made by women/mothers which is consumed daily by individuals after their birth. From the perspective of the houses (Dalmaso, 2014), preparing meals for family members, especially for husbands and children, is a function that many women see as a pleasure and an obligation. In this sense, more than a simple domestic task, cooking is part of the language of affection and sharing the food is part of building kinship between those who are living together.

Additionally, there exists a strong relationship between women and the practice of commercial activities in Haiti, whether in their own homes or in the "marketplaces" (Mintz, 1961, 1964; 1967; 1971). This strong involvement with commerce is widely portrayed Haitian naïve art and can be seen in sculptures made of wood, soapstone, or iron. In addition, he appears in several Lepwa *mizik fanm* such as in one of Fanm Malere's stanzas; "we are small businesses (*ti komès se nou mem*)." When examining the role of personal relationships and loyalty in Haitian economic exchanges (*pratik*), Mintz (1967 ; 1964), draws attention to the place occupied by women not only as buyers and/or sellers, but also as intermediaries in commercial practices that interconnect the various markets across the country. Also, according to Mintz, the bonds established through these relationships produce "networks of economic association" that "ensure and solidify the channels of trade" (1967, p.102). This aspect is notable in Jacmel. Most of my interlocutors are or have been at some point in their lives involved in the trade of some product. Some moved between different markets, doing what they called sara. Others, like one of my hostesses and their daughters, had a fixed place at the Jacmel or Lepwa market. Still, others remained in their homes where they sold bread, cookies, matches, clothes, or credits for cell phones; helping to compose the infinite list of what is marketed by them daily. However, none of these positions are fixed or exclusive; selling in some market does not mean that you cannot sell at home, or that these tasks remain unchanged over time.

The engagement in commercial activities and the construction of *pratik* relations require a great deal of communication skills, characteristics that are immediately associated with women who "really know" how to "do business" much better than anyone else in Haiti. In this sense, it is essential that they know how to negotiate the amount charged while also dealing with the demands of buyers, most of whom are other women. Moreover, they also must know how to "make the price" (*fè pri*), an expression widely used in reference to those who did not know how to bargain (such as foreigners). Considering these points regarding commerce, it is clear that women are endowed with an enormous expansive capacity; living up to their description as the *potan mitan* of life and family - the channel that establishes communication between heaven and earth. Thus, one of my main interlocutors from Lepwa affirmed that the woman is the family and house's *poto mitan* of life because without her presence this house cannot be sustained. In addition, she is pointing to a predisposition - associated with the female nature in Haiti - to create, maintain, and expand relationships, whether through the preparation of food, or in the production and maintenance of personal networks in stores. Due to this expansive nature attributed to women, as the main provider of substance in all human beings, they are, from the native point of view, the fundamental agents in the production of familiarity between people.

Finally, it should be noted that in the day-to-day life experienced in Jacmel, the centrality of women is mobilized through the figure of the *potan mitan* and not so much from the supposed absence of their husbands or their marginal role as parents within the houses. As I drew attention elsewhere (Dalmaso, 2019 p.77), although any supporting beam may be called *poto mitan*, the image, which explicitly occupies a central position in the vodu temples, represents the connection of heaven with the land, and around the *lwa* (spirits) dance, which provides the closest idea of the analogy with the feminine nature, made by my interlocutors. Lastly, it is this centrality, which affirms women's role as life maintainers in its fullest sense, and what Haitians refer to as the *poto mitan* in their daily interactions.

ENDNOTES

1. Master and PhD in Social Anthropology at the Museu Nacional / UFRJ. Member of NuCEC (Center for Research in Culture and Economics) http://www.nucec.net/ based at UFRJ and collaborating professor in the Graduate Program in Social Anthropology at the Federal University of Mato Grosso do Sul.
2. As pointed out by Marcelin (1999, p. 45) for the Recôncavo Baiano region, in Brazil, "if blood is the necessary condition to identify those who are relatives (blood relatives), it is not, however, a sufficient condition", a relative is only one who is "recognized as such".
3. The ethnographic material on which this article is based is the result of a long field research in the Jacmel region, where I was for several periods between the years 2008 and 2016.
4. Some of these works question the dichotomy between the public and private domains that marked gender research at the time, trying to show how they mix and how women's tasks are not restricted to the domestic domain (Berleant-Schiller and Maurer, 1993). Others question the theory developed by Peter Wilson (1973) that Caribbean societies would organize themselves based on two dialectical principles, that of reputation linked to men and that of respectability to women (Besson, 1993). Still others focus on female migration and the problems that women face when separating from their support network usually made up of relatives (men and women) who stay in the country of origin (Olwig, 1993).
5. Mesye yo di yo travay passe fanm/Men janm yo di se yo ki sous lavi a/Fanm se pa yon rabann ki abiye san sòti/Fanm se pa yon rido w ap di tyoule bò w pase/Fanm se pa yon bale ki apiye nan yon kwen /Fanm se poto mitan lavi a.
6. Olivro de Berverly Bell Walking on Fire: Haitian women's stories of survival and resistance prefaciado por Edwige Danticat é um ótimo exemplo de elaborações mais recentes de um rico movimento feminista haitiano.
7. Often traders are called madanm Sara, after a species of bird found in Haiti, but originally from Africa, known for flying in flocks and making a lot of noise when they are together, as traders do in markets or inside trucks. The term, which can also be used for men, draws attention to this communicative aspect that is part of commercial relations. Information extracted from the textbook *M'ap li ak kè kontan*, 5th year.

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Peace Journalism in Haiti

Leara Rhodes

Peacekeeping in Haiti has been attempted with different results and with different actors. The most recent effort was with the United Nations (UN). A contingent of military officers were left to train a national police force and to focus on the justice system and the rule of law and order. If peace is seen as an important existence for any country, then more needs to be done to leave Haiti with a lasting peace. This essay suggests that UN peacekeeping should have provided a space for institutions within Haiti to transition into keeping the peace for themselves and to offer a process that would incur a change of mindset rather than financial support. Through philosophical logic, existing constitutional guarantees, and functions of three major institutions: political, economic and communications, the argument here is that each of these institutions, with emphasis on communications, especially in peace journalism, Haiti can create its own peacekeeping policies.

Keywords: Peacekeeping, Peace Journalism, Communication, Institutions

Introduction

What do peacekeepers do? According to the United Nations (UN) website, peacekeepers provide security and support to help countries transition from conflict to peace guided by three basic principles: consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate. The UN peacekeepers maintain peace and security but also facilitate the political process, protect civilians, assist in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, support the organization of elections, protect and promote human rights and assist in restoring the rule of law, according to the peacekeeping UN organization.[1]

After 13 years of the UN in Haiti, most of the military forces were removed leaving a smaller contingent in place to train Haitians as National Police and to focus on the justice system and rule of law. The Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en Haiti (MINUJUSTH) began in Haiti in 2004 after the unrest of Jean-Bertrand Aristide's exile but was extended in October 2017 to 2019. According to MINUJUSTH's website[2], the mission was completed due to the force completing its goals. The website listed their accomplishments as reducing community violence with 75,000 direct beneficiaries, helping 1,587 youth who have benefited from income-generating activities (vocational training and entrepreneurship), and promoting community dialogue, capacity development and vocational training with 3,881 beneficiaries. For two years of additional effort, and 10 million people in Haiti, this seems like a drop in the bucket. The 15-year mission left more controversy than helpfulness. Reported by Aljazeera (6 Oct. 2017), UN peacekeepers may have helped train a police force, but members of the mission were also responsible for the cholera outbreak killing 9,000 Haitians (see the film "Haiti in the Time of Cholera") and 134 members were found guilty of rape and other sexual charges.

If the mission's charge was to assist the Haitian government to develop a Haitian National Police, to strengthen Haiti's rule of law institutions, including the justice and prisons, and to promote and protect human rights, according to the peacekeeping UN website, they failed. The strengthening of Haiti's rule of law institutions to include the justice and prisons is where the

Haitian development toward peace should begin to happen and could make a difference. Without a strong judicial system and belief in the rule of law, there is little to be done to maintain peace except with force and that is not peaceful. The U.S. State Department in its document, 2018 Human Rights, reported that the Haitian government rarely took steps to prosecute government and law enforcement officials accused of committing abuses and that corruption and a lack of judicial oversight severely hampered the judiciary. The judicial branch investigated several corruption cases, but none of them resulted in prosecutions in 2018. The government fired 21 assistant prosecutors because of allegations of corruption.[3] According to the 2018 Human Rights report, "the perception of corruption remained widespread in all branches of government and at all levels…. As of year's end, no government had ever prosecuted a high-level official for corruption."[4]

The rule of law should protect all three basic institutions that form a democratic society: political, economic, and communication. Democracy, according to Schiller (1981), is a form of government established when these institutions operate separately as institutions but together as enabling democracy. According to Schiller (1996), how and for what purposes information is used is essential and can define features of the social order. Information can be regarded as a social good and central element in the development and creation of a democratic society. Under this premise, information serves to facilitate democratic decision making, assists citizen participation in government, and contributes to the search for roughly egalitarian measures in the economy at large. Comprehensive and well-organized information enables decisionmakers to make rational resource allocation decisions, to prioritize social claims, and to maximize social welfare. It allows them to overcome baleful practices that harm the general welfare, like pollution, smoking, and armaments production. Such information resources allow leaders to promote the development of science and invention that are socially beneficial and to organize historical experience for meaningful contemporary reflection and use. In brief, comprehensive, well-organized public information enables decisionmakers to bring past knowledge and experience to bear on current issues and problems.

To create a more peaceful Haiti, the rule of law, a strong judiciary system and transparent communication systems could enable Haitians to govern Haitians peacefully. This essay will focus on how this process can work with emphasis on peace journalism, a concept advanced by Johan Galtung, a Norwegian sociologist. The peace journalism model is a source of practical options for journalists. Peace journalism shows backgrounds and contexts of conflicts, hears from all sides, explores hidden agendas and highlights peace ideas and initiatives from anywhere at any time (Peace Journalism, nd.).[5]

Status of Communications Institutions in Haiti

Politically there is chaos and fear between the State and communication institutions. The UN peacekeeping would not have been brought in if the Haitian institutions could function on their own. To maintain hegemony over communications institutions, the government continues to use bribes, threats, and sanctions to control information. According to Freedom of the Press:

> Threats and assaults against media personnel, including by police, are frequent enough to create a climate of fear among journalists whose work is critical of the government. As antigovernment demonstrations spiked in November and December in response to complaints of election fraud, so did attacks on the media. In the early morning of December 1, unidentified assailants sprayed the office of Radio Télé Kiskeya in Port-au-Prince with automatic gunfire, though no injuries were reported. A few days earlier, a group of armed individuals had denounced the head of Radio Télé Zénith and threatened to set fire to the premises. Both outlets reported that they and their staff had received death threats. Witnesses say journalists were attacked during the election-related protests, with both demonstrators and police destroying or seizing their equipment. (2016, Haiti).

The Haitian State has no freedom of information legislation. Both Haitian and foreign journalists report that it is almost impossible to obtain government documents and data, especially should the journalists be critical of the regime in power. Haitian law also places defamation as both a civil and a criminal charge. The new law does not make a distinction between public and private figures. Public officials should not be able to hide behind defamation laws. The Omega World News (n.d.) uses the United States as a way to explain defamation. In *New York Times v. Sullivan*, the United States Supreme Court held that "for a public figure to prevail in a civil lawsuit for defamation, that person must prove that the newspaper published patently false information with the malicious intent to defame the person". In other words, the newspaper must know that the information published was false and that it published the information anyway for the purpose of destroying the person's reputation. Also, in the United States, truth is an affirmative defense to defamation.

Through the Haitian laws, journalists face imprisonment, civil damages, and litigation costs. Criminal defamation such as insults against public officials can get a journalist three years in prison, according to Freedom of the Press, 2016 – *Haiti report on press freedom in Haiti*.

This same report cites that there were bribes to journalists. President Michel Martelly's office handed out "gifts" of cash ranging from $870 to $1,100 to Haitian journalists at a Christmas reception in 2014. In November 2015, Haiti's communications minister announced that the government would help finance car loans for journalists. Lemaire, et al. (2019) in VOA News, reported that Radio Metropole reporter, Luckson Saint-Vil, said working conditions were difficult for reporters, which is the reason that reporters get involved with corruption by accepting bribes. And if the journalists do not accept bribes, there are threats. In a Freedom of the Press, 2016 – Haiti report, it was cited that in August 2017, the mayor of Les Cayes threatened the life of a journalist for negative reporting on a local musical festival. Lemaire, et al. (2019) cites evidence of this with a story about a reporter who went to a gang plagued neighborhood and never returned. Moreover, sanctions are used to control the media.

Attempts have been made to raise broadcast license fees for those stations that criticize the government. CONATEL, the National Telecommunication Council, issues licenses and has threatened to sanction stations that "broadcast false information liable to disturb order, destabilize the Republic's institutions, and attack the integrity of many citizens" (Refworld, 2020). The National Association of Haitian Media argued that CONATEL must stay within the parameters of technology and not content. CONATEL has shut down 50 community stations due to improper licenses, (Refworld, 2020). Additionally, one of the most powerful media countries, the United States, is ignoring Haiti. Some say it is because President Jovenel Moïse has been hand-picked to follow neoliberal policies, that Haiti is open for business, (Regan, 2019).

Economically there needs to be more investment in training and building communications infrastructure, not just making money for outside investors.

In 2016, the United States exports of telephone sets to Haiti reached $13.51 million, an increase of 37.29 percent. Total telephone set imports for the same year reached $26.07 million

with no local production, according to the US embassy website.[6] There are two primary internet/phone providers: Natcom and Digicel. Natcom is a joint venture between Viettel Global (Vietnam) and Télécommunications d'Haiti S.A.M (Haiti). Natcom was launched in 2011 with an investment of USD 230 million creating 2,400 direct and 25,000 indirect jobs. Digicel, owned by Irishman Denis O'Brien, reported a revenue of $2.5 billion in 2012, with Haiti leading the way, generating $439 million. Digicel has its problems. Though it has been seen as a great investment to build Haitian telecommunications infrastructure, there is a pending lawsuit in 2019 (Adams, 2013). The class-action case revolves around levies that the Haitian government applies to all international phone calls and money transfers to and from the impoverished nation. A fee of $1.50 is automatically added to every money transfer, while an extra five cents per minute is added to every international call.

Digicel controls more than 70 percent of the Haitian telecoms market, and the overwhelming majority of international calls between the nation and the US are connected via its telecoms network, therefore it is the main collector of the five cents per minute that is passed on, purportedly to fund free education. The question remains: where is the money to fund free education in Haiti?

There is a lot of money in telecommunications for Haiti. Businesses, however, need to remain nonpartisan and avoid politics. They need to be transparent in how they do business. And media owners need to pay fair wages. With journalists working multiple jobs, the risk of bias and of taking bribes increase. Communications institutions in Haiti have been based on both the authoritarian model of the press and the political function of the press. Historically, the four theories of the press were authoritarian, libertarian, social responsibility, and soviet communist, (Siebert, et al,. 1994). More current scholars have updated the theories to include developmental, revolutionary, and western systems. These have all been tied to the type of government system in place within a country. However, within our global world, different press systems can be located within the same country systems. These are the political resource model (has a political agenda), commodity model (profit-making is the main function), cultural product (educational, religious or cultural in focus with sponsors and/or pro bono) and the truth-seeking model (combination of western, libertarian and social responsibility models), (Rhodes, 2001). Based on the type of government Haiti has and how the government has supported the bribes and threats of journalists and sanctions against media, it can be argued that the press model in Haiti is authoritarian. The government decides how the media will function. And even though Haitians have struggled to say they have a democracy because they have elections, without a reliable judicial system to protect institutions such as communications, the government system remains authoritarian. Under this system, the media functions as either the political resource model (media with stated political views and agendas) or as a cultural product (for example, radio stations that play all music and the Kreole newspapers focusing on health, education, and language like the early Bon Nouvel—Protestant church publication and Boukan—Catholic church publication). However, and this is a big however, the political media only survives by supporting the government rhetoric or by being as neutral as possible and not connecting the news with politics, like Le Nouvelliste. The Haitian economy has not been strong enough to support a commodity press or much less a truth-seeking press. The ongoing argument here is that the truth-seeking model would encourages more investment in Haiti in all sectors and would be only a mindset change to actually work. The following shows how challenges for both the economic and communication institutions within Haiti can grow.

Economics and communications are organic to society according to Schramm (1972), who suggested that neither can develop without a corresponding development in the other. The challenge for both economic and communication institutions within Haiti is how to grow within a society that has a high level of poverty, little economic infrastructure, and a hostile media environment. For the communication institutions, Haiti's constitution protects the right to express opinions freely. Censorship of the media is prohibited except in cases of war, and journalists cannot be compelled to reveal their sources.[7] Though there is constitutional protection, the reality is that the rule of law is not extended to include and protect media institutions or media personnel, nor is the justice system used to protect freedom of speech. Examples are plentiful: Radio Télé Zénith reporter Wendy Phèle was shot, the case remained stalled in the courts in 2015. There has been no prosecution of who murdered radio journalist Jean Léopold Dominique in 2000 with a key witness killed. And, according to the Freedom of the Press Haiti report (2016):

> In 2015, community radio journalist Sony Estéus died of unknown causes in March, and Melodie FM journalist Marc Elie Pierre was murdered on a bus by unidentified assailants in April. Because of a lack of trust in the authorities, human rights organizations and journalists were reportedly suspicious about Estéus's death, and it remained unclear whether Pierre's murder was connected to his work. In July a police officer struck the motorcycle of Radio TV Signal cameraman Samus David François with his vehicle and subsequently beat him. A criminal complaint was filed, but the case made little progress during the year.

In addition to the inadequate protections through the judicial system, there are functions of the press which are underdeveloped in Haiti, some for clear reasons.

These functions include being a watchdog of government performance, being a reliable distributor of information so the people can make informed decisions and being an educator both to provide society with a range of information and to uncover truths over a range of social and political issues, (Rhodes, 2001, p. 12). As a watchdog over the government, if there are threats against the Haitian journalists or the media houses, self-censorship overrides telling the truth. And if information is hard to verify or interviews impossible to secure, then partial information can take the form of untruths. To solve this problem, the government can take the lead and provide statistics and other information to make the news more reliable, granting access to key decision-makers for interviews, and finding money to subsidize educational, ecological and health coverage in the media, (Rhodes, 2001, p. 18). Limitations by the government of obtaining accurate information hurts all segments of the society.

There has been progress on the economic side of communication institutions. Haiti now has an internet penetration of 11.4 percent while other Caribbean islands rank higher. Bermuda has 95.3 percent, Curacao has 94 percent, Saint Lucia has 87.5 percent, Antigua and Barbuda have 81.1 percent, Saint Kitts and Nevis have 80 percent, Aruba has 78.9 percent, and Barbados has 75 percent, according to the internet world stats website.[8] The World Bank reported that 65 percent of the Haitian population has access to a mobile phone and thus access to the internet via their phone. The main suppliers for telecommunications services and equipment are the United States, China, and Sweden. There has been a growth of the telecommunication infrastructure which will allow for an expanded market for internet services with free-zones where investors have access to locations that offer bandwidth connectivity for IT services and call centers to include Lafito Global Business Park, the Caracol Industrial Park, and the Triangular Business Park. Each of these have their controversies, according to the US embassy website.[9] Though more than half of

the population have access to a mobile phone, subscription prices are high, up to 34 percent of gross income per capita for a broadband subscription, competition is low and there are few apps which support daily financial transactions, according to the World Bank.[10]

Can Communications Institutions in Haiti change?

There are many examples of how media has been successful in Haiti. Throughout history, many journalists and editors have fought for freedom of the press but a few of these are notable examples. These include Le Nouvelliste, Radio Soleil, Daly Valet at Radio Vision 2000, and social media used during the 2010 earthquake.

Le Nouvelliste was founded in 1898 by Guillaume Chéraquit and printed by his friend, Henri Chauvet. The paper is still owned by the Chauvet family. In an interview with Max Chauvet, he said:

> "[p]oliticians feel Le Nouvelliste is too soft when they're running, then when they're in power they like it. The paper doesn't change; the people do. This paper was to last long, the founders said. It is the first paper with the general public in mind" (Rhodes, 2001, p. 192).

Le Nouvelliste has found a way to suggest changes and not demand changes, thus they stay in business. Radio Soleil was credited with taking a stand against the Duvalier regime. They did this by ridiculing the persons in power and questioning their decisions. One example is the program "Garanti la loi" (Guarantee the Law) when Jean-Claude Duvalier called for a referendum for life-presidence, (Rhodes, 2001, p. 91). Though they were heavily persecuted, the station remained a creative avenue of protesting what was happening in Haiti at the time.

Daly Valet at Vision 2000 used the talk show format on radio. In an interview, Valet said there were two roles for talk shows in society. First, they allowed anonymity. People could hide behind information. Second, talk show formats could encourage democratic formation for public opinion. These allowed deeper discussion of issues with an interaction between the presenter and the audience which allowed policy-makers to hear what the people were living, (Rhodes, 2001, p. 168). The 2010 earthquake in Haiti was covered by blogs and Twitter. Both played a critical role in spreading information and awareness after the earthquake. According to the Twitter-tracking service Sysomos, 2.3 million Tweets included the word "Haiti" or "Red Cross" between January 12 and 14. There were also 189,024 tweets that included "90999," the number that could be used to text message a donation to the Red Cross. According to CNN, the use of social media helped raise $8 million by the end of the week, according to Pew Research.[11]

How can Haiti create its own Peacekeeping Policies?

There are many challenges for Haitian communications institutions: having legal protection, paying fair wages to journalists to lessen bribes and to strengthen professionalism, and gaining access to information. In spite of these challenges, there are processes media personnel can take to assure better peacekeeping in Haiti. As defined earlier, the peace journalism model is a source of practical options for journalists. Peace journalism shows backgrounds and contexts of conflicts; hears from all sides; explores hidden agendas; highlights peace ideas and initiatives from anywhere at any time (Peace Journalism, nd.).[12] Scholars Lynch and McGoldrick (2005) expand this definition to include how editors and reporters make choices of what to report and how to report it to create opportunities for society at large to consider and value non-violent responses to conflict. These scholars offer 17 steps to guide a journalist in providing peace initiatives in

reporting. In Peace Through Media, Rhodes (2018, pp. 161-173) offers these 17 steps and provides news examples of how journalists have covered stories using techniques offered by the scholars familiar with peace journalism. These steps are helpful, but only if the mindset of the journalists and editors actually covering the conflict is changed from one of covering the conflict as a win/lose situation versus covering conflict as nonpartisan and finding sources to explain all facets of the conflict.

To begin this process, Irvan (2006) offers an ethical code for journalists to use when conflict areas are being covered.

a) Mission oriented principles:

- Journalists should seek peaceful solutions.
- Peace journalism is truth-oriented journalism. Journalists should expose untruths.
- Journalists should avoid becoming part of the problem – they should try to become part of the solution.

b) Principles on news gathering

- Journalists should seek "non-elite" sources.
- Journalists should give more and positive attention to peace-makers.
- Journalists should try hard to verify all claims. Skepticism is an important quality of good journalists.
- Journalists should investigate the wrongdoings of all sides of a conflict.
- Journalists should focus on the process, not only on the specific events.

c) Principles on news writing

- Journalists should highlight peace initiatives.
- Journalists should focus on visible and invisible effects of violence and conflict.
- Journalists should provide background information.
- Journalists should always exercise the ethics of accuracy, veracity, fairness, and respect for human rights.
- Journalists should avoid victimizing, demonizing, derogatory, and inflammatory language.
- Journalists should avoid relying on the simple "us versus them" dichotomy.

How can Haitian journalists apply these ethical codes? To understand, an article published in Le Novelliste (the first/top article in the newspaper that day) is used to discuss ethical principles and to suggest how the reporter could develop the article using peace journalism concepts. The reporter from the Agence France-Presse (AFP), wrote a story about women in the La Saline slum who have suffered violence and abuse. Though the story was published on July 14, 2019, the news event took place in November 2018. The reporter interviewed three La Saline residents and received brief quotes. Two documents were referenced but with incomplete information on how to verify the facts (UN Report and a Haitian Human Rights Organization Report). and Evelyne Trouillot, who is a well-known writer, and a member of the Gathering for a Dignified Haiti Movement was quoted (Baron, 2019).

To apply the ethical code to this story, the reader first asks, "what is the truth?" The Haitian paper acknowledged the AFP reporter writing the story, but not that it was published two days earlier in The Jakarta Post. The newspaper also used an outside reporter to cover a crime story, possibly a way to remain outside of the backlash of covering a crime story in Haiti and a way of protecting the newspaper's local reporters. Though the story said there were no police resources available to protect the women, no spokesperson was quoted. The story news event happened in November 2018, yet the story was reported eight months later. As mentioned above, Evelyne

Trouillot, a well-known Haitian writer suggested that people looked down on the people in the slums and therefore no help would be given. Using her as a source was based on the fact that she is member of the Gathering for a Dignified Haiti Movement. Information on this movement and the impact on helping women living in the slums was not discussed. What type of peaceful solutions could the journalist have offered the reader?

Information on how the Gathering for a Dignified Haiti Movement is working to make a difference would have been a good start. Nothing was readily available via the web on the organization, so the reporter on the ground in Haiti could have investigated or even asked Trouillot. Then, according to the article, Haiti, Event of 2018 in the Human Rights Watch Report for 2019, "Gender-based violence is a widespread problem. Haiti does not have specific legislation against domestic violence, sexual harassment, or other forms of violence targeted at women and girls. Rape was only explicitly criminalized in 2005, by ministerial decree." Again, here is where judicial institutions are necessary to protect women in the slums. A conversation with one of the ministers of government might shed some light onto why women are not protected. In the article, the reporter inferred that gang violence was a result of a turf war to control one of the largest marketplaces in Haiti; more reporting could have been done. Easily accessible was an article in the Miami Herald:

> "The culprits: bandits tied to gang conflicts over control of a sprawling outdoor market where protection rackets are the norm, but also guns-for-hire by powerful politicians and well-heeled businessmen seeking to control votes in the run-up to upcoming legislative and mayoral election" (Charles, 2019).

At least with the Miami Herald article there are more local connections to explain the gang violence. The Le Novelliste article only illustrates why journalists have problems in Haiti covering stories. Though the reporter used non-elite sources (the three people who had experienced violence in the slum, all were women who had had their husbands or sons killed, none attested to being raped), there were no verified official sources to the story. Trouillot would be considered a safe source since she was involved in a movement to help women and to establish dignity for all in Haiti. However, to be able to verify all claims eight months after the news event is nearly impossible, especially with no police records to use as facts. The story left the reader with the feeling that the situation is hopeless. No investigation into what is being done to control the gangs was even explored; therefore, not all sides of the conflict was covered. And when other reporters verified that a journalist went into a gang area to report a story, he was killed. Losing one's life to write a story is not an option for some journalists, nor should it be. The process of the story, however, was how violence impacted the lives of women living in the slums, but the writer chose to write only about specific events of violence. Other sources and deeper understanding of the process of the story would have provided the reader options to think about and policies to promote for the state to enforce.

The peace journalism concept has been successful in many places around the world that has had major conflicts. As a result, peace journalism has been included in journalism training programs to include: The United States, Australia, The Philippines, Turkey, Egypt, and Afghanistan. Conflict sensitivity training for journalists has happened in Denmark, The United States, Colombia, The Netherlands, United Kingdom, Switzerland, France, Germany, and Canada. Major peace-oriented media projects around the world include radio for peacebuilding on the African continent, the SFCG production studio in Angola, communicating justice through Studio Ijambo in Burundi, Radio UNTAC in Cambodia, Radio MINURCA in Central African Republic, Medios par la Paz in Colombia, communicating justice through Studio Ijambo in Democratic Republic of Congo, Studio Moris Hamutuk in Indonesia/East Timor, the Common Ground News Service in Israel/Palestine, STAR radio in Liberia, regulation of commercial press in Northern Ireland, Studio Ijambo in Rwanda, radio soap opera in Casamance region of Senegal, Talking Drum Studio in Sierre Leone, Radio Voice of Hope in Sudan, radio talk shows in Uganda, TV OBN in Yugoslavia, and Eyes on Zimbabwe in Zimbabwe (Rhodes, 2018, pp. 195-201). If peace journalism can work in these conflict prone places, it can work in Haiti; there is only the need to change how media covers conflict.

Conclusion

This essay argues that the Haitians can be their own peacekeepers. This is based on using Schiller's philosophy that political, economic and communication institutions should operate separately as institutions but together to enable democracy. This argument is also based on the notion that the UN peacekeeping force can strengthen the Haitian judiciary system and allow the courts to manage and protect the Haitian citizens. With a strong judiciary system, communications institutions could then operate in a more truth-telling function rather than political or cultural by applying the principles of peace journalism. Historically, through individual media houses and journalists, the "will" to have a truth-seeking media has been sought.

The task now for the communications institutions in Haiti is to provide a space where journalists can report stories fairly and in-depth. To do this though, there must be cooperation between the state and all communications institutions. Communication institutions need to change the mindset of media personnel to explore how stories can be ethically reported. Moreover, state representatives must provide access to information and protect the constitutional guarantees already in place. Defamation laws need to be updated to protect the journalists. Both political and communication institutions must work together, not go against each other. And both of these institutions need the judiciary to provide a balance and to assure the people that fairness is being sought. There can be no peace in Haiti without protection by the courts. Both the state and courts may be willing to cooperate if media personnel agree to be more truthful than sensational; these institutions must work together. The UN peacekeeping force in Haiti has provided a space where the judiciary can be strengthened. A strong, fair court system would enable Haitians to finally have a system where communication institutions could verify that Haitians can keep peace without the UN.

ENDNOTES

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6. See https://ht.usembassy.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/100/Haiti_Country-Commercial-Guide.pdf.
7. See Articles 28, 28-1, 28-2, 28-3 of the Haitian Constitution https://www.oas.org/juridico/MLA/en/hti/en_hti-int-const.html..
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Building on International Law and Diplomacy to Explore a Legal Policy for Change in Haiti

Mulry Mondélice

This paper exposes the increasing interest of international society in the promotion of the rule of law and the legal foundation of this doctrine in international law, as well as concrete expressions of the promotion of the rule of law in Haiti, while underlining their limits. Analyzing the role that international human rights law plays in today's diplomacy in the quest for social change, this study asks how such a trend can help Haiti improve the domestic legal and institutional landscape in cooperation with interested states and international organizations in order to empower the people. This paper argues that while the political and economic context is challenging for change in Haiti, shared values grounded in international human rights law explains Haiti's needs and provides a framework for a people-centered legal policy which embraces the two-fold political and economic dimension of the rule of law in a globalized world. The shaping of such a policy would eventually bring about a more coherent stance for Haiti in diplomacy and for international cooperation with Haiti.

Keywords: International Law, Diplomacy, Human Rights, Legal Culture, Haiti

Introduction[1]

The promotion of democracy, with an interest in political representation, human rights and the rule of law has been a notable trend in international relations particularly since the 1990s (Crépeau 2001, p. 171) resulting in an increase in the promotion of international human rights law, which is at the heart of global law theories (Hennebel, 2012). That trend has led to several legal and institutional reforms in Haiti and has posed tremendous challenges for this developing country in the Caribbean and the Americas, which has engaged in democratization since the late 1980s.

This paper aims at analyzing opportunities and challenges for Haiti in the promotion of the rule of law in light of the evolution and the use of international law by international actors in international cooperation. This study stresses the relevance for Haiti to formulate a people-centered legal policy at the national level. Haiti should utilize a people-centered domestic policy as a model to build a people-centered foreign policy and use it in diplomacy to protect the Haitian people. Indeed, the Haitian people are subject to violations of human rights, not only in the context of migration, but also given the overwhelming international cooperation touching the country, specifically with a number of states, international organizations (IOs) and non-states actors operating in Haiti. The Haitian state should thus build on such a people-centered legal policy as a priority in negotiations regarding Haiti in both bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, be it in the field of international peace and security or developmental aid and humanitarian assistance.

Adopting an interdisciplinary approach and a mixed methodology, this paper builds on the democratic theory of international law as illustrated in legal theory by the work of Olivier de Frouville. This theoretical perspective helps approach international law "as a set of rules and institutions governing relations between members of international society"[2] (Crépeau and Gareau

2007, p. 47). And, this is also true with regards to diplomacy. Indeed, diplomacy is "a process through which the objectives of policies directed towards the management of relations with an actors international environment are translated into outcomes through the employment of a range of institutionalized techniques and strategies mediated through a set of established structures, rules and norms" (Hocking 2016, p.67). In other words, diplomacy is "a process (…) based on the practices- representation, communication, negotiation - of (...) diplomats"[3] (Lequesne 2016, p. 9). That is to say, stemming from the Kantian perspective on the legal doctrine and the Habermassian theory of communicative action (de Frouville, 2001), the democratic theory of international law focuses on human rights in the quest for peace through international law resulting from a process of dialogue that diplomatic processes guarantee (Lundestad and Mikalsen, 2011).

With regard to the Haitian legal system, this study builds on the work of Patrick Pierre-Louis (2013) which crosses political philosophy and the sociology of law, in line with thought-provoking scholarship in sociology and the anthropology of law as related to Haiti (Montalvo-Despeignes, 1976; Barthelemy, 2001; Pesant, 2003). Such scholarship helps to better understand the existing complex legal culture in this Caribbean country. Additionally, these theoretical approaches, desk-study and legal analysis were confronted with reality in order to explore what is at stake practically in the implementation of international law in Haiti and the extent to which representations of the legal system could jeopardize institutional reforms and legal protection. For this research, more than thirty semi-directed interviews with various actors were conducted[4] and testimonies were taken into account on reporting practices that undermine the independence and impartiality of judges in the Haitian judicial system (Fleury, 2008).

Haiti illustrates both theoretical and practical issues in the construction of the rule of law, namely at three levels. First, there are concerns about the substantive dimension of the rule of law, with the content of norms promoted by international society. Second, international action regarding Haiti illustrates the formal dimension of the rule of law, with international society approaching such a promotion through the lens of a number of rule of law institutions. Third, Haiti raises questions regarding the extent to which the weight of social perceptions touch the justice system, including the judiciary and other rule of law institutions and legal professionals, which are often forgotten in the international arena, and which affects the implementation of law.

While North American states and IOs, including the European Union (EU), have recently adopted strategies that place security and the rule of law at the heart of their priorities for the Caribbean (US Department of States 2020; Sutton 2012), the relationship between the Haitian state and its population stresses the importance of a people-centered legal policy. Anchored in the Haitian judiciary and foreign policy, such a legal policy would help redefine a stance of the state with respect to international law in international cooperation and its articulation with domestic law. Therefore, to what extent could the Haitian state and international society take into account the evolution of international law and the relationship between Haitian domestic law and international law in order to strengthen the rule of law to better promote human security in this Caribbean country?

The paper closely looks at challenges surrounding the promotion of the rule of law in international law and diplomacy specifically since the 1990s. It shows the forms and limits of the promotion of law in Haiti by states (notably Canada, the United States (US) and France for the purposes of this paper focusing on Haiti), and IOs. These include the United Nations (UN) and specialized agencies of the UN system in particular the World Band (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Union (EU), the Organization of the American States

(OAS), the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), and the International Organization of la Francophonie (IOF)), in cooperation with multiple non-state actors such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and multinational corporations (MCs). This analysis reflects on the challenging reception of international law in Haiti and sheds light on the conceptual contours of the rule of law and the importance for the Haitian state and international actors to build on this doctrine to promote human rights in cooperation with Haiti.

This paper argues that multidimensional setbacks in Haiti, which has been the subject of an increasing promotion of the rule of law by international society, illustrate that defining a comprehensive people-centered-legal policy is necessary at the national level and for international cooperation. The following section discusses how measures aimed at building the rule of law in Haiti based on the evolution of international law elucidate a security, institutional and state-centered approach to security that is not in line with the reality of the Haitian population. Considering the geopolitical context and the legal culture of the country, the last sections argue that rethinking individual capacity building by enhancing legal information and training, and judicial reform within a comprehensive approach is crucial to strengthen the rule of law in Haiti. This includes not only cooperating with institutions close to the population, including humanitarian aid and development action, but also formulating a legal policy to be mobilized in both the domestic legal system and international cooperation to minimize inconsistencies in the implementation of international law.

Limited Institutional Reforms based on International Law in Haiti

The rule of law concept often gives rise to confusion. In fact, an "elusive concept (...), the rule of law means that government officials and citizens are bound by and abide by the law." (Tamanaha, 2012, p. 232). However, the practices of states and international organizations (IOs), have stretched the rule of law, with a two-fold political and economic dimension. This section discusses the concept *rule of law* and analyzes the forms and limits of its promotion by international society in Haiti.

Legal Foundations and Meaning of the Rule of Law Doctrine

The adoption of the UN Charter in 1945 and other subsequent treaties at the regional level has led international society to promote the rule of law at the national level. Indeed, built on the faith placed in democracy and human rights particularly since the 1990s, with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the UN has contributed considerably to the promotion of the rule of law globally. This doctrine, rooted in political philosophy and developed in public law in Europe in the 19th century, and later according to various institutional models (Herschling, 2009), is not subject to a static definition, although the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan (2004), formulated a definition of the rule of law, which has been referred to in other reports. The concept of the rule of law is seen as a system of standards limiting the state, protecting human rights for all persons and subject to control by independent and impartial bodies. According to the Secretary General:

> The concept of „rule of law" or „legality" lies at the very heart of the Organization's mission. It refers to a principle of governance by which all individuals, institutions, and public and private entities, including the state itself, are accountable for the observance of laws that are publicly promulgated, equally applied and independently administered, and consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It also implies measures to ensure respect for the principles of the rule of law, equality

before the law, accountability under the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, freedom from arbitrariness, and transparency of procedures and legislative processes.

Echoing in a number of main organs and agencies of the UN, and in regional treaties and organizations that rely on human rights, the rule of law has become a means and a general framework for assessing the quality of political and economic governance within the state (Mondélice, 2015), both at the national and international levels (Chevallier, 2009). Consequently, the rule of law is at the heart of international action in the three pillars of the UN: international peace and security, human rights, and development, as stated in the declaration adopted following the UN High-Level Meeting on the Rule of Law in 2012 (UN, 2012).

Other than human rights treaties, the rule of law is based on "soft law" resulting notably from resolutions and declarations of various UN organs and echoed at the regional level. Among others, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 48/134 on National Institutions for the Promotion and the Protection of Human Rights illustrates interactions between international human rights law and human rights diplomacy. Such a legal basis, which is more acceptable to states through diplomacy and more suitable to produce effects (Carlier and Crépeau, 2011), supports the variable dimension of the rule of law. Through such processes, states and IOs, as well as non-state actors promote the rule of law as an expression of the globalization of law at the heart of the political dimension of the rule of law, coupled with the globalization of the economy.

Consequently, the UN has been cooperating in the promotion of the rule of law in nearly 150 countries since the 1990s, in all world regions. Beyond peace operations, actions include, but are not limited to, law reform, including constitutional reform, reform of the justice system and security institutions; the establishment of national human rights institutions and ombudsmen against maladministration; anti-corruption institutions and electoral observations (Mondélice 2015). The case of Haiti is a perfect illustration of the promotion of the rule of law by international society focused on state empowerment with an emphasis on law and institutional reforms to promote democracy and security.

Expressions of the Promotion of the Rule of Law in Haiti

To better understand the approach of international actors to the promotion of the rule of law and limits of actions taken to build and strengthen the rule of law in Haiti, one must understand the overwhelming challenges regarding the rule of law in Haiti. In this regard, are of particular interests in the works of Patrick Pierre-Louis (2002) on judicial reform in Haiti and the proceedings of an insightful workshop on Mapping Justice and the Rule of Law in Haiti organized by the Interuniversity Institute for Research and Development (INURED) in July 2012. The participants have highlighted, among the main challenges for the rule of law in Haiti, weaknesses regarding guarantees of independence and impartiality of judges in law and practice, a lack of public policy in terms of administration of justice, unadapted imported institutions given the historical manipulation of law and the political instrumentalization of justice, as well as lack of understanding the users' perception of the justice system and how they interact. In addition to the insignificant part of 2% allocated to justice in the national budget and needs for training, the participants (…) identified the government's failure to update the criminal and civil codes to reflect the realities of modern day Haiti as a clear barrier to the advancement of rule of law and justice in Haiti. Other challenges to justice reform identified from the perspective of the Haitian government included: the lack of enforcement of laws, the lack of financial support provided to

Tribunals of Peace to ensure that they can function effectively, and the proximity of Justices of the Peace to rural communities. (…) the lack of a real understanding of the current state of Haitian justice, both the formal and the informal, and thus the crying need for a "mapping" of the sector based on rigorous research that would yield reliable data and an enhanced qualitative and quantitative understanding of the state of play in this crucial sector. [The need for an] evidence-based program which could then be measured and assessed for their impact to determine whether the access to and delivery of justice was improving for the ordinary Haitian (INURED 2012, p.5).

Considering this picture, it is not surprising that, in the 1990s, Haiti was one of the first countries where international society began to promote the rule of law. The context concerned actions undertaken by the UN and the OAS for a "return to constitutional order" in the aftermath of the September 30, 1991 *coup d'état* against then-president Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Indeed, the situation was described as "unique and exceptional" by the UN Security Council in its Resolution 841 of June 16, 1993, which was to give rise to the operation Uphold Democracy, decided by the same organ in its Resolution 940. It has been pointed out that, "for the first time in its history, the Security Council had resorted to coercive measures, going so far as to authorize the use of force to restore democracy in a UN member country"[5] (Corten, 1995; Christakis, 2009). Since this operation for the "restoration of democracy in Haiti," the country has experienced nine peace missions, three civilian missions and six peacekeeping operations deployed by the UN in Haiti. The United Nations Mission for the Support of Justice in Haiti (MINUJUSTH), followed by the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) established by Security Council Resolution 2476 of 25 June 2019 under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, illustrates the focus on security. In other words, the Haitian case is meaningful when it comes to analyzing the role played by the doctrine of the rule of law in extending international peace and security with such a political mission regarding peaceful domestic political dispute settlement, whereas previous resolutions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter focused mainly on insecurity in the region. Such steps supported by the aforementioned states and organizations and independent experts within them aiming at establishing the rule of law in Haiti, have had various expressions, which can be understood in four areas (Mondélice, 2015).

First, in the area of law, justice and security, the three acts of 2007 on the Reform of the Judiciary, the National School for the Judiciary[6], and the Superior Council of the Judiciary are part of a dynamic launched in the field of security with an interest in the Haitian National Police (HNP) and the penitentiary system. Those institutions have roots in demands for reforming the system even before the transitional government under the administration of President Alexandre Boniface and Prime Minister Gérard Latortue from 2004 to 2006 (Latortue, 2018). Indeed, as highlighted in the aforementioned scholarship on the Haitian legal system, Haiti shows a complex legal culture, a set of "knowledge relating to laws and institutions, the relationship between the state and the citizen, their formation over the course of national history and the common values to which they call upon"[7] (Kourilsky, 1991). A country with a particular history expressed in its legal system, Haiti's legal system straddles official law influenced by both civil law and common law traditions, and informal law composed of practices governing social interactions. Thus, such institutional reforms could be considered as important steps taken in Haiti. However, they do not rhyme with the expected efficiency of the administration of justice and the long-awaited independence of judges. The same is true concerning the Constitutional Council, which is still not operational, while being created in the context of the controversial amendment of the Constitution of March 29, 1987, finally published in 2012.

In December 2020, the President of Haiti, Jovenel Moïse, launched a constitutional amendment process regarding the amended Constitution in a referendum. Not only does the ongoing process, undertaken less than ten years after the amendment of the 1987 Constitution, speak about the limits of law reform supported by international society in Haiti, but it also sheds light on the complex interactions between law and governance in Haiti (Charles, 2020). Moreover, one could argue that the constitutional amendment process added to the correlated electoral process should be seen as an expression of the promotion of the rule of law. However, the lack of legitimacy surrounding the envisaged reform without the legislative branch of the state is not reassuring for strengthening of the rule of law in the future given the Haitian political context. In fact, controversial debates between diverse actors on constitutional amendments and electoral processes in Haiti illustrate a challenging political context that requires actions regarding not only education and law enforcement but also economic, social and cultural rights. In reality, the environment facilitates the manipulation of law by powerful individuals and people in power, while the majority of the population is starving.

Another example is Haitian criminal law reform, mishandled by a legislative vacuum that led to the publication by the executive branch of a decree for a new *Code pénal* in June 2020. The absence of a functioning Parliament raises questions about the constitutionality of the process, especially since there have been reports of concerns surrounding the publication of the decree. The clarification that the Penal Reform Commission wants to bring about the content of articles in the new *Code pénal* (Le Nouvelliste, 2020) sends a message that a large part of the population cannot understand it in practice (Mondélice, 2020). Additionally, the remobilization of the Haitian Armed Forces (FAd'H) in 2017, nearly two decades after their disbanding by Jean Bertrand Aristide and supported by the UN, requires close attention, since interactions between the security (HNP) and defense forces (FAd'H the Army) is anything but reassuring in a context where the democratization of those forces remain urgent.

Second, reforms touching the institutions against corruption and money laundering illustrate the influence of international law on the Haitian legal system.[8] Nevertheless, the functioning of such institutions and the entrenchment of practices touching corruption in the public administration are challenging for the system, as shows the report of the high administrative court- *Cour supérieure des comptes et du contentieux administrative* on the PetroCaribe case (2018).

Thirdly, is the paramount role assigned to the Office for the Protection of the Citizen of Haiti (OPC) as a National human rights institution (NHRI) following the attention international society pays to those institutions because of their role in building and strengthening the rule of law in the three pillars of the UN. The OPC has evolved under the leadership of the respected chief Florence Elie, from its ombudsman status to a hybrid status with the 2012 act. This law makes this body an NHRI in accordance with the *Paris Principles* governing more than 123 NHRIs around the world, allowing them to cooperate with the UN and other IOs (Mondélice, 2017). Characterized by their independence and pluralism, those institutions are promising in the promotion of the rule of law, especially through their advisory and advocacy roles, as well as their actions in the implementation of international human rights law. These institutions interacting with non-state actors have become at the heart of the political and economic dimensions of the rule of law with the UNGA Resolution 70/1 regarding sustainable development goals. However, without strong political support and constructive cooperation with the executive, legislature and judiciary branches of the state, as shown in an excellent Master's thesis on the

OPC (Karamaoun, 2020), the context jeopardizes the effectiveness of such institutions. Indeed, the rule of law and NHRIs do not fit well in a political and institutional landscape driven by the image of the "chief" as an all-powerful figure who is not subject to the law in practice within Haiti.

Fourth and lastly, Haiti is all the more relevant to illustrate the promotion of the rule of law doctrine at the heart of global law because the political dimension of the rule of law resonates with its economic dimension under what has been called conditionality (Guitian, 1995; Sorel, 1996; Kochenov, 2008). In fact, the latter led to an embargo on Haiti in 1993 after the *coup d'état* against Jean-Bertrand Aristide, as well as to the suspension of bilateral and multilateral aid in 2001 following the elections organized by the administration of the same president (EU, 2001). In the same vein, economic policies promoted by the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) remain the monetary and financial counterpart of free trade promoted in international relations since the adoption of the Marrakesh Accords in 1994 creating the World Trade Organization (WTO). Hence, international economic law and policies influence relations between Haiti and the EU, and to some extent, the cooperation envisaged in the strategies of Canada and the US (2020) regarding the Caribbean. Indeed, the principle of differential treatment in favor of developing countries has evolved in the direction of free trade agreements in EU-Caribbean relations (Mondélice, 2020), as shown by the 2008 Caribbean Forum (CARIFORUM) and the EU Economic Partnership Agreement (EU, 2008). One of the objectives of the treaty is to integrate the Caribbean countries into the world economy through regional integration within the CARICOM framework. As of January 2021, Haiti has signed but has not ratified the CARIFORUM-EU Agreement. However, this growing promotion of the rule of law has not been able to contribute to improving the human rights situation in Haiti in practice.

One can observe this with the rulings of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) regarding Haiti in the cases of *Yvon Neptune v. Haiti* in 2008 and *Fleury et al. v. Haiti* in 2011 which shows the weaknesses of Haiti's justice system and its failure to protect human rights. Moreover, the already serious humanitarian situation (Rull, 2015), in nexus with the economic situation of the country, is exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic (Mondélice, 2020), especially since Haiti remains in political crisis management at the risk of seeing human rights violations continue to go unpunished. This explains the rationale for the Haitian state to rethink legal policy in order to protect human rights at the national level, and includes the framework of international cooperation.

Necessary People-Centered Legal Policy for Haiti

Based on the definition of public policy in legal theory and sociology of law (Jean-Arnaud 1993, p.457), the paper approaches legal policy as a state policy aimed at making the law and the institutions of justice and security a priority and founding a set of acts and actions suitable to better promote the rule of law in order to ensure the protection of human rights. The need for a legal policy for Haiti lies, first, in the interest of the population and, second, in the quest for a better image of Haiti as a member of international society. Identifying the content of the advocated legal policy helps explore avenues such policy could envisage in Haitian foreign policy and diplomacy.

Towards a Legal Policy Based on International Law for the Construction of the Rule of Law

The historical use of the formal legal system for purposes other than the protection of all individuals, the lack of confidence of the population in the institutions of justice and the situation of civil, political, economic, social and cultural human rights, should inspire us to rethink legal policy in Haiti in a perspective of social change centered on the people. This remains an arduous but necessary task for the construction of the rule of law in Haiti. In this regard, the democratic theory of international law, which emphasizes the role of people-centered law in the quest for peace and security, is of interest. This theory helps understand how the active development of international human rights law can serve social peace because it serves the interests of every person under the jurisdiction of a responsible state. This analytical grid leads us to explore three overlooked points that should be taken into account in proposed legal policies.

First, what should be considered is the reforms of law and institutions which includes the Public Prosecutor's Office (*Commissaire du gouvernement*) with a clear mandate and status in the judiciary, so that such an institution becomes more adaptable to social reality, with increased information on law and justice. Dematerializing legal and judicial data would be a good path to realizing the right to information in Haiti. Second, the state should look closely at the training of law students, lawyers and judges, as well as continuing professional legal education including strengthening the bar associations at the country level. Such considerations extend to the security and defense institutions (notably the HNP and the FAd'H) involved in law enforcement. Third, interviews with judges reveal that notwithstanding the explicit recognition in the Constitution of the primacy of international law over domestic legislation (art. 276-2), Haitian judges consider international law norms provided that an act of Parliament of Haiti or a decree of the executive branch transposes an international law norm into domestic law. This is an illustration that the old debate on monist and dualistic theories deserves to be overcome in international law.

Such a resistance to the application of international law is expressed by two cases involving crimes that are classified as serious crimes under international law and that enjoy recognition as customary international law binding on all states. Leading is the *Jean-Claude Duvalier case,* which has been the subject of a legal battle, included with submissions of an *amicus curiae* from non-governmental organizations such as Avocats sans frontières Canada to recognize the jurisdiction of national judges in cases of such crimes prohibited by customary international law, in the absence of any "national legislation".

This was not the case until the ruling of the Port-au-Prince Court of Appeal on February 14, 2014. The second case is the *Prison des Cayes* case, where 13 police officers were implicated in practices of police brutality to counter an escape of detainees on January 19, 2010. It appears that prisoners whose bodies were not found could not be identified, since prisoners set the prison archives on fire and police officials concealed the facts that eight prisoners had previously been transferred to the neighboring prison in Aquin (Court of first instance of Les Cayes, 2011). The head of the penitentiary administration contacted high-ranking police officers from the jurisdiction of Les Cayes, who carried out a bloody operation, injuring and killing an unknown number of prisoners, ranging from a dozen to twenty deaths. Contrary to the charges of assassination, attempted assassination, murder and attempted murder under the *Code pénal,* under international law, the aforementioned allegations are grounds to make a case against enforced disappearances, recognized as prohibited by the "international community as a whole," ranging from the prohibition as a norm of *jus cogens* character. If the charges involved enforced disappearances, there would be greater legal consistency, as was the *Raboteau case* (Court of first instance of Gonaïves, 1999) with respect to international humanitarian law, although the execution of that decision remains questionable (Darius, 2020). These cases elucidate the need for more training in international law in Haiti.

Indeed, as described in the aforementioned 2012 INURED report, the main problem in the Haitian justice system remains the independence and impartiality of the judiciary, with concerns regarding the political instrumentalization of justice, resulting in a lack of legal and institutional guarantees and career stability for judges. However, one has to recognize that a lack of training in international human rights law, added to the dualistic approach in practice in an official monist system, and its challenges for the protection of human rights in a dominant civil law system, where, unlike the common law system, judges generally pay attention to codes and do not make law. This is all the truer, especially since the Haitian criminal and criminal procedures codes, inspired by a state-centered approach and adopted in the 19th century to foster national defense, have not been subject to significant modification (Pierre-Louis, 2002). So far, while continuing professional legal education programs have been initiated (at the *Ecole de la magistrature* for the judiciary and the Police Academy for the HNP), training in law and the audience to be covered should go beyond the framework of continuing professional education.

Firstly, Law has an axiological dimension that members of the entire society have to experience in order for the law to govern social interactions in practice. Accordingly, the state should focus on forming a mentality favorable to the rule of law, by various means, including education at all levels. So far, international cooperation aiming at strengthening the rule of law has overlooked this side. Secondly, Haiti's dated legal language deserves a thorough reform. The language of law must not continue to be understood by the closed circle of jurists. Justice has a communicative dimension, requiring that those who are seeking justice understand the language of law.

Haiti exemplifies that when the legal language remains so complicated and the procedural nature of justice is pushed to the extreme in a least developed country, it is hard for people to seek justice and for justice to be done. In this quest, jurist-linguists could contribute to take into account the two official languages, Creole and French, to simplify the language of Haitian law. Thirdly, and lastly, the situation of Haiti requires comprehensive actions in coordination according to an integrated approach so as to not lose donors. This would stand in need of, for example, rethinking the working conditions of legal professionals, especially judges, who must not be in a job paid peanuts with months in arrears. Judges should have stability in their careers and enjoy guarantees of independence and impartiality in practice, both at the time of their appointment and later in their professional development, which includes continuing professional legal education as discussed above. Thus, formulating a people-centered legal policy is necessary for Haiti, not only in order to build and strengthen the rule of law at the national level, but also to mobilize human rights law in Haitian foreign policy and diplomacy.

Uniting Human Rights Law and Haitian Diplomacy

Contemporary international law gives rise to a set of norms, which in application may lead to inconsistencies with respect to the rule of law doctrine. This applies to the Haiti cholera case, where the principle of immunity of international organizations prevents the realization of the right to reparation of the victims (Mégret, 2019). Therefore, what is at stake is to turn the fragmentation of international law into "unity" (Dupuy, 2003), based on the requirements of the rule of law. This is all the more crucial for Haiti, especially since attention paid to this developing country in the

Americas and through international action affecting Haiti in the quest for international peace and security, and human rights and development (Daudet, 1992) exposes human rights violations and the manipulation of international law.

The focus of Third World Approaches to international law (TWAIL) on historical experiences in the application of international law can be helpful in understanding those issues in the case of Haiti (Okafor 2005). In the same vein, scholarship touching upon Haitian Studies underline both the complex historic and geopolitical context of Haiti in diplomacy and the role Haiti played in diplomacy with a number of prominent diplomats such as Anténor Firmin, Jean-Price Mars, Stéphen Alexis, Émile Saint-Lot, paving the way for a diplomatic tradition for Haiti as an international actor (Arthus, 2017; Joseph, Saint-Paul and Mezilas, 2018). Such considerations raise questions regarding theoretical frameworks in international relations, which would allow Haiti to establish a solid foreign policy.

Indeed, according to general settings of foreign policy (Nossal, Roussel and Paquin, 2015, p.6), among challenges for Haiti are the complex history of the late recognition of the state by France, the US and Canada, and its geographical proximity to those states that play a major role in international organizations cooperating with Haiti, specifically the UN, OAS, CARICOM, the EU and IOF. In addition, the legal tradition and institutional weaknesses with an unstable political system characterized by struggles for power lead to situation of quasi-permanent political crisis management (Seitenfus, 2011). Furthermore, the domination of certain classes and the carelessness given the majority of inhabitants path for migration, specifically in the Caribbean and the Americas, and the domination of French over Creole in the legal system, place people in a quest for their survival. Last but not least, the unending humanitarian crisis leads to a dependence of international assistance, ensuring a presence of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) to the detriment of an economic policy anchored in the perspective of sustainable development. On the contrary, involving local actors and institutions close to the population and supporting civil society engagement in public affairs should require closer attention. These are all tremendous challenges for the framing of an effective Haitian foreign policy in a changing world.

While theories of international relations influence diplomatic practices and help locate the aforementioned challenges for implementing foreign policy, states do not seem to exclude a combination of realistic, institutionalist and liberalist theories in their practices in promoting international cooperation (Slaughter, 2011). International law also recognizes this mixed approach. Indeed, article 3 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and article 5 of the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations rely both on States' interests and on international cooperation. Practically, states seek to defend their interests while cooperating with other states, including through multilateral diplomacy in a world facing global issues that require multilateral responses.

To quote Maya Angelou's poem title, that Haiti as a member of the "human family" has to take action to improve the living conditions of its domestic population and relations with international society under shared values capable of building a fairer society for all individuals is a desirable objective. Moreover, the geopolitical context of Haiti creates a natural need and rationale for the country to frame a coherent foreign policy. Consequently, while it is a titanic work for a developing country to frame a solid foreign policy, from the quest to freedom and international recognition in bilateral diplomacy to its evolvement in multilateral diplomacy within the UN as a founding member state, Haiti experienced several steps in diplomacy. Hence, building on the Haitian diplomatic tradition and history would be worth focusing on in training Haitian

diplomats in order to make Haitian thought and actions in diplomacy better known. That being said, to revitalize Haitian diplomacy, adapting diplomatic traditions to the changing context at both the national and international levels is a demanding task, especially since the COVID-19 pandemic has been challenging to international cooperation and multilateralism. To this end, a people-centered legal policy inscribed in Haiti's foreign policy could explore, but is not limited to, four avenues which touch upon international law and diplomacy.

Firstly, Haiti should show consistency by ratifying and implementing human rights treaties, and by cooperating with universal and regional human rights bodies and mechanisms responsible for monitoring state's compliance with international human rights law; UN Conventions on torture and enforced disappearances are among such treaties. As noted above, such a policy should include the training of judges on methods of interpreting domestic law in the light of customary international law and norms of *jus cogens* character, particularly in relation to serious violations of human rights. This does not imply that Haiti will not have problems of forced disappearance and torture. However, from a comprehensive perspective, among other avenues to promote the rule of law, ratifying those conventions and training would be a path to actions regarding cooperation in the field of human rights law and diplomacy (Decaux, 2015) prevention and the prosecution of serious crimes in a context of a state that has experienced crimes against humanity involving security and defense forces.

Secondly, in bilateral diplomacy, focusing on international human rights law is of interest for Haiti in relations with other states. For instance, it would be beneficial to rely on human rights law and promote human rights in relations with neighboring states, such as the Dominican Republic for accountability. Indeed, the protection of Haitian migrants remains problematic in the Dominican Republic, as evidenced by the cases *Expelled Dominicans and Haitians* and the *Yean and Bosico Children* ruled by the IACHR, respectively in 2014 and 2005. With tact, such shared values-based approaches could be extended, to some extent, to other states in the Caribbean, the Americas and Europe. In multilateral diplomacy, with cooperation involving international organizations, human rights law must not only be an instrument for crisis management against Haiti, but also for Haiti and its people. This should lead to a rights-based approach in negotiations affecting Haitian migrants, refugees, internally displaced persons, women, children, persons deprived of their liberty, as well as in the area of diplomatic means of dispute settlement (Cançado Trindade, 2004), with a focus on diplomatic protection. The policy might also require taking opportunities, such as when nearly 15 UN experts demanded reparations for cholera victims based on international law, to draw the UN's attention on the need to review its cooperation with Haiti according to standards that the organization itself has adopted (Havard Law Today, 2020).

Consequently, it is essential for diplomats at headquarters, as well as those posted abroad, including heads of missions, to be trained in international law with a critical approach that also allows them to take into account the subtleties of the implementation of law in international relations and, thus, to stress the interconnection between international law and diplomacy. With the uncertainties and economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic exacerbating the economic and humanitarian situation in the country, this would be an opportunity of formulating a policy on the right to health and the right to food to address cooperation with the UN, the WHO, the World Bank, the IMF and the EU. This envisaged reversed conditionality in international cooperation would be based on standards international society has adopted. Such an approach would have the virtue of putting the need for coherence on the table, which also requires that the state work on the functioning of the rule of law institutions at the national level.

Thirdly, as a precautionary measure, Haiti should pay particular attention to the headquarters agreements that the state concludes with international organizations in order for the latter to carry out their missions accurately on the territory of the former. In fact, as the cholera case shows, the risks associated with the operations of international organizations are significant in a country with a fragile humanitarian and economic situations. Considering the wording used in such treaties, it would be worth promoting and inserting in such agreements, including in the context of peace operations, a provision allowing for the protection of and reparations for human rights violations. For instance, according to the wording of the Articles 54 and 55 of the Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Haiti concerning the status of the United Nations operation in Haiti (MINUSTAH):

> Third-party claims for property loss or damage and for personal injury, illness or death arising from or directly attributed to MINUSTAH, except for those arising from operational necessity, which cannot be settled through the internal procedures of the United Nations; (…) [e]xcept as provided in paragraph 57, any dispute or claim of a private-law character, not resulting from the operational necessity of MINUSTAH, to which MINUSTAH or any member thereof is a party and over which the courts of Haiti do not have jurisdiction because of any provision of the present Agreement shall be settled by a standing claims commission to be established for that purpose (UN, 2004).

Such wording culminates in a restrictive substantive approach to disputes (private law) and appropriate modes of disputes settlement. It illustrates inconsistency regarding the rule of law in international relations and prevents access to justice due to immunities of international organizations. As Philipp Alston put it, the existing legal approach of simply abdicating responsibility is "morally unconscionable, legally indefensible and politically self-defeating" (2016). In reality, a wording less vague than those used in the former articles would help counter immunities for sexual crimes and human rights violations affecting the population. The same precautionary measure should apply to a non-exhaustive list of damaging practices that should eventually lead to civil reparations for victims.

Lastly, institutional reforms could bring about not only a more rational use of resources but also better coordination among the key actors of the state involved in legal policy. Among these reforms envisaged could be the merging of the "International Institutions" and "Legal Affairs" directorates of the Foreign Affairs Department- in French *Ministère des Affaires étrangères et des Cultes* (MAEC). Likewise, the creation of an interministerial committee on legal affairs could bring together the MAEC and the Department of Justice- in French *Ministère de la Justice et de la Sécurité publique*. The envisaged committee would work closely with the OPC to better integrate a human rights approach into the actions of the state and the Ministry of Planning and External Cooperation, in French *Ministère de la Planification et de la Cooperation externes* (MPCE). Restructuring the MAEC to integrate the MPCE should also be under consideration. The Haitian state should additionally envisage a mandatory continuing professional education program in international law at the Jean Price Mars Diplomatic Academy for all heads of missions, consuls general and senior foreign affairs officials.

Conclusion

Overall, the multidimensional context of political crisis in Haiti and the attention payed to the rule of law doctrine in international law and diplomacy, promoting the idea of the primacy of law to ensure the protection of human rights in the conduct of power, show need for the country to formulate a legal policy. That would be a good step taken in the quest for reconciling the legal and the justice systems amid Haitian society. Such a policy would be in the interest of individuals in a more responsible state within an international society which promotes shared values.

The avenues Haiti could take are multiple, however, information and training, reform of the language used in the justice system and better working conditions and benefits for legal professionals remain necessary at the national level. Such a legal policy would help frame a more coherent Haitian foreign policy by training diplomats including ambassadors and consuls general. Moreover, Haiti should concentrate on the protection of human rights in negotiations affecting the Haitian population, including in international cooperation, as well as on institutional reforms involving the MAEC, the MJSP and the MPCE, to better ensure coordination in the formulation and the implementation of the proposed policy.

However, the Haitian political context and the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic are major challenges for such an ambitious legal policy in an international society marked by powerful states, which weigh within international organizations operating in Haiti. Therefore, Haiti has to behave with tact, starting with exemplary actions in the conduct of public affairs at the national level, and in cooperation with the North American and Caribbean regions and, in the framework of the relations between the EU, the Organization of African, Caribbean and Pacific States, and the European Union. This requires increased consideration of bilateral relations with leading states in organizations working in Haiti, as well as for areas of improvement with non-state actors' actions in Haiti. This is a matter of effective diplomacy, a demanding task in a hard time for multilateralism.

ENDNOTES

1. This is a revised version of the paper *Repenser Haïti dans la diplomatie promouvant un droit global dans une société internationale en mutation* presented at the Haitian Studies Association's 32nd Annual Conference, *Nou La Pi Rèd! Embodying a New Praxis* on October 10, 2020. Deepening a SSHRC previous post-doctoral research touching international cooperation with democratizing States at the McGill University's Faculty of Law, this paper is part of an ongoing research on international law, diplomacy and immunities and responsibility of international organizations with The Hague Academy of International Law. The author is grateful to Dr. Jean-Eddy Saint-Paul for his insightful comments at the HSA's Congress and to Dr. Henry (Chip) Carey and his JIOS' reviewers and colleagues for their thought-provoking comments.
2. Our translation.
3. Our translation.
4. These interviews took place between 2012 and 2018, with members of the Criminal Law Reform Commission, judges from the Port-au-Prince, Aquin and Miragoâne districts, law professors, lawyers and student-judges at the *École de la magistrature* of Haiti, the *Protectrice du citoyen*, United Nations officials in New York, the Rule of Law Section of MINUSTAH, UN independent experts and members of UN committees in France and Canada, as well as members of the OAS diplomatic representation in Haiti.
5. Our translation.

6. Cf. the *Loi créant le Conseil supérieur du pouvoir judiciaire* du 17 décembre 2007, *Loi portant statut de la magistrature*, *Loi relative à l'École de la magistrature* du 17 décembre 2007, Le Moniteur No. 112 du 20 décembre 2007.
7. Our translation.
8. For instance, cf. *Arrêté créant un organisme à caractère administratif dénommé: Unité de lutte contre la corruption* du 8 septembre 2004, Le Moniteur No 61 du 13 septembre 2003; *Loi sur portant création de l'Unité centrale des renseignements financiers* (UCREF); *Loi portant prévention et répression de la corruption* du 10 mai 2013, Le Moniteur No. 87 du 7 mai 2014; *Loi portant de patrimoine par certaines catégories de personnalités politiques, de fonctionnaires et autres agents publics* du 9 août 2007, Le Moniteur No. 17 du 20 février 2008; *Loi sanctionnant le blanchiment des avoirs et le financement du terrorisme*, Le Moniteur No. 212 du 14 novembre 2013.

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Haiti's Structural Vulnerability at the Juncture of Ineptitude

Patrick Sylvain

This article addresses the intricate complexities of natural disasters and structural vulnerabilities within the context of post-colonial governance and dictatorial regimes. The overarching goal is to establish a new topography of the prevailing effects of structural vulnerability on the Haitian people. Politico-anthropological mapping is provided to both construct and deconstruct the body of analysis contributing to instructive theoretical discourse on Haiti's structural vulnerability as it relates to an ecology of violence, indifference, and health-related ramifications of disaster. This article also demonstrates how social factors such as poverty, political instability, rapid urbanization, and the fragility of the state constitute the very etiology of sustainable underdevelopment in Haiti. The corollary effects of natural disasters not only expose the weaknesses of the State, but irrevocably compromise the future of the Haitian people.

Keywords: structural vulnerability, natural disaster, postcolonialism, cholera, COVID-19

Introduction

As the world witnessed in the aftermath of the Haitian earthquake of 2010, the cholera epidemic as well as the COVID-19 pandemic, Haiti's geographical location in the Caribbean Sea renders it susceptible to natural disaster and catastrophe—the impacts of which might only be mitigated by amenable, future-oriented policies. The viability of the Haitian people and their land should not be dependent upon the caprices of "God," but must exist within the parameters of amenable policies to ensure that each generation has the legal and ethical power to thrive. This article places at the forefront the importance of establishing an analytical framework that asserts that the needs of all Haitians are essential to the survival of the country.

Essentially, the article argues that the spaces deemed minimally important—*andeyò* /the countryside—are the most integral. This article also demonstrates that Haiti's structural vulnerabilities are due to societal denial of the interrelated concepts of *Moun Mòn*—the mountain folks who were excluded from the polity of the new nation yet provided the nation its labor force and its nourishments—(*moun* + *mòn* = *totalite* / people + mountains = totality). By denying the quintessential essence of the *moun mòn*, Haitian society negates the foundational principle of the modernist revolution, "*tout moun se moun*" (all people are people), and in the process, marches toward collective suicide as fundamental human needs are sacrificed.

Stuctural Vulnerability

After spending many weeks reading documents from the United Nations (UN) and the Haitian government, I wondered how it could be possible for Haiti to reach the 2035 Sustainability Goals and make qualitative developmental leaps (DSNCRP, 2007; CHPSSN, 2010) when Haiti is not only exposed to hurricanes almost every year but also rests on active tectonic fault lines. In addition, social factors such as poverty, political instability, rapid urbanization, and the fragility of the state constitute the very etiology of sustainable underdevelopment in Haiti. The corollary

effects of natural disasters not only expose the weaknesses of the state, but irrevocably compromise the future of the Haitian people.

The January 12, 2010 earthquake was not only a cataclysmic event of devastation, but it also laid bare gaping fault lines undergirding Haitian society that render the nation structurally vulnerable. This vulnerability impacts millions of Haitians and people of Haitian descent who currently live in subhuman conditions in Haiti and neighboring countries (e.g. Dominican Republic sugar plantations). The earthquake revealed Haiti's unfortunate susceptibility to health-compromising pathogens (*Vibrio cholerae*) and made other institutional weaknesses fully palpable. Despite this truth, however, the Haitian political, social and economic elite have ultimately failed to address the root causes of Haiti's impoverishment and susceptibility to destruction.

The term "vulnerability" comes from the Latin noun *vulnus* (*volnus*, *vulneris),* which means having a wound. The adjective is *vulnificus*, which means wound-inflicting or wounding. The suffix *-abilis* refers to a relationship (external alteration) or being able to be carried away (i.e. exposed to attack), or a possible failure of the internal balance; whereas, *-ability* comes to mean having a mental or physical capacity, being able or having the power to accomplish something. According to the *Oxford American Dictionary*, the vulnerable person is the one "who can be injured, wounded, harmed, or exposed to damage; the one who can be easily reached, the unshielded." The synonyms of vulnerability are fragility, precariousness, uncertainty, and frailty. In the New World, vulnerability was established through Atlantic slavery and maintained via the economic and political apparatus of North Atlantic imperialism. To speak of structural vulnerability is to admit the paradox of the underlying fragilities of a country that has miserably failed in anticipating and managing monumental and continuous population growth. The population of Haiti has increased nearly 500% in the past 70 years as chaotic urbanization has overtaken Port-au-Prince and its environs. During this time various administrations have spent enormous political energy fighting over control of executive power. Meanwhile, the demographic, economic, financial, political, cultural and technological power required to establish functioning cities elude the grasp of the capital city, the center of power, that so many politicians fight over. The "political sphere," according to Michel-Rolph Trouillot, has an "unruly nature," and it "exacerbates [the] process of social exclusion because it restricts and sometimes annihilates forms of interaction—both civil and political—that could challenge mechanisms of exclusion" (2001, p. 123).

Since the end of the Duvalier family dictatorship in 1986, Haiti has experienced significant instability triggered by various factors, including coup d'états, violent protests, military insurgencies, ideological and constitutional disputes, epidemics, natural disasters, drug trafficking, political factionalism, and challenged political legitimacy. Despite a multitude of promises to address and redress Haiti's political instability, including the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), the country has experienced hiccups of change and appreciable improvements only to be thwarted by deeper chasms undergirding the fabric of Haitian society—thus, exposing Haiti's structural vulnerabilities.

The nation is the life-world, and human security within the life-the world is the biological system. Since 1804, when Haiti proclaimed its independence, Haiti's life-world, Haiti's *biological* system, has been under attack both externally and internally. Alex Dupuy (2014), argues that the slave rising of 1791, which would "eventually lead to the independence of Haiti and the creation of an entirely new social order" (p. 38), was motivated by several grievances,

including "those that had to do with social justice, land reform, jobs, higher wages, healthcare, education, and social services" (p. 3). However, these grievances, expressed in 1804, 1915, 1935, 1946, 1957, 1986, 2004, 2010, and continuously since, have never been fully redressed, contributing in large part to Haiti's structural vulnerabilities. The continuous struggle for democracy has morphed into a power struggle over access to the state, which continues to be the primary, yet derisory, engine for economic development. Such persistent struggle leads to corruption, socioeconomic inequalities, dictatorial politics, clientelism, and the murky delineation between the public and private sectors of the economy. As a result, Haiti has not been a viable environment for competitive politics, economy, or democracy.

All societies or nation-states do not have the same potential for sociopolitical and economic transformation, for each has its unique macrosociology. Additionally, we must consider key aspects of each nation-state: its size, education, history, geopolitical location, and natural resources. Due to these quintessential variables, each society presents itself on the world stage as a complete and distinct *living entity*. The living, in Heideggerian terms, is its being or its beingness in the world. As such, the living entity, which is the society, can be fathomed as an intrinsically organized biological system. It can also be considered an organization of variable units of energy, all interrelated and interacting with one another within a bio-socio-politico logic. In this context, structural vulnerability becomes a fundamental phenomenon which raises the question of the relationship of individuals to the society in which they live. It questions the quintessential representation of the human, which is linked to our human condition. Our ***mounness****—tout moun se moun* (everyone is a human being), the primary ethical and philosophical foundation of the nascent Haitian society—functions as an integral part of society. Structural vulnerability is concerned with the economical, ecological, social, political, cultural, and linguistic. It fundamentally involves the totality of society and its functioning.

Since no life can escape injury, being wounded, or living vulnerably, I see a nation's life-world as a biological system or an integrated building. Vulnerability constitutes our original human condition as much on the ontological level (which characterizes the human being) as it does on the psychological (in the very broad sense of the term psyche, or on the ethical level), concerning our fundamental relation to others. Vulnerability therefore is a common, universally shared structure of existence. However, being structurally vulnerable is not a viable condition of living and being.

Paul Farmer (2011) reintroduced the socio-medical concept of "acute-on-chronic" (p. 3) as he addressed a barrage of problems facing the Haitian population immediately after the January 12, 2010 earthquake. Water insecurity, which was already primordial, coupled with the threat of cholera, which materialized due to the introduction of foreign, waterborne pathogens. Displacement, lack of sanitary living conditions, and the structural problems of health-care delivery became extremely critical. "If past were prologue," Farmer claims, "Haitians themselves would be blamed if such problems were not addressed. But many factors, within Haitian borders and without, had weakened Haiti's institutions and made its people so vulnerable to the quake" (p. 77). For one thing, foreign aid was used as a weapon. Moreover, the "foreign aid apparatus," Farmer asserts, "kept too much overhead for its operations and relied too heavily on international NGOs and contractors" (Farmer, 2011). In addition, one might consider the German philosopher, Jürgen Habermas (1994), who claims that "material poverty and political oppression are *also* the responsibility of the indigenous elites, whether they react in a totalitarian manner or not" (p. 19).

The Haitian elites, or the possessing class, have never given this much thought—that they are ecologically interconnected with the rest of the materially abject population.

Structural vulnerability is generatively a very broad notion in terms of the subjects it encompasses and the possibilities of analysis it can engender. As a result, the notion of structural vulnerability and its correlation with stress and risk factors are more than a referential category, but a practical category of analysis and of action for policymakers. Maturana (1970), reminds us that a biological system is "characterized by exergonic metabolism, growth and replication, all organized in a closed causal process" (p. 5). A society can also be categorized as an organically tethered system, functioning by defined and closed tessellations of response that form and reform the operative life of perpetually renewable human beings living within that structure. Since behaviors are learned, I would argue that history then becomes tessellated cells expressed in a repetition of constellations, some more colorful than others—or, in sociopolitical terms, some more violent than others. In this regard, the Haitian Revolution did not eradicate colonial structures of class and racial antagonism; they were reproduced and retrenched. "Mulattoes," according to Alex Dupuy's cogent reading, "practiced their own racism against blacks by excluding blacks from their social networks and intermarrying among themselves or with whites if possible" (p. 39). These practices, which are still at the heart of wealth consolidation and maintenance, "were at the root of the reproduction of the class relations and divisions that came to be expressed ideologically as relations between whites, mulattoes, and blacks" (Dupuy, 2014). Unfortunately, Haitian society is still operating within a dominant sociopolitical logic that reproduces class vulnerabilities and enlarges the national wound.

State Against Nation

The structural vulnerability of Haiti is inarguably a product of its harsh legacy of slavery, occupation, dictatorship, hyper-exploitation, and willful neglect. This has eroded the thin fabric of the nation, leaving a country that is, as Trouillot describes, a "state against nation," where the interests of the state and its political actors supersede the collective interests of the nation. Additionally, internal forces, including the structural polity engendered by post-colonial rules, fail to reconstitute an imbalance created by France in the form of divisive class and race politics, as well as the politics of integral territoriality that are psychologically embedded in the draconian policies of nationhood. As Robert Fatton Jr. (2006) points out, "Haiti's predicament is not rooted in the absence of a nation, but rather in the ruling class's incapacity to construct an 'integral' state," meaning "a state that is capable of organizing both the political unity of the different factions of the ruling class and the 'organic relations between…political society and civil society'. The integral state expresses therefore the hegemonic governance of the ruling class" (Fatton, *TWQ*, pp. 115–116).

It is the absence of nation-state integrality that has caused such grave structural vulnerability. Problems arising from the lack of social and political governance have affected every sector of civil society, creating a warped dynamic of independent selves, rather than sculpting a diversely unified Haitian identity. Also integral to the problematic of nation-state integrality is the notion of representation. Although Haiti has periodically had legitimate governments, equitable representation has always been at the core of the struggle for power and political survival. In the ineffectual and disjoined nation-state, the incentive to obey the rule of law is never fully a legal or a nationally constructed ethos, but rather is the result of a self- or community-based moral expectation. Those who are in a position of power are the first violators of the rule of law. Again,

Robert Fatton Jr. (2002), is correct in asserting that in Haiti "[b]oth the possessing and ruling classes have no social project, except the day-to-day struggle of keeping themselves in positions of power, wealth, and prestige" (p. 37).

The structural vulnerability of Haitian society has eroded even the venerable religious and secular traditions where a form of communal ethos, a *koumbitaj*, has maintained the integrity of individuals within the corruptible political space. Increasingly, dishonesty and one-upmanship have regressively become the normative functions of society since the feeble state, along with the non-productive possessing class, have, as Fatton Jr. remind us, "neither a national vision nor a coherent ideology… whatever unity they achieve is rooted in an opportunistic convergence of interests" (pp. 37–38). This convergence of interests is hardly ever nationally oriented, and civil society is unable to maintain its esteemed traditions for the reason that relationships, more and more, are based upon opportunistic kinships that eat away at the fabric of the society. The grave structural vulnerabilities revealed by the 2010 earthquake prompted members of the Chamber of Commerce to declare in March 2010 that:

> For the first time in the history of Haiti, a unified and inclusive private sector, organized around the Private Sector Economic Forum (PSEF) has decided to break with the past and formulate a shared vision and roadmap for the sustainable development of Haiti… we re-affirm our commitment to working to create an equitable, fair and opportunity-laden society for all Haitians… (*Forum Economique Secteur Privé*: Introductory Memo, March 23, 2010)

The formative processes of structural vulnerability are less a function of one-party responsibility, resting with the possessing class, but are a synchronous confluence of malevolent, corrupted practices sanctioned by the inept state and the nonproductive possessing class to impact the marginalized and exploited civil society. The aforementioned private sector's statement is indicative of its conscious and willful neglect of the masses since the inception of the nation.

Historical Antagonism—War Against the Peasants

The three main social groups in Haiti—the black peasants/masses, the educated blacks, and the tiny mulatto possessing class—have a historically antagonistic relationship. The majority black peasants are only called upon to serve as low-paid laborers or domestics, to pay taxes without representation, and to occasionally vote. They are the *moun andeyò* (outside folks or excluded folks). *Moun andeyò*, Trouillot (2001) remarks, is a term "used to describe peasants or urbanites of peasant origins, verifying the lack of sociocultural cohesion on the national scale" (p. 119). Already, through the practice of naming, the Haitian peasant is the *Other*, a curious object of abjection.

In an extremely powerful article that appeared in the Boston Globe on April 22, 1985, Pamela Constable wrote: "in this desperately poor agricultural country, where thousands of tiny farms perch among breathtaking rocky ridges, people have always prized two possessions as fundamental to survival: arable land and pigs" (p. 2). When the article was written, Haiti had a population of 5.8 million people. In 2020, the population has doubled, with 11.5 million inhabitants. Since the 1980s, most of the arable plains have been used to "build" new towns or expand the boundaries of an existing town. At the same time, Haitian pigs were slaughtered in the interest of American farmers who wanted to sell their own farm-raised Iowa pink pigs (*kochon grimèl*) to Haitians.

Both the Jimmy Carter and the Ronald Reagan administrations pressured the Haitian government to kill the Haitian black pig population, but it was under the Reagan administration that the eradication campaign materialized. Over a million pigs were slaughtered, wiping out peasants' savings. At the same time, several hurricanes devastated many southern Haitian towns, thousands of boat people made their way up to Miami in leaky boats, and the United States falsely accused Haiti of being the vector of the AIDS epidemic, destroying the tourism industry. Through all these calamities, the early to mid-1980s distilled the perfect storm that first exposed Haiti's structural vulnerability. Of the multiple traumas that shook Haiti during that time period, however, Constable reports, "the official slaughter of 400,000 native black pigs in 1982-83—a campaign undertaken with US backing to prevent a swine fever epidemic—has had the more acute impact on farm families" (p. 2). The slaughter of the Haitian black pigs did not concern the Haitian possessing class, which makes up less than one percent of the nation, because they dominated import-export commerce, and, therefore, controlled the new pink Iowa pigs, seeds, feed, and building materials to house the pigs. Since independence, this small and powerful group has used all possible tactics and methods to maintain and amass power, including by forming foreign alliances that are detrimental to the national interest. "Haiti's so-called international partners will not change course" Robert Fatton Jr. (2014) astutely claims, "on behalf of the nation because their interests, as the outer peripheral model clear, are served too well by existing neoliberal policies" (p. 176).

All the while, as Pamela Constable observed in 1985, "the gradual, massive erosion of topsoil due to years of intensive over-farming," as well as the cutting down of trees to make space for crops and making charcoal, have left the soil with no anchors, and "tropical rains have gradually eroded entire mountainsides and left rivers alternately flooded and parched" (p. 2). Unfortunately, these conditions remain true some 35 years later. Instead of replenishing the land, rain has become another element that aggravates Haiti's vulnerability. With minimal livestock and a land which yields less and less, Haiti continues to pivot around patronage, corruption, and optimizing a system of spoils (the Petro-Caribe scheme as the latest example), rather than responding to the needs of the people.

The fundamental challenge of Haiti remains that a stagnant state structure is unable to cope with the disconcerting effects of leaders' ineptitude, profound corruption, and a rapidly changing society that has become gangsterish and destitute. Demands on the acephalous state are growing as its capacity shrinks. Especially alarming is the vile ineptitude of leadership in crisis after crisis, particularly regarding structural security affairs. The state apparatus has failed. It seems as though instead of the nation fighting corruption, it allows it to become more entrenched.

Many of the crises facing Haiti have taken the form of natural disasters, which have had undesirable effects on production and presented a major obstacle to the growth of the economy. In order for the country to cope with these natural disasters, it must take necessary measures to mitigate their impact, such as building equipped shelters throughout the country and securing reserves of grains and other dry goods. On the other hand, a tighter fiscal policy needs to be applied throughout the higher echelons of government—from parliament to the executive—with limitations on traveling and per diem expenditures, to leave more room for increased spending in emergency situations. Such measures are of particular importance for the poorest Haitians, as Kasia Mika (2019) contends that "urban factors add to and can determine the hazardous and potentially deadly nature of environmental phenomena" in Haiti (p. 33). Some of the slums around the *Bicentenaire* area are actually built on a precarious landfill, and previously occupied

land were built, as Mika claims, "without an accompanying development of the city's infrastructure [that] further contributes to people's vulnerability in case of floods, mudslides or earthquakes" (2019, p. 33).

Haiti is ranked 18th out of 197 countries in terms of population density per square mile and is the 6th most populous nation. In comparison, the Dominican Republic is ranked as the 18th most populous nation out of the 197 countries (UN, 2019). Additionally, the 2019 United Nations Human Development Index ranks Haiti 168th out of 189 countries. As of 2020, 56.1% of the Haitian population is urban and 30% experience food insecurity. This marks a significant change since 1985, a year before the Duvaliers' exodus to France, when Haiti was overwhelmingly rural at 85%, amid food insecurity, despite the killings of the pigs, and this was not yet a major issue. By 2000, with massive migration to the urban centers, poverty as well as proletarianization became acute. Dupuy, astutely identifies the process of proletarianization within the context of power struggle for sovereignty and access to Haitian resources:

> The 20th century began with the 19-year US occupation (1915-34), which led to the second major transformation of the economic, social, and political landscape of Haiti. That process of transformation was characterized by: (1) the substitution of US dominance for European, primarily French, in the 19th century; (2) the proletarianization of Haitian peasants combined with the export of Haitian workers to other parts of the Caribbean and North America; and (3) a transition to a weak or minimalist democracy and the disempowerment of the people to effect substantive change (2014, p. 62).

The notion of "disempowerment" fundamentally runs counter to any real notion of democracy, confirming Dupuy's suggestion that Haiti's attempt at democracy was "minimalist." The term "democracy" is derived from the Greek words *demos* and *Kratos*, meaning rule by the people or the majority. What is often overlooked is that Greece had a large population that was poor, similar to Haiti, and the rulers wanted government to be representative of the people, not governed against them. In a sense, the establishment of democracy in Greece was a revolutionary act that ushered in the voices and interests of the poor. However, since the Greeks, no nation has achieved democracy without overt social conflict relating to economic equality, quality education, a just police force, and equal political representation. Despite the grounding of communities within the rural areas around the *Lakou* system (extended kinship compounds), the public democratic sphere has never developed proper political provisions capable of addressing the exigencies of the rural areas.

Recognizing democracy as a site of struggle transcends the realm of politics, particularly politics of contestation, in order to highlight other key structures of society (economic, cultural, educational, judicial, health, physical security, environmental, human rights, and labor) that must be beneficial for the majority and the recognition of common national interests. Democracy cannot superficially be reduced to the vague notion of majority rule politically, while the minority controls the economy. This permanently imprisons the nation's interests for the minority's economic and political benefit. As is evident throughout the world, especially in formerly colonized countries like Haiti, democracy cannot function without a fundamental vision of common interest nor the common will to foundationally establish economic, educational and social equality. Whatever vulnerabilities, and there were plenty, that existed in Haiti prior to the US occupation, they became exacerbated by the violent disregard of the majority's interests within a capitalistically racialized society that viewed black bodies as machines of production for agricultural products to benefit the minority.

On Dictatorship, Democratic Hiccups, and Being

The inner space of one's thoughts, regardless of their level of positive freedom (cognitive), can never fully live outside the containment of a dictatorship, for one is one with it: physically, psychically, and temporally. Dictatorship is an overwhelming sea and it produces anxiety within its subjects. It transgresses all realms and sits in the nook of beings. Capitalist dictatorship has never been about the people's interests. Hannah Arendt (1968) reminds us that dictators "naturally rule to the advantage of their own class and at the disadvantage of all others" (p. 257). Whether under the Duvaliers or other dictatorial/ authoritarian regimes, the military has always been used as an instrument of repression. Thus, in Haiti, any perceived threat to established draconian control has always led the Haitian armed forces to crush resistance. As Dupuy reasons, the Duvalierist regimes:

> "sought to preserve power not simply for its own sake, but to enable them to plunder the public treasury for their own benefit. The Duvalierists ran the state and the government like an organized gang, with the Duvalier family originally at its head" (2014, p. 86).

The disposition of, acclamation, or acculturation to a dictatorial system of governance plays a particularly important role in the development of sources of both community and identity at the national and personal level. One acquires a way of being that is fundamentally affective in both a rhetorical and grammatical perspectival sense. The collective "we" becomes superficial, for it gives precedence to the "I" within the context of an immediate future and constant present; for the long-term future is never thinkable, or attainable, within the territoriality of lack, deprivation, and violent poverty. The "we" is superficial and manipulative when it is the "I" that establishes the dictatorial supremacy over the "we" for the sole benefits of the "I" or the "my." So, as Haitians, we learn very early to play a linguistic tongue-twister that demarcates possession: *pa m' se pa m', pa ou se pa m', pa m' pa pa ou* (what's mine is mine, what's yours is mine, mine is never yours). The horizon of being a part of, with, and toward the world, which must be acquired at an early stage of development within a context of shared communal perspective, is shattered or contorted within the composite realm of a dictatorial "we" that is never fully inclusive of a national "we."

Being repeatedly identified as the "Poorest Country in the Western Hemisphere" not only places Haiti on the outer margins among nations, but this label carries dire consequences in terms of safeguarding sovereignty and inscribing symbolic poignancy to its citizens. Additionally, in terms of economic policies, being incorporated within the capitalistic world of the so-called free market, Haiti further succumbs to neoliberal indifference regarding the fundamental needs of the country and savage exploitations that proceed unchecked and unchallenged. Haiti's survival and recovery of sovereignty requires a new form of a decolonization campaign. This would have to be a national campaign that prioritizes the collective needs of the citizenry. Unfortunately, at this point, Haiti remains a Port-au-Princean acephalous state that neglects the body of the country. The heavy macro-acephalous structure creates a constant pounding due to the warring factions competing for access to the state's vault against the nation's interests. When a capital city becomes a "microcephalia," as Michel-Rolph Trouillot (2001) asserts, the "most provincial towns lose residents or become steppingstones to longer migratory flows to the capital or to foreign lands" (p. 117). Having such a heavy administrative and institutional presence in one location, the capital, creates a locus of order and disorder that reverberates throughout the country, not only through rituals of symbolic power but also through rituals of brute force instrumented by the military and, now, the National Police. The processes of disorder are due to the macro-acephalous structure of the Haitian society, which is its colonial inheritance of the power structure.

Dupuy (2014) concisely articulates the fundamental issue of accountability, corruption, and encroachment of power: "the formal trappings of democracy in Haiti notwithstanding, the government has been hijacked by and essentially functions as the privileged domain of the wealthy and powerful classes by negotiating on their behalf with international actors who ultimately hold veto power over the state and its agenda" (pp. 133-4). Hence, the failure of Haitian governments to make long-term and quality investments in education, healthcare, environmental protection and rehabilitation, infrastructure, food security, and job creation has fundamentally ensured the persistence of grotesque poverty and baffling inequality. The Port-au-Princean macro-acephalous bedlam creates structural disorder that results in a dubious space of shambolic sociopolitical activity. In Haiti, the moral authority of the state was always lacking due to generational abject poverty, power struggles, and an indigent superstructure of power that lacks the trappings of grandeur and institutional respectability. Instead, the ritual of power has always been symbolically represented by military/police uniforms and paramilitary accoutrements. As elements of order, their rituals have been those of repression, which has served to legitimize the state's authority in using various forms of violence. According to John Shattuck (2003), "repression in Haiti has always had a special logic… repression keeps the lid on freedom and destroys those who try to pry it off" (p. 77). Thus, Haiti remains unsecure, structurally vulnerable with a violence-ridden environment that impairs the country.

Since the removal of the Duvalier regime in 1986, the Haitian military, with the backing of the United States and the Haitian possessing class, has been unable to prevent any democratic movement from taking root. Four years later, after several military coups and provisional governments, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, then a well-known and beloved radical theology priest, became the spearhead of the people's movement and won the 1990 national election in a landslide. As Dupuy (2014) correctly observes, the "democratic movement fought to rid the country of dictatorship, democratize the government, eliminate corruption in public office, reform the military and police, and create a more just and equitable society" (p. 67). That movement became another earth-shattering moment to the Haitian society, a moment that altered the possibilities of achieving real democracy, as it was violently interrupted while exposing internal contradictions within the movement and society at large. Again, Dupuy argues that the popular democratic:

> "movement comprised many different political, religious, civic, human rights, neighborhood, women's, student, professional, labor, peasant, and media organizations that gave voice to the people and formulated their aspirations. Yet, the interests of the minority, as well as those of the imperial United States, superseded those of the majority: "[t]he bourgeoisie responded by backing a military coup against Aristide in September 1991 that sent him into exile" (2014, p. 67).

This coup killed over 9,000 people between 1991 and 1994. Through this coup, military/ police violence undermined democracy by sapping the pro-democratic camp's ability to address critical issues of transparent governance, sovereignty, reformation of the justice system, and control over Haiti's natural resources.

Searing Inequality and Democratizing Democracy

The searing inequality experienced daily by the people, as well as their deep desire to participate in the democratic future of Haiti, have not been enough. Haiti's structural vulnerabilities attest that democracy cannot be established in the absence of shared national values of respecting and uplifting the intrinsic rights of each human, *chalk moun*, to be recognized as a deserving, free

being through communal policymaking. Despite Aristide's shortcomings as a leader, his ideas about democracy are valid. At a United Nations' Leadership Seminar held at Brussels in June 1996 and co-hosted by the Belgian parliament, Aristide asserted that "one of the main tasks facing today's civil society, particularly the countries of the South, is that of **democratizing democracy** [Aristide's emphasis]. It is a task facing the men and women of Haiti" (1996, p. 14). Democracy critically requires democratic institutions that can safeguard the sanctity of the human as a right-bearing being within an avowed constitutional republic. Hence, Aristide's remarks are apropos when he later claims:

> in Haiti 1% of the population still possess half of the wealth in a country where we have only two doctors per 10,000 inhabitants… where the remaining 0.3% of wooded land will be reduced to 0.1% if we do not give greater impetus to a reforestation campaign which requires an agricultural reform in compliance with the constitution (p. 15).

Unfortunately, the poor and the marginalized are most commonly reproached for environmental degradation in underdeveloped or developing countries; yet, they are the ones most victimized by it. What Aristide meant to relay is that such poverty and ecological degradation is quintessential in understanding the confluences between power, inequality, poverty, and the environment. Without a grounded understanding of those intersections, sustainable development will never be achieved.

Democracy without practical implementation of socioeconomic policies of advancement, access to quality education that reflects the nation's needs, and robust policies that protect the environment is not a democracy worth having. Jürgen Habermas (1994) aptly posits that "the failures of old-fashioned developmental aid programs has served as a reason, and pretext for the increasing unwillingness to continue the export of capital into developing countries. But one mustn't look only to the barbarian living conditions to see where modernization brings neither prosperity nor freedom" (p. 85). Countries like Haiti cannot continue to be a place of material extraction and hyper-cheap labor. Trouillot (2001) reminds us that "the plantation system was the dominant form of integration of the Caribbean into the world capitalist economy" (p. 106), and that mode of production cannot be easily erased. Consequently, Trouillot asserts, "areas dominated by mines or plantations, ownership of the major means of production is limited to the state or to transnational corporations" (p. 111). One cannot contemplate the human dimensions of poverty without pondering the environmental dimensions as well. The poor in Haiti, especially in the rural areas, depend upon the surrounding environment for their livelihoods. Hence, the absence of available and sustainable economic opportunities establishes a paradox: when the environment is sustenance, with no other alternatives, there is no incentive to prioritize long-term sustainability over immediate survival. In an article published in *Foreign Affairs*, anthropologist Sidney W. Mintz (1995) expresses Haiti's fundamental problematic:

> …existing terrible asymmetry of economic power in Haiti is just what has kept the vast majority of the Haitian people utterly defenseless for centuries…. the present situation is the outcome of 200 years of a war of attrition against the people by a ruling class. U.S. rule early in this century confirmed, sustained, and underwrote that asymmetry (pp. 85–86).

In that sense, socioeconomic and political inequalities compel the poor to dig their own graves, interred by the thrashing of their natural capital. The thrashing of the environment, in effect, started in 1493 when the Spaniards began planting sugarcane on a large scale in order to harvest their white gold, and such agriculturally intense labor and land usage continued for 178 years under French colonial slavery (1625–1803), with many forests destroyed for sugar production (Benitez-Rojo, 2005, p. 38). In his journal, Christopher Columbus noted on December 13, 1492, that "the land was so lovely and fertile" (pp. 94–95). Columbus also informed Queen Isabella of Spain that "these lands are such of extent, good and fertile, and especially those of this island of Española, that no one knows how to describe them and no one can believe it, unless he has seen it" (p. 101). The impoverishment and deforestation of Haiti does not have a Haitian genesis, but a European one. From 1804 to today, the land has been heavily exploited by various multinational corporations (Gulf and Western, Reynolds Metals, Doles, the Haitian American Sugar Company, and others), as well as by the people for subsistence. From 1493 to 1957, 80% of Haiti's forests disappeared. During the United States' occupation alone, 30% of the land was deforested. The prized mahogany tree, the hardwood trees (campêche), as well as the cotton-silk trees were chopped down. One must also take into consideration the massive campaign of *rejete*, the violent anti-Vodoun superstition movement spearheaded by the Catholic church and supported by the government that was instrumental in eliminating the *repozwa lwa*, the trees in which the Vodoun spirits dwelled.

Haiti's structural vulnerabilities are intrinsically linked to its environmental destruction, which is entrenched in international political economy and policies. SHADA (Société Haitiano-Américaine de Dévelopment Agricole) played an integral role in this process after its foundation in 1941 under the Antoine Élie Lescot government (May 15, 1941–January 11, 1946), which intended to establish Haiti as a major supplier of rubber to the United States: "SHADA expropriated peasant land, destroyed their houses, devastated their fields, and cut down their trees. Not a single ton of rubber was produced" (Dayan, 1995, p. 87). According to Matthew J. Smith (2009), "by 1943, an estimated 47,177 acres were cleared to make way for the planting of cryptostegia… the large labor force mostly comprised peasant farmers lured from food crop cultivation to meet increasing rubber demands" (p. 44). Although Haiti had moments of droughts and food shortages, it was under the Léscot government that a rural exodus began and small-scale food insecurity (*lavi chè*; *pa gen manje*) emerged as a frequent occurrence of the Haitian vocabulary, including in literature. Additionally, the purging, or riddance, of natural habitats such as forests into industrial farm fields resulted in significant loss of biodiversity. This remains a major threat to Haiti's terrestrial and coastal environments. If Haiti manages to emerge from its condition of dependence on foreign aid and technical support to a viable condition of economic independence, the country will need robust and enforceable environmental policies that might be able to ensure a collective survival within a novel, sustainable context.

Land Use, Natural Disasters, Poverty, and Water

Haiti is one of the poorest countries in the world and is also "the most water-insecure country in the hemisphere" (Farmer, 2011, p. 71). Haiti faces a series of problems that prevent it from taking the path toward sustainable development. These problems are linked to two forms of disaster. One is man-made, resulting from acute political crises (coup d'états, military occupations), and the other is caused by natural disasters resulting from poor risk management. More than 85% of domestic wastewater, including most of the human sewage from Port-au-Prince, is untreated or, at minimum, receives primary treatment before being discharged into the three primary tributaries that run into the bay of Port-au-Prince. According to a 2000 CIDIHCA documentary, *Potoprens Se Pa'm*, directed by Rigoberto Lopez and Frantz Voltaire, 90% of the air that people breathe in the center of Port-au-Prince contains fecal combustion particles.

Port-au-Prince is a polluted city with a bay that is filled with excess nitrogen, phosphorus, and industrial waste, including cars. Festering over time, this pollution leads to algal blooms, loss of seagrasses and other fish habitats, fish kills, coral reef degradation and death, and shellfish poisoning. According to water expert Lamothe Lormier (2005), the public water transported around Port-au-Prince has been rendered undrinkable due to an *E. coli* infestation. Making matters worse, the packets of water sold by street vendors throughout the city contain an extremely high level of Bisphenol A (BPA), a colorless solid that is soluble in organic solvents, but poorly soluble in water. Exposure to high temperatures creates a photochemical breakdown that causes a leaching effect. Encyclopedia Britannica claims that "from the mid-1990s, numerous studies determined that both high-level and low-level exposure to BPA can adversely affect reproduction and development in animals." With a lack of enforceable regulations, Haitians might be exposing themselves to greater health risks while trying to remain hydrated in a water-insecure country.

It should also be noted that the Republic of Haiti is exposed to all forms of risk and disaster in relation to its geospatial position and colonial history that brought various diseases (syphilis, smallpox, mange, and scabies) to the land. However, it is the devastating forces of the earthquake that we tend to forget, since we are so preoccupied with the political quakes. James E. McClellan III reminds us not only of the frequency, but the impact that earthquakes had on the development of Port-au-Prince after it became the political center of the colony: "[t]he earthquake of 1751 destroyed three-quarters of what had been built by then, and the quake of 1770 destroyed the still nascent town completely" (2010, p. 27). As a result of the frequency and destructive forces of earthquakes, "authorities ordered that Port-au-Prince be rebuilt only in wood" (p. 28). This mandate was certainly forgotten by the time we entered the period of U.S. occupation as well as the modernization project that President Dumarsais Estimé oversaw. In 2020, the inhabitants of Port-au-Prince are fully facing the same conditions that Sabine Manigat recorded in 1996–7: "alarming unemployment, deplorable living conditions, low incomes, and lack of job security" (p. 119).

This country of 27,700 square kilometers is threatened by other natural disasters too, including hurricanes, cyclones, and extreme heat. These disasters, whatever their degree, their gravity, always seem threatening and have caused great losses in human lives, as well as animal lives and material. They have halted developmental projects and caused substantial economic regressions. Even prior to the 2010 earthquake, the infrastructure of Port-au-Prince was (is) in a state of complete collapse. Garbage lay heaped in most Downtown streets, and certain neighborhoods were impractical to navigate through. To this day, public sector workers go unpaid for months; meanwhile health hazards increase, and a collective despair embraces the city. Certainly, natural disasters cannot be avoided, but their effects can be mitigated through responsible policies and forward-thinking governance, which are currently entirely lacking.

Decisions around risk and disaster management are prioritized in countries that desire sustainable development, and this should be especially true for Haiti. As Gérard Holly (1999) remarks, "water has become the limiting factor for development" (p. 72). Access to quality potable water in Haiti would reduce the risks of water borne-illness and alleviate poor sanitation in the country. It is wholly possible for Haiti to leave its ranking as one the poorest countries in the world if Haitians become socio-politically determined to follow a sustainable development route as a matter of collective survival over the vulgar opulence of a microscopic few who rapaciously continue to amplify Haiti's structural vulnerabilities.

The January 2010 *Goudou goudou*, an earthquake measuring 7.3 on the Richter scale, affected the west and southeast departments. The overcrowded capital Port-au-Prince and the city of Léogâne, epicenter of the earthquake, were the most affected. Within one minute, about 300,000 lives were destroyed. In the immediate aftermath, the economy collapsed; the loss from damages amounted to approximately 120% of the 2009 GDP, or $7.9 billion dollars (PDNA, 2010). The *Goudou goudou* rendered 1.7 million people homeless. Government institutions were critically affected. In September of the same year, Hurricane Tomas further harmed the agricultural sector. The overall GDP growth was -5.5% against a forecast of 4%. Haiti's poverty deepened, and its reliance on foreign aid and foreign actors catapulted an army of NGO parasites into its wounds.

In order to prevent the Préval government from launching agrarian reforms and moving the country to the left, the United States, along with major international donors, pushed Haiti to accept and adopt the recommendations of the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC). Established in March 2010, the IHRC, co-chaired by former U.S. President Bill Clinton and Haitian Prime Minister Jean-Max Bellerive, emerged from the January 2010 Haiti Action Plan for Strategic Development (*Construire Haiti Plan Stratégique de Sauvetage National* /CHPSSN). It was clear, as Dupuy (2014) remarks, that "the IHRC placed the Haitian government under the tutelage of a decision-making body conceived and imposed on Haiti by foreign powers" (p. 116). In effect, the international community rendered President Préval politically impotent by upending the presidential election to usher in their favored candidate, Michel Martelly. Martelly, a right-wing sympathizer, subserviently accepted neoliberal policies, and, in return, was assured that his corruptions would proceed unchecked.

Health-Related Vulnerabilities, COVID-19, and Natural Disasters

In just a few months—for some countries, a few weeks—the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) caused a paralysis of global functioning by placing large metropolises under confinement and exposing the vulnerabilities of healthcare systems throughout the world. Countries with robust nationalized healthcare systems that prioritize human lives, like Rwanda, New Zealand, Cuba, Madagascar, Vietnam, Norway, and South Korea, are faring much better than liberal, capitalist countries that prioritize material wealth, like the United States, England, Italy, and Spain, which have registered the greatest number of infections and fatalities. The present pandemic reminds us that vulnerability increases proportionally to a country's economic power and social safety nets. Colonial legacies of forced migration become an important underlying factor, as health and environment are interlinked. Dr. Joseph F. Bentivegna (2010) demonstrates this through his discussion of tuberculosis:

> Blacks, unlike whites, have poor natural resistance to tuberculosis. Whites have lived with this disease for millennia and a strong immunity has evolved. Blacks, on the other hand, first encountered tuberculosis when they were enslaved five hundred years ago. Untreated chronic tuberculosis may fester in a white [person] for years, even decades, but it kills a black in a matter of months (p. 71).

Dr. Bentivegna's statement amplifies the need not only for knowing one's natural environment, but also the history of the human in relation to it. Measles, typhoid, yellow fever, and smallpox are also epidemic diseases that Europeans brought to the Caribbean which are still ravaging the poor in Haiti and other countries. If there are risks, how would they be mitigated?

In a state of active urban interaction, with legacies of migration, the history of diseases becomes quintessential knowledge for discovering quality solutions. Pandemics and epidemics provoke extensive social as well as medical effects among the populations who experienced them. And nowhere was the cholera outbreak worse than the Central Plateau and the northern parts of Haiti, where roughly 10,000 were killed and where living conditions were (are) precarious. By 2013, the country had experienced over 600,000 reported cases of infection and 330,000 hospitalizations. Fear of cholera spread to Port-au-Prince, where shabby neighborhoods and portside slums would have been perfect vectors for the deadly bacterial disease. All applied problems or challenges that affect the vulnerability of the human (a nation) require the examination of the total environment. This is why contact tracing in cases of disease transmission is so essential. Health-related vulnerability concerns cities of all sizes, particularly those with widespread urbanization and inadequate public healthcare systems. Were it not for the determined investigative work of scientists such as Piarroux and the United Nations, conservative members of the world scientific community would have continued to blame poor Haitians for their unsanitary living conditions, misfortunes, and environment (as Professor David Sack of Johns Hopkins did). Some would have outright lied about dates and other facts, like Rita Colwell—former president of the National Science Foundation and distinguished professor at Johns Hopkins—did in 2014 when the Préval government asked her to investigate the epidemic, even though French epidemiologist Renaud Piarroux and his team had already identified the *Vibrio cholerae* genome as deriving from a Nepalese cholera strain (Frerichs, 2016, p. 252). When the genesis of the cholera was clearly linked to a United Nations' Nepalese Base in Mirebalais, the Martelly government refused to blame the United Nations or seek damages for the families who had lost multiple members to cholera, despite the fact that a legal claim by the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti was filed in February 2013 against the United Nations.

Much more disheartening were the efforts of President Martelly, Prime Minister Laurent Lamothe, and skeptical international stakeholders who did not provide support to Renauld Piarroux and his colleagues, even though they had put together a 10-year plan to stop the spread of the bacterium. Piarroux had discovered that the "the Haitian environment with its own microbial flora seemed to provide some ecological protection against colonization of deadly toxin-producing strains" (Frerichs, 2016, p. 232). Unlike Colwell's and Sack's theories that the Haitian environment had produced or awakened the dormant strains, Piarroux proved the opposite. Yet, by the end of 2012, the "fight against cholera remained deadlocked" (p. 233).

Fortunately, and ironically, it was the French team led by Piarroux and funded by a public-private hospital in Marseille that provided the financial support to enable Piarroux and his colleagues (along with the reluctant new Health Minister of Haiti, Florence Guillaume) to "build treatment centers, integrate management of cholera cases into routine hospital activity, and organize vaccination campaigns" (Frerichs, p. 234). As Ralph Frerichs indicates, the UN had built a "monolithic wall… around determining the origin of the cholera in Haiti" (p. 198). However, the French team was determined to break through and provide answers, which they did.

In the end, Renaud Piarroux, with the collaboration of the Chilean UN diplomat, Pedro Medrano Rojas, agreed with Piarroux's 10-year plan in mid-2013 to improve water and sanitation, as well as eliminate cholera. By 2014, Medrano Rojas had not accepted Piarroux's finding that cholera was introduced in Haiti by United Nations forces from Nepal. However, according to Ralph R. Frerichs:

> Piarroux and Medrano Rojas were in agreement that the UN had made efforts to clean up the mess once it was made, providing numerous on-the-ground support activities, including new treatment centers; family hygiene kits with soap, water purification tablets and oral rehydration salts; safe drinking water; and logistic and security assistance (2016, p.245).

Sadly, it took another foreign physician to intervene on behalf of neglected Haitians who were vulnerable to all sorts of foreign pathogens and will be further victimized by the absence or the complicity of the Haitian government to uphold and defend their fundamental human rights.

In a country like Haiti where the government has been both absent and discredited by the vast majority of the population, one exists in a chaotic and flammable micro-world. In 2020, it is COVID-19 that tests the resolve of the Haitian government and the "luck" of the Haitian people where healthcare is privatized and/or provided by international organizations. Writing for NACLA, Jane Regan (2020) claims that the:

> lack of, and fear of, testing mean that thousands go undiagnosed and that hundreds, or perhaps even more, have died—untested and uncounted—due to a combination of factors that are as much political and economic as they are related to the weak public health system.

That said, even smaller cities or those located in less-developed countries have heightened exposure to this health crisis that further exposes the fundamental problem of what Michel-Rolph Trouillot (2001) refers to as "urban microcephalia" (p. 117)—where inbuilt socioeconomic disadvantages are aggravated by the advent of pandemics and diseases. As Paul Farmer (2005) qualitatively deduces, "both violence and disease have always appeared as pathologies of power" (p. xxviii). In Haiti, COVID-19 is particularly worrisome due the history of governmental ineptitude, neglect, and corruption. Haitians "also do not trust international humanitarian actors, whose repeated promises in the wake of 2010 earthquake did not deliver the promised Haiti 'built back better'" (Regan, 2020). In a country where hustling and bustling, particularly in the acephalous republic of Port-au-Prince, are part of daily existence, the immediate adaptation of new forms of social life required by the distrusted government of Jovenel Moïse was beyond challenging. Again, Regan reports that President "Moïse's pandemic decree also set a curfew which said people are not allowed to meet in groups of more than five. Many, including the director of the Haitian Platform of Human Rights Organizations, said the Moïse government took advantage of the virus to quell dissent and mobilization." Just like in the United States, healthcare rights in the time of coronavirus are very much related to national politics and an administration's willingness to politicize the pandemic. Many people applauded the Haitian government's March launch of a permanent information center on COVID-19 that intends to help coordinate all public awareness-raising actions/campaigns. A month later, the government distributed masks and soap in care packages that contained relevant information about COVID-19. Yet, despite the informative public infomercials, the government lacks the capacity to have a nationally coherent, synergistic, and standardized response to COVID-19.

Undoubtedly, the COVID-19 pandemic highlights the vulnerability of the global system as a whole and how deeply interconnected we are. However, COVID-19 also fundamentally exposes a country's policy of indifference toward certain segments of its population, or the lack of health rights afforded to a portion of the population deemed expandable. Since the establishment of the Albert Schweitzer Hospital in Deschapelles, Haiti, in 1956, the Haitian government has essentially turned its back from providing quality healthcare, and has simply allowed foreign

doctors, missionaries, and others to care for its destitute population. As such, albeit deservingly, people like Dr. Paul Farmer have become adopted national heroes for not "giving up on the public system and seeking to rebuild it" (Farmer, 2011, p. 71). Meanwhile, in other cases, all sorts of experiments are carried out on Haitians by foreigners who see themselves as do-gooders and saviors. It is very telling that Dr. Bentivegna (2010) informs his readers on the issue of birth control that:

> I spoke with one missionary, a nurse, who implanted IUD's (intrauterine device) as a method of birth control and felt this was the wave of the future in Haiti, since no patient participation was required…. Once considered an effective method of birth control, IUD's have fallen into disrepute in the United States because they can cause permanent sterilization from an associated pelvic infection which is invariably followed by a million-dollar lawsuit (Bentivegna, p. 131).

In Haiti, what lawsuit? What are laws? What are rights and consent? These women are poor, black, peasant, or phantomatic urban dwellers who lack the representation of a legitimate government. In Port-au-Prince, in the San Fil area, Dr. Bentivegna encountered a patient who had an IUD implanted in her that later caused pelvic inflammatory disease, or perhaps "her IUD had perforated the uterine wall causing peritonitis" (p. 132). Although he recommended immediate surgery, the staff at the Hôpital Général refused to admit the woman. She languished in pain and eventually died a few weeks later. Dr. Bentivegna was forced "to wonder whether it was fair to put these things in people when they did not have access to the medical care to treat complications" (p. 132). No, it is not a question of fairness; it is rather one of legality, and it is a further violation of human rights by foreign missionaries who are deepening the level of structural vulnerabilities that Haitians are facing.

Conclusion

It seems there is also a sense of insensitivity to human suffering, quotidian tragedies, or collective accidents that reveals fragility in the face of highly disturbing events but does not call into question the ethical aspects in responding and preparing for disasters within an urban setting, or in the country as a whole. It is after a crisis that a regime's crisis-handlers proceed from handling the "exceptional event," as we have observed during episodal floods, storms, earthquakes, and even a pandemic in regions where they are common, such as Haiti. In the years since the 2010 earthquake, bridges, houses, crops, and villages have been destroyed by hurricane-strength winds and flooding. For example, the 2016, category-4 Hurricane Matthew destroyed several southern towns and killed nearly 600 people. The damage to property alone was estimated at $2.6 billion dollars. Ill-prepared and with a depleted national treasury, the Haitian government relied on non-governmental organizations (NGOs), as well as foreign donors, to alleviate these costs. Floods are much more frequent than earthquakes in Haiti and are the most common form of natural destruction. Floods affect vast areas that are critical in the context of minimally existing infrastructure. They are difficult to contain and result in catastrophic destruction, disrupting commerce, schooling, and daily activities. Floods represent a consequential threat to lives and property.

In 1991, former President Aristide wrote an op-ed for the New York Times in which he correctly argued that the "army's role should be limited to areas in which prompt and disciplined intervention is necessary: prevention of national disasters, search and rescue operations, assistance in the development of deprived areas, building and maintaining highway systems and

patrolling our border and coastline" (Oct. 27, 1991). Instead, the military has served as the unequivocal guardian of the possessing class and against the nation's future as a sovereign and viable republic.

If we want to lay foundations for sustainable development in a geographically high-risk country like Haiti, the government and the private sector must develop and implement risk and disaster management policies. The exasperation of the chasm between the accumulation of wealth by the microscopic possessing class and the monstrous spread of poverty contributes to producing numerous urban and rural dysfunctions that are expressed on sociopolitical and ecological terrains. The constant physical confrontations between the population, and/or between the population and the authorities who have historically acted as the defenders of the elites as well as their own interests, are getting much more violent and frequent. Manigat (1997) incisively conceives that the "political situation in Haiti to a large extent reflects the condescending vision of the modern and technocratic sectors: they are unwilling to pay the price for change; that is, they are unwilling to share power and privileges with other sectors of society" (p. 120). Haitians are questing a proper and impartial rule of law that would provide security and the assurance of promulgating a just society. Unfortunately, the state lacks the capacity to produce a large and efficient managerial cadre that would enhance social service capabilities and vigorous administrative responses to enable the government to meet and cope with a population that is above 11 million. For now, we go on existing, being, living with the dream of a better tomorrow, and hope that the country will be spared future calamities, including foreign aggressions and dehumanizing exploitation.

Haiti's colossal losses and structural vulnerabilities stem from the neglect of public risk and disaster management policies that would allow the state to mitigate disaster and reduce damage. This neglect weakens the development of sustainable actions that could be carried out with a view to transform the condition of human life in social, economic and environmental terms. In this sense, all investment projects relating to sustainable development that are carried out without taking into account the environmental and social risks to which Haiti is exposed inevitably lead to a sustainability of underdevelopment.

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What Difference has the Government of Haiti Made for Tourism Development?

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This research examines the actions that the Haitian government has taken to develop and sustain tourism within their borders. My premise is that governments, through state institutions and policies, can implement branding strategies that impact and change existing country image perceptions. Expanding on the determinants of tourism demand literature, I present a theoretical framework for how government institutions collaborate to create a favorable country brand by investing in the development of functional benefits {public safety and infrastructure quality}. The functional benefits are then supplied to the mass tourist market, who demands them in order to visit, lodge and spend money in the country. The findings of this study confirm that a causal relationship exists between a country's level of stability and tourism arrivals and receipts, further establishing this study's theory that high levels of investment in infrastructure quality and nation branding can positively influence country image perception to generate arrivals and receipts. Surprise outcomes regarding crime's impact on arrivals and receipts present future opportunities to advance the literature.

Keywords: Infrastructure Investment, Nation Branding, Political Stability, Government Policy

Introduction

For many low-income developing countries like Haiti, with limited natural resources to competitively trade globally, tourism can serve as a vital economic driver. To that end, it is in the best interest of governments to make attempts to attract private sector investment, to generate tourist arrivals and travel receipts, with the hopes that an abundance of tourism development will create linkages with other sectors to produce growth in their economy. The reliance on this industry is paradoxical, as governments of many poor nations habitually underestimate their role as the key stakeholder in determining the acute strategies which will attract, grow, and retain tourism demand. Furthermore, government leaders of developing countries may desire to generate economic growth through tourism channels; however, they fail to consider that tourism is as particularly sensitive to political factors as it is to economic and environmental ones. Moreover, governments must understand that their country projects an image that potential investors and tourists may perceive as feasible for investment and travel. The global perception of a country is partially exogenous and beyond a government's control. However, there are preemptive measures that governments can take to attract tourism and to contribute to a positive perception of their country as a viable travel destination. Governments in developing countries, who are successful at generating a thriving tourism sector, work to create safe and stable political environments, invest a tremendous amount of state capital in tourism sustainability, hire destination managers, execute sound tourism public policies, and consult with public relation firms to assist in the process. Conversely, governments, who fail at fostering a sustainable tourism industry and remain in economic jeopardy, can attribute as reasons political instability, insufficient security policies, and deficient tourism promotion strategies, along with a lack of capital expenditure investment in developing quality infrastructure.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this paper is threefold. First, it explores key arguments in the literature on the determinants of tourism demand to provide a more comprehensive theory and methodology for measuring security, infrastructure, and marketing promotions' impact on tourism arrivals and receipts in Haiti. Secondly, it evaluates the Haitian government's effectiveness in developing a sustainable tourism sector in the context of those main tourism drivers. Thirdly, it provides recommendations for expanding understudied hypotheses in future scholarship on Haitian tourism. The main question this paper seeks to answer is what difference the Haitian government institutions make to develop the tourism sector within Haiti. Ultimately, the paper expects the answer to this question to help solve the conundrum for why Haiti's once thriving tourism sector deteriorated in the early 1980s and has not rebounded.

Background on Tourism in Haiti

Having a sustainable tourism sector often appears to be beyond Haiti's grasp. From a historical perspective, the tourism industry in Haiti is categorized as having uneven development that was marred by many "setbacks" (Lundhal, 2004). Tourism began in the mid-1940s with around 5,000 visitors (Lundhal, 2004); and, by 1956, Haiti had reached 67,700 travelers (Séraphin, 2011). During the 1950s and early 1960s, Haiti was perceived by travelers as a good place to visit. And, subsequently, during that time, Haiti experienced one of the fastest growth rates of visitors in the Caribbean (Séraphin, 2011). However, violent unrest during the cruel dictatorship of Francois "Papa Doc" Duvalier led to a sharp decline in visitors in 1963. After that, Haiti was considered unsafe by travelers and a country to avoid. The negative country perception ended when Jean Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier became president in 1972, and tourism experienced a revival. Tourist numbers peaked at 300,000 visitors by 1980 (Steif, 1985; Fass, 1988). However, this upsurge was temporary as a rumor developed in 1982 that AIDS originated in Haiti; and then Duvalier's dictatorship was overthrown in 1986. Except for cruise ship tourism in Labadee, Haiti's mass tourism potential collapsed after the 1986 coup, and a series of political and socio-economic problems began to plague Haiti that had lasting effects well into late 2010. In late 2010, after a 7.0 earthquake hit the country, the Haitian government began making serious efforts to revitalize tourism (Séraphin, 2011). Foreign investors began constructing hotels in Haiti to cater to the country's new brand of travelers: aid workers, missionaries and businesspeople. There is recent legitimate hope that the country may finally capture a small portion of the mass tourism market of overnight visitors. However, whether Haiti can convert hope to reality largely depends on the approach the Haitian government takes to drive and maintain its tourism sector for the long-term.

Tourism Demand Determinants Literature

The literature on determinants of tourism demand has established that a country's tourism sector is driven by numerous factors. A panel data analysis study of Latin American and Caribbean countries establishes three main classifications for the determinants (Pivčević et all, 2016): 1) pull (or attractive) factors—the characteristics of the inbound travel destination which includes destination promotional programs, destination attractiveness, social and cultural ties, climate, events; 2) political and social factors—indicates that political stability is important for security in that the higher the political stability, the higher the tourism demand (Eugenio-Martin, Morales and Scarpa, 2004 as mentioned in Pivčević et al, 2016); and 3) pull-tourism competitiveness factor—

an inbound country determinant of tourism demand that includes nation branding/marketing promotions. From the three classifications, political stability, tourism infrastructure investment and nation branding are the most positive, statistically significant and correlated relationship with creating sustainable tourism demand (see Table 1.1). These preliminary causal factors provide the basis for a more precise theoretical framework for how governments can utilize tourism drivers as mechanisms for sustainable tourism demand.

Table 1.1 Most Significant Determinants of Tourism Demand Identified in Literature

Causes/Influences	Tourism Demand Determinants	Independent Variables in the Literature
Political and Social Factors	Political Stability/Security	Political Stability
Pull Factors	Destination Attractiveness Infrastructure	Tourism Infrastructure Expenditure
Tourism Competitiveness Factors	Marketing Promotions	Nation Branding

1. Political Stability as a Security Determinant

Hall (1994) determined that political stability is a "fundamental precondition" to establishing a successful tourism sector. Baker contends that "modern mass tourists tend to long for relaxing, safe, and unconcerned vacations when they travel" (Baker, 2012, p. 91). Generally, any evidence of unrest within a country will deter visitors from traveling to that destination. Therefore, political instability, the inverse of stability, within a country produces a negative effect on both tourism demand and tourism sector development.

Political instability often generates negative publicity; and, because of deleterious travel reports, tourism demand decreases (Thapa, 2003). The decline in tourism arrivals comes from the fact that political instability creates the perception of a safety risk for travelers (Lepp, 2003). Therefore, the perceptions of political instability and safety become the prerequisite for tourists to travel (Hall and O'Sullivan, 1996). Governmental leaders underestimate political peace as the primary and fundamental precondition for tourism development (Nyaruwata, 2013). Ultimately, tourists seriously consider safety and security problems when choosing travel destinations (Nyaruwata, 2013). Therefore, it is the government's responsibility to create a politically stable environment to attract and retain a thriving tourism industry for the purposes of economic development (Nyaruwata, 2013). Causevic and Lynch (2013) point out that there is a void in the research with studies focused on how governments handle challenges with political instability within their borders. Most specifically, literature is still lacking on regulations and laws which are created to manage tourism development post-conflict or counteract the decline in tourism demand caused by political instability (Causevic and Lynch, 2013).

2. Tourism Infrastructure Expenditure

Much of the tourism determinants literature focuses on infrastructure quality as a vehicle to develop tourism and attract tourism demand. Few tourism driver studies specifically investigated spending on infrastructure directly or a country's critical role in securing investors. The literature on this subject is important for two reasons: 1) establishing that infrastructure is a prerequisite for maintaining a successful tourism sector; and 2) incidentally linking the importance of spending

on infrastructure to tourism demand. An important study that included Haiti discovered that tourism increases if three key factors are established: infrastructures, education and safety (Eugenio-Martin et al, 2004). Furthermore, capital investment in infrastructure and safety, factors which are essential for attracting tourist investors and tourists, will lead to an increase in tourism development (Eugenio-Martin et al, 2004). Giap et al. (2016) contend that government expenditures on tourism promotion and infrastructure, specific to the enhancement of airport facilities, are the main determinants of tourism demand in Malaysia. Similar studies on developing countries also identify infrastructure quality as either an important factor or the most vital determinant of tourism demand (Khadaroo-Seetanah, 2007; Dwyer and Spurr, 2011; Assaf and Josiassen; 2011; Seetanah et al, 2011; Giap et al., 2016 and Jovanovic and Illic, 2017). However, the authors conflict on the type of infrastructure most relevant for tourism.

3. Nation Branding as a Marketing Determinant

An ongoing scholarly debate highlights a misperception about nation branding solely being a marketing tool versus a concentrated strategy which governments can actively implement with the help of tourism promotional agencies. Challenges exist on how to measure or conceptualize nation branding, as governments often confuse it with public relations. As a result, nations often employ promotional advertising campaigns instead of improving the structural problems within their country that contribute to their brand image (Anholt, 2011). Despite the dispute, the consensus of authors across all disciplines is that nation branding is a determinate of tourism demand.

In today's globalized world, nations and brand image integrate in the minds of potential customers and investors creating a "country of origin" effect (Van Ham, 2009). The country of origin effect is where a nation's reputation influences consumer purchasing power or foreign direct investment (Van Ham, 2001; 2009). A state's good reputation and image are part of its "strategic equity" (Van Ham, 2001) where a country, much like a company's products, relies heavily on consumer and investor confidence based on their interpretation of that brand's quality.

Theoretical Framework

Governments of developing countries, like Haiti, can manage the main drivers of tourism by implementing policies that impact country image perceptions to attract more visitors and travel receipts. It is probabilistic that tourism arrivals and receipts are generated when travelers perceive a country's image as positive and viable for travel based on a combination of three main drivers of tourism demand: public safety, infrastructure investment and nation branding. Government institutions can employ strategies to create a favorable country brand by investing in the development of functional benefits (public safety and infrastructure quality, as foundation for destination's appeal) to meet the demand of potential travelers to incentives them to visit, lodge and spend money in the country (Anglade, 2018). The theoretical framework of this study is based upon an expansion of the most statistically significant tourism demand determinants identified in the literature, namely political stability and security, infrastructure quality and nation branding as the vehicle for marketing promotions. Table 2.1 outlines the expansion of the most significant determinants of tourism demand that is used as the basis for this paper's independent variables.

Table 2.1 Theoretical Expansion of the Determinants of Tourism Demand Literature

Causes/Influences	Determinants of Tourism Demand Literature	Theoretical Expansion of the Determinants of Tourism Demand
Political and Social Factors	Political Stability	Public Safety Crime rates Political stability
Pull Factors	Tourism Infrastructure Expenditure Destination Attractiveness Infrastructure	Infrastructure Investment Government spending on infrastructure Private sector investment in infrastructure
Tourism Competitiveness Factors	Nation Branding Marketing Promotions	Nation Branding Public tourism promotion investment Public Private Tourism Promotion Partnerships

Public Safety Theory

Safety and security are prerequisites for successful tourism development, as tourists desire to travel to destinations that are safe, and where security is assured (Mansfield and Pizam, 2006). If travelers believe a destination is unsafe, it will cause them to develop a negative impression of that destination, thereby causing tourism demand to decline (George, 2010; Ghaderi et al., 2017). Political stability is a positive determinant of tourism demand, and a converse relationship exists when instances of political instability threaten safety and security at tourist destinations. The measurement of security must be expanded to include the examination of other potential security threats that may serve as deterrents to travel. Four types of security threats often cause tourists to avoid a travel destination: 1) crime-related incidents; 2) terrorism; 3) war; and 4) civil/political unrest (Pizam, 2006). Terrorism, war and civil/political unrest and other violent occurrences are often linked and classified under political instability by researchers. Crime-related incidents are important, but not collectively considered as political stability in terms of its relationship to tourism demand (Ghaderi et al, 2017). However, crime-related incidents or the perception that a destination has a high level of crime could potentially render a destination unsafe.

The findings on crime rates and tourism indicate that theft is often the most widely reported crime against tourists (Glensor and Peak, 2004). Yet, in the event tourists do not report crimes against them, crime rate levels will indicate the overall safety of the travel destination. Crimes against tourists typically occur in areas that experience higher overall crime rates. Travelers are at risk of other crimes in addition to thefts such as assaults, homicides, robberies, scams and credit card fraud. Moreover, the assessment of crime rate levels indicates the effectiveness of the government providing tourism security (Glensor and Peak, 2004). To address the gap in the literature that excludes crime rates and solely focuses on political instability as creating a security risk for tourism demand, the public safety variable includes the measurement of crime rates as well as political stability.

Infrastructure Investment Theory

Previous literature has measured investment in public infrastructure through infrastructure rankings that assess the quality of a nation's infrastructure. Undoubtedly, a quality and modern infrastructure is an important driver of tourism development (Sakai, 2007; Jovanovic and Ilic, 2016) as infrastructure facilitates the commerce of tourism (Sakai, 2007). Infrastructure makes the

private distribution of tourism services more efficient. In addition, all forms of transportation infrastructure (road, air and sea) are important for travel to and within a destination, especially for countries with remote attractions to offer. Moreover, overnight tourists serve as temporary residents of a destination; therefore, the demand for physical infrastructure such as water, sewer, electricity and communication is also important for investment. Public infrastructure is a fundamental function of the government (Hodge and Greve, 2017), who will allocate public capital on infrastructure if tourism is intended to be a vital part of the country's economy. The level of public expenditures the government allocates is directly correlated with its intention to actively develop its infrastructure (Sakai, 2007; Jovanovic and Ilic, 2016). In addition to public investment in infrastructure, it is important that the private sector is given incentives to invest in infrastructure.

While the state is directly responsible for transportation and environmental infrastructure, social tourism infrastructure (rooms to accommodate tourists and other supportive physical structures that facilitate activities and services to attract tourists such as hotels, stadiums, convention centers and galleries) (Jovanavic and Ilic, 2016), as part of the overall tourism infrastructure framework, requires extensive investment from the private sector (Jovanavic and Ilic, 2016). Vives, Benavides, and Paris contend that nearly all public infrastructure endeavors will need the participation of the public and private sectors; therefore, infrastructure projects are generally public-private partnerships (2010, p. 412). To effectively assess the government's role in building and improving infrastructure, this paper uses government's spending on infrastructure and private sector investment (including public-private partnerships in infrastructure) as the measurements for the infrastructure investment variable

Nation Branding Theory

Nation branding has been a challenge for scholars to define and measure. The dispute on the conceptualization and operationalization has led to the creation of a country brand index which is more of a measurement of country image quality than it is on effective branding efforts. This paper bypasses the debate on how branding is operationalized to provide a simpler measurement for tourism promotions. The goal of nation branding is for countries to self-evaluate, conduct a situation analysis of the country's strengths and weaknesses, and recognize what needs to be achieved to make the country more attractive as a destination (Nawaz & Hassan, 2016). For countries, this involves investing heavily in the factors that drive tourism, developing policies to encourage tourism and then promoting the country brand through marketing initiatives. The public sector is responsible for building a country brand image and the promotion of its tourism sector outside of the country (Nawaz and Hassan, 2016). The level of capital investment from the public and private sectors signifies the priority governments place on building a positive image of their country. At the beginning of tourism development, government authorities from the national and regional level take a primary leadership role promoting tourism. To that end, the government is the pioneer in all facets of tourism development including marketing endeavors (Nawaz and Hassan, 2016). However, as tourism successfully develops through later stages, effective nation branding causes the public sector to partner with the private sector in its nation branding efforts (Göymen, 2000; Mckercher and Ritchie, 1997; Nawaz and Hassan, 2016). The evidence of public sector expenditures on tourism marketing and public-private sector partnerships to promote tourism will serve as the variables that comprise nation branding in this paper.

Country Image Perception (Intervening Variable)

Country image perception is discussed in numerous scholarly reports on tourism development. This is because the perception of a country can contribute to its overall reputation over time in the mass tourism market based on the continual information potential travelers receive. The perception of a country's image ultimately influences travelers' decision to visit that destination. For travelers, a strong positive country brand image projecting a destination's appeal will likely create a higher demand for travel to that destination over other possible destinations with weaker and negative brand images (Ezeudiji et al., 2016). Country image perception is often caused by the image projected to and developed emotionally by travelers (Lopes, 2011; Rajesh, 2013; Ezeudiji et al, 2016). The traveler's perception derives from direct travel experiences (Lopes, 2011; Ezeudiji et al, 2016) or from external information sources about a destination (Tasci and Gartner, 2007; Ezeudiji et al, 2016) that is then conveyed to the public. The destination travel information may take the form of a traveler's country travel warning reports, mass media reports or by public comments made available to them from seemingly credible sources such as, for example, United States' President Donald Trump's "shithole" comment about Haiti. The information received about a destination, which affect tourist perceptions, are exogenous to the inbound travel destination; and, therefore, it is beyond the destination's control. However, there are internal country image management strategies, in the form of nation branding, that destinations can implement to influence how their country is perceived.

Country image perception originates from tourism demand based on a traveler's desire for destination attractiveness. Therefore, for a tourist destination, its supply (or its country's brand essence) must project a positive country image to satisfy tourism demand. Crouch (2011) stated that it is up to the country to supply destination attractiveness, which is comprised of important elements: "the reality of the destination's attributes and qualities (destination's appeal), and how this reality is communicated to and perceived by tourists (destination's knowledge and understanding), in comparison to the other information received about other destinations" (Crouch, 2011; as discussed in Ezeuduji et al., 2016). The country's brand essence provides the "functional and emotional benefits of a brand" (de Chernatony and Harris, 2010, as discussed in Ezeuduji et al., 2016), as well as establishes the country's competitive advantage over its potential competitors in the mass tourism market.

As the costs associated with travel are large and infrequent, potential travelers will likely choose a destination with a positive image over one that is unfavorable, and they will favor the destination that can offer the functional and emotional benefits demanded for traveling outside of their usual habitat (Ezeudiji et al, 2016). While the emotional benefits (i.e. visiting family, attending business events, sight-seeing and visiting attractions) (Ezeuduji et al., 2016) are acknowledged, the focus of this paper will be on the functional advantages that the destination can supply to meet a tourist's demand. The functional benefits are tangible in nature, serve as the basis for a destination's appeal and positive country image, and those benefits are comprised of a country's physical characteristics such as tourism security, quality infrastructure and facilities (Pawitra & Tan, 2003; Vengesayi, 2003; Ezeudiji et al., 2016). Ultimately, to match tourism demand and exceed traveler's destination costs, destinations need to provide a balance of functional and emotional advantages by producing a positive country brand.

Tourism Arrivals and Receipts (Dependent Variable) Theory

Tourism demand is often measured in the literature by "international arrivals" per year indicating overnight stays or "international visitors per year" that includes all visitor types (i.e. cruise arrivals) if overnight arrival data is unavailable. This study expands on most of the literature's operationalization of tourism demand and creates a new dependent variable called "tourism arrivals and receipts." Tourism arrivals and receipts consists of two components: 1) the international arrivals per year and 2) international receipts per year. As the case study on Haiti in this paper will conduct an analysis over a time series, over which Haiti departed the mass tourism market to evolve into a niche tourism market (which includes an extensive cruise tourism sector), it is important to evaluate the actual growth rates of tourism over time.

The Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) method[1] is used to calculate the growth rate either annually or per tourism period (depending on the available years for statistics on arrivals and receipts) in Haiti. Then, the growth rate is calculated either yearly (where available) by the entire tourism period (to show the total rate of growth for that time). The value of the arrivals and the receipts, respectively, at the end of the period in question is calculated by its value at the beginning of that period, raising the result to the power of one divided by the period length, and subtracted one from the subsequent result. After the coversions, graphs were developed to show the variation of tourism arrivals and receipts per period. For the dependent variable, the starting point for all tourism arrivals and receipts rating scales covering the tourism time periods in this paper (1940-2016) is to place any number under the "average growth rate" given for the Caribbean region under the "low" category. Any number within 2% over the average growth rate is "moderate" and 3% over the average growth rate is high.

Figure 2.1 below is a visual overview of the theoretical framework of this paper and how the independent variables interact with country image perception to generate increases in tourism arrivals and receipts. Tables 2.1-2.4 provides how each of the variables are operationalized.

Figure 2.1 Theoretical Model - How the Main Drivers of Tourism Demand Interact with Managing a Country Image to Increase Tourism Arrivals and Receipts



Table 2.2 Independent Variables (Public Safety / IV1 and Instrastructure / IV2)

Independent Variables	Definition & Hypothesis	Measurement	Subject judgment operationalization
Public Safety (IV1)	State security measures taken to protect people against safety and security risks such as crime and unintended consequences of an involuntary nature such as political instability[2]. **Public Safety (IV1) Hypothesis** - The lower the level of crime rates and the more political stable the country, the higher the public safety which produces a positive country image perception that attracts more tourism arrivals and receipts	Crime rates – the total crimes complied to "assess the effectiveness of a crime control policy, and the impact of the policy on the risk of crime victimization"[3].	Ratings scale of low, moderate, high and critical for homicides per capita reported (various country reports & Overseas Security Advisory Center/OSAC) Low = 0-500 Moderate = 500-1,000 High = 1,000 – 2,000 Critical = 2,000 – above Premise - the higher the rate of homicides, the more unsafe the country
		Political stability – Following Hurwitz, political stability is the: "(1) absence of violence; governmental longevity/duration; (3) existence of a legitimate constitutional (4) absence of structural change; and (5) a multifaceted societal"[4]	Ratings scale based on World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators' (WGI) percentile rank measurement definition: Unstable (active unrest/violence) = 0-49 Moderate (some unrest or conflict) = 50-89 Stable (no unrest) = 90-100 Premise – per WGI, the closer the percentile rank to 100, the more stable the country
Infrastructure Investment (IV2)	Public and private spending on all the facilities used to deliver energy, water, sanitation, telecommunication and transport (land, air, and sea **Infrastructure Investment (IV2) Hypothesis** – The higher the level of public spending and private sector investment in infrastructure, the higher the investment in infrastructure which produces a positive country image perception that attracts tourism arrivals and receipts	Public spending — state, regional and local spending on infrastructure services in six sectors: irrigation, energy (primarily power), transport, communication, wastewater management, and water supply[5]	Ratings scale for the level of public spending on infrastructure from various country Reports & World Bank's PPP Knowledge Lab (in millions) Low = $0-500 Moderate = $501-1,000 High" = $1,001-above Premise –the higher the level of public spending on infrastructure, the higher the infrastructure investment
		Private sector investment - capital investments in a) full privatization or standalone infrastructure developments; or b) public-private partnerships (PPPs)-partnerships between public sector organizations and private sector investors for designing, planning, financing, constructing, providing and/or operating infrastructure, facilities or related services[6]	Ratings scale based on capital investment from country reports & PPP Knowledge Lab (in millions) Low = a $0-500 Moderate = $501-1,000 High = $1,001-above Level of hotel rooms investment Low = 0-7,999 Moderate = 8,000-19,999 High" = 20,000-49,999 Very high=50,000 and above Premise –the higher the level of public spending on infrastructure (capital or hotel rooms), the higher the infrastructure investment

Table 2.3 Independent and Intervening Variables (Nation Branding / IV3 and Country Image Perception / IV4)

Independent Variables	Definition & Hypothesis	Measurement	Subject judgment operationalization
Nation Branding (IV3)	The coordinated government efforts to manage a country's image in order to promote tourism, investment and foreign relations[7] (Volcic & Andrejevic, 2011. Nation Branding (IV3) Hypothesis: The higher the level of public tourism promotion investment and public-private partnerships, the higher the nation branding which produces a positive country image perception that attracts tourism arrivals and receipts.	Public tourism promotion investment— National, regional and local government expenditures spent to advance tourism promotional activities including tourism promotion, marketing, visitor information services, administrative and other public services related to tourism development[8].	Ratings scale of low, moderate, and high percentage of government spending on travel and tourism percentage" statistics from the World Bank's World Trade and Tourism Council data set[9] Low = 0-9% Moderate = 10 - 19% High = 20 % - above Premise - the higher the public tourism promotion investment percentage, the more effective the nation branding strategy
		Public-private tourism promotion partnership — a partnership between the public and private sector to develop, position and execute destination branding, tourism promotion and marketing activities[10]	Ratings scale of low, moderate, and high based on classifications from various data sources on public-private tourism promotion partnerships Premise – the higher the level of investment, the more effective the nation branding strategy
Country Image – Intervening Variable	Country image perception - the sum of beliefs, ideals, and impressions people have toward a certain country based on interpreted information received regardless of the nation's real character[11].	Travel Destination Information (TDI) — interpreted information received by potential visitors about a country from secondary (induced, organic and autonomous information compiled from other people or through organizations) sources that creates a perceived image of the country as a travel destination and influences potential visitors' travel behavior[12]. TDIs include-mass media reports; travel guides; travel destination surveys; travel reviews and country safety rankings	TDIs (as available) from 1940-2017 Premise– more favorable the travel destination information (mass media reports, surveys, travel reviews and country safety rankings), the more positive a potential traveler's perception of a country's image as a viable travel destination.

Table 2.4 Dependent Variable

Dependent Variable	Definition & Hypothesis	Measurement	Subject judgment operationalization
Tourism Demand	Total number of people who travel or desire to travel, and the total amount of money they spend to use tourist facilities and services at their travel destination -which is located away from their places of work or residence	Number of international tourism arrivals –	Ratings scale established from the World Trade Organization Reports on classifying the average growth rate (percent) of international tourism arrivals for the Caribbean Region For 1950-1980 Low = 0-6.99% Moderate = 7-9.99% High = 10% - above For 1980-1995 Low = 0-4.99% Moderate = 5-7.99% High = 8% - above For 1995-2016 Low = 0-2.69% Moderate = 2.7-4.99% High = 5% - above
		International tourism receipts per year –	Ratings scale from global, country or regional reports and World Bank data classifying the average growth rate of tourism receipts for the Caribbean Region For 1940-1990 Low = 0-9.99% Moderate = 10-12.99% High = 13% - above For 1990-2000 Low = 0-12.99% Moderate = 13-17.99% High = 18% - above For 2000-2016 Low = 0-3.89% Moderate = 3.9.-5.99% High = 6% - above

Methodology and Case Study Analysis

A qualitative analysis case study method is employed to evaluate the theoretical arguments of this paper. The years when tourism was in the nascent stage of development in the test country, Haiti, to the present (1940-2017), is divided in block of twenty-year periods: 1940-1960; 1961-1980; 1981-2000; and 2000-2017, for most of the variables identified in this paper (where information was available). The evolution of Haiti's tourism sector is examined in a time-series comparison evaluating the individual relationship between public safety, infrastructure investment and nation branding on tourism arrivals and receipts. The focus of the case study is to determine the level of interaction of the independent variables to create a positive country image that generates more tourism arrivals and receipts.

The statistics on the variables which comprise the independent (public safety, infrastructure investment and nation branding), intervening (country image perception) and dependent (tourism arrivals and receipts) variables of this study come from multiple data sources (regional reports, country data, world indicators, etc). For each test variable of this paper's theoretical argument, data is compiled into tables as follows. First, public safety is comprised of crime rates and political stability percentile ranks for 1940-2017, the major crime incidents and threats to political stability for the four periods of Haiti's tourism development are organized into tables and graphs that indicate the crime rate and political stability level. Secondly, infrastructure investment consists of

public expenditures, private sector and public-private partnership capital investments in infrastructure for 1940-2017 (into the four tourism development time periods), the data on infrastructure investments, classify the type of investment and the level of investments in tables and graphs. Thirdly, nation branding data on public and private tourism promotion investment are arranged in tables and graphs for the tourism period and categorized by the investment type and level.

For the intervening variable, country image perception, there were several forms of travel destination information sources (from mass media reports, travel guides, travel reviews and country safety rankings) that provided either favorable or unfavorable reviews of Haiti and the Dominican Republic, respectively. The data sources are assessed and a categorical scale is provided for the country perception for Haiti divided into ten-year time intervals covering 1940-2018 (see Table 3.3). Finally, the statistics for tourism arrivals and receipts for 1940-2017 were provided by the World Bank and from various country reports on Haiti or Caribbean regional reports. The raw data are produced into graphs to show the variation of tourism demand over designated tourism period covered in this paper. This paper assigns a scale level for international arrivals and receipts for Haiti. For each of the variables of this paper, scaled categories were defined as subjective judgements to compensate for either missing, unreliable or unreported information (see Tables 2.2-2.4). The scaled categories, for each variable, are compatible to make analysis of the relationship between them more transparent. After the designating the scaled ratings for each variable, a summary table of all the variables of this paper and their corresponding rating for Haiti is provided (see Table 3.1) as the basis for the case study analysis.

Table 3.1 Tourism Arrivals and Receipts in Haiti (1940-2016): Scaled ratings based on analysis of data compiled for each variable

Tourism arrivals and receipts in Haiti (1940-2016)									
	Independent Variables						Interactive Variable	Dependent Variable	
	Public Safety		Infrastructure Investment		Nation Branding		Country image perception	Tourism arrivals and receipts (average growth rate percentages were calculated)[14]	
Tourism Periods[13]	*Crime Rates* [15]	*Political Stability*	*Public & Public-Private (PPP)*	*Private*	*Public Tourism Promotion*	*Public-private tourism promotion*	*Travel Destination Information*	*Arrivals*	*Receipts*
Pre-Tourism 1930-1940	Low	Moderate	High (1930-1940)	Low	Low	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Golden Tourism 1940-1980	Low	Moderate (1940-1955) Unstable (1956-1971) Moderate (1972-1980)	Low (1940-1960) Moderate (1961-1980)	Moderate	Low	Moderate	Positive (1940-1963) Negative (1964-1971) Positive (1972-1980)	High (14%)	High (14%)
Deprived Tourism 1981-2010	High	Moderate (1981-1982) Unstable	Low	Low	Low	Low	Negative	Low (-	Low (8%)
Rejuvenated Tourism 2011-2016	High[16]	Unstable[17]	High	High	Low	High	Negative	High (13.9%)	Low (3%)

Haiti Tourism Case Study (1940-2017)

1. Public Safety

From the time that Haiti's tourism sector began developing in the mid-1940s, the Haitian government continually declared that it was crime-free up until 1986 when crime rates began rising considerably. Tourists, prior to 1986, enjoyed attractions and resorts that were "virtually free of street crime" (Library of Congress Country Report, 2001). Moreover, aside from instances where the country experienced political instability: 1) during 1956-57, when President Paul Magloire was overthrown for attempting to extend his constitutional term of office (Haggerty, 1989) and the country experienced five governments within a nine-month period; and 2) during President Francois "Papa Doc" Duvalier's administration from 1962-1971, the country was moderately stable until Duvalier's son, Jean Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier was overthrown in 1986 (Library of Congress Country Report, 2001; Haggerty, 1989). Tourism arrivals and receipts were high through Haiti's "Golden Tourism Period" (1940-1980), with on average a total growth rate of 14% for international arrivals and international receipts. This figure was double the regional growth rate of 7% for international arrivals in the Caribbean, and Haiti was also faring higher than the growth rates for international receipts which was 10% (Country Report, 2001). As there were bouts of political instability, the rate of tourism arrivals and receipts (in terms of international arrivals as international receipts data is sporadic) slowed before picking back up in 1972 after Jean Claude Duvalier instituted many policies favoring private investment geared towards tourism development (Country Report, 2001).

In 1945, when tourism started, Haiti's international arrivals was 5,000. By 1956, arrivals grew to 67,000 (nearly 5.5 times the amount of its 1950 figure-12,000 arrivals). In 1963, during Francois Duvalier's brutal dictatorship, the arrivals fell to under 50,000 but they climbed to over 159,000 by 1972 after Jean Claude Duvalier took office and kept rising until a peak in 1979 with 338,900 (Figure 3.2). From 1980-1986, during which political unrest was beginning to stir leading to Jean Claude Duvalier's ouster in 1986, tourism arrivals and receipts remained at moderate levels; however, the number of arrivals was slowly declining while the tourism receipts from 1979-1984 was steadier (Figure 3.3).

Figure 3-1 Political instability & international arrivals in Haiti (1945-1984)



Figure 3-2 Political instability & international arrivals in Haiti (1995-2015Figure 3-3 International receipts in Haiti between 1950-2015



Figure 3-3 International receipts in Haiti between 1950-2015



Following Jean-Claude Duvalier's coup in 1986, a long-standing history of political instability began to plague Haiti. The country had eighteen regime changes of government between 1986 and 2014 with former presidents Leslie Manigat ousted in a coup in 1988 and Jean Bertrand Aristide overthrown in 1991 (Aristide was restored in 1994 and finished his term in 1996) and in 2004 (after returning to power in 2001) (Library of Congress Country Report, 2001). Furthermore, since the crime rate levels were simultaneously rising around 1986 (and a rumor arose linking the origin of the AIDS virus to Haiti in 1982), tourism arrivals and receipts in terms of overnight visitors severely declined to stagnant levels. While Haiti's cruise ship tourism began to significantly rise in the 2000s, the dynamics of Haiti's tourism sector concerning overnight visitors transitioned from a mass tourism contender to a niche tourism market of diaspora, business and aid/missionary travelers. Haiti's inability to manage public safety since 1986 appears to be a major contributing factor in the decline of overall tourism arrivals and receipts.

Haiti's military forces, the Forces Armées d'Haiti (FAd'H), had been policing the country, as Haiti had no national police force until one was instituted in 1989 (Library of Congress Country Report, 2001). FAd'H found itself unable to combat the severe crime the country was facing, and the security by the late 1980s was inadequate. Despite the Haitian National Police (HNP) finally being instituted, managing crime has remained a major challenge for the country. After Jean Bertrand Aristide's coup in 2004, the United Nations sent peacekeeping forces (MINUSTAH) for 13 years to assist the HPN and bring stability to the country. However, MINUSTAH's legacy is a reported mixture of partial success and disaster. The mission was blamed for bringing the cholera to the country post-Haiti's 2010 earthquake and 134 members of MINUSTAH have been accused of sexual assault crimes (Johnston, 2017). While MINUSTAH has been credited with restoring some stability (the slight rise of which is evident in Figure 3.3 from 2009-2016), the country remains classified as "unstable" according to the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) measuring the likeliness of political instability and/or politically motivated violence. Unfortunately, the classification was confirmed as Haiti's recent bout of violent protests in Haiti stranded several missionary groups, mostly from the United States.

Figure 3.4 - Public Safety: Political Stability Percentile Rank (Haiti)



Percentile Rank (0-100%)	Political Stability Level	Political Stability Level Definition
0-49%	Unstable	Active Incidents of violence, political unrest and political instability
50-89%	Moderately Stable	No major incidents; but, there may be some random political unrest or temporary instability incidents
90-100%	Stable	No threat of major incidents, political unrest, violence and political instability is unlikely

A recent report by the U.S. Department of State on Haiti, indicated that the Haitian National Police has been underreporting the country's crime rates. The underreporting of crime insinuates that Haiti is statistically safer than its Caribbean counterparts (OSAC Report, 2018). Haiti, like many countries in its region, had not been providing reliable data on recorded crimes for several years. In fact, recoding systems for crime reporting were not instituted in Haiti until 2000 (UNODC Report, 2002). For the last seven years that OSAC has reported on Haiti, the U.S. Department of State has been classifying Haiti's crime rate levels as "critical" (OSAC Reports, 2012-2018); however, the scale for crime rates in this paper classifies Haiti as "high" due to its reported

homicide estimates from 1999-2016 as well as the limited data available for other forms of crime (see Table 3.1, Table 3.2. and Figure 3.5 below for Haiti's specific crime rate information).

Table 3.2 – Public Safety/Crime Rate Level (Haiti)

Time Period[18]	Major Crime Incidents	Reported Crime Rate Level
1940-1960	Haiti's military (Forces Armées d'Haiti—FAd'H) inadequately polices the country as Haiti has no national police force	Low
1961-1980	Haitian government continually reports Haiti is "free of crime"[19]	Low
1981-2000	**1986**-crime levels are continually reported as "rising" (through the 2000s) and undermines the FAd'H credibility **1990s**—Haiti tries to build its national police force to combat severe security and crime problems (police force starts in 1989)	Low (reported until 1985) High (since 1986)
2001-2016[20]	**2001—2016:** Kidnappings (until 2013), homicides, car jackings and robberies are a major crime concern Haiti's overall crime rate is classified as "high" but considered lower than other countries in its region mainly due to a lack of mass tourism and continued "underreporting" (especially of homicide rates 2007-2011) 2010—Nearly 5,000 prisoners escaped from the national penitentiary during the earthquake and only 25% are recaptured **2014—2017:** Kidnappings are diminishing (especially incidents against American victims) **See homicide (and other crime rate, as available, for Haiti in Figure 3.5)**	High (But, OSAC repeatedly reports as Critical[21])

Figure 3.5 - Public Safety/Crime Rate Graphs (Haiti)



Number of Incidents	Crime Rate Level
0-500	Low rate of crime
501-1000	Moderate rate of crime
1001-2000	High rate of crime
2001-above	Very high rate of crime

2. Infrastructure Investment

Haiti's overall infrastructure has been considered poor quality and a deterrent to sustainable tourism in terms of increased overnight visitor arrivals (cruise ship travelers are often insulated from being impacted by infrastructure problems as the cruise lines are "all-inclusive" sea resorts where traveler's do not remain overnight). Prior to the advent of the country's tourism sector in 1945, the United States was occupied in Haiti and invested extensively in building Haiti's infrastructure in terms of roads, bridges, canals, public buildings, telecommunications, water and sewage. This massive investment contributed to the start of the country's tourism infrastructure. By 1980, the public and public-private investment in infrastructure continued to grow with paved road projects constructed in Haiti's major cities as well as the construction of an 80-mile from Port au Prince to Cap Hatien, i.e. "Route de L'Amitie Franco Hatienne (Library of Congress Country Report, 2001). Also, private investment in terms of hotel accommodations increased from under 1,000 in 1941 to 2,000 rooms in 1960 to 3,000 rooms in 1980. The rate of hotel development during that time, to accommodate the rate of tourism arrivals and receipts Haiti was experiencing, was rapid as Haiti went from having low number of hotels at the start of its tourism sector to a moderate level. Examining the relationship between infrastructure from 1930-1980, the level of investment in infrastructure appears to be positively correlated with tourism arrivals and receipts which grew high during that period.

Since 1980, public investment in infrastructure (which, in the indices of this paper on infrastructure level, is combined with public-private partnerships (PPI) in infrastructure; this is because infrastructure projects (electricity, transportation, ports, water and sewage) are usually funded by a combination of public and public-private-partnership capital) has been rated low (see Table 3.1 in the Methodology section). During 1981-2000, infrastructure projects did not exceed $500 million (Preeg, 1996; Library of Congress Country Report, 2001). According to the PPI Index, private participation in infrastructure, which is important for governments to secure to finance the extensive capital required for infrastructure projects, totaled just $129 million (to illustrate the stark contrast in investment, a comparison with the Dominican Republic's PPI investment will be discussed in the third case study of this paper). Also, private investment receded when the number of hotel rooms decreased from 3000 in 1980 to 800 by 1999 due to a loss of tourism arrivals and receipts (to be explained further in the discussion on the interactive effects of country image perception). Moreover, for the period 2001-2017, a high level of private capital was allocated to build or improve infrastructure in Haiti, especially after the 2010 earthquake. However, only a fraction of the amount allocated was disbursed, and accordingly few infrastructure projects pledged were executed (PEMFAR Accountability Report, 2008; U.S. Government Accountability Office (GOA) Report, 2013). For example, the United States Congress granted $1.14 billion, and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) pledged $651 million to building Haiti's infrastructure which had amassed nearly $13.2 billion in damages (IADB Country Report, 2013; GOA Report, 2013). Despite this allocation, only $203 million was disbursed by the end of the accountability of funds period in 2013. Further, a $260 million project proposed in 2013 to develop ecotourism in Ile-la-Vache was halted in 2015. Haiti did have some success with its telecommunications sector due to the Haitian government signing a public-private partnership with the Vietnam telecommunication company, Viettel, for nearly $100 million to upgrade infrastructure and services. Post-earthquake, it was one of the highest delivered capital investment in infrastructure projects to be completed.

Pending infrastructure amounts pledged and outstanding amounts allocated, but not yet disbursed, represent opportunities for increasing tourism arrivals and receipts for Haiti. During the 2000-2017, private investment in terms of hotel accommodations increased from 2,000 rooms in 2010 to nearly 4,322 by 2015 (Export.gov, 2017). After the earthquake, several hotels needed to be rebuilt, and aid workers and missionaries involved in the reconstruction needed lodging. Minister of Tourism Stephanie Villedrouin acknowledged the post-earthquake growth in a 2015 article with the Haitian publication, Le Nouvelliste, and indicated that direct investments to tourism were $345 million (a moderate level amount according to the scale of this paper) (Le Nouvelliste, 2015). Further, she stated that Haiti saw a 40% increase in hotel rooms from 2011 to 2015 and claimed that the total number of hotel rooms was 9,280 (with 4,861 classified rooms of international standard of 1 to 5 hibiscus rating, in 177 hotels). Despite the disparity in the number of reported hotel rooms, private investment infrastructure from 2011-2018 has been rated as high. Tourism arrivals and receipts (the most recent numbers for all types of arrivals) for 2014 show Haiti had 1,127,577 visitors (662,403 cruise passengers and 465,174 regular tourists) with a reported increase of nearly 11% in the number of regular tourists compared to the prior year. In 2014, Haiti's rate of increase for tourism arrivals was 13.9 percent, over 5 times the regional average of 2.7%.

3. Nation Branding

Haiti's nation branding efforts from the inception of its tourism sector prior to the time where it experienced public safety challenges, during the 1940-1980 period, mostly relied upon public-private tourism promotion. The government allocated public funds to promote tourism. However, according to a 1973 Organization of American States (OAS) Audit Report, Haiti's tourism promotion budget was poorly allocated (OAS Audit Report, 1973). Nearly 60% of the total budget went to the salaries of the large staff that was employed at the National Tourist Office (OAS Audit Report, 1973). Due to the misallocation, only a small amount remained for promotion, public relations efforts, publicity and literature (i.e. advertising brochures, flyers). As a result, public spending on marketing promotions was low. Reported public-private partnership in tourism promotion involving mostly private sector funding was at a moderate level in the form of airlines, hotel investors and travel agencies. During the initial period of Haiti's tourism sector development, it experienced a high growth rate of tourism. While its arrivals and receipts (tourism arrivals and receipts, this paper's dependent variable) were at moderate levels compared to its region by 1956 with 67,000 visitors, from the time tourism started in Haiti in 1945 with 5,000 visitors to 10,788 in 1951, it grew tremendously in just over 10 years (Seraphin, 2011). Haiti received nearly 6 times the number of visitors in a five-year period 1951-1956.

During 1981-2010, public investment in marketing promotions continued to remain at low levels. Haiti had experienced setbacks in its tourism sector development, and tourism arrivals and receipts had stagnated. There appeared to be several reasons for this unfortunate reversal. In 1982, a rumor associated the origin of the AIDS disease to Haiti (Library of Congress Country Report, 2001). By then, political unrest had begun against President Jean Claude Duvalier's dictatorship culminating in his ouster in 1986 and decades of political instability and increasing crime levels (World Bank Country Report, 1987; Library of Congress Country Report, 2001). In response, the Haitian government retreated their nation branding efforts instead of employing nation branding crises management promotional strategies. Once tourism stagnated, the country closed its tourism offices in 4 locations globally namely, New York, Miami, Paris, and Canada

(Library of Congress Country Report, 2001; Fass, 1988); removed its Ministry of Tourism department in 1986; and reduced its allocated budget for tourism promotion by 1994.

In terms of thousands of visitors from 1987 to 2004, Haiti saw a reduction of 54% of arrivals (from 239,200 of all arrivals to 108,868) (Seraphin, 2011). Haiti attempted to revitalize its tourism industry in the mid-1990s and early 2000s prior to the 2010 earthquake, but nation branding strategic efforts such as promoting the city of Jacmel were continually hampered by the country's public safety and infrastructure weaknesses (Seraphin, 2011). After the earthquake in 2010, the country began attempting to revitalize tourism with more concrete results evident in its level of arrivals and receipts outside of its more successful cruise sector. In 2011, the government appointed Stephanie Villedrouin as Minister of Tourism, who quickly began strong efforts to rebrand Haiti in the wake of proposed and received aid to rebuild the country. The "Why Not Haiti" slogan was initiated and began appearing on the Ministry of Tourism website as well as promotional advertising literature. Within five years, Haiti was included in World Economic Forum's Competitiveness Index for the first time, but it was ranked low for tourism marketing promotions. Assessing the amount that the Haitian government spends on tourism promotion, based on the percent share of total tourism expenditure for 1995-2017, the WEF Report (2015) showed that Haiti's levels ranged from 1.7% in 1995 to 3% from 1999 to 2017. Consistent with the scale of this paper on nation branding (public spending on tourism promotion) levels, the percentages demonstrate a continued trend of low public investment in marketing promotions. By contrast, public-private tourism marketing (another component of nation branding tourism promotional investment) has been high in terms of branded hotel promotions built after the 2010 earthquake and continued cruise ship promotions during the 2011-2017 period.

4. Interaction of IVs with Country Image Perception

Examining tourism arrivals and receipts in Haiti from 1940-2016, as indicated in Table 3.1, at times, there appears to be a correlated individual relationship between each of the independent variables and tourism arrivals and receipts except for the public safety variable level in Haiti's most recent tourism period (2011-2016). For public safety, during 1940-1980, when crime was reported as low, tourism arrivals and receipts were high. Furthermore, when crime was high during the time tourism was deprived (1981-2010), Haiti's tourism sector had a -0.30% average tourism arrivals and receipts rate. Political stability, the other measurement of public safety, created much variance with the dependent variable throughout Haiti's tourism periods. Tourism arrivals and receipts were affected each time the country experienced political instability. Likewise, the infrastructure investment levels, public and private, seemed to be correlated with tourism arrivals and receipts; however, there was no evidence that infrastructure investment made a direct change in tourism arrivals and receipts. This could be attributed to the periods where there was political instability (a public safety issue) and the overall tourism arrivals and receipts were adversely affected during those periods because of the reduction of arrivals and receipts. Likewise, during that time, nation branding strategies to counteract the effect of the public safety situation were at moderate levels (with moderate investments invested by the private sector for tourism promotion and low investments coming from the public sector).Despite the modes of instability during the first half of Haiti's tourism sector development, the overall perception of the country remained positive and tourism was growing at a high rate.

During the 1981-2010 "Deprived Tourism" period, it is evident that there is a greater impact that public safety levels have on tourism arrivals and receipts with the additive effect of low

infrastructure investments (from both the public and private sectors) and a retreat in the country's nation branding (characterized by low tourism promotion investments by the public and private sectors) on the image of the country. Travel destination information had reached potential international visitors during that time about Haiti's political instability problems. Crime levels were not highlighted in the travel destination information reviewed for this paper. However, political instability reports, along with the AIDS rumor, appeared to be sufficient to create the perception that the country posed a threat to public safety (as tourism arrivals and receipts plummeted during that time). While the public safety challenge appears to persist, according to reports from OSAC and country safety rankings, there seems to be some steady increases of tourism arrivals and receipts–especially since the 2010 earthquake. Strong infrastructure investments from the private sector in terms of increased hotel rooms to accommodate the significant number of projects developing to rebuild the country is likely a contributing factor. However, nation branding promotions in terms of public-private tourism promotion can also have an impact as Haiti has recently been included in country rank indexes on global competitiveness. Furthermore, the travel destination information sources, which make up the country image perception interactive variable in this study, had some positive information mixed with the mostly negative reviews of the country during the 2010-2017 period (see Table 3.3).

The Igarape Institute reported on Haiti's recent tourism potential that "given the relatively low incidence of criminal victimization, the perception of Haiti at arrival to departure…overall tourists felt safer than expected during their stay."[22] In line with the theory of this paper, there were no positive travel destination information discovered for 1990-2009 when public safety infrastructure investment and nation branding were at low levels that corresponded to the lowest growth period in Haiti's tourism history.

Table 3.3 – Haiti's Country Image Perception Scale

Haiti Country Image Perception 1940-2018[23]			
Time Period	**Travel Destination Information Source**	**Review of Travel Destination Information Source**	**Country Perception**
1940-1949	Missing data	Later sources reveal a perception that covers this period	Positive
1950-1959	Missing data	Later sources reveal a perception that covers this period	Positive
1960-1969	Travel guide ▪ Fodor's Guide to Caribbean (1960) ▪	Favorable – Haiti is viewed as "fascinating" with much to offer tourists (29-page review)	Positive (1960-1963) Negative (1964-1969)
1970-1979	Mass Media reports ▪ Sports Illustrated article (1973) ▪ New York Times article (1974) ▪ New York Times article (1976) ▪ People Magazine article (1977) Travel guide Fodor's Guide to Caribbean (1974)	 Mass Media reports Favorable on tourism surge in Haiti Favorable on Haitian art (including souvenirs) Favorable – Haiti is fascinating and safe Favorable – Baby Doc to undo father's damage Travel guide Favorable—Haiti is still "fascinating" as 1960s	 Negative (1970-1971) Positive (1972-1980)
1980-1989	Mass Media reports New York Times article (1982) Washington Post article (1984) New York Times article (1984) New York Times article (1986)	Unfavorable--AIDS link to Haiti- tourism decline Unfavorable--AIDS, instability causes decline Favorable—Haiti still has allure for business FDI Mixed—AIDS stigma killed tourism; FDI hopeful	 Negative
1990-1999	Mass Media reports Baltimore Sun article (1994) New York Times article (1995)	Unfavorable - Club Med Haiti's loss of tourists Favorable – Haiti tries to revive tourism	Negative
2000-2009	Mass Media reports ▪ BBC News (2004) ▪ Christian Science Monitor (2008) ▪ The Independent-UK (2008) ▪ Reuters online article (2009) ▪ The Tyee (2009)	Unfavorable – Haiti: an economic basket case Mixed – Haiti is safe; negative image hurts tourism Mixed review -Haiti a mix of fun & poverty Favorable – Cruise ship boost tourism in Haiti Unfavorable – Haiti's brand is cursed	Negative
2010-2017	Mass Media reports World Nomad blog (2011) BBC article (2013) Haiti Hub website Lonely Planet (2015) USA Today (2018) Travel guide (2016) Fodor's Guide to Caribbean Travel reviews: TripAdvisor Country Safety Rankings SafeAround (2017) UL Safety Index (2017)	Mass Media reports Unfavorable—Haiti has safety issues Unfavorable—safety warnings about Haiti Favorable—Haiti is as safe as others Favorable—on the best places to visit in Haiti Unfavorable—Advises Haiti is dangerous Unfavorable – Haiti: no longer included in Guide Favorable—travelers claim Haiti is as safe as others Unfavorable – Haiti is ranked 118/128 Unfavorable—Haiti: below average 40/100	Negative

Conclusion and Future Study Recommendations

In Haiti's case study, this paper assessed the effectiveness of the country's government institutions in providing functional benefits, such as public safety and infrastructure investment, as part of their country brand offering to satisfy the demand of their target market of potential travelers. The paper's theory was that higher levels of the independent variables, public safety (which was comprised of political stability and crime rates), infrastructure investment (comprised on public, public-private partnerships and private sector investment {hotel rooms}) and nation branding worked to create a positive brand image. The favorable country brand is what countries promote

to potential travelers to influence their travel decisions, as well as to counteract any negative travel destination information they may receive from outside sources. Countries that were successful would experience a rise in international tourism arrivals and receipts. Considering the literature had already established an individual correlation between political stability, infrastructure investment and nation branding with tourism demand, the expectation was that the newly operationalized independent variables and dependent variable would indicate a better causal relationship to explain how countries generate increases in tourism arrivals and receipts.

The findings of this paper were not entirely as expected. Political stability, one of the variables used to measure the level of public safety in each test country, was the only variable which produced a strong causal relationship with the dependent variable, tourism arrivals and receipts. Generally, over the different tourism periods for Haiti, whenever political instability was evident, tourism arrivals and, in most times, receipts declined significantly. Furthermore, when Haiti transitioned from a period of instability to moderate levels of political stability, the tourism arrivals and receipts increased to high levels. The exception to that finding was during Haiti's most recent tourism period (2011-2016), during which the government took steps to revitalize tourism with extensive infrastructure and nation branding public and public-private sector investments. In that time, crime (the other measure for public safety) was high, and the country was classified as unstable (at a percentile rank ranging from 17.54/100 in 2011 to 22.38/100 in 2016, according to the levels on political stability described under the World Governance Indicators (WGI) on "*Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism*" that was used to determine the level of security risk. However, over the 2011-2016 period, Haiti experienced an average increase of 13.9% in tourism arrivals that was over five times the annual average with a 2.7% increase for arrivals in the Caribbean region overall. During the 2011-2016 period, tourism receipts grew an average of 3% for Haiti, about less than 1% of the annual average for receipts in the Caribbean. This unexpected outcome indicated that there was likely an additive effect coming from the inclusion of the other independent two variables in the theoretical framework, which will be discussed further in the conclusion.

For this study's intervening variable, country image perception, the outcomes were mostly as expected. Country image perception for Haiti was directly impacted by information pertaining to the political stability level of the country. In nearly every instance, when Haiti was categorized as unstable, the rate of arrivals and receipts declined. When the country was at least at a moderate level of stability, Haiti experienced high levels of increase in arrival and receipts. In Haiti's case study, during the 1940-1980 and 1981-2010 periods, when country image perception was positive (Haiti was described by a 1976 New York Times article as "exotic and fascinating, possessed of a rich culture, a tempestuous past and a smiling, friendly populace"[24]), the country experienced high increases in arrivals and receipts (see Table 3.1). Predictably, when perception of the country was negative (according to the 1994 Baltimore Sun article "Haiti has been so messed up for so long, it can't even do tourism anymore"[25]), tourism was negatively impacted as tourism arrivals and receipts declined by -30% for the entire period (see Table 3.1 and Figure 4.3). However, in Haiti's most recent tourism period, the country image perception is still negative; a 2012 L.A. Times article was titled "*For troubled Haiti, tourism is a tough sell*"[26]). Despite this, the country experienced a high increase in arrivals (see Table 3.1), and tourism receipts were just slightly under the regional average. As country image perception, from the demand side (i.e. potential travelers), is influenced by travel destination information sources, the results for Haiti indicated that it was possible that information was coming from the supply side (i.e. the potential travel destination) that could explain the difference in Haiti's case. The outcome revealed that there was

an impact from the independent variables that seemed to bypass the normal effects of the intervening variable, country image perception, on the level of arrivals and receipts.

There were periods where a correlated relationship was predictably evident between individual independent variables and the dependent variable, tourism arrivals and receipts. However, for the public safety independent variable, findings indicate that crime rate levels did not appear to impact tourism arrivals and receipts as expected. As a security measure, no apparent causal relationship with tourism arrivals and receipts could be determined in the case study analyses for Haiti. It appeared that there were times that high levels of crime were correlated with low levels of tourism arrivals and receipts. Alternatively, there were times when crime was at low levels in a period while increases in tourism arrivals and receipts were high. Yet, after evaluating Haiti's tourism periods, crime proved not to be a causal factor. High percentages of arrivals and receipts were still generated during periods when crime was high in Haiti (see Table 3.1.).

To explore this puzzle further, this study examined the individual impact of the remaining two variables in the theoretical equation and their impact on tourism arrivals and receipts in Haiti. There were varied levels of public spending, public-private partnerships and private sector investments in infrastructure throughout each period of their tourism sector development. Despite the different levels of investment, they did not create any apparent variations on the dependent variable in each period. In one period (1981-2010), there was a general correlation between infrastructure investment and tourism arrivals and receipts. During that period, low levels of public spending, public-private partnerships and private sector investments in infrastructure corresponded to low levels of tourism arrivals and receipts. That relationship was not as clear in the previous period (1940-1980), though, where similarly low levels in public and public-private partnerships still generated a high increase over time in arrivals between years where growth rate figures were available: 24% in 1950, followed by 41% in 1956, and 6% in 1960 (see Figure 4.1). Tourism receipts for 1960 indicated a 14% increase over time from 1950 figures. Furthermore, despite public and public-private private sector investment in infrastructure being at moderate levels during this period (1940-1980), tourism arrivals declined in 1963 and dropped to -24% for tourism arrivals and -53% for tourism receipts from previously recorded figures (see Figure 4.2). This meant that changes in the level of another independent variable was likely creating that variance.

Figure 4.1 – Tourism Arrivals in Haiti (1940-1980)

Table 4.2 - Tourism Receipts in Haiti (1940-1980)



Table 4.3 - Tourism Arrivals in Haiti (1980-2010)



For the nation branding independent variable, the impact of public tourism promotion and public-private tourism promotion in terms of generating tourism arrivals and receipts varied across time periods in Haiti. Between 1940 and 1980, public tourism promotion was low; however, public-private tourism promotion was at a moderate level. Despite the low level of public tourism promotion, it appeared that a moderate level of public-private tourism promotion was sufficient to produce high levels of tourism arrivals and receipts (see Table 3.1). During the next period (1981-2010), when public and public-private tourism promotions were both at low levels, tourism arrivals were at low levels as expected. In Haiti's final tourism period, public tourism promotion was low while public-private tourism promotion was high, and this resulted in a high level of tourism arrivals while tourism receipts were at low levels (see Table 3.1). Therefore, some level

of nation branding is strongly correlated with tourism arrivals and receipts. However, a causal relationship between nation branding and tourism arrivals and receipts is not as evident as it is with political stability.

The results of the intervening variable, country image perception, helped clarify the nature of the relationships between the independent variables of this paper. In terms of interaction between the independent variables in Haiti, it was observed that when the country experienced political instability and a low level of public safety (where crime and instability simultaneously existed as in Haiti's case), high levels of infrastructure investment and nation branding (only high levels of public-private tourism promotion for Haiti) appeared to offset the perception of the security threats. This is where the previously discussed outcomes, for country image perception, indicated that certain variables were interacting to offset any negative information being provided to outbound potential travelers (which often deterred their decision to travel). Despite the potential threat that a high crime level and political instability in Haiti could pose, tourists still chose to visit Haiti during 2011-2016. However, it was unclear whether the overcompensation was based on a combination of high levels of infrastructure investment and nation branding, or if high rates of one variable were creating the overcompensation. It was not determined if the high level of nation branding (or a high level of one component of it), as the promotional component this paper's theory, was sufficient to offset the perception of security risk for travelers.

In Haiti, the public spending measure of the nation branding independent variable, remained at low levels across all time periods; however, moderate levels of the public-private component of the nation branding seemed sufficient to help counteract the negative country image impact that political instability caused during the 1940-1980 period. After the political instability period passes, the country image perception intervening variable becomes positive. This indicates that a moderate level of investment in public-private tourism promotion in Haiti can be sufficient to impact perception. In comparing the interactions between the variables in both cases, the country image perception only changed from negative to positive when political stability was moderate and nation branding investment was at least moderate in one of its variables (public-private promotion in Haiti's case). The sustainability of this additive relationship indicates the following: 1) with high levels of nation branding and infrastructure investment, and moderate political stability, governments can create a favorable country brand; 2) the country brand is strong enough to project a positive country image that generates high levels of tourism arrivals and receipts - even when the crime rate is high.

While the hypothesis tests were not completely confirmed (the prediction was that all three independent variables would be high to generate a high increase tourism arrivals and receipts), the theoretical framework concerning the necessary, additive relationship between the independent variables, and their ability to influence country image perception by providing functional benefits (reduction of security risk via at least moderate stability and infrastructure) to generate tourism arrivals and receipts is confirmed. What this means is that government institutions can effectively manage the level of security risk by providing adequate infrastructure that insulates travelers from unsafe conditions created by crime and/or some level of political instability.

Future studies on tourism development or demand should conduct a comparative study among test countries with similar backgrounds of conflict like Haiti. Furthermore, in the comparative analysis, the number of independent variables may be expanded to compare the level of governance among the countries. Moreover, political stability should be treated independent of crime rates or solely as a determinant of security risk. In this study, because public safety was

being measure, only the WGI were used for political stability/absence of violence. An expansion of the independent variables in a comparative study may find that the level of governance is significant to explain why some countries in the region maintain a successful tourism sector while Haiti has struggled. Haiti has had eighteen governments in less than 30 years. The frequent change of governments makes it difficult to produce policies that require continuity, persistent investment, extensive planning, and financial accountability as tourism development does. In recent years, studies show that Haiti's level of governance has increased, even if the global community still classifies the country as "unstable" from the political instability/absence of violence perspective. Expanding the literature in the future would be helpful in seeing the variance levels of stability in Haiti and countries like it. The theoretical framework provided in this study allows for future scholarship to build upon the arguments to provide further explanations for how governments can effectively manage their country brand, tourism development and global perception to generate increases in tourism arrivals and receipts.

Future scholarship may also consider exploring alternate hypotheses *f*or why the Haitian government was not as successful in securing higher levels of foreign private investment for tourism as other countries in the region. In an interview with political scientist Dr. Henry "Chip" Carey, Haitian economist Gabriel Verret presents some compelling arguments concerning the level of foreign tourism investment in the Dominican Republic which was not experienced by Haiti especially after tourism declined in the early 1980s (Verret and Carey, 2020). Verret questions why two countries with similar backgrounds did not enjoy similar beneficial outcomes when it comes to the successful tourism development evident in the Dominican Republic versus Haiti. He further argues that the attitudes of the elites in the Dominican Republic were open to foreign capital investment in tourism to help advance the industry and, subsequently, create more economic growth for the country. By contrast, Verret noted the protectionist attitudes of local Haitian resort owners, which arose during close ties with the Duvalier era, may have persisted across subsequent regime changes to contribute to the Haitian government's hesitation to promote and secure higher levels of foreign capital investment when the need was most dire. Future studies may focus on researching the literature to obtain evidence of Haitian government policies to limit or restrict foreign capital investment in tourism development. Alternatively, absent government restrictive policies against foreign investment, the tourism literature on Haiti should be explored to evaluate the impact of local elite attitudes that may have informally influenced a lack of government capital investment promotion outside country borders.

Finally, the findings of this study produced a unique problem concerning the measurement of crime rates for public safety, the main independent variable of this paper, and its impact on tourism arrivals and receipts. This quandary serves as an opportunity for further studies to provide more concrete explanations for the variance concerning what creates the perception of a threat to safety in this paper's findings. While political stability is used as a common measure for security risks, the expectation was that including the crime rate as a variable for public safety would be an even more important indication of the level of security risk in each country.

In conclusion, this study highlighted the issue of underreported crime and the lack of national crime statistics system in many countries. The scarcity of reliability of crime data information explains why literature on tourism demand determinants tends to exclude it as a measurement for security. Political instability is widely reported by most country's media sources. Therefore, travel warnings or information about the volatile environment within a foreign destination is more accessible. To advance the literature in this area, there are several

variables that can be used to determine why crime is underreported and how it impacts travel safety when tourists are given misinformation about crime abroad. For destinations where crime is being or has been underreported, it will be important to look at corruption levels, governance, the strength of and reliability of the country's security institutions (such as their national police).

ENDNOTES

1. https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/cagr.asp.
2. Public safety definition—is my conceptual definition based on a combination of definitions from the tourism determinants literature defining safety and security. My conceptual definition is derived from this link: https://erl.ucc.edu.gh/jspui/bitstream/123456789/3157/1/GETRUDE%20POKU.pdf.
3. Crime rate definition—https://definitions.uslegal.com/c/crime-rate/ .
4. Political stability definition—Hurwitz, L. (1973). "Contemporary Approaches to Political Stability," *Comparative Politics* 5(3): 449-463.
5. Public spending on infrastructure: The conceptual definition comes from the Public Spending on Infrastructure guide available at the World Bank website: https://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/abs/10.1596/1813-9450-5905.
6. Private sector investment in infrastructure definition: The conceptual definition for private sector investment in infrastructure comes from the World Economic Forum Infrastructure Investment Participation Blueprint (Wyman, 2014); and Public Private Partnerships (PPP) definition: The conceptual definition for PPP comes from Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation report: http://www.cpppc.org/u/cms/ppp/201711/30162729estl.pdf.
7. Volcic, Z., & Andrejevic, M. (2011). "Nation branding in the era of commercial nationalism," *International Journal of Communication* 5: 21.
8. Public tourism promotion investment definition: —the conceptual definition is based on the World Trade and Tourism Council's definition on government collective spending: https://www.wttc.org/-/media/files/reports/economic-impact-research/regions-2017/world2017.pdf.
9. https://tcdata360.worldbank.org/indicators/govt.tat.spend?country=HTI&indicator=24661&countries=DOM&viz=line_chart&years=1995,2027
10. Public-private tourism promotion partnership definition— is my conceptual definition based on the World Travel and Tourism Council discussion on private sector's marketing role in conjunction with the public sector http://www.ontit.it/opencms/export/sites/default/ont/it/documenti/archivio/files/ONT_2003-08-13_00163.pdf.
11. Country image perception—the conceptual definition is developed following a combination of concepts from the country image literature (Nagashimu, 1970; Shields, 1991; Martin and Eroglu, 1993; and Haider et al., 1994).
12. Travel destination information (TDI)—the conceptual definition is developed through a combination of concepts from the following source: Marine-Roig, E. (2017). "Measuring Destination Image through Travel Reviews in Search Engines," *Sustainability* 9(8): 1425.
13. The names of each tourism period are loosely based on Hugues Séraphin's 2016 study on marketing to diaspora community, which categorized the level of tourism that existed during those times.
14. Tourism growth (in terms of absolute numbers over time)—no figures available prior to tourism starting in Haiti in 1945.

15. The ratings for each scale are reported except as footnoted as there may be deviations in terms of how data sources report their scaled statistics inconsistent with the scales used in this report.
16. OSAC (2012-2017) Reports on Haiti rated the crime level as "critical" in their scale whereas the scale of this study classifies it as "high" instead.
17. WGI indicators indicate levels of political stability for Haiti that would classify the country as "unstable". However, the indicator is based solely on measuring "absence of violence" as a security risk measurement; this indicator does not indicate the potential governance level which would provide a better measurement for stable government (such as governance and the effectiveness of its government institutions, rule of law and corruption levels.
18. Political Instability Task Force (PITF) *Consolidated Problem Set* version 2016, https://web.stanford.edu/group/ethnic/Random%20Narratives/Dominican%20RepublicRN1.2.pdf https://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/Dominican%20Republic%20and%20Haiti%20Study_1.pdf and https://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/Dominican%20Republic%20and%20Haiti%20Study_4.pdf?ver=2012-10-11-163239-190.
19. Report that Haiti is crime free: Country Report, 2001 and NY Times article (1976) https://www.nytimes.com/1976/11/21/archives/whats-doing-in-haiti.html.
20. Based on OSAC (2006-2018) Reports.
21. Based on OSAC (2006-2018) reports that classify crime rate levels as "critical" mainly based on the homicide rates and other violent crimes such as kidnappings, rapes, assaults, shootings and carjackings.
22. https://igarape.org.br/en/is-tourism-haitis-magic-bullet-an-empirical-treatment-of-haitis-tourism-potential/.
23. The country image perception references are listed in a separate page in the Works Cited section of this paper.
24. https://www.nytimes.com/1976/11/21/archives/whats-doing-in-haiti.html.
25. http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1994-10-09/news/1994282027_1_haiti-club-med-luisetti.
26. http://articles.latimes.com/2012/nov/22/business/la-fi-haiti-tourism-20121122.

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APPENDIX

Country Image Perception Data Sources (Haiti, 1940-present)

Haiti (1940- present)

1) 1940s-1950s

a. *Missing data*

2) 1960s

a. *Travel Guide*

i. Fodor's Travel Guide to Caribbean (1960) incl. 29 pgs. on Haiti (positive review)

3) 1970s

a. *Mass Media Reports*

i. Sports Illustrated - incl. report of tourism surge in Haiti (1973) https://www.si.com/vault/1973/05/21/618336/to-hell-with-paradise

ii. US/NY Times report incl. Haiti's art (1974)-https://www.nytimes.com/1974/09/08/archives/haitian-primitives-from-art-form-to-souvenirs-art.html

iii. US/NY Times report incl. safety (1976)- https://www.nytimes.com/1976/11/21/archives/whats-doing-in-haiti.html

iv. People Magazine report on Papa Doc instability/tourism impact (1977)- http://people.com/archive/papa-doc-terrorized-and-pillaged-haiti-now-his-son-aims-to-undo-the-damage-vol-8-no-20/

b. *Travel Guide*

i. Fodor's Travel Guide to Caribbean (1970)

4) 1980s

a. *Mass Media Reports*

i. NY Times report on impact of AIDs rumor on Haiti's tourism (1983)- https://www.nytimes.com/1983/11/29/world/for-haiti-s-tourism-the-stigma-of-aids-is-fatal.html

ii. UK AIDs report on Haiti (attributed to tourist going to Haiti vs originating there—confirms it's rumor vs real-2008 re 1982): http://www.progressio.org.uk/sites/default/files/HIV-AIDS-in-Haiti.pdf

iii. AIDs and Unrest Image cause tourism to drop (1984) https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1984/06/13/riots-follow-liberalization-in-haiti/0bab2e94-47e5-4f4a-a2f1-75d7ecd7da0e/?utm_term=.00c352c61418

iv. US/NYT Haiti attractive for business (1984) https://www.nytimes.com/1984/06/17/business/haiti-s-allure-for-us-business.html

v. NYT (1986) FDI industry hopeful post-Duvalier https://www.nytimes.com/1986/02/17/business/duvalier-flight-leaves-haiti-industry-hopeful.html

b. Travel Guide

i. Fodor's Travel Guide to Caribbean (1980)

5) 1990s

a. *Mass Media Reports*

i. Baltimore Sun article on Club Med Haiti's loss of tourists (1994) http://articles.

baltimoresun.com/1994-10-09/news/1994282027_1_haiti-club-med-luisetti

ii. NYT on Haitian tourism (1995)- https://www.nytimes.com/1995/03/12/travel/travel-advisory-correspondent-s-report-haiti-makes-effort-to-revive-tourism.html

6) 2000s

a. *Mass Media Reports*

i. 2001 country report on Haiti's non-existent tourism sector since 1990: http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/x9800e/x9800e10.htm

7) 2010s

a. *Mass Media Reports*

i. World Nomad Blog report on Haiti's safety, crime, and travel (2011 and 2018)

1. https://www.worldnomads.com/travel-safety/caribbean/haiti/haiti-safety-tips
2. https://www.worldnomads.com/travel-safety/caribbean/haiti/haiti-high-crime-and-chaos

ii. BBC article on Haiti's safety for travel (2013):

1. http://www.bbc.com/travel/story/20130110-is-haiti-safe-for-travellers

iii. Haiti Hub website (2013) Is Haiti Safe?:

1. https://haitihub.com/is-haiti-safe/

iv. Lonely Planet (2015)

1. https://www.lonelyplanet.com/haiti/travel-tips-and-articles/ten-things-to-know-about-visiting-haiti/40625c8c-8a11-5710-a052-1479d2762896

b. *Country Rankings*

i. Safe Around website (country danger ranking-2017)

1. https://safearound.com/americas/haiti/

ii. Social Progress Index (2017)-

1. *http://www.socialprogressindex.com/assets/downloads/scorecards/en/HTI-Scorecard.pdf*

c. Travel Reviews

i. Trip Advisor Reviews (2010-2018)

1. https://www.tripadvisor.com/ShowTopic-g147306-i747-k11014825-Haiti_Safe_in_2017-Haiti.html
2. https://www.tripadvisor.com/Tourism-g147306-Haiti-Vacations.html

a. *Mass Media Reports*

i. USA Today (2018): http://traveltips.usatoday.com/dangers-travel-haiti-102649.html

ii. UK Travel Advice on Haiti (2018): https://www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice/haiti

iii. New Zealand Safe Travel report (2018): https://www.safetravel.govt.nz/haiti

Leveraging the Power of the People

Isabelle Clérié

This paper is a detailed account of the three-year process undertaken between Haitian civil society and the United Nation's Office of the Human Rights Commissioner to determine if and how Haiti can address past crimes through transitional justice mechanisms and tools. The process found that Haiti's dysfunctional government and judicial sector made past crimes an unrealistic undertaking, however, community organizations within civil society are an overlooked and highly valuable conduit for reshaping narratives about the present by shedding light and insight on the truths of the past.

Keywords: transitional justice, truth-seeking, asset-based approaches, civil society, impunity

Introduction

In 2018, the Haitian government submitted a report, Rapport de l'État haïtien au CIDCP, to the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in response to the Council's 2014 report that presented a series of recommendations to the Haitian government (CIDCP 2018). The Council's initial report urged Haiti's government to resume the Duvalier legal case, to which the Haitian government very briefly listed a few steps taken in this case specifically and then stressed the need to "revitalize" the *Cour de Cassation*, Haiti's highest court. The Council went on to recommend that the Haitian government review and implement the recommendations of the Commission Nationalle de Vérité et Justice, the National Truth and Justice Commission, of 1995 which included its obligation to try any person accused of serious human rights violation. The Haitian government responded to this last point by appealing to national reconciliation, instead of justice for the victims of the Raboteau massacre:

> With regard to the recommendations of the Truth and Justice Commission, since they are linked to the Raboteau trial and that subsequently, victims and executioners coexist in harmony in a relatively lasting social peace, the Government has deemed it necessary not to stir the ashes of the past by resuming the trial (CIDCP 2018, para. 135).

This is demonstrative of the absolute lack of political will to pursue any form of justice or truth seeking on the part of the Haitian government. So, in light of this and the pervasive culture of impunity, within the Haitian state, what can realistically be done to face the past? In recent years, more attention is being given to the events leading up to our current state. What happened to allow our government to be so dysfunctional not only in criminal justice, which is part of a larger pattern in governance generally? In recent years, international agencies have allocated significant resources towards strengthening the rule of law. Inter-governmental organizations like the United Nations (UN) or international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), such as Lawyers Without Borders Canada, have partnered with public sector entities like the *L'Office du Protecteur du Citoyen* (OPC – Office of the Ombudsman) to bolster the Haitian state's capacity in criminal justice through training in international law, strategic litigation, advocacy, and more. The success of such programming is debatable, but it has increased discussion within Haitian civil society about citizen rights and participation. Most of such interventions to date have sought to effect institutional

reform of ministries and municipal leader capacity. But what about the people inside of these very systems? In one very memorable workshop, a young woman argued that "It is not enough to have a good president or a good judge but to have a system that allows us to develop good people."

When Jean-Claude Duvalier returned unhindered to Haiti in 2011, it spurred ire amidst victims and their families and confusion across generations that were under the impression that "things were better" with the Duvalier dictatorship. Since then, groups like the Collectif Contre l'Impunité and the Fondation Devoir de Mémoire Haïti (FDDMH) have led most of the awareness on the violence of the dictatorship. This eventually led to groups like the UN Office of the High Commission for Human Rights (OHCHR) to incorporate past crimes or transitional justice into their programming. The intention was to determine if there was a need to develop more programming around past crimes and impunity, and if so, what form this programming would take.

Transitional justice refers to the way that countries emerging from violent periods confront systematic human rights violations and abuses through judicial and non-judicial mechanisms. Judicial mechanisms pursue trials of perpetrators and formal redress for violations while non-judicial mechanisms stress the importance of recognition and collective healing. Since 2011 in Haiti, there has been an increase in discussions and programming around impunity that look at past crimes of the state. This chapter will present the challenges and opportunities for transitional justice in Haiti by focusing on two periods, namely that of the Duvalier dictatorship (1957-1986) and the military regime under Raoul Cedras (1991-1994) and will offer an overview of the considerations that can be applied for fostering collective memory and social appeasement to dismantle the abusive political systems that Haiti has been subject to since the early 20th century. Faced with an unstable and complicit system, what tools can be applied in Haiti to combat impunity? Is there value in fostering collective awareness rather than only pursuing formal justice? Who is responsible for bringing to light the truths of these violent periods?

Transitional Justice

The UN identifies four pillars of transitional justice: the pursuit of justice, the pursuit of truth, reparations, and the guarantee of non-repetition.[1] While all four are symbiotic in nature, the application of transitional justice mechanisms rarely allows for all of them to be fulfilled (Crocker, 2010). Most often, transitional justice initiatives will emphasize truth seeking to acknowledge and reveal the crimes committed, understand the enabling environments for the abusive systems, and divulge the impact of the crimes on victims and on the nation (economy, infrastructure, legal, etc.) (Hayner, 2003). The groups most involved in this work are human rights organizations whose mission is to support and, in cases of threats or ongoing violence, to represent victims and witnesses of human rights violations. Institutions such as the International Federation of Human Rights (FIDH) and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) at the UN are such institutions that, despite their clear mission, can't do much without the will of a state and the engagement of a civil society. These institutions have various expertise and can provide technical support on the tools and mechanisms of transitional justice, legal strategies to be pursued nationally and internationally, as well as raise awareness about violations and their consequences.

Formal transitional justice procedures, regardless of their aim, will inevitably require victim and witness testimonies for analysis. Merwe and Lykes argue that transitional justice attempts to balance social engineering mechanisms while navigating one-on-one engagements with traumatized victims (2018, pp. 381–85). They are emphasizing that the practice of transitional justice requires a systematic collection of information from traumatized people in order to devise a strategy to "reform" a country marred by violence and its cohorts. They alert us to the need for special considerations when engaging with traumatized persons, and for this we should acknowledge the value of local knowledge and resources in these interactions. This is precisely the role that civil society can play in such initiatives.

Local organizations are more likely to know victims in their communities and have one or two degrees of separation from many of these individuals. Facilitating access to these victims for transitional justice advocates and professionals is an essential need for a more equitable and effective outcome. What's more, civil society has a more enduring memory than ad hoc mechanisms and is better suited to not only contribute to information gathering but to house information that can be transferred within communities across generations. Such initiatives, which can take many forms including historical education (Cole, 2007), are important aspects to safeguard the guarantee of non-repetition. It is not enough to write new policies and laws. Citizens must not only know their history but also know the parameters of their capacity and their rights so that they can actively participate in dismantling abusive systems: "transitional justice efforts aimed simply at repairing the past without seeking to prevent future violence appear as an interminable exercise of rescuing victims while the cycles of conflict simply repeat themselves." (van der Merwe and Lykes, 2018, p. 381). So, if communities are not actively engaged in the processes of transitional justice, it will be as the Haitian proverb says, "*lave men, siye atè*" (wash your hands only to wipe them on the floor).

In order for transitional justice mechanisms to be implemented, there needs to be a political will to see it through. Ideally, the fundamental goal of transitional justice work is the pursuit of justice, and for this the first order of business is a truth commission, which can take many forms, as defined by its mandate, but its purpose is to collect evidence of crimes committed. The outcome of a commission, a final report, provides a foundation for judicial and non-judicial pursuits like reparations and reforms. In the case of Haiti, where the weaknesses of the judicial system are very pronounced, the path to justice is not evident. The independence of the judiciary is poorly secured and often subject to the intervention of the Executive, and judicial institutions, such as the police and the courts, do not have the capacity to investigate crimes of the past, especially since information such as physical evidence and archives are virtually non-existent. This reality demonstrates the gaps that can be filled, at least in part, by local organizations and associations that have significant access to victims and witnesses and who can more easily gather testimonies, a key step in the pursuit of justice.

Transitional Justice in Haiti

In the last sixty years, Haiti's defined periods for transitional justice considerations have focused on the 29-year successive Duvalier dictatorship between 1957 and 1986, and the 3-year military regime between 1991 and 1994. Between 1986 and 1991, the country had 5 transitions of power, two of which were by military coup led by Henry Namphy, who was allegedly responsible for a series of massacres and assassinations; most notorious is the July 23rd, 1987 massacre of the 139 *peyizan* of Jean Rabel in the Northwest department.[2] From 1994 to today, the country has had 5 presidents and 24 prime ministers. With every transition of prime ministers come new ministers in the 21 ministries of the country and each *chef,* or boss, comes with *moun pa*, their people. From a purely operational standpoint, the high turnover and pervasive nepotism inside of state

institutions drastically deteriorate the functionality of these offices and encourages corruption. More importantly, however, people with ties and associations with previous corrupt and abusive "administrations" are always in or within arm's reach of the government.

In the wake of the dictatorship, several victims' groups mobilized to pursue justice proceedings. Between 1986 and until Jean Claude Duvalier's death in Haiti in 2014, several attempts were made to see this case through.

The Duvalier Case[3]

- April 28, 1986 - The first investigation into the regime's financial crimes is completed but not publicly released. The investigation involves Jean-Claude Duvalier, Michelle Bennet Duvalier, and several other people for embezzlement (Freeman & St Fleur, 2000).
- June 9, 1999 - A further instruction listing the allegations of the original 1986 instruction was sent to a new investigating judge, Pierre Josiard Agnant, who filed a complaint against several individuals, including Jean Claude Duvalier and Frantz Merceron, for corruption and against Michele Bennet as an accomplice of corruption.
- April 29, 2008 - Submission of information was taken, targeting Jean-Claude Duvalier and 17 "consorts." The indictment introduces legal proceedings against those named for crimes against humanity, financial crimes, and acts of corruption, forfeiture, embezzlement of officials, embezzlement, theft and criminal conspiracy.
- January 19, 2011 - Three days after Jean-Claude's return to Haiti, 29 victims filed complaints with the government commissioner against Jean-Claude and his associates. The prosecution drafts an indictment hoping that the investigating judge will finally investigate the crimes.
- November 3, 2011 - The investigating judge goes back on the previous decision to prosecute Jean Claude Duvalier et al., saying that, firstly, there was a procedural flaw, and second, that according to the code of criminal instruction the statute of limitations was for ten years from the day the crimes were committed.
- January 27, 2012 - Jean-Claude Duvalier is sent back to the court for the misappropriation of public funds. For the indictments on violent crimes, the investigating judge maintains that there was not enough evidence and that Haitian law does not recognize crimes against humanity. This blatant misapplication of law and disregard of international law is characteristic of Haitian courts. In rare but significant instances where a judge would even want to prosecute state officials for human rights violations, the Executive office maintains a chokehold on the Judiciary that halts such proceedings swiftly. Nevertheless, it is important to note that under the Martelly administration Jean-Claude was welcomed back. When asked about a trial, then President Martelly was quoted saying "[i]t is part of the past. We need to learn our lessons and move forward." (Booth, 2012).

Haiti's Truth and Justice Commission

When Aristide was re-installed to power in 1994, he ordered a truth commission to reveal the crimes of the military regime under Raoul Cedras.[4] The commission was given about 10 months to conduct their investigation and though they were empowered to access national archives by presidential mandate, they were unable to consult official records, largely because the United Sates had seized the military's archives comprised of some 60,000 pages. The commissioners proceeded by collecting victim and witness testimonies that culminated in a final report detailing

about 19,000 instances of violations to approximately 9,000 people. In the report, the commission explains that they relied heavily on morgue records mostly for quantitative data as hundreds of people had gone through the morgue but were never identified and buried in mass graves. Additionally, they discussed the reticence of victims and the underreporting of specific violations, like rape, making it so that the number of violations reported was likely only one third of the real number.

In its mandate, the commission was to produce a final report that would be made public. In 1996, when the commission's mandate ended, the government was transitioning from Aristide to Preval. Seventy-five copies of the final report were printed, and its findings were subsequently neglected. Today, it is yet unclear who has a physical copy of the original report with its original four annexes including a list of victims, the actual mandate, statistical data, and lastly, the fourth annex reported to list the names of perpetrators.

Given the state's responsibility and role in not disseminating and applying the report's findings, the report was considered disappeared. During my research in 2017, I found a copy of the report and the first three annexes in the digital library of the University of Kansas. Upon further investigation, I found a very short reference to a diaspora publication *Haïti Progrès* that was reported to have found and published the contents of the fourth annex.[5] This publication has its physical archives in Port-au-Prince, which was largely destroyed in the 2010 earthquake.

Luckily, the issue in question survived, and I was able to track it down and discreetly photograph it with a phone camera. The report and the photos of the fourth annex are currently online on FDDMH's website (Devoir de Mémoire Haiti, 1995). They were also loaded onto USB drives and shared during a 2018 workshop with 30 local human rights organizations from across the country, most of whom had never heard of the report and its contents.

On April 22, 1994, members the Forces Armés d'Haïti (FAd'H) and their paramilitary group the Front pour l'Avancement et le Progrès d'Haïti (FRAPH) attacked the town of Raboteau in the Artibonite to suppress a resistance movement that had taken root in the town. People were shot in the streets, houses were ransacked and burned, and many were injured. Once the regime was overthrown, the victims of the attack were able to make formal complaints, and in the year 2000, after five years of preliminary proceedings, a six-week trial was held. The court sentenced 18 people who were already in prison, including 12 life sentences and 37 people were sentenced in absentia, including high-ranking military and paramilitary forces.[6] The trial was a historic event that was announced as a new start for a country with a notoriously inefficient legal system but it was an encouraging step towards realizing respect for human rights and the fight against impunity in Haiti (Grann, 2001). However, in 2005, decisions were overturned and quashed under pretexts and accusations of court incompetence, and all detainees were released (Amnesty International, 2005). Among those tried and sentenced was Jean Robert Guerrier, who can be found today serving as a colonel in the reinstated FADH.[7]

Crimes of the Past and Impunity Programs

In 2017, the OHCHR in partnership with FIDH and the European Union (EU) hosted the first conference on transitional justice in Haiti. The conference welcomed about 100 members of civil society from most of the departments in the country, and the list of panelists featured experts on truth commissions from Peru, Chile, Argentina, Guatemala and Tunisia. All of the presentations of the international experts stressed the importance of civil society's leadership and participation in truth seeking (EU / OHCHR / MINUSTAH, 2017). To date, attempts to address past crimes in

Haiti have focused on judicial proceedings and prosecutions of perpetrators. Over the course of three years of attending various human rights events, including the two conferences/workshops hosted by OHCRH on transitional justice specifically, and multiple formal and informal discussions with civil society actors, victims, and intellectuals, five key challenges to addressing past crimes were revealed (EU / OHCHR / MINUSTAH, 2017).

1. Lack of confidence in the justice system
2. Lack of political will
3. Inefficient reporting mechanisms within the human rights sector
4. An unsustainable application of the power of civil society
5. A lack of resources and knowledge within the human rights sector

The first two challenges are known to all and are a broken record in Haiti's history. Justice is arbitrary and highly manipulated by either executive powers or by those willing to pay for it. Haitians, particularly those living in rural areas, have no concept of formal justice and are inherently wary of it. And finally, the lack of political will is blatant and most aptly demonstrated by the participation of known perpetrators and accomplices to human rights violations in the government or their marked influence from the private sector and even abroad. The last three challenges are a bit more nuanced and will be analyzed individually.

Inefficient reporting mechanisms within the human rights sector

In several discussions during events and meetings, the treatment of human rights data frequently came up. Generally, the top human rights organizations have national networks that collect data for reporting. Once drafted, the reports are published on their respective sites or pages, and they release a public statement on the incident in question that is diffused across social media and often read or mentioned on the radio. These organizations house an inestimable wealth of information on human rights violations that could provide strong evidentiary support for analyses, reforms and legal proceedings.

Nevertheless, there is a pervasive competitive tendency within the sector whereby each of these organizations produces separate reports and houses separate archives. The resources – human, time, and financial – needed to produce these reports are substantial, and the organizations themselves are already woefully under-resourced and overwhelmed. The unfortunate reality here is that a lot of human rights organizations are politicized, and this creates a very volatile and counterproductive environment where they compete not only for resources but also for visibility so that there are the "usual suspects" who are on all of the international bodies' call lists for experts and funding.

An unsustainable application of the power of civil society

Generally, as mentioned above, transitional justice initiatives start with truth seeking, and civil society is a key driver of these efforts. Argentina is considered one of the most successful examples of the application of non-judicial mechanisms and the important role that civil society can play. Indeed, immediately following the removal of the Bignone regime, a truth commission was launched but only awarded nine months to conduct their investigation. Given the short period of time and the pervasive fear among the population such a short time after the traumatic period, the commission only reported about 8,000 disappeared persons. But, afterwards, through the efforts of civil society organizations over several years, it was revealed that an estimated 30,000 people disappeared between 1976-1983.

In Haiti, the recent #PetroChallenge campaign, which demanded accountability for the embezzlement of over two billion dollars by government officials and their consorts, was an instance of the power of civil society to "make noise." The hashtag went viral on social media networks, and there were graffiti messages posted all over Port-au-Prince, including black banners demanding "Where is the Petrocaribe money?" But this campaign soon lost its way as the instigators of the purported movement did not harness the momentum into a targeted strategy. Today there are self-proclaimed "PetroChallengers" but it's not clear if they are a platform or if they have any materials or objectives to pursue, and today there is a sense that people are "over it" as they do not believe anything will be done to the guilty parties who are seen driving their expensive cars or living the life in the US.

Haiti's civil society does not lack the passion nor the competencies to fight for human rights. What it lacks is the capacity to persist.

A lack of resources and knowledge within the human rights sector

The principles and mechanisms of transitional justice, including international procedures pertaining to past crimes, are little known in Haitian civil society, and the players interested in its application are few. As stated above, human rights organizations simply do not have the resources to invest in past crimes. The overwhelming challenges of the present day and the meager financial resources at their disposal do very little to allow anyone to carve out the time to look at the past. Nevertheless, organizations acknowledge the importance of truth seeking as a driver for social change and eventually for justice.

UNDP / OHCHR

In September 2017, OHCHR and the European Union sponsored a three-day conference titled "Lutte contre l'Impunité des Crimes du Passé et Justice Transitionnelle" (Fight against impunity of past crimes and transitional justice). The conference featured presentations from civil society representatives from Peru, Chile, Argentina, Guatemala and Tunisia on their respective efforts to memorialize and achieve justice in the wake of their respective dictatorships and violent periods. Participants were from a national network of human rights defenders, individuals and organizations, including victims and victims' groups. The conference was the first to be held in Haiti with an emphasis on transitional justice and past crimes. One of the panelists was the former independent expert to Haiti, Gustavo Gallon, who had cited addressing past crimes as one of the five key priorities for Haiti (UN Human Rights Council, 2015). In the final version of the report of this conference, published two years later, the recommendations were broken down into three sections for civil society, the state, and the international community.

For civil society, the recommendations were centered around the acquisition of information or truth. This includes working with victims and witnesses of violations, demanding access to henceforth inaccessible public documents and archives, conducting a stakeholder analysis to see who should and could be involved in this work, and lastly to map violations across the country. The final recommendation was in response to participants bemoaning the lack of follow up after conferences and workshops. So it was recommended that participants themselves ensure the follow up. For the Haitian government, the recommendations focused on the state's responsibility to address crimes committed through reparations and reforms. Specifically, it was recommended that "presumed perpetrators" be dismissed and/or isolated from public posts.

Lastly, for the international community, the original version of the report stated that civil society also pointed to the complicity and participation of the international community by supporting perpetrators both during and after their crimes (i.e. hosting them in their respective countries). This recommendation did not make it to the final version of the report, and the recommendations to the international community instead highlighted the need for these agencies to help build the capacity of local organizations and, more importantly, to diversify their local networks to reduce the monopolistic practices of the human rights sector. As part of their efforts to ensure the follow up to the conference, OHCHR and the EU sponsored a workshop one year later that was focused on the mechanisms of transitional justice and their potential application and relevance in the Haitian context. The workshop was done in partnership with the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) and was conducted in a very participative manner that allowed for free form questions and open discussions over the course of the three days. There was a presentation on Haiti's truth commission, at which point it became evident that only one person out of the thirty participants knew that the report existed. At the end of the workshop, each participant was given a USB drive with resources on transitional justice mechanisms from ICTJ in French, UN reports on Haiti, and finally, the entire report of the 1995 truth and justice commission, including all four of its annexes.

On the last day of the workshop, the participants were asked what they wanted to see happen with the information they now had. There was a unanimous assent that something had to be done with the commission report, and a committee was named, made up entirely of volunteers representing nine organizations from seven departments, to assume a follow up for the workshop and share the report across their networks. After three meetings, the committee decided there was a need to develop a long-term vision and became the Comité National pour la Justice Transitionelle (CNJT). The CNJT's objective is to promote and coordinate efforts pertaining to past crimes. Since its inception, members of the CNJT have held three conferences, two on the truth commission alone, and one on impunity and past crimes. Members have actively participated in regular communication and reporting of meetings, as well as in the most recent initiative to design a national strategy for transitional justice.

Designing a transitional justice strategy

Over the course of three years of research, meetings and discussions with human rights organizations, activists, victims and their families, international agencies and other experts, a few observations have stood out as being most apropos for the Haitian context. First and foremost is that truth seeking is the foundation on which justice can be sought. A truth commission has been discussed as an opportunity, but truth commissions are mandated by the state, and we have established that there is very little political will to do such a thing. So, what makes sense for Haiti? Much like the example of Argentina, there is a very significant role for human rights and other civil society organizations to play in the pursuit of truth, namely the collection of testimonies, a stakeholder analysis, as well as concerted mapping of violations.

The purpose of truth is not simply to collect evidence for judicial proceedings, but to "render irrefutable the facts" (Hayner, 2003) and "reduce the number of lies being told by the state" (Chapman & Ball, 2001). Revealing the facts of violent periods can also reveal the modus operandi of an abusive system, thereby allowing for the denunciation of a system and all of its participants; as was the case with the Guatemalan truth commission, which revealed the racist and discriminatory practices of the war towards indigenous Mayans allowing for public discourse to effectively isolate known associates of that system.

Civil society also has a key role to play in revealing the enabling environments and conditions that continuously allow for abusive and extortive governments to rise and denounce not just the practices, but the perpetrators involved be they individuals, local state or private institutions even international institutions and foreign governments. In the 2018 workshop, during a discussion on the accessibility of judicial mechanisms on the first day, one participant said "notre système est vendu" (our system is sold) (EU / OHCHR / ICTJ, 2018). This powerful comment was posted on a board for all of the participants to see for the entire three days of the workshop and the discussion kept coming back to the idea that for a legal process to go through and reach a conclusion, someone has to be willing to pay for the outcome.

If one reads through the recommendations of human rights reports written about Haiti, there is a noticeable emphasis on the state's responsibility and on reforms. This is understandable given that adherence to human rights is first and foremost the responsibility of a state, but in Haiti, as we have seen, the state is not overly concerned with upholding the law. As such, the methodology applied was rooted in strength-based frameworks and communication that prioritized assessing the strengths of Haitian civil society, particularly human rights organizations, rather than focusing on weaknesses and needs. The overall approach was anthropological in nature and as such, it emphasized context-based considerations and participant observations to determine what could be done based on participants' own reflections.

Challenges

One of the key observations made throughout this process was that people systematically underestimated their own capacity so that discussions were usually a barrage of grievances and misgivings about the way that things really are in Haiti. Despite this collective anger and frustration that things are not as they should be, they did not often see their own potential to participate in the making and upholding of the way things should be. In the first two days of the 2017 conference, participants persistently argued that justice was the only recourse but that it was unfathomable given the weaknesses and the corruption of the system. Following the testimonies of the various experts who themselves represented civil society organizations, participants began to consider non-judicial mechanisms. The testimonies of the experts from Peru, Argentina and Guatemala, where truth commissions emphasized truth seeking and where civil society took up the charge to lead to systemic changes within their countries, provided excellent examples of the power of civil society. On the third and last day of the conference, during breakout sessions, every single group presented priorities for truth seeking.

Similarly, at the 2018 workshop, the initial discussions largely centered around a list of issues and challenges, but when presented with the effects of acknowledgement and truth on a society they began to think differently. Most notably when they determined that a priority for them was to find out what happened to the 1995 truth and justice commission at which point 11 people volunteered to form a committee to study the document and share it throughout their networks. The committee has since become the Comité National pour la Justice Transitionnelle and has taken ownership of the strategy.[8] Moreover, two members of the CNJT in Saint Marc and Fort Liberté requested to host workshops in their own communities to present the truth commission. With the support of UNDP and FDDMH, they received funding, and each held their workshops in July 2019. The partners in Fort Liberté also hosted an event for the 71st anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on December 10th to present the mechanisms of transitional justice as well as share the strategy with representatives of 13 communes of the Northeast department.

Finally, the context-based approach allowed for the most appropriate consideration of the entire process: human rights organizations are overwhelmed by the day-to-day realities they face and are woefully under resourced. Participants very often shared stories from their work where they had to help people facing horrible abuses and the situations they often found themselves in during this work. During a discussion on the incompetence of the legal system, a judge stood up to say that it was not a fair assessment because he and several of his colleagues were very competent but that because of the constant interference by senators and presidents he would end up with clerks who were barely literate. Another lawyer talked about going to the courts to complete specific procedures and having to show the clerks what forms they needed. Others talked about trying to help people who are in prisons with absolutely no file on record for their arrest or any subsequent ruling for them to be imprisoned. Still others gave accounts of receiving victims' testimonies in instances of rape and repressive violence. All of this demonstrated the psychological tole it takes on them as advocates and citizens, so that sometimes there were moments of reflection where there was a sense that people knew they were fighting just to go down fighting.

In face of such realities, how could we charge them with looking to the past? Even after determining that truth seeking should be a priority, when tasked with listing action items organizations could not get passed a project centric approach where proposals would have to be written and budgets allocated, for which they were not very optimistic and reverted to complaining about being under resourced.

Justice

To date, most attempts to address past crimes have centered on judicial proceedings, and yet the strategy proposes no activities related to judicial mechanisms. One of the most common feedbacks received on the strategy was the absence of justice and the need for it. Its absence from the document is not intended to be a dismissal of its significance, but merely demonstrates civil society's choice. While participants vehemently called for justice, after several discussions, there was a consensus that in light of Haiti's current situation and political climate, and in light of the general population's perceptions of justice and the risks associated with it, it was more conducive to emphasize truth seeking.

Truth seeking was always seen as more attainable and more likely to yield immediate results, such as with commemorations and workshops where people leave with more information than when they arrived. Truth seeking sparks conversations and sharing of even more information, informally and otherwise. Since FDDMH started its commemorations and its mobile exhibit, people have reached out of their own accords to give their testimonies, share documents and photos, and request more information. More powerful than this are the accounts of people who share with FDDMH that through the commemoration they feel like they can finally openly mourn their lost ones and feel empowered to no longer whisper the name of their perpetrators. The strategy then is a concerted effort to find and share the truth so that justice is more attainable.

The Strategy

Using the context and strength-based approaches revealed the incredible capacity for mobilization within civil society, particularly outside of the capital, and highlighted social bonds and systems that could be conducive to a transitional justice approach. One of the biggest concerns of participants was their limited access to funding for their existing activities so it was difficult for them to justify adding to their workload. To address this, the strategy considered activities that could be integrated into existing activities and capitalize on mobilization efforts that were very low cost. The opportunities identified in the strategy are based on the comments and observations of participants which were formulated into action items around three broader themes: knowledge production and organization, advocacy, and awareness.

Through several discussions, participants were asked three guiding questions. What truth does Haiti need? What form of truth? And lastly, to what end? To the first question, participants listed the need to know the facts of the types of violations committed, the victims and the perpetrators, but they also emphasized the need to understand how these things happened. What were the enabling conditions that allowed for these abusive systems to be put into place? How did they maintain their power? What was their *modus operandi?* And finally, what are the legacies of these systems?

To address all of these questions, the strategy proposes a concerted data collection and inventory process in the form of archiving and mapping of violations. These two things can lead to any number of applied research initiatives such as understanding the economic impact of the dictatorship on the peasantry to design a reparations program. Similarly, a mapping process could serve as the basis for more targeted interventions throughout the country with respect to the historic struggles of communities, both geographical and demographic such as women and children. In understanding their role in such a process, organizations were shown that their social networks and their capacity to mobilize were invaluable resources through which victims and witnesses could be identified and approached in a minimally invasive and discrete manner, and through which information could be shared and absorbed more effectively as it would be diffused through locally trusted channels.

Lastly, despite the strength-based approach, there is a call for building knowledge bases with a series of targeted training programs. For instance, organizations wanted to have more technical workshops on truth seeking in their respective communities. Additionally, they wanted to know and understand international mechanisms and how to engage with them. This leads us to the advocacy component that largely centers around access to existing and restricted information such as the military's archives, and the use and application of this information such as reviewing and applying the recommendations of the 1995 truth and justice commission.

One key component of this section is pushing for more commemorations throughout the country. As stated above, participants had a hard time letting go of the project centric approach with proposals and budgets. One activity that many human rights organizations do is to make people aware of their rights. They often do this in schools and with other community associations; so they determined that they could pair these interventions with a mention of past crimes, preferably as it pertains to their community or department, or they could present a broad overview of the lasting negative impacts of various periods. Additionally, they could mobilize any and all spaces in their communities that have Haitian flags lowered at half-mast for specific occasions such as anniversaries of massacres or on April 26th, the national day of memory for victims of the dictatorship.[9] Such suggestions incited enthusiasm and concrete steps that could be realized in a relatively short amount of time for little to no money.

Finally, awareness is presented as a way to "make noise" and give more people access to the information they need to make noise, meaning broadcasting information as much as possible. Social networks are effective but do not reach the majority of the population, so radio shows were suggested as a more effective medium for sharing information. For example, FDDMH has a radio

show called "Vinn Koute" (Come Listen) on Radio Kiskeya that airs once a week and is circulated through 5 community radio stations; the episodes are also uploaded on their website. Diaspora members are frequent listeners of stations like Kiskeya and are also an important audience for the implementation of this strategy.

Players and partners

The CNJT was positioned as a key driver to the implementation of the strategy. The idea is that the committee would act as the coordinator for transitional justice in the country and assume the operational and administrative burden to spare organizations this added load. Local organizations were split into two networks: the community network that includes peasant associations (i.e. cooperatives) and OCBs, and the large network that includes the largest rights organizations in the country that have national scopes. The OPC was identified as a key player as such work falls within their mandate and is purportedly part of their programmatic objective. And finally, the international community was identified as a source for funding, technical assistance (trainings), and other advocacy initiatives.

Conclusion

The national strategy for transitional justice was finalized and launched on December 6th, 2019. The final document presents opportunities and a suggested outcomes table to help guide organizations in defining their priorities. The strategy is not a project proposal with a budget and timeline. The document is a framework from which initiatives and projects can be elaborated. More importantly, it demonstrates the willingness and strengths of Haiti's civil society to participate in a democratic process whereby citizens are able to know their history and participate actively in the shaping of their nation. The idea that Haiti needs everything is daunting and frequently acts as a deterrent for any investment or engagement. The exercise of developing this national strategy allowed for civil society organizations to realize that they, as individuals, have privileged access to their communities and as activists they can leverage this access to propagate truth and resources for truth, such as websites with historical documents and archives.

Since we started this work, organizations throughout the country have requested and sought technical trainings on transitional justice and its many avenues for change; several lawyers have received special training in transitional justice; and relevant language and terminology; for example, the terms memory and truth seeking are appearing more and more in public conversations. As stated above, the strategy is meant to act as a framework, a launch point from which citizens, activists, civil society, researchers, any and all, can reshape the narratives about our present by better understanding our unique past.

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Misguided Multilateralism? The Saga of UN Peacebuilding in Haiti

Henry F. Carey and Alla Manukyan

There have been various international actors with a long presence in Haiti, rendering heterogenous and complex effects that have not been systematically studied. This article analyzes the United Nations active involvement in Haiti since 1990, by focusing on the legacy of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), 2004-2017. This article explains MINUSTAH's limited effectiveness and discusses its consequences for Haiti in the context of the political, security, and humanitarian situation in the country after the mission ended, though the UN presence remained in the country alongside different international actors. Finally, MINUSTAH is reviewed in peacebuilding studies and is interpreted through the lenses of seven theoretical frameworks on peacebuilding.

***Keywords*:** Haiti, MINUSTAH, multilateralism, international intervention, peacebuilding, peacekeeping, security, human rights

Introduction

This article studies the consequences of multilateralism in Haiti with a focus on the influence of the United Nations (UN). It traces the UN's involvement in Haiti since 1990, with a close attention on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) during 2004-2017 and beyond. Of course, international involvement in Haiti has a much longer history, dating to the isolation of the second independent post-colony in the Americas by the United States (US), and the imposed reparations by France early in the Nineteenth Century.[1] A great variety of actors, including formal international organizations, have complex and heterogeneous effects. The UN is part of the context of multilateralism, which is wide and complex. It is compiled by actors with diverse interests and powers, norms, the international political economy, and an emerging instability of nascent multipolarism, as well as a most challenging political environment inside Haiti characterized by sultanistic rule, massive corruption, impunity, gangsterism, a flattened civil society, and widespread poverty.

Historically, the UN has been present in Haiti since 1949, starting with an integrated assistance program by the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), followed in 1954 by the United Nations Office of High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) helping to certify persecuted Haitians for refugee status in order to resettle.[2] Decades later, came various UN agencies and the United Nation Resident Coordinator (UNRC) which is the highest ranking representative of the United Nations development system (UNDS) at the country level. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) was active in giving interest-free loans. If you asked somebody in downtown Port-au-Prince in 1990 where the UN was, they would point you to the UNHCR and UNDP offices. This changed in 1990, which marked the start of UN active involvement in Haiti with almost continuous missions, certified every six to twelve months by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) or the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

Three types of missions can be conceptualized for the period since 1990; the first was from 1990-1991, which was a unidimensional peacekeeping mission which focused on elections and was divided between the UN and the Organization of American States (OAS). The second was the 1993-2000 multidimensional peacekeeping mission, which was divided between the OAS on elections, the UN on human rights, and the US via the Army Corps of Engineers infrastructure projects but was subsequently unified by the UN and OAS field staff. It was based on the UN's earlier El Salvador and Cambodia experiences, which combined human rights and election monitoring. The third was the 2004-2017 complex multidimensional peacekeeping mission MINUSTAH, which was established in response to the political instability in Haiti after regime collapse earlier that year. In the words of Sandra Honore, UN Special Representative (UNSR) and Head of MINUSTAH from 2013-2017, the UNSC decided that "[w]ith the presence of 18 UN aid programs already operating in the country, … a multidimensional integrated mission with a stabilization mandate was the most suitable model of peacekeeping to address the situation" (Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS, 2017). This third phase of UN peace operations is the largest by far and is at the center of the present analysis.

We locate MINUSTAH, as a part of a longer-term UN involvement in Haiti, in peacebuilding studies and interpret it through the lenses of seven theoretical frameworks on peacebuilding. There has been little academic work within the peacebuilding concept in Haiti as such. The existing studies of MINUSTAH mainly describe it in broad terms, usually highly critical of its performance and effects. Thus, there is a need for a more nuanced and focused study of MINUSTAH's impact and implications for Haiti; this task is at the hearth of this article's research question. MINUSTAH's effectiveness was limited in time and scope. It was essential to restore stability in Haiti, which proved unsustainable after the end of the mission. It reformed the Haitian National Police (HNP), which has been the primary provider of security in Haiti since the end of the UN mission. It was less effective in strengthening the rule of law and human rights systems. Haiti seems to be in a vicious circle; after 2004, political instability was overcome under the UN's watch. Haiti went through a period of stagnation in political, socioeconomic and human rights areas, and slid back into political turmoil in mid-2019, and since the July 2021 assassination of then president, Jovenel Moïse, the country has been in a political gridlock, left ineffective to deal with escalating and expanding violence and the resulting multifaceted humanitarian crisis.

The UN presence in Haiti continues into 2024, with most of the multidimensional peacebuilding activities intact, except for the presence of thousands of soldiers, which arguably were the most visible, harmful, and controversial aspect; they were also the least essential, given that Haiti had no army to supervise it for most of its tenure, and the UN police mission and rule of law mission addressed Haiti's primarily political-legal deficits. While the UN troops can be credited with deterring coups and regime changes, their departure was not accompanied with a police and justice system capable of managing the takeover of much of the country, especially Port-au-Prince, by organized crime gangs, the political elites, and parties with whom they collaborate. Elections, the main dimension of democracy, were conducted poorly in 2016 without the UN election monitoring system, declaring Jovenel Moise the winner of dubious first-round votes. This proved that Haitians remain as capable of rigging elections as the US, in coordination with the UN and OAS in its predecessor, Michel Martelly's 'selection' in the 2010-2011 vote, and the manipulated false majority that was declared for Rene Preval in the 2006 presidential election.

Multilateralism

Multilateralism is defined as the practice that "coordinates behavior among three or more states on the basis of generalized principles of conduct" (Ruggie, 1992, p. 574). Generalized principles of conduct entail indivisibility and generate diffuse reciprocity among the members of a collectivity.[3] Multilateral organizations (MOs) are distinguished from the institution of multilateralism (IM) (Caporaso, 1992, Martin, 1992). The meaning of multilateralism is not fixed, and it can be understood within the context of the evolving world order - the kind of members in multilateral relations, the kind of systems that connect those members, and the conditions of the world system (Cox, 1992). Contested multilateralism explains contemporary multilateralism, which is not essentially cooperative and characterized by integrated rules and arises when the members "either shift their focus from one existing institution to another or create an alternative multilateral institution to compete with existing ones" (Morse and Keohane, 2014, pp. 386-387). Consequences of multilateralism may vary depending on the present conditions. It may have democracy-enhancing effects in already well-established democracies (Keohane *et al*., 2009). Multilateralism may also have debilitating effects on democracy – "promote special interests, violate rights of minorities, diminish the quality of collective deliberation, or seriously degrade the ability of people to participate in governance without compensating democratic advantages" (Keohane *et al*., 2009, p. 27). Critics particularly point to the democratic deficit of international institutions due to their bureaucratic, diplomatic, and technocratic nature, their elite-driven agendas, and lack of democratic deliberation and direct popular accountability.

Multilateralism has been studied through different theoretical lenses (Cox, 1992). Realism and various critical theories share the view that international organizations (IOs) are nothing more than the great powers that comprise and fund them. The UN is not autonomous and is merely an agent of the power structure in the international system. Its programs can be insidious because this is a convenient way for great powers – the US in this case – to blame all the failures in Haiti on the UN when in fact the US is dictating and directing its actions.

The world systems approach, created by Immanuel Wallerstein and elaborated for Haiti by Alex Dupuy, is based on the premise that the international system divides the world into a center and periphery and argues that the periphery states are not allowed to develop and their national autonomy and policies do not matter. The economic structure of the international system matters the most, and global capitalism has been detrimental for Haiti. The UN is a part of this structure and is often utilized as a tool for the great powers, namely the permanent five (P5) members of the UNSC, which include China, France, Great Britain, Russia and the United States.

Liberalism, and to some extent constructivism, believe that ideals and norms are consequential as they elevate expectations and standards. Constructivists particularly emphasize ideas and identities. Change starts when people start enunciating discourses about human rights violations; something that did not happen in Haiti during the Duvalier family dictatorship, except towards the end of the Baby Doc period and to some extent along with the Catholic Church's transformation and the Social Doctrine. When in Port-au-Prince, the Pope said things had to change; this was partly because the Vatican itself was starting to talk about human rights in regards to how policies were changing around the world, particularly in the Southern Cone.

The UN and Peacebuilding

UN missions can be authorized by the UNSC, such as MINUSTAH and all Chapter VI and VII missions, and by the UNGA, such as the 1990-91 UN electoral mission in Haiti. The UN is

primarily an intergovernmental organization (IGO) that reflects the interests of the UNSC and the UNGA, though its decisions may often reflect big power preferences. UNSC decisions on Haiti usually reflect US preferences, as the rest of the P5 do not have geopolitical interests in Haiti.[4] As the world order becomes more multipolar, less coalescence over issues can be expected. There is also interests of UN bureaucracies, such as the UN Secretariat, which includes the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO). MINUSTAH, with its own bureaucracy was placed under the UNDPKO and was overseen in a decentralized way by different special envoys, who at times reported to the Secretary General, the UN's supra-national aspect, or the UNDPKO. The UN's intergovernmental decision- making would prevail during the beginning and the end of the mission, and super-national decision- making would prevail during the mission dominated by the UNDPKO. There is also interests of the UN national units, which report in their own separate chains of command and are not necessarily loyal to the UN strategy. Finally, UN international personnel deployed on different missions have their own career objectives and personal interests.

Three trends have changed the nature of peace operations in the 21st century. First, missions, budgets, and personnel of peace operations have been growing. Second, peace operations have been most often deployed in complex post-conflict environments, which led the UN to rethink its principle of the non-use of force except in self-defense. Third, in order to achieve more lasting solutions, peace operations have shifted from traditional peacekeeping to peacebuilding, tasked with building and strengthening institutions (Benner *et al*., 2011). Peacekeeping is defined as "the deployment of a neutral military-diplomatic mission to observe and potentially enforce the terms of an armistice agreement and/or a mandate handed down by the UN Security Council" (Benner *et al*., 2011, p. 5).

Peacebuilding is defined as "rebuilding the institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war … which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict" (UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali quoted in Benner *et al*., 2011, p. 5). Adopting Michael Doyle's concept, MINUSTAH falls under the category of complex multidimensional peacekeeping operations. The UN characterizes peacebuilding as operations that "facilitate the political process, protect civilians, assist in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants; support the organization of elections, protect and promote human rights and assist in restoring the rule of law" (United Nations Peacekeeping, undated[a]). The literature underscores the complexity of modern peace operations:

> "[t]he mandates of modern peace operations essentially fused peacekeeping and peacebuilding tasks in a way that also blurred the line between the responsibilities of DPKO and those of the roughly three dozen other Secretariat departments, funds, programs, and agencies that have come to engage in some aspect of civilian peacebuilding" (Benner *et al*., 2011, p. 5).

Studies of peace operations distinguish between relatively successful and failed cases. Case studies explain each country's conditions for and constraints upon peacebuilding and examine the quality of international responses (Cousens *et al*., 2001). Large-N analysis has shown that UN involvement in post-civil war environments does in fact increase the chance for peace (Doyle, 2006). The findings underscore the importance of development programs for lasting peace. Peacebuilding requires "the provision of temporary security, the building of new institutions capable of resolving future conflicts peaceably, and an economy capable of offering civilian employment to former soldiers and material progress to future citizens" (Doyle, 2006, p. 5).

Peacebuilding has been interpreted through seven interpretive frameworks: realism, liberalism, constructivism, cosmopolitanism, critical theories, locality, and policy analysis (Carey, 2021). For realism, strong coercive authority is essential for peace, and the top-down approach is the only way to achieve peace. International organizations are not autonomous and represent the self-interests of big powers. Unlike realism, liberalism distinguishes between democratic and non-democratic regimes, and believes that international cooperation is possible, international politics can be a positive-sum game, IOs can promote cooperation and peace, and ideas and norms are consequential. Like realism, liberalism adopts a top-down approach to peacebuilding, but focuses on democratic norms rather than state interests. Constructivism, which comes in different variations, emphasizes ideas and identities. Cosmopolitanism is an argument for implementing international law the way it was supposed to in that all human beings are members of a single community. Cosmopolitanism focuses on people's interests and redefines peace as being more than just the absence of violence. For critical theory, peacebuilding starts at the level of an individual. Locality focuses on the local context and culture as factors that need to shape peacebuilding. It criticizes approaches like liberalism that try to extend one (Western) model over all cases without contextualizing that model. Policy analysis is a micro-economic rational choice approach that conducts cost-benefit analysis and other linear programming and techniques to maximize the efficiency of the outcome. No one paradigm has a monopoly on truth and there are certain elements from all the paradigms that have an element of truth to them (Carey, 2021).

Peacebuilding in Haiti

Throughout the 1990s the UN was involved in Haiti to support democracy through different initiatives: monitoring elections, promoting human rights, imposing mandatory economic sanctions and arms embargo, authorizing the use of force, etc. However, the UN failed to make a lasting positive change in Haiti – "failed to stabilize the country and improve its standard of living" (Hawrylak and Malone, 2005, p. 33-39).

The first UN peacebuilding mission in Haiti was the 1990-1991 Organization for the Verification of Elections in Haiti (ONUVEH), which was authorized by the UNGA and focused on verifying elections. It was staffed, as the overlapping missions for the 1990 Nicaraguan elections (ONUVEN) and 1991 El Salvadoran elections (ONUSAL), by most of the same groups of international civil servants, such as Mario Gonzales and Maria Grossi. ONUVEH was supported by a contingency of mostly Venezuelan military officers, commissioned by then Venezuelan President, Carlos Andrés Pérez, who was active in the two Central American elections as part of his self-proclaimed mission to promote democratic regime changes. The Haitian army had violently disrupted and cancelled the 1987 elections, when the UN and OAS, and a few international NGOs besides the International Human Rights Law Group were present.[5] The Venezuelan officers ensured that the Haitian military protected the December 16th 1990 elections, which only had one important violent incident in Petionville after Aristide's final campaign rally on the Champs de Mars in downtown Port-au-Prince. The Venezuelan officers were crucial to crushing the failed coup attempt in early January 1991 by Roger Lafontant, a former Haitian army commander of legendary brutality.

The second round of elections, which was for most of Haiti's hyper-federalized system of elective offices, occurred without violence, but with less than a five percent voter turnout. The OAS, which was led by Pierre Coté of the Quebec election office, provided counterpart support to the UN's civilian mission headed by Gonzáles, who had been the second in command of the

two Central American missions, which were led by Iqbal Riza and supervised by the former US Attorney General Elliot Richardson while such supervision occurred in Haiti. The UN and OAS in all three elections conducted a "quick count," a relatively representative sample of the election results, which provided indicative results for the presidential vote, and prevented uncertainty in light of the number of days it would have taken to count the vote. In Haiti, Jean-Bertrand Aristide had a landslide victory with 67.5% vote based on the count of one-hundred voting precincts. 300,000 ballots, one-fifth of those cast in the first round, were lost with the voting tally sheets. The second round of elections were between the top two finishers for each available seat based on these incomplete vote counts. The UN and OAS maintained silence or did not discover this sad reality until nine months after the elections, when the fact was published and the Aristide presidency had already been overthrown in a coup (Carey, 1998). The UN and OAS were actively involved after the September 29-30, 1991 coup that overthrew President Aristide. Both organizations supported an embargo on Haiti to pressure the regime, but it benefited monetarily by monopolizing smuggling goods on inflated prices (Carey, 1991).

In February 1993, the International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH), a joint UN and OAS human rights monitoring mission, was established. It continued to evolve under a variety of different names throughout the 2000 elections. For the sake of simple explanation, they are all referred to as MICIVIH here.[6] From the beginning, the mission came across difficulties in implementing its mandate due to little cooperation from the Haitian military. There was intimidation of those who cooperated with the mission, and failure of the military high command to take action on the mission's complaints about human rights violations by the Haitian military and police. However, during its first phase between February and October 1993, the mission played an important role in keeping the international community aware of the human rights situation in Haiti, deterring the military from human rights violations to some extent by the mission's mere presence, visiting prisons and detainees and freeing some detainees, providing emergency medical assistance to human rights victims, and finding safe houses, food and clothing for those being persecuted by the military. While the mission's work encouraged the Haitians to exercise their freedoms more assertively, the Haitian military did not tolerate such popular activeness and intensified its repressions in the summer of 1993, followed by political assassinations in October 1993. Having anticipated such developments, UN experts emphasized the urgent need for finding a political solution (O'Neill, 1995).

After a peace pact was finally negotiated at Governors Island in July 1993, which would allow the end of the embargo, amnesty for violent human rights violators, and the reinstatement of Aristide, the UN approved a small peacekeeping mission. It was about the same size of a few dozen troops that had been present for ONUVEH, to monitor compliance with the Governors Island Agreement. However, on October 11th 1993, a week after the "Black Hawk Down" debacle in Somalia and intimidated by a few drunk protestors at the dock, President Bill Clinton aborted the disembarking of Canadian and US peacekeeping troops in Port-au-Prince (Carey, 2005a). Days later, the UN police monitors and the MICIVIH monitors left Haiti. Thus, the multilateral effort ended prematurely without achieving its goal to restore democratic rule in Haiti (Martin, 1994). MICIVIH had another short phase from January to July 1994, when the Haitian de facto government expelled the mission.

On 19 September 1994, the Multinational Force (MNF) was authorized by the UNSC Resolution 940 and led by the US, which deployed 20,000 troops in Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti. The coup regime resigned on October 10th 1994, and President Aristide returned to power on October 15th 1994 (and served his term till February 1996). At first, the mission provided no armed protection of Haitian civilians. It changed after the US media aired US soldiers observing the shooting of civilians by thugs and looting of medical supplies and food warehouses. But no arrests were made of those responsible, in the past or present, for political violence. Eventually, Army chief Raoul Cédras, Police chief Michel Francois, and CIA informant Emmanuel "Toto" Constant were all permitted to leave the country with their stolen money so long as they kept quiet about their connections to US intelligence (Carey, 2002a). In the end, the US invasion in 1994 was a reflection of US domestic politics, then-President Clinton's and his predecessor George H.W. Bush's soaring rhetoric and campaign promises in 1992 to restore democracy in Haiti and the Americas, following the OAS Santiago Declaration of 1991 to preserve democracy in the Americas (Carey 1997/1998a, 1997/1998b, 2001). MICIVIH's reporting on the human rights situation also played a significant role in that decision (O'Neill, 1995, p.125).

MICIVIH was re-established after Aristide's return (United Nations Archives, undated). MICIVIH oversaw the creation of the new Haitian National Police (HNP) in 1996 after Aristide abolished the armed forces in December 1995, a creature largely and initially of the 19-year US occupation of Haiti form 1915-1934. A variety of UN missions were commissioned by the UNSC, UNDPKO, and UNGA, which evolved directly or indirectly from the original 1993 MICIVIH human rights monitoring mission. The UNSC's decision in 1994 to authorize use of force to restore democracy in Haiti was unprecedented in the organization's history. The UN had declined to make a similar authorization earlier after the coup when it was officially requested by Aristide, having considered coups strictly a domestic matter posing no threat to international peace. The 1994 decision reflected the growing political salience of democratic governance in international relations (Dohono, 1996) and the international law doctrine of humanitarian intervention (Carey, 1998b). Though it can be argued that the 1994 intervention was tasked to implement the 1993 Governors Island Agreement (Cousens *et al*., 2001), it is also argued that restoring democratic rule "was asserted as the UN goal in and of itself" rather than as a "means to anchor fragile peace agreements" (Hawrylak and Malone, 2005, p. 34). Moreover, UN humanitarian interventions and especially the "fusion of geopolitics and U.N. peacekeeping" are argued to be doomed to failure, unlike UN security missions in response to clear acts of aggression (Falk, 1995). Arguably, the US national security interest, traditional or redefined, was not at stake either. First, a non-democratic Haiti was a threat to US national security interests given that the US had tolerated and supported non-democratic regimes in Haiti (and elsewhere) in the past. Second, the US could control or absorb the Haitian refugees, which partly were a result of the imposed economic sanctions on Haiti (Donoho, 1996; Beardslee, 1996).

MINUSTAH

During Aristide's second term from 2001 to 2004, with the UN and the OAS gone, and under the pressures of economic sanctions, foreign aid was withheld, and amid growing domestic opposition, Haiti descended into political instability and resurgence of armed gangs. Aristide had won a second term in the November 2000 presidential elections boycotted by the opposition after controversial legislative and local elections in May of that year. The UN had worked closely with rebel leaders like Guy Philippe. In retrospect, the UN could have mediated a truce or peace agreement with his forces, who went on to take over all of Haiti's police stations and had planned to attack the capitol Port-au-Prince, when Aristide left Haiti after the US decided to

remove his personal security detail and offer him a safe departure. However, instead of the UN negotiating, the US advised the rebels through an employee of the International Republican Institute. Under pressure, Aristide resigned in February 2004 and was exiled from Haiti (Carey, 2004, 2005b). Haiti collapsed into "a profound state of instability, characterized by political and economic turmoil, as well as rampant violence perpetrated by armed groups said to have varying linkages to the country's political spectrum" (Sandra Honore at CSIS, 2017).

In April 2004, the UNSC Resolution 1542 authorized the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti or Mission des Nation Unies pour la Stabilisation en Haiti (MINUSTAH). Technically, a transitional administration with a different name managed the two-year period following Aristide's overthrow. It was formally established in 2006 in order to hold elections to replace the transitional government. MINUSTAH maintained its name as the umbrella for all its names during 2006-2017, but also included the following: two UN police missions – CIVPOL and UNPOL, the armed forces mission (UNMIL), [7] and any number of coordinated activities with other UN agencies and other governments and NGOs that were involved with the earthquake, elections, refugees (UNHCR) migrants (IOM), economic policy (UNDP), children (UNICEF), Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council (Independent Expert on Haiti), and UN human rights treaty bodies (e.g., CCPR).

In April 2017, the UNSC unanimously 'decided' that the 2,370 soldiers serving in MINUSTAH had to be gradually withdrawn by 15 October 2017. A smaller peacekeeping mission, the UN Mission for Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH) took over with 1,275 members of the MINUSTAH police monitoring and advising unit (UNPOL), as well as correction officers and international civilians. Two of three Indian military units with about 300 troops, which had served in MINUSTAH, remained in MINUJUSTH, however, its mandate ended on 15 October, 2019. MINUJUSTH had a more limited mandate; its main mission was to assist the Haitian government in strengthening the rule of law, monitoring human rights, and further developing the HNP. In October 2019, MINUJUSTH was replaced with a political mission, the UN Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) with an initial one-year period. However, as of 4 July, 2023, the UNSC extended the mandate of BINUH until 15 July 2024. BINUH's mission is to assist the Haitian government to advance stability, strengthen the rule of law and protect human rights. In many ways, its goals are unchanged from MINUSTAH's, even though the absence of tens of thousands of soldiers and military bases throughout the capitol and the country has changed both its perception and capabilities.

Unlike former UN missions in Haiti, MINUSTAH focused on addressing human security problems and had a much stronger uniformed personnel capacity. Comparatively, the UNSC resolutions that authorized its missions in Haiti in the 1990s did not focus on human rights and human security in Haiti, while those two issues were at the heart of the resolution that created MINUSTAH. The interventions in the 1990s presented a "model of how not to intervene in a fragile state" and they were terminated prematurely. Conversely, MINUSTAH had an "extremely robust and ambitious agenda" (Heine and Thompson, 2011, p.15). MINUSTAH was the first UN peacekeeping operation with a majority of its troops from Latin America. This exemplified the region's shift from a strong preference for the principle of nonintervention to a greater interest in participating in peace operations (Kenkel, 2013). Latin America's influence on the mission goes beyond the number of troops. In the words of Edmond Mulet, MINUSTAH's Head during 2006-2007 and 2010-2011:

> "[t]he emphasis that MINUSTAH has – more than in any other peace operation – on civil affairs, quick-impact projects, community violence reduction programs and, since the devastating earthquake of 2010, in recovery and reconstruction efforts is due to the influence that Latin American countries have exerted in legislative and budgetary bodies in the UN" (Kenkel, 2013, p. xvii).

Brazil provided the mission's military command, presenting a sharp contrast to its non-interventionist stance in the 1990s and specifically its opposition to the 1994 US-led intervention. Brazil's decision might have been guided by a pragmatic interest to expand its power within the UNSC and in relations with the Global South, by a moral obligation as an emerging power to take on greater responsibilities in maintaining the international order, or by the concept of "non-indifference" towards Haiti with which Brazil shares not only identity background but also several deeply-rooted societal problems. It has also been argued that MINUSTAH was a laboratory for Brazil to test its public policy of using military force to address urban violence. The Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti (IJDH) drew parallels between Brazilian forces' pacification of the slums in Port-au-Prince and the favelas of Rio de Janeiro (Gomes, 2006).

On January 12th 2010, Haiti was struck by a 7.0-magnitude earthquake. It killed over 316,000 people, injured 300,000, and displaced over 1 million people (Carey, 2010a, 2010b; Cecchine *et al*., 2013; estimates vary). The earthquake destroyed over 100,000 structures, including the presidential palace, the parliament building, and 14 of 16 government ministries. The MINUSTAH headquarters collapsed and 102 UN staff died, including 97 MINUSTAH personnel, the mission's head and his principal deputy – the greatest loss of life in a single event in UN peacekeeping history (Cecchine *et al*., 2013; United Nations Peacekeeping, undated[b]). The international community's response to the earthquake was "swift and generous" amidst general "donor fatigue" (Heine and Thompson, 2011, p. 3). The UNSC authorized to increase MINUSTAH's 9,000 uniformed personnel by 2,000 troops and 1,500 police officers (United Nations Peacekeeping, undated[b]). MINUSTAH continued to provide security and stability in post-earthquake Haiti. In coordination with the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), MINUSTAH established a joint operations and tasking center (JOTC), which served as a single point of contact for requests for military and police assistance. MINUSTAH worked in coordination with the joint task force (JTF-Haiti) established by the US military. To avoid confusion and duplication, the leadership agreed that MINUSTAH would provide security and that JTF-Haiti would provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (Cecchine *et al*., 2013).[8] More likely, the earthquake and other natural disasters prolonged MINUSTAH's stay in Haiti. In Edmond Mulet's words:

> "[w]ith the earthquake, everything has changed not only for Haiti and Haitians, but for us also – the UN and peacekeeping. So we have to be here for a longer time in order to help the government to stabilize the country and assist in the recuperation and reconstruction of the country" (MaximsNewsNetwork, 2010).

A reoccurring theme in the existing studies of international involvement in Haiti is the country's persistent problems in search of the most effective approach to tackle those problems. Haiti is said to have been caught in a conflict-poverty trap (Verner, 2007). One component of this trap is Haiti's demographic and socioeconomic factors, such as high population growth rate, poor economic performance, rapid rate of urbanization, high population turnover, especially in metropolitan areas, widespread poverty, high inequality, low human development, and high unemployment. The second component is the Haitian state's low institutional capacity to provide

public goods and manage social risks. Education, health, and infrastructure have suffered from insufficient investments due to the government's weak capacity to generate revenue, poor expenditure targeting, and frequent withdrawals or the redirection of international development assistance. The non-state sector, largely uncoordinated and unregulated, became a larger provider of health, education, and security. The rule of law and security institutions have been weakened by corruption and political interference. The third component, which needs to change first to break this trap is political. Haitian politics has suffered from "capture by privileged elites who harness government to protect their dominant position in society; and populism that neglects the country's long-term institutional and economic development while paying lip service to the poor" (Verner, 2007, p. 73). Given these domestic problems, many scholars have questioned the effectiveness of the UN's approach in Haiti.

MINUSTAH's greatest achievement in *relative* terms was restoring stability in Haiti. After MINUSTAH left, the achieved political stability collapsed. Organized crime gangs and ransom-for-profit rackets returned with a vengeance as soon as the troops left. Sandara Honore explains that the underlying social, political and economic drivers of instability in Haiti were not tackled, and such unresolved grievances triggered violent protests, and increase in crime and gang violence (CSIS, 2017). "The problem of public security was dealt with solely as a security problem, not as a political problem," said Carlos Alberto Dos Santos, MINUSTAH Force Commander during 2007-2009 (Guidi, 2009). Patrick Elie, a Haitian sociologist and former defense minister, predicted the unsustainability of the MINUSTAH-provided stability well before the mission ended:

> "[i]f we just accept the dictate of MINUSTAH or the US or Canada, we're going to hit a wall in about 5 or 10 years. … If you don't deal with the socioeconomic problems, and all you think about is how many more policemen you're going to have, or if you are going to have an army that can go down in the shantytowns with tanks—… you're going nowhere very fast" (Guidi, 2009).

Instead, Haiti needs a "holistic approach" to its security threats aimed at addressing the "root causes of fragility" (Heine and Thompson, 2011, pp. 19-20). Another criticism is that the UN could have put its resources to a better use in Haiti (Quigley, 2014). There was skepticism about the relevance of MINUSTAH to the daily lives of Haitians in predominantly peaceful rural areas where "the struggle of day-to-day survival in the face of severe poverty and serious food insecurity was greater than the largely urban issues of kidnappings, gang violence, and common crime" (Farmer, 2012, p. 315). The billions of dollars that MINUSTAH spent in a country with no civil war could have been used for "economic revolution" (Richardo Seitenfus, OAS Special Representative in Haiti during 2008-2011, in *Right Now I want to Scream,* 2020). MINUSTAH did not solve any structural problems - political, socioeconomic or legal. Because MINUSTAH did not oversee the economic and social programs, it is not fair to judge it by Haiti's failures in those realms. But MINUSTAH institutionalized Haiti's problems by supporting the stability of the regime that has not solved Haiti's socioeconomic problems and by supporting the parallel-NGO state in Haiti which lacks accountability.

Haiti: The Regime and Socioeconomic Factors

For most of its history, up through 1986, if not beyond, Haiti was a predatory state used for extortion. Without strong national security, Haiti was unable to deliver economic performance; the regime stability and survival relied on the use of paramilitaries during the Cold War. Strongly

hated, the paramilitary was later disbanded though its remnants continue to this day in decreasing numbers. Now Haiti is a patrimonial state or a competitive electoral regime where elections are not regularly held , and their integrity is questionable. Haiti has suffered from weak governance, high corruption, low socioeconomic development, and high inequality. The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project ranks Haiti very low on all of its six broad dimensions of governance: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption (Kaufmann and Kraay, 2023). Between 1996 and 2022, Haiti had the following trends; first, even with very low starting points in 1996, all six WGI indicators in Haiti further declined for the following several years, reaching the lowest point for the period in 2003-2004, except for the estimate of Government Effectiveness, which after hitting a low point in 2004 improved till 2008, remained relatively stable till 2013, and thereafter resumed its downfall reaching its lowest point for the period in 2022. All six WGI indicators for Haiti improved for several years starting 2003-2004, stabilized for several more years, and started to decline in deferent years during 2013-2019. Finally, despite some ups and downs throughout the period, five out of the six WGI indicators hit a lower mark in 2022 than in 1996, and one indicator, the Rule of Law, had equally low marks in 1996 and 2022.

Haiti is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere. Critics of international intervention emphasize that regionally it is the most impoverished country, its socioeconomic situation being the result of systematic and deliberate international policies pressured upon Haiti for centuries (Technology and Culture Forum, 2002). According to the World Development Indicators, Haiti's GDP per capita (constant 2015 US$) slightly improved from 1,279.5 in 2004 to 1,430.8 in 2018, then dropped for four consecutive years to 1,247.9 in 2022. Haitians heavily rely on remittances, which in 2022 made up about 22.4% of the country's GDP. As of 2021, Haiti had the lowest Human Development Index in the Latin America and the Caribbean region, and the third highest value for the Coefficient of Human Inequality in the world. According to the World Food Programme, over half of Haiti's population faced chronic food insecurity in 2023 – one of the highest levels in the world.

MINUSTAH: Analysis

MINUSTAH's primary mandate was "to ensure a secure and stable environment within which the constitutional and political process in Haiti can take place." Its broad mandate also included: assisting the transitional government in reforming the police; disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating armed groups; restoring and maintaining the rule of law; supporting the constitutional and political process; holding elections; promoting and protecting human rights.

The official mantra of the UN intervention in 2004 was to stabilize the country. But the case can be made that the UN intervened in the first place because the US had forced Aristide out or had facilitated his removal; one can call it a US-assisted Haitian coercion. The US role and motivations in Aristide's resignation is a contentious issue.[9] Critics of US foreign policy argued that the US viewed Aristide as a left-wing danger in the Caribbean and supported the anti-Aristide movement.

The US animosity to Aristide can be traced to the 1990 presidential elections when he won the race over the US administration's favored candidate Bazin, a former World Bank official and advocate of economic liberalization. International financial assistance to this very poor country was frozen to bring down his rule. Defenders of US policy in Haiti blamed the Aristide regime,

pointing to his unfulfilled promise to the Haitians as a revolutionary new leader. The US cut off direct aid to Haiti, while humanitarian assistance continued bypassing the government because the aid allegedly was not going to the people. Both critics and defenders agree that Aristide had disappointed the Haitians on a number of issues, but they argue whether the US wanted to help Aristide develop the country or they wanted to "break him." In any case, there was a broad-based domestic opposition to Aristide's rule. His ouster could have been a combination of local armed revolt and the US assistance used to push him out.[10]

MINUSTAH was comprised of a military and civilian component – troops, civilian police, international and local civilian personnel, and UN volunteers. MINUSTAH was one of the largest UN peacekeeping operations by the number of uniformed personnel and budget, both in absolute and per capita terms, ranking 3rd or the 4th among the UN then-current peacekeeping operations during most of the years of its operation. MINUSTAH was authorized to start with over 6,700 troops and 1,622 civilian police. Growing almost annually since its start, its capacity peaked in 2010-2011, when the number of troops was authorized to increase to 8,744 and civilian police to 3,240. That year, its budget reached $853,827,400, which was equivalent to about 50% of Haiti's annual government expenditures and 10.7% of the country's GDP (Johnston, 2011). The cumulative expenditure for MINUSTAH and MINUJUSTH from June 1, 2004 to June 20, 2020 was $7,768,638 (UN, 2021).[11] According to Sandra Honore's evaluation of MINUSTAH's work:

> "[a]midst the vast needs and challenges facing Haiti and many setbacks which Haiti has had over the past 13 years, …concrete and visible headway has been made. However, the results in respect of the multitude of tasks mandated to the mission have been mixed" (CSIS, 2017).

MINUSTAH can be credited for stabilizing the situation and restoring state authority in the country. Kenneth Merten, a former Ambassador to Haiti said, "MINUSTAH has done what it was established to do – create a measure of stability in Haiti …job well done" (CSIS, 2017). It combated organized crime, drastically cut the rates of homicide and kidnapping, and gained back the control of several neighborhoods from armed gangs. MINUSTAH can be credited for the HNP's growth in size, strength, and professionalism, as well as its de-politization, as sustainable as it may be. From 2004 to 2017, the HNP significantly grew, increasing the police to population ratio from 0.6 officers per 1000 people in 2004 to 1.3 in 2017. The HNP had about 14,000 officers in 2017, 9.5% of them female. As of 2020, the HNP grew further to include about 15,000 officers (CSIS, 2017; Congressional Research Service (CRS), 2020). MINUSTAH took down (remnants of) Duvalier's paramilitary structure, which reduced but did not eliminate selective assassinations. Recent administrations have not traversed the path of mass terror, which as effective as it is, can also be costly for the economy as well as the country's reputation. It can be argued that President Martelly's regime resorted to selective assassinations. However, MINUSTAH failed to establish the rudiments of a political system during the 2004-2006 transitional government.

The provisional electoral council marginalized Aristide's political movement, disqualifying all of its candidates initially in 2004 and then in the 2005 to 2006 elections. Since then, Haiti has not had a mass-based ideological party. MINUSTAH continued the practice of establishing a provisional electoral commission, instead of a permanent one required by the 1987 Constitution. Elections had to be reestablished with a new electoral law for each subsequent round of elections to the present day, along with a new set of commissioners, who are usually inexperienced in elections. The commissioners lack a permanent data base of registered voters or national citizens' list (both of which have been used in different elections) and are widely corrupt from bribes to include or exclude candidates, as well as procurement kickbacks, to petty theft of equipment. MINUSTAH, like previous peacebuilding missions in Haiti, turned a blind eye to these aberrations. Local, parliamentary, and three presidential elections were held during MINUSTAH's mandate.

The provisional government came to an end with the 2006 presidential election. Rene Preval got 49% of the vote in the first round. By excluding blank ballots, they increased his vote percentage to over 50% to avoid a second round. The election was supervised by the International Commission to Verify Elections. Serious electoral problems were reported, but the international community did not delegitimize the election. Beginning in 2006, the UN set up a system where they actually counted the regional balloting papers to avoid post-poll rigging in the counting stages. The next presidential elections were held in 2010-2011. During the first round in November 2010, former first lady Mirlande Manigat finished in first place; Preval's candidate Jules Celestine finished second, and singer Michel Martelly finished third. There was electoral fraud and irregularities by many candidates. The government dropped its candidate from the runoff ending a stalemate with the US, moving Martelly forward to run in and win the second round in April 2011. The US administration conditioned provision of over $1 billion in aid to Haiti on elections that it would find credible (NYTimes, 27 January, 2011). Then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton flew directly from Cairo during the Arab Spring, complained about the first round, and insisted on removing Celestin from the second round. President Martelly suspended all the scheduled elections for five years and appointed his own loyalists to the entire country's mayors, Communal Councils (CASECs) and the Communal Section Assemblies (ASECs). Following the former, the next presidential elections, together with parliamentary elections were scheduled for August/October 2015. The results of August's first round presidential election were annulled due to significant electoral fraud, and fresh presidential elections were held after mass protests and several cancellations in November 2016. Haitian authorities controlled the administration of the November 2016 elections, the first since 1990 that were not advised and monitored by the UN or OAS. In the absence of the UN's elaborate election verification system and with abuse of the powers of government, Martelly's handpicked candidate Jovenel Moise was announced the winner after the first round with a surprising 56% vote. Thus, MINUSTAH can be credited for no coups under its watch and for the survival of elected presidencies.

In support of rule of law and human rights systems, oversight institutions were established such as the General Inspectorate of the HNP and the Office of the National Human Rights Ombudsperson. The mission also supported legislative reform such as the draft Criminal Code, the draft Code of Criminal Procedure, and the draft Penitentiary Law. The mission supported the creation of the Superior Council of the Judiciary, the School of Magistrates, and the Juvenile Tribunal outside the capital. Therefore, when evaluating MINUSTAH's legacy, it is important to acknowledge the limitations of what UN missions may achieve given domestic constraints. Sandra Honore identified Haiti's political challenges as the main impediment to the consistent progress in policing, rule of law, human rights, investment and job creation. Laying out the role of MINUSTAH's successor missions, Honore remarked that "[u]ltimately, the success [of the UN missions] will reside in the hands and in the minds of the Haitians" (CSIS, 2017).

MINUSTAH's Controversial Legacy

MINUSTAH's legacy was marred, however, with several problems – the illegal killings of civilians, the cholera outbreak, and the sexual exploitation and abuse of Haitians. Moreover, the way the UN handled these problems affected the public's attitude toward them. The mere presence of the UN troops in Haiti in the absence of a civil war was controversial:

> "This is Haiti, this is the land of Juan Jacques Dessalines, this is a people that vowed never to be controlled and chained and slaved again, and here is a military force walking around in full battle regalia with hands on the trigger and who treat the people with great deal of contempt," said Mario Gousse of the Haitian Support Group (TRT, Oct 14, 2017).

Human Rights Violations

MINUSTAH was accused of systematic attacks resulting in deaths and injuries of civilians, unlawful detention, and enabling the police to engage in illegal killing of civilians and suppression of political dissent (Halling and Bookey, 2008, pp. 461-462). It has been criticized for disproportionate and indiscriminate use of force during its raids on armed gangs in densely populated slums, mainly Cité Soleil – Haiti's largest and poorest slum. Since the mid-1990s, Cité Soleil was under the effective control of armed gangs that conducted kidnappings for ransom and enacted in drug trafficking, as documented in a film called *Ghosts of Cite Soleil (2006)*. With a series of incursions in Cité Soleil between 2004 and 2007, MINUSTAH disbanded many of its gangs, reduced kidnapping, and reestablished state authority over the areas previously controlled by the armed gangs (Guidi, 2009). The targeted areas had concentrations of supporters of Aristide's Fanmi Lavalas party. Some critics argued that those raids were purposeful attacks against Lavalas party activists and Aristide supporters (Haiti Information Project, 2007).

Between 2005 and 2007, MINUSTAH conducted fifteen major raids in Cite Soleil. During Operation Iron First on July 6th 2005, it used 22,700 firearm cartridges, 78 grenades, 5 mortar shells (*It Stays with You, 2018*). The operation killed a gang leader and his associates but also innocent civilians. The death toll was estimated at 30, with 26 gunshot victims, including 20 women and at least one child which sought medical assistance. After another major raid in Cite Soleil on December 22nd 2006, MINUSTAH was criticized for its use of heavy artillery, such as shooting from helicopter gunships, and indiscriminate killing of civilians (Buncombe, 2006). It resulted in a death toll estimated as high as 70 people. The Red Cross was not immediately allowed into the area to assist the victims, which included wounded children. According to survivors' accounts, people lived in constant fear due to MINUSTAH's operations. It was not safe outdoors or indoors, as many were shot dead inside their homes. Houses were ruined after the bombings (*It Stays with you, 2018*). MINUSTAH claimed that they did not target civilians and took "all possible measures to reduce the risk of civilian casualties in their operations." However, they did not deny the possibility of collateral victims as "the nature of such missions in densely populated urban areas is such that there is always a risk of civilian casualties" (MINUSTAH, 2005).

Later, the UN admitted that innocent people may have been caught in the crossfire between MINUSTAH and gangsters (Buncombe, 2006). US Ambassador to Haiti, James Foley, stated "it is likely that rounds penetrated many buildings, striking unintended targets." Deputy Chief of Mission at the US Embassy in Haiti, Douglas Griffiths, stated that the allegations that MINUSTAH had killed 20 women and children were "credible" (*It Stays with You, 2018*). The

connection between MINUSTAH's heavy-handed military operations in Haiti's slums and the militarized approach to public security used by the Brazilian police in their favelas is well established (*Right Now I Want to Scream, 2020*). First, in both countries, entire poor neighbourhoods were criminalized and targeted due to a few gangs operating there. Second, Haiti served as a laboratory for the Brazilian troops training and testing their approach to public security. Several Brazilian generals continued their careers in the government after their deployments in Haiti.

Cholera Outbreak

Before the 2010 cholera outbreak, inadvertently introduced by UN peacekeeping troops, Haiti had never registered a case of cholera. The first case of cholera in Haiti was confirmed on October 22nd 2010, and within ten weeks the epidemic spread throughout the country (Bode, 2016). From October 2010 to March 2022, Haiti had nearly 10,000 deaths and 820,000 suspected cases of cholera (UN, 2022). The transmission declined to about 720 suspected cases in 2019 and there was no laboratory-confirmed case for over three years after February 2019 (CDC, 2022). But Haitians continued to be vulnerable to the disease due to poor conditions of water, sanitation, and health systems. In October 2022, cholera resurfaced in Haiti and as of September 2023, had spread to over 75% of communes, resulting in about 64,496 suspected cases of cholera and 906 deaths (UNICEF, 2023). The situation is exacerbated due to the resurgence of violence as "gangs have reportedly prevented patient access to health facilities and denied medical staff entry to affected communities," as well as many health facilities shutting down or reducing their activities (CRS, 2023, pp. 8-9). For many Haitians, MINUSTAH is associated with the healthcare crisis caused by the cholera epidemic. The UN had failed to test its Nepalese peacekeepers coming from a city with an active cholera outbreak and followed poor sanitation practices at its camps in Haiti discharging raw sewage into Haiti's major river system, thus contaminating water used by thousands of Haitians for cooking and drinking. Several factors contributed to a rapid transmission of cholera across the country due to most Haitians lacking access to safe water and sanitation, and the earthquake that had devastated the country earlier that year. The epidemic further strained Haiti's already overwhelmed public health system.

The UN did not immediately acknowledge its responsibility. On December 17th 2010, then-Secretary General Ban Ki-moon ordered an investigation into the cause of the cholera outbreak. The official report, released in May 2011, was "scientifically accurate and politically cautious" (Bode, 2016, p. 766). It provided a careful analysis of circumstantial and genetic evidence that pointed to UN responsibility. It lacked a strong conclusion as it did not determine the source of the pathogen. That is because the UN did not allow testing of its camps and Nepalese troops (Bode, 2016). Until August 2016, the UN denied involvement in the cholera outbreak, and only in December 2016 did Ban Ki-moon briefly apologize to the Haitian people in Creole and in English, accepting the UN's moral responsibility to the epidemic's victims. However, moral responsibility is different from legal responsibility, which the UN still has not conceded. The shift in the UN's official position on the cholera outbreak was caused by a combination of actors and campaigns pressuring the UN to accept responsibility (Freedman and Lemay-Hébert, 2019). Among these was the strategic collective action suit against the UN initiated by the IJDH and BAI in 2013, after having unsuccessfully sought alternative resolution mechanisms on behalf of cholera victims with the UN.

The courts have upheld the UN's claim to absolute immunity. As the victims' attorney argued, absolute immunity enabled the UN misconduct, "[a]ny time an organization feels it can never be held accountable, that's when mistakes happen, corners are cut and things are done that are

negligent or worse" (Guardian, 2019). Arguments for the UN's absolute immunity say it protects the UN against baseless and politically motivated suits in national courts, and against diversion of resources from programs to such lawsuit payments and characterize the UN as a public non-profit entity that provides benefits to people without compensation and has a structural incentive to reduce malpractices (Bode, 2016). The UN has failed to undo the harm caused by the epidemic. In 2016, Ban Ki-moon announced a new plan to solicit $400 million in voluntary contributions by UN members from MINUSTAH unencumbered balance towards the UN Haiti Cholera Response Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF). According to the MPTF's Annual Report 2021, as of that year, only $21.8 million was donated to the fund. For the sake of comparison, MINUSTAH's average annual budget was $593 million.

Sexual Exploitation and Abuse

MINUSTAH soldiers have been accused of sexual exploitation and abuse against Haitians, including the rape of minors and transactional sex in exchange for food and medicine. The UN claimed that they took allegations of sexual misconduct very seriously with thorough investigations, worked with the perpetrators' countries of origin to deliver justice, and tried to help the victims with employment. However, victims tell a different story (*Haiti by Force*, 2017). Those include the "MINUSTAH wives" who did not receive paternity recognition and allowances for their children, which were fathered by UN peacekeepers.

First, the UN failed to investigate many allegations. Second, when investigated and sustained, such allegations resulted in little or no punishment for the perpetrators in their home countries, and the victims received little or no assistance and compensation (Ivers and Guillaume, 2017). Third, many victims chose not to file claims due to little trust in the UN proceedings and feared the stigma. Justice was not served in one of the most horrific sexual crimes by MINUSTAH; several Uruguayan peacekeepers gang raped a teenage boy. The act was documented on video and it quickly spread over the internet, sparking anti-UN protests (Sadri, Al-Jazeera English News, 2012). Five of the peacekeepers were deported, put on trial and later released in their home countries. As is commonly known, since sexual exploitation and abuse had been reported as a problem with other UN peacekeeping missions, in 2016, the Secretary-General appointed a Special Coordinator on improving the UN response to sexual exploitation and abuse. MINUSTAH was one of the UN peacekeeping missions with the most allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by its personnel. However its successor mission, MINUJUSTH, was not marred by such allegations, either because of a lack of cases or the victims' reluctance to report them. While sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers cast a dark shadow over its mission to keep the Haitians safe, some Haitian women and girls living in tents found MINUSTAH a source of security; "[f]or some the UN are protectors, for others they represent much that is wrong with Haiti; it is a contradiction in a country which already has many" (Al Jazeera, 2011).

Another source of controversy of the UN actions has been its unwillingness to release its detailed human rights internal reports. Those are often confidential documents that could have been shared with the government. The UN held the Haitian government accountable for certain issues, such as prison conditions, keeping people in detention without bringing charges against them for years, etc. However, the UN has not held the Haitian government accountable for the failure of the police and court systems to arrest people properly, and to prosecute people properly, especially as concerns human rights violators. Releasing detailed internal reports on the government is one way to hold them accountable, but exposing the links between some human rights violators and the government is risky; it could jeopardize UN relations with the host country.

MINUSTAH's controversial actions and the way in which the UN handled them have fueled Haiti's deeply rooted and well-founded culture of suspicion about foreign intervention and despise of dependence, which go well beyond public mistrust of the UN. In turn, negative public perception of the UN may taint the legitimacy of international involvement and complicate the work of successor missions. When speaking about the prospects of MINUSTAH's successor mission, critics argued that:

> "without the means to make amends to those who have been harmed by these misdeeds already acknowledged by its own experts and review panels, the new UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti cannot have real legitimacy as a moral authority on justice and human rights as proposed" (Ivers and Guillaume, 2017, pp. 639-640).

Post-MINUSTAH Politics

Upon MINUSTAH's departure, President Moise's patrimonial regime continued to dominate Haitian politics, amidst increasing political and socioeconomic instability, and resurgent gang violence, until his assassination on 7 July 2021, which left the country in a political stalemate, unable to deal with escalating gang violence and a multifaceted humanitarian crisis. Regular mass protests started in Port-au-Prince and other regional cities in September 2014. The first wave of protests erupted over rising food prices due to world scarcities and the depreciating national currency. These protests had demographic and economic roots - internal migration from the rural countryside into cities, where people were alienated; overpopulated areas struggled to earn a living while governments were accused of poorly managing the economy amid massive corruption scandals. Mass protests resumed in 2017 over the government's socioeconomic policies, including protests against increased fuel prices, increased taxes, remobilization of the army, the Petro-Caribe scandal, and other allegations of corruption.

In November 2017, the Haitian Senate released a report, entailing that then-current and former Haitian officials allegedly engaged in embezzlement and fraud, managing $2 billion in loans from Venezuela's Petro-Caribe discounted oil program from 2008 to 2016. President Moise was being investigated for his possible engagement in various corruption activities, of which he denied. A May 2019 court report by state auditors to the Senate alleged that Moise had embezzled millions of dollars (CRS, 2020; Nugent, 2019). The country entered a turmoil in mid-2019. Mass protests intensified calling for an end to corruption and resignation of the president. During the September-November 2019 protests, at least 42 people died and 86 were injured. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) concluded that state authorities responded to the protests with excessive use of force (IACHR, 2019). The HNP was not able to stop the resurgence of gang violence and crime in Haiti (Haiti Times, 2020) as some of its resources were directed at dealing with anti-Moise protests. Yet, there is the problem of linkages between armed gangs and elites.

Gangs fight for control over areas to extract protection fees, and trade drugs and arms. Politicians provide the gangs with weapons and impunity in exchange for repressing dissent. When paid by the government, the gangs stop anti-government protests; when paid by the opposition, the gangs force people to protest (Paultre and Marsh, 2019). Links between armed gangs, the police, and local government officials were reported during the tragic events of the La Saline massacre (Charles, 2019a). The massacre, which was carried out during November 13–17,

2018, resulted in an unknown number of injured people and close to one-hundred murders (59 officially according to MINUSTAH, 2019; at least 71 according to IACHR, 2019). The culprits of the massacre were:

> "bandits tied to gang conflicts over control of a sprawling outdoor market where protection rackets are the norm, but also guns-for-hire by powerful politicians and well-heeled businessmen seeking to control votes in the run-up to upcoming legislative and mayoral elections" (Charles, 2019a).

There were allegations of the complicity of state actors in the massacre, and charges were pressed against two high officials of the state (IACHR, 2019; UN, 2019, para. 38). After MINUSTAH left, the regime's survival greatly relied on the HNP. Other possible factors included a new army, international support to the regime, fragmented opposition, and the COVID-19 pandemic's limiting consequences on Haiti's discontent masses. There was a concern that the police would become a force of repression to ensure regime survival at any cost. However, MINUSTAH's main legacy is the highly professionalized police.

It is a result of multilateralism in Haiti that started and progressed throughout the UN missions, including CIVPOL/UNPOL. The regime's remobilization of a small new army in November 2017 was controversial due to the former army's horrible mark on the Haitian history. Before the army was disbanded in 1995 by then-president Aristide, it had earned a terrible record of coups and gross human rights violations. The stated role of the new army is to patrol the country's border with the Dominican Republic, combat smuggling, and assist in post-natural disaster recovery efforts. However, there was skepticism about whether Haiti would need an army at all to protect itself against outside threats. There were concerns that the new army might instead engage in internal political repression (CGTN America, 2017), especially with Moise's recruitment of former army soldiers (CRS, 2020). Haiti and the Dominican Republic had hostile relations in the 1820s. They have engaged in hostile rhetoric from time to time, but they have never had territorial invasions. Also, the two countries are economically interdependent. By primarily working with the government, international actors legitimized Moise's regime. They talked about the need for a dialogue and underscored the importance of following the electoral process for changes in political power (CRS, 2020, p. 3). However, the opposition claimed that international actors wanted to "impose a solution without listening to the popular demands of the population" (Charles, 2019b).

During and after the intense UN presence of ONUVEH (1990-1991), MICIVIH (1993-2000), and MINUSTAH (2004-20018), that is, ever since the 1990-1991 national elections, which were regarded as Haiti's first free elections,[12] Haiti has been unable to complete its democratic transition (Linz and Stepan, 1996). Haiti has clearly not passed the second phase of consolidating democracy. Since the end of the Duvalier family dictatorship in 1986, the Haitian authorities have not invested enough in preparing for holding regular elections. The international community has not made it a top priority either. As of February 2024, Haiti does not have a permanent Electoral Commission. This is important not only for the integrity of the electoral process, but also for the development of prerequisites for a more democratic and sustainable political order, i.e. the development of more permanent political parties and consolidation of the party system around an ideology rather than an individual or access to patrimony.[13]

Haiti's semi-presidential structure of government, adopted in the 1987 Constitution, has often led the president to struggle to operate with either an obstructionist parliament or a parliament with no functioning majority. As a result, Haitian presidents sometimes ruled by

decree, such as Martelly, from the January 2015 dissolution of the parliament to the end of his term in February 2016, and Preval, from January 1999 to the end of his first term in February 2001. President Moise ruled by decree after mid-January 2020 when the terms of most of the legislature expired. Because the government had failed to hold the legislative elections scheduled for October 2019, they were left with no functioning legislature. As of February 2024, Haiti's last held elections were in 2016. Failure to hold elections according to schedule pushed Haiti into a downward political spiral. Another structural problem is Haiti's hyper-federalized government with too many local elections. Those positions are often not filled or filled through patrimonial politics.

Since the July 2021 assassination of Juvenal Moise, Haiti has been governed by Prime Minister Ariel Henry[14], who was named to the position by Juvenal Moise two days before his assassination, however, Henry was not sworn in, and as most of legislators' terms had expired, they lacked quorum to select a president to serve for the rest of Moise's term. During the second half of 2023, the CARICOM Eminent Persons Group tried, without much success, to facilitate a dialogue between the High Transition Council (HTC) which was established by the government, and political and civil society stakeholders in Haiti, and to bring them closer to a political consensus about a governance framework and a pathway to elections (CRS, 2023). The government failed to hold elections in 2023, as anticipated by the December 21, 2021 transition proposal put forward by the government and signed by many stakeholders. Thus, calls for Henry's resignation intensified in early 2024 with disruptive anti-government protests held across Haiti, especially leading up to and on February 7 – a highly symbolic date for transfers of power in Haiti. Guy Philippe, one of the 2004 coup leaders, who was repatriated to Haiti in November 2023 after serving several years in a US prison for money laundering, has called for civil disobedience across the country and joined the anti-government protests. He is a charismatic populist figure and is backed by an armed brigade in the Environmental Ministry. Philippe opposes the deployment of an international security mission to Haiti (Charles, 2024; Merancourt and Coletta, 2024).

The prospect of Philippe gaining popularity in Haiti is viewed problematic by the US, and other actors in the international community, who continue to support Henry's holding on to his position at least until elections. Given the security issues in Haiti, the only type of elections feasible in Haiti would be an interim government, which would be quasi-extra-constitutional but possible, as the country has already been operating in this way. And, while there have been major structural problems with all elections in Haiti, they have had the most success when votes were counted by UN election staff.

The current political stalemate "has hindered Haiti's ability to respond to worsening security and humanitarian crises caused by rampant gang violence, food and fuel shortages, and a resurgence of cholera" (CRS, 2023). Gang violence has escalated and expanded within and outside the capital. Especially since 2023, Haiti has seen a surge in murders, injuries, kidnappings, sexual violence, destruction of private and agricultural property, as well as attacks on infrastructure, including on judicial and police institutions, and various public and private infrastructure, and the response of police and judicial authorities has been inadequate and inconsistent (UN, 2023). Over 8,400 were direct victims of violence, including killings, injuries, and kidnappings in 2023 – a 122% increase compared to the previous year (UN, 2024). The International Organization of Migration tracked a rapid increase in the number of internally displaced people in Haiti from about 24,000 in September 2022 to 200,000 in November 2023 and to 313,000 in December 2023. Haitian migration to the US more than doubled in 2022-2023,

with over 160,000 Haitian immigrants making it to the US in 2023 (Walsh and Robles, 2024). The HNP, under-numbered and out-gunned, as well as weakened by "corruption among police and politicians linked to criminal groups," has failed to curtail violence (ICG, 2024). According to the UN recommended ratio, the HNP should have over 25,000 officers, and it has fewer than 9,000 in 2024. Its main trade union estimated that the force lost about 3,300 officers over the past three years, about 90% of which were fired for abandoning their posts, 123 resigned and about 80 died or disappeared (Reuters, 2024). A vigilante movement, called Bwa Kale, emerged in April 2023 as a form of self-defense, which has also engaged in lynching men suspected of belonging to gangs.

In October 2023, a year after Henry's initial request, UNSC Resolution 2699 authorized the Multinational Security Support (MSS) Mission in Haiti; it is mandated for one-year, and to be reviewed after nine months. Its mandate is to provide operational support to the HNP, by planning and conducting joint security operations to counter gangs, secure key infrastructure, to help ensure unhindered and safe access to humanitarian aid for the population, to re-establish security and build conditions conducive to holding elections, protect critical infrastructure and transportation locations, as well as to help the HNP to maintain public safety, which includes arrest and detention. However, it is not clear how this will work in practice. This is not an UN-led mission and will be financed by voluntary donations (the US has pledged $300m), rather than assessed contributions by the UN. Kenya volunteered to lead the mission with the deployment of about 1000 police officers, and other countries have promised to contribute another 1,500 more to the mission.[15] International actors, particularly the US, played an important role in the authorization of the mission. Georges A. Fauriol, CSIS Senior Associate, Americas Program, has characterized it as "an initiative that is derived from US diplomacy," and while acknowledging Washington's "unfortunate history of trying to impose political outcomes in Haiti," he argues that the US can also play an important political role in helping the Haitians reach a consensus about transition and governance, which will allow different security, humanitarian, and socioeconomic initiatives to move forward timely and coherently (CSIS, 2023).

Previously, the Thirdway Alliance, a Kenyan opposition group had challenged the government's decision to deploy police to Haiti and in October 2023 obtained a court order to suspend the deployment. Nevertheless, in November 2023, the Kenyan parliament approved the deployment. On January 26, 2024, Kenya's High Court ruled the government's decision to deploy police to Haiti illegal, finding that deploying police requires "a reciprocal arrangement" with the host government but not a domestic parliamentary approval, unlike deploying militarily. The government announced they would appeal the ruling, and the opposition insisted that only a democratically elected legitimate president in Haiti could make such a request or enter into a reciprocal agreement with another government (Reuters, 2024). The court's ruling was ambiguous; it found that "Kenya's government had not followed correct procedure in authorizing the mission to Haiti — although it also appeared to leave room for it to proceed" (Walsh and Robles, 2024).

It is argued that the money pledged by the US can be put to better use by helping to build Haitian institutions, particularly the HNP (Robles, 2024). Former Haitian diplomat Edwin Paraison suggests using Haiti's military, "even if it is at an embryonic stage," and would include over 600 Haitian soldiers recently trained in Mexico to support the police to fight gangs (NPR, 2024). However, a more important question is whether the MSS will succeed in Haiti, especially when the current conditions in Haiti are characterized as unprecedented and much worse than the conditions for past missions – much deeper political and humanitarian crises, and gang violence that is out of control (Christopher Hernandez-Roy in CSIS, 2023).

Addressing the UNSC on January 25, 2024, BINUH Head María Isabel Salvador described an ambitious and complex road to a lasting success:

> "[t]he continuous support to the Haitian National Police; the deployment of the MSS; a sustained political process resulting in credible, participatory and inclusive elections, constitute fundamental elements that can contribute to restore security and stability to Haiti, where consequently the rule of law, democratic institutions, and sustainable development become a reality for the people of Haiti."

Of utmost importance, MSS should avoid the mistakes of past missions, which are partly reflected in the safeguards described in Resolution 2699. Georges A. Fauriol underscores the need for the security mission to be synchronized with humanitarian, social and economic initiatives, all of which should be carried out in partnership with a governance structure and in an environment of political consensus. Also, instead of training more HNP officers, it may be more effective to specify what the force can and should do and find ways to expand and diversity Haiti's national security capabilities, for example through the private sector, as the HNP has arguably developed into an all-purpose security force with an overly general mission, ultimately unable to carry it out (CSIS, 2023).

There is a shared sentiment that to succeed, any security mission should prioritize Haitian voices. While calling for the international community's urgent action to improve the security situation and "break the cycle of crises in Haiti." BINUH Head Salvador, acknowledged that "long-term stability can only be achieved through a nationally owned and inclusive political process" (UN, 2024). For Fritznel D. Octave, Haitian journalist and author, the ongoing crisis in Haiti is not just a security issue that can be resolved with the deployment of international forces (such results have been short-lived), but rather a multifaceted crisis that calls for a holistic approach to understand all the different aspects and tackle the root causes, and any framework to come out of the crisis should be designed in a dialogue with all different stakeholders in Haiti. He calls for Haitians to dig deep into their souls to understand why the nation, which celebrates 220 years of independence in 2024, has failed and to find good will to build a country for everyone to thrive, and not just for the few (CSIS, 2023).

Conclusion

This analysis has focused on the United Nations active involvement in Haiti since 1990, by focusing on the legacy of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) from 2004 – 2017. This analysis draws two main conclusions for peace- building in general and for Haiti in particular. Peace can be built from a pact or peace-treaty after a war or some constitutional order that exists on paper through common understanding, and then to continue to work things out through negotiations. This is how countries can successfully build democracy after conflict when clearly identified sides come to make a social or a political pact, according to the pact model of *Transitions from the Authoritarian Rule* (O'Donnell et al., 1986). This process heavily relies on local elites, representing broad classes of people in the society, to come up with the pact so that they could be mediated by, for example, the Catholic Church in Catholic Latin America, or the UN and the Good Offices of the Secretary General. But this model does not fit Haiti, where troops were sent to stabilize the situation but no political agreement was made.

After Aristide's ouster, a transitional government (2004-2006) took over, which on purpose or not, decided that Aristide's party would not qualify for a number of sequential elections. Thus, Aristide's force ended politically as a competitive factor. Other parties, that probably did not meet the minutia of all the rules of signing petitions on ballots, managed to get on the ballot. This was followed by interruptions of democracy, including electing Preval in 2006 and Martelly in 2010-2011, in ways that were not strictly according to the letter of the law, and the dubious 2016 elections, which brought Moise to power in which Haiti held its own, without the UN supervising and counting the ballots, like in 2006 and 2010-2011. Thus, the political process that unfolded in Haiti does not represent the entire country, and the government of Moise lacked legitimacy. The political turmoil that followed was in part due to the quality of the election that occurred without the UN present. In this sense, without MINUSTAH, the earlier elections could have been far worse than they were. In the absence of a pact, there is no coherence and no consensus among elites. Thus, gangs and traffickers replaced Aristide's mass party with the rule of warlords in alliance with elected officials, who are formally and informally connected to the gangs amid significant urban centers throughout the country and in rural areas as well. Certainly, the southern half of the country has been overtaken by organized-crime gangs. In general, the UN has never succeeded in such situations involving organized gangs. However, the UN had important accomplishments in Haiti that should not be undervalued.

These accomplishments include the professionalization and growth of the HNP, which ended the kidnapping for ransom epidemic in 2007-2009; the absence of coups; the practice of elections; as well as some reasonable economic growth and economic activeness rather than the paralysis that followed MINUSTAH's departure. But a major problem for the UN was going into Haiti with a stabilization mission without any plan for national reconciliation. This is partly because the former antagonists are not involved politically in any recognizable form. The mass-party phenomenon that Aristide introduced in 1990 has no real equivalent today. Instead, the elections are contested among newly formed and weak parties with small bands of followers around individual leaders. And parties that did survive set up what one could call a sultanistic regime based on Max Weber's conceptualization.

The term sultanism is developed out of authoritarianism and is the least consolidated form of quasi-democratic rule. What Haiti has is authoritarianism with elections but no rule of law. There seems to be no viable set of policy solutions for Haiti in the short or medium- term without having addressed the macro-factors, among them deeply embedded poverty, and the structural factor of center-periphery relations. If the path to development is set to go through prioritizing economic development, the state of democracy arguably should not be a concern as there is no necessary correlation between the two. Of course, political stability under authoritarianism has been shown in East Asia to be beneficial for economic development, which in some cases produced democratization. However, these were rapidly industrializing countries that experienced economic takeoff. The US industrialization policy for Haiti was designed for light manufacturing at low wages, without any prospects of creating a large enough middle class to even inaugurate democracy, let alone sustain it. The UN verified elections in 1991, 1995, 2000, 2006, 2011 and 2016 only proved that elections can be held without the institutions needed to govern democratically.

Political stability, the main interest behind MINUSTAH since 2004, is different from protecting a functioning democracy. If progress is possible in any realm, it begs the question of whether it is interdependent with other structural improvements. If there was a "benevolent" or

"smart" dictatorship, that hypothetical assumption clearly is not necessarily going to be implemented in any realistic scenario either-- as not only the 29-year Duvalier dictatorship years so well demonstrate, but also most other presidencies of any regime type.[16] One could argue that MINUSTAH, in particular, was important and desirable because the country avoided mass protests, paralysis from the gang kidnapping for ransom plague in Port-au-Prince, and the armed rebellion led by former Army officers and drug traffickers. The same argument could be made for what transpired after the MICIVIH departed with its engineering troops after 2000, and when UN troops had departed by 2017 (though technically two Indian units of soldiers remained under the subsequent UN missions that had allowed Brazilian forces to bomb Cite Soleil in the previous decade). Haiti was in near lockdown for most of 2018-2019, with gang leaders allying with politicians to control the country, while ostensible democratic oppositions protested to demand the resignation of President Moise, not only because of his non-credible election, but also because of the massive Petro-Caribe corruption scandal, which implicated the President and many of his associates, political allies, and cabinet ministers.

Gangs are an extended arm of the government; they have more power than the police and terrorize all of the slum areas. Their candidates are free to campaign and govern, but there is no real competitive option allowed in gang-controlled areas, such as the entire area of Port-au-Prince from Cité Soleil to Carrefour and the entire area of the Plateau Central and the Artibonite valley. It is no longer safe to drive from Port-au-Prince to Cap-Haïtien. So, the situation was better when the UN was in control with its soldiers. However, what really counts in any peacebuilding mission is what is left behind as sustainable governance, political economy, and rule of law. Instead, MINUSTAH left the country and soon thereafter, Haiti continued in the same chaos that ensued when the gangs ruled the capitol in the early years of the new century. The government's legitimacy was protested after the May 2000 legislative election fraud, which resulted in not only constant protests, but there was also a suspension of foreign aid.

The only difference now is that the international community used the UN to install an anti-Aristide, anti-progressive transitional government in 2004-2006. Then, under a UN continued presence in Haiti, there was the illegitimate rule of President Moise which was supported by foreign governments and the UN agencies operating in Haiti. In this second, more apt formulation, MINUSTAH and the UN generally had failed to mediate political solutions, which is a prerequisite for the kind of political and economic stability and sustainability needed for peacebuilding success. The challenge in Haiti has been great, but ultimately, the UN could have said "no" to the US in negotiations. However, once the UNSC authorized the stabilization project, not only the UN, but all of its member states were legally bound to support the mission. The realist proposition is not only that the UN cannot do more, but it is also the fault of the UN member states for not developing a more sensible plan of implementation and to monitor its compliance in its oversight and financing roles.

Another unfortunate tendency of many UN peacebuilding missions was replicated in Haiti, the mixing of the roles of critic and pact verifier as well as technical advisor and occasional implementor. This was perhaps most dramatic in Afghanistan and Namibia, where the UN implemented elections and then turned a blind eye to deviations from electoral and human rights standards. This is not unique to the UN by any means, as bilateral election delegations and NGOs are often biased and/or conceal vital information from the public. The International Mission to Verify Elections in Haiti, which was uniquely formed by election officials and agencies in the Americas, never made public the varieties of documented acts of malfeasance, including

corruption and electoral law violations by some of Haiti's political parties and election commissioners. To some extent, UN missions, which are usually funded by voluntary contributions by UN member states, reflect the latter's priorities, which in the case of Haiti, was usually led by the US. Even if one is not conspiratorial about these financial relationships, the UN has its own institutional interests and reputation to defend. The result is that many historical details remain hidden and classified at UN headquarters, or simply have been lost to history. Author Carey has made various types of requests to gain access to these files without success—just as many have tried and failed to gain access to US government records in Haiti, such as the CIA archive on the 1991-1994 FRAPH files on Emmanuel "Toto" Constant, the leader of the paramilitary force/death squad.

Interpretive frameworks offer some insights into the UN's experience at peacebuilding. Realism suggests that international organizations, like the UN and its financiers and controllers in the UNSC (especially the US), do not have the same interest as that of Haitian civil society. Furthermore, peacebuilding is constrained when economic elites dominate the Haitian state for their own interests, or undermine mass parties, who, in turn have been ill-served by some of their leaders. Liberalism identifies the vast challenges in Haiti for which multilateral cooperation is required. However, collective action problems make it extremely difficult to get coherence among the international community, let alone coordination with the Haitian government. Constructivism emphasizes that ideas matter, without specifying which ideas. It means if the Haitian people do not want the UN there, the UN cannot be effective. At a certain point, MINUSTAH became very unpopular, especially after its bombing of Cite Soleil, after the 2010 cholera epidemic, and after Haitians believed that the international pressure for elections was interference with their sovereign domestic affairs. They were, in theory, promoting international human rights, the right to free and fair elections which is found in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Like most elections in Haitian history, the reality was far from ideal and arguably below the threshold of credibility, often deemed "free and fair." In practice, the UN and most foreign actors have applied a lower standard, "good enough for Haiti," given the absence of documented fraud, but in politics, perception is reality; this is the heart of Constructivism.

The perception among a lot of Haitians, probably the majority nationally, and certainly the overwhelming majority in Port-au-Prince where all the protests were taking place, was that the UN was up to no good, the UN was riding around in expensive cars, staying in their bases. Then at a certain point, the scandal about the UN peacekeepers engaging in not only prostitution, but also human trafficking, added to the perception that the UN was actually causing more harm than the accidental cholera epidemic. Constructivism explains, in part, why the UN could not be effective even if it wanted to, because of the way the UN mission was socially constructed. The UN had its own interests, that whoever they were serving - the US or the UN or some vague concept of humanitarian intervention or responsibility to protect - it was not in the interest of the Haitian people. Haitian people suspected this, as their quality of life never improved; this same situation happened when the UN intervened in 1994. They just succeeded in stopping the mass killing by FRAPH – a paramilitary group organized by Emmanuel "Toto" Constant. Of the three missions, the 1994 invasion succeeded to reinstate Aristide and to stop the mass murders. The daily grind of existence in Haiti probably did improve statistically, yet the basic underdevelopment, poverty, and insecurity did not improve.

Cosmopolitanism shows what can be effective when the norms are observed and when Haitians are actively engaged with determining whatever national politics they want to implement. The international community faces a dilemma in cosmopolitanism, where the local actors are unwilling or unable to observe norms, but also listen to the Haitians themselves, when they spoke of violations and of their right to sovereignty. They were quite legitimately complaining about a force of intervention, even to reinstate Aristide under the supposed notion that the country was ready to self-govern itself before it was able to self-govern.

Critical theory is a skeptical approach, which says whether it is the inability of local government, or the inability of the international community to resolve their own differences or cooperate locally, and that international capital is driving most of the Marxist interpretation or the anti-imperialist interpretation of critical theory. International capitalism and the lack of attention and respect for local and domestic sovereignty and autonomy will not work.

The penultimate peacebuilding paradigm, locality, says that there are regional and national approaches (Carey, 2021). The UN takes a cookie cutter approach, does the same thing every time or only modifies it because of its budget, or whoever pays the piper chooses the tune. The UN did not customize an approach for Haiti. Instead, they established a commission headed by Bill Clinton after the earthquake to give out all the aid. According to press reports, only 10% off the pledged money was actually even given, and Haiti never even got that in the end. Supposedly by having Prime Minister Lamothe on the commission that co-chaired with Clinton, Haiti would have some say in how the funds were distributed and utilized. First, they did not get the funds. Second, the funds that were given were directed at projects like the Caracol Industrial Park, and not for the things that the Haitian government really wanted. Third, the Haitians who are on the commission were hand-picked by the international community - people that saw things the way they wanted to see them.

While policy analysis is a rational choice approach, things are not very rational in Haiti. How many cost-benefit analyses have the Inter-American Development Bank, World Bank, USAID and other such organizations conducted? They planted trees to combat soil erosion, and still they have terrible deforestation problems. They spent a lot of money to build highway roads to the Caracole Industrial Park, and instead of having 60,000 employees, they have about 10,000 employees. They could not even get the Clintons to agree to raising the minimum wage to some pathetically low level - $3 a day. In other words, Haitians did not receive a living wage that would have made a difference to their livelihoods. Was policy analysis correct in any sense? Nominally, there has been improvement in income. To that extent, any number of these projects have been somewhat effective. There are some incredible statistics - $3 billion of Haiti's GDP every year comes from remittances from Haitians in the diaspora, probably two thirds or more from the US and the rest from Canada, France and elsewhere. It is quite likely that most of this nominal doubling of income are situations that are attributed to the increase in remittances. Then another large hundreds of millions, if not a billion dollars, have to do with drug and other smuggling operations that are brought into the country and are distributed to the rich and the other crooked elites. There is little evidence that policy analysis has done much good for Haiti, even though that is the standard programmatic evaluation beforehand and post-project evaluation afterwards. There does not seem to be too many lessons learned from this experience.

Part of the problem is that the effectiveness of any outside actor is very much the result of an interaction effect. There are the outside actors' capabilities, influences, strengths and weaknesses, priorities, and limited resources. The inside actors, which are primarily the political

system, its institutions and its leading elites, limit the effectiveness of the outside actors. The domestic system can act as a veto player, but, it can also act as a polarized society, which is what Haiti has always been. Polarization is nothing new to Haiti. Also, the long-term impact is seen after the mission ends. In 1994, when the US invaded Haiti with the UN Security Council's authorization, (initially it was just US troops), but it was said that the test of the impact of this invasion would be after all the troops left. However, most of the troops left within a year, some troops remained almost the entire period from then till about 2000, but then the troops were back in 2004, only four years later. What is left now is chaos, with the gangs, non-stop protests and police shooting at militia and vice versa and the economy has been closed. Moreover, all of this started before COVID-19.

The country has been paralyzed; it is not completely shut down because even a poor country like Haiti, the poorest in the hemisphere, cannot close everything down because of COVID-19. But they are in a situation where there is a high correlation between MINUSTAH's absence and its polarization. The UN did not cause the polarization, as it existed before between the economic and political elites and the government. Moreover, there is the failure of Haiti to hold free and fair elections, first sponsored by the international community; the international community was in a dilemma where they had an unfair presidential election yet did not want to admit failure and redo it. For the first time since 1990, Haitian authorities controlled the administration of national elections without UN or OAS help in November 2016. Moise won in the first round, which was a surprise to all. Arguably those elections were not free and fair, and the result was rigged. Certainly, it was not fair because Martelly used all the powers of government to favor his candidate Moise, and also because they did not have the elaborate system set up by the UN to verify the results. Beginning in 2006, the UN set up a system where they actually counted the regional balloting papers to at least make sure that they were not rigged in the counting stages in the post-poll rigging phases, as this happened in 2000 when Aristide announced that he would not count places above fourth place. This also occurred in 2006 when Preval obtained 49% in the first round. Then there was some gimmick about excluding blank ballots in order to get his percentage over 50% to avoid a second round because the mobs were protesting. These were extremely serious violations of electoral law. The Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) was rife with corruption (Carey, 2006).

It is noteworthy here that the UN did not establish a "Special Political Mission" for Haiti, which would have specialized in policy and mediation for the many political impasses and crises that occurred during the UN tenure from 1990 to 2017, and which continued with MINUJUSTH and then to the present day with BINUH. Neither MICIVIH (1993-2000), MINUSTAH (2004-2017), nor MINUJUSTH (2017 to the current UN Integrated Office in Haiti, BINUH) have made any serious attempt to mediate political and/or violent conflicts.[17] For example, when legislative elections were not held and the legislature was closed, it forced presidents to rule by decree, like President Préval in 1999-2000, President Martelly in 2011 and 2014, and President Jovenel Moise in 2020, who not only ruled by decree, but also appointed most of the country's elected officials extra- constitutionally. Instead, the UN provided a country-specific Special Procedure, the Independent Expert on Haiti, who provided annual human rights reports, culminating in March 2017 (UN Independent Expert, 2017).

There was international supervision of the 2006 election, not by the UN or OAS, but by the International Commission to Verify Elections, however, there were problems. This Commission did the same thing that the international community historically does; when there is a problem, you can delegitimate the election by telling the truth, or you have a choice of telling the truth about how badly the elections are going and then you do nothing about it. For example, in 2010, Hillary Clinton interfered with elections, she complained about the first round and moved Michele Martelly up from third place so that he could make the second round of elections. That is electoral fraud and interference by the outside. If the elections were not appropriate, you cannot declare somebody else to go forward, but you hold the elections over again. There was fraud and rigging and irregularities by many candidates, not just by the candidate nominated by Rene Preval. And the reason Hillary Clinton changed course is because of the US government, for reasons that remain completely unclear. The US went from begging Preval to run in 2006, to declaring him effectively no longer "our person," "he won't cooperate with us." The reason may be because Preval opposed the limitations on minimum wages for a number of projects and wanted Haitian workers to be paid more.

International actors like the UN face this kind of problem most starkly in an election because the stakes are clear: you either accept the results and move on, however imperfect they may be. However, you can accept the elections and move on but admit what went wrong, or you can accept them and act as if they never happened by keeping all the information secret, or you can hold the election again and say the election is not credible. Most countries may say that this election is good enough or they can't document the fraud within the tiny window of time that is considered reasonable - four or five days after an election. The Haitian elections of 2000, the Senate elections (that Aristide tried to steal), was caught in the third week by the OAS, not the UN, because the OSA was in charge primarily with electoral monitoring of the legislative elections. It was a presidential election year, but they had the Senate, legislative, and local elections in the first round in May of 2000. The Presidential elections were postponed to later in the year, and those elections were fraudulent as Aristide ran unopposed because the opposition boycotted his electoral rigging of the legislative elections.

Another problem in elections is the polarization between the economic elites and the masses. The Electoral Commission has been so rife with corruption that there has not been a mass party. In 2004, they did everything to keep Aristide's mass party from qualifying to run in those elections. That party has never recovered, and there has never been a mass party since then. Haiti has basically an elite party whose leadership is populated by the Duvalier regime elites – Michelle Martelly, Moise, or people who play by their rules. The politicians are basically opportunists trying to make money, because throughout the whole country, with all the local elections, the way to get ahead is trying to get an education or getting involved in politics. So, politics become dirty and ugly in a country that does not have the rule of law. Although the police has improved a lot over the years, there is still a lot of corruption, especially in the case of human rights and politicians, there is impunity and very little punishment, and even a lack of investigation of perpetrators of political violence. The UN has tried to fight human rights impunity but has failed. Part of the problem is that the UN has reports but does not provide them to the government. Or, maybe they give them to the government, but nothing happens to them because the judiciary should be independent, but the prosecutors are scared for their life to go after politicians. Or the prosecutors, who in the civil law system are investigating judges and are not independent prosecutors like in the British-American system, are bribed.

Martelly engaged in the systematic, but selective assassination of people. Carey personally investigated five earlier assassinations allegedly perpetrated by three Martelly associates during his presidency in his 2015 and 2016 in trips to Haiti. This kind of pattern has only become worse since MINUSTAH left. But even while there, MINUSTAH was incapable (if it was monitoring

human rights) to mobilize the information and reporting that they gathered, which was quite extensive. This pattern of not providing information also occurred in the 1990 elections and the 1991 January 2nd round elections. The UN reported (but only in a tiny paragraph eight months later), well after Aristide took office and around the time that Aristide was deposed in a coup in the end of September 1991, that 300,000 ballots were lost in the first round of elections. The UN never admitted this because they basically knew Aristide won by a large margin based on the survey of a mere 100 voting precincts. Thus, the UN reported it too late and it is unclear whether they even realized the loss of ballots for a number of months. UN reports in those days did not automatically appear on the Internet, and one had to be in a UN depository library, etc., to find reports. A pattern of activity results from the UN, and for that matter the US, with its information reporting through the CIA, keeps most of the information to itself simply because it does not want to get involved. They want to be involved in controlling the country according to their own interests; this is particularly true of the US. But, the UN also has an interest, which is to be seen as successful, whether you are monitoring elections or overseeing the judiciary or in a stabilization mission like Haiti. The UN does not address the problem head on or publicly. It is not clear if they even released the information to the government. But if it is released to the government, and the government is in charge, the government has the same incentive not to let the public know about all of these issues, for example political assassinations, bribes, and any other malefactors.

The interest of outsiders, the UN or US are different from each other and different from the Haitian people. The US' true motives in Haiti include keeping Haiti off the front pages (it used to be to keep the boat people away), controlling communism and progressives that would destabilize the existing international political order by demands for justice and progress. Do the US interests in Haiti change along with a change in their own administration? No, it may be a factor but it is not a driving factor. The UN interest is to be successful and keep its benefactor, the financier of the projects going; there is also the context of foreign aid by separate countries.

The interests of the Haitian people do not necessarily converge with the interests of outsiders – including the UN and US interests, which are also different from each other. Haitian exceptionalism is also a factor, as Haiti is treated exceptionally differently than most foreign countries by the UN, the US and the rest of the international community

What would have happened in the absence of MINUSTAH? In terms of counterfactual speculations, comparing MINUSTAH's legacy with the post-MINUSTAH period resembles a natural experiment. On the one hand, MINUSTAH stabilized the country and restored the constitutional order. Without MINUSTAH, the political process could have been less stable. Without MINUSTAH, there would not be its controversial legacy either. But the devastating earthquake and hurricanes would still occur, albeit without MINUSTAH's logistical support to the humanitarian relief efforts. On the other hand, upon MINUSTAH's departure, the restored security proved unsustainable and Haiti slid back to political turmoil. But one cannot assume that the post-MINUSTAH instability was not caused by the fact that the UN was there in the first place, just as one cannot assume that the instability in Haiti from 2001 to 2004 was not affected by the UN/OAS prior presence. Complex interdependence continues even after international actors leave. In terms of long-term solutions, one conclusion is that the UN prevents the Haitians from figuring it out on their own. Whether the Haitians could have figured it out on their own with so much poverty, corruption, and political instability cannot be answered with much certainty. Ambassador Kenneth Merten reasons:

> "One of the challenges that Haiti has, excuse me for saying this, psychologically is that every time they find themselves in an impasse, neighbors for better or worse are always there to help fix the situation. We often help Haiti avoid what we fear is going to be the worst in terms of political uprisings or so forth, but I think it creates in a certain respect a level of dependency on external intervention in Haitian affairs which allows the local political actors not to have to take responsibility for their actions, not to take responsibility or blame, if you will, for not finding a compromise" (CSIS, 2017).

After MINUSTAH, discussions started about whether there would be another UN stabilization mission in Haiti if the situation deteriorated. Back in 2017, Juan Gabriel Valdés, former SRSG & Chilean Ambassador to the US, answered this question negatively, arguing that "[t]here is no other alternative than to give and to allow the Haitians to resolve their problems and take their own responsibilities" (CSIS, 2017). Thus, another UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti seemed unlikely in the foreseeable future for three main reasons. First, there was fatigue with such missions due to their mixed record.[18] Stabilization missions have sometimes proven rather destabilizing. Second, there was a change in the motives for involvement beyond the stated mantras. The US did not have the concern of a large inflow of Haitian refugees and favored the façade democracy in Haiti. Third, MINUSTAH's controversial legacy further fueled a negative public perception of the UN; this attitude taints the legitimacy of future international involvement and complicates their mission. The situation on the ground has changed dramatically since 2017, and the fate of the UN-authorized security support mission remains unclear. For the time being, the US and the international community have not only Haiti fatigue, but there has also been a rise in nationalist populism as a counter-weight to the liberal institutionalism and multilateralism that prevailed in the decade after the Cold War ended in 1991.

Currently, there are large uncertainties over Haiti's political direction and security situation. Gangs and weapons are a huge part of the current situation in Haitian society; thus, it is imperative that future research examine the root causes as to how gangs have penetrated Haitian politics since its inception and how arms have continued to flow into Haiti unabated since this is one of the main causes of Haitian instability. BINUH has been extended until 15 July 2024. Future research should assess BINUH and the current MSS mission in Haiti combined in order to assess its successes/failures as compared to previous missions. The MSS faces great challenges in Haiti, with complex political turmoil, rampant gangs, a collapsed economy and Haitians in dire need of humanitarian assistance. Thus, it will be interesting to see how these two missions work in providing Haiti with operational support, planning and conducting joint security operations, securing key infrastructure, re-establishing security and building the conditions conducive to holding elections within an extremely volatile environment.

ENDNOTES

1. Other international actors have been involved in Haiti for decades; the Organization of American States (OAS), the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (IACH), the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACrtHR), the Caribbean Economic Community (CARICOM), the Caribbean Free Trade Area (CAFTA), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank (WB); these are the formal IOs with direct influence. MERCOSUR, EU and other free trade areas have trade agreements with Haiti. The EU also has a foreign assistance program in Haiti. Influence is exerted through relations with foreign

governments, bilateral aid programs, and foreign investment; the UN interacts with many of these too. Other components in the organization of the international system include international regimes, and the "good offices" of presidents who are cooperating in a multilateral fashion with other countries, and the "good offices" of the UN and OAS, special representatives of the Secretary General, UN Treaty-based bodies for dozens of major human rights treaties, and UN Charter-based human rights organizations, including the Special Procedures and Independent Experts of the UN Human Rights Council that regularly report on Haiti. The most significant has been bilateral relations, especially with the United States, Canada, Chile, Venezuela, Brazil, France, Germany and the UK. A full discussion of their involvement in Haiti is beyond the scope of this chapter.

2. The IMF offered Haiti a line of credit up to $6 million in this period, while the World Bank's subsidized loan window, the International Development Association, made a fifty-year low-interest loan of $300,000 to Haiti in November 1962. The OAS, the Economic Commission on Latin America, the America, the Inter-Americana Bank all had projects in Haiti by 1961-1962 (Plummer, 1992, pp. 171-72).
3. An example of indivisibility is the collective security system, which "rests on the premise that peace is indivisible, so that a war against one state is, ipso facto, considered a war against all" (Ruggie, 1992, p. 569). Generalized principles of conduct refers to "principles which specify appropriate conduct for a class of actions, without regard to the particularistic interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that may exist in any specific occurrence," such as most-favored nation (MFN) treatment in trade (Ruggie, 1992, p. 571). Diffuse reciprocity refers to the expectation by the members that the arraignment will yield "a rough equivalence of benefits in the aggregate and over time" (Ruggie, 1992, p. 571).
4. The UN reaction to the cholera outbreak in Haiti is used to explain the power dynamics inside the UNSC. Freedman and Lemay-Hébert (2019) show how elected members may play a crucial role inside the UNSC when the P5 take a backseat or do not coalesce on an issue. During UNSC debates in 2016, the US took a backseat as it was preoccupied with litigation. France did not want to speak out as it did not want its colonial history and the independence debt to surface in the news. The UK had little interest in Haiti, nor did Russia and China, which at that time were preoccupied with Syrian resolutions. Thus, the P5 behavior opened the door for the E10, led by Venezuela, to influence UN discourse on the epidemic.
5. The IHRLG election delegations had set the standard for international election monitoring in the 1980s, epitomized by its How-to guide (*Garber*, *1984*). The first UN election mission was the decolonization election of Southwest Africa (Namibia) in 1989. The Haitian election was the fourth major mission for the UN, though the latter had also supervised two rounds of elections in South Korea before and after the Korean War in the 1950s and was prevented from doing so in Vietnam by the US opposition to the Geneva Accords that had planned elections there. For further information on the historical evolution of election campaign monitoring, see Ace, *International Election Observation* (at http://aceproject.org/ace-en/focus/international-election-observation/iii.-origins-and-evolution-of-international).
6. UNMIH (https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/past/untmih.htm) was replaced in its functions by the United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH), which was followed by other operations: the United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH) and the United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH). The reason for these name changes mostly reflects UN politics and legal authorizations but not necessarily a change in function.

7. Other UN mission names included: MINUCI (2003–2004); UNMIL (2003–2018); UNOCI (2004–2017); ONUB (2004–2006).
8. The US disaster response to Haiti was based on a "whole-of-government" approach involving multiple federal departments and agencies, led by the USAID and with significant support from the DoD. Twenty-five other countries provided military assistance to support the earthquake response. The largest contributors after the US were Canada and the Dominican Republic (Cecchine *et al*., 2013).
9. For a debate on this question see Charlie Rose interview: Did the US break Haiti? (1 March 2004, at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y6Y75mCaJwY) with Jeffrey Sachs, Director of the Earth Institute at Columbia University, and Michelle Montas, Director of Radio Haiti, on one side and Timothy Carney, former US Ambassador to Haiti under President Bill Clinton, and Republican Representative Mark Foley of Florida on the other side of the argument. For a presentation of the historic context and consequence of US foreign policy in Haiti, including the economic embargo, see Noam Chomsky and Paul Farmer at Technology and Culture Forum, 2002.
10. Parallels can be drawn with the 1994 US intervention in Haiti, when the UN authorized force to reinstate democracy but it has been argued that the real reason of intervention was to stop the inflow of the Haitian boat people.
11. Note: UN peacekeeping uniformed personnel includes troops, police, and military observers. Data for 2012-2019 are utilized from the UN Peacekeeping Operations Fact Sheet reports for respective years, and data for earlier years are utilized from the UN Peace Operations Year in Review reports for respective years. The 2010 budget figures are utilized through the MINUSTAH by the Numbers report.
12. During the first round of elections on 16 December 1990, a fifth of the ballots – 300,000 of about 1.6 million ballots – were lost. Aristide was elected president with a quick count sample of a hundred precincts, all of them in urban areas. Aristide had a large lead. In fact, an hour after the US Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Bernard Aronson gave his announcement recognizing Aristide's victory, the Carter Center held a press conference announcing the elections were not over yet as they had not counted the ballots. The integrity of the legislative and regional/local elections was compromised.
13. Party training in Haiti has been mainly supported by the International Republican Institution (IRI) and National Democratic Institute (NDI).
14. This paper was updated on February 19, 2024, and does not account for the developments that followed in Haiti, including Prime Minister Ariel Henry's resignation in April 2024, months after he was blocked out of the country after his Africa trip, and the installation of a transitional council."
15. "Haiti in-depth: Ten key questions as Kenyan police deploy to restore order," The New Humanitarian, 26 June, 2024; available at https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2024/06/26/haiti-ten-key-questions-kenyan-police-deployment.
16. Other countries have pledged either personnel or logistic and financial support: Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Canada, Chad, France, Germany, Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Spain, and the United Kingdom. See: The New Humanitarian | Haiti in-depth: Ten key questions as Kenyan police deploy to restore order.

17. Only René Preval's two presidencies, 1996-2001 and -2006-2011 come closest in Haitian history to being benevolent. Despite being Haiti's best president, his record was severely marred in the first term, when Préval refused to disobey his benefactor Aristide's order to rig the May 2000 elections by only counting the votes cast for the top four positions, thereby disenfranchising about one-third of the votes cast. In his second term, Préval disappeared in the aftermath of the January 2010 earthquake, rather than exhibit leadership when it was most necessary.
18. "Haiti in-depth: Ten key questions as Kenyan police deploy to restore order," The New Humanitarian, 26 June, 2024; available at https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2024/06/26/haiti-ten-key-questions-kenyan-police-deployment.
19. There has been general fatigue with foreign entanglements. For example, the failure of the Iraq and Afghanistan missions has contributed to it. Another negative experience was the Libya – intervention without a peace-building mission in place.

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Rank versus Normative Commitment among Haitian Peasants: A case study of Reciprocity in Agrarian Festive Labor

Yves-François Pierre

Contrary to descriptions found in the literature on agrarian labor, this study reveals the existence of a stringent norm of reciprocity in a non-reciprocal labor event, festive labor, usually coined konbit in Haiti. By redefining the Haitian konbit as a work party exchange among cultivators with both food and labor as currencies, it uses a representative sample of 840 peasants in five watersheds of the Central Plateau to show how members of reciprocal labor groups (locally called sosye) sustain cultivators' commitment to the norm by putting pressure on their peers to contribute konbit, regardless of the latter's rank, as they expect to be hired for future jobs by konbit participants.

Keywords: konbit, agrarian labor, labor réciprocité, peasant economies, sosye

Introduction

As compared to other Caribbean and Latin American countries, the cultivation of small and diversely located agricultural plots with little financial and technological means stands out as an essential characteristic of the Haitian peasantry (Mintz, 1974: p. 275; Murray, 1977). As a consequence, Haitian peasants rely on the use of different forms of labor to cultivate their land.[1] Thus, to secure extra household labor, a peasant may choose to sharecrop his plot; buy labor either individually (on a daily basis or on a task basis) or collectively from a squad of laborers; exchange labor against labor with other agriculturalist peers on a rotating basis (or *sosye* in local lexicon); or organize a festive work party (locally coined konbit[2])in which he has to buy food and beverages for his laborers-guests. In short, peasants exchange labor against labor, money, or any other material amenities or services, either individually or collectively[3] (Laguerre, 1975; Murray, 1977; Pierre, 1992).

The following essay focuses on reciprocity of festive labor work parties in the Central Plateau of Haiti. I have chosen this area because in addition to having data available for analysis, it is similar to other regions of the country. I focus on festive work party because it has been depicted in the literature on agrarian economy as being typically non-reciprocal (Moore, 1975; Patterson, 1984; Suehara, 1983), although students of peasant culture have maintained that reciprocity is "a central moral formula for interpersonal conduct …" in peasant economies (Scott, 1976; Weller and Guggenheim, 1989, p. 24). In this vein, M.P. Moore's declaration about the non-reciprocal nature of konbit against that of a *well-off* peasant from the Central Plateau of Haiti is about its *typical* reciprocal nature:

> Despite the multiplicity of the differences between exchange and festive labour...,the essential distinction between them lies in the form of remuneration for attendance at work parties. In the case of exchange labour (and especially group exchange), the reward is simply reciprocal amounts of labor, and the reciprocity is precise; the immediate rewards for festive labour are food, drink and entertainment… and *reciprocity is weak or absent* (1975, p. 273; emphasis added).

For the well-off peasant:

> Konbit establishes something like a communal link between people. It is like being associates (sosye). After a cultivator has participated in your konbit, whenever he organized one, you should go to his in return… (Translation of an interview as of February, 1991).

If it were not for social rank consideration, such a description would fit well with the one Michel Laguerre (1975, pp. 24-26) proposed in his stimulating essay on Haitian traditional work groups where he declared that:

> The konbit is not a simple gift of one's labor to a landowner. This gift requires from the latter a reciprocal gift, effective or latent… *In the konbit, we are at the heart of a system of reciprocity*… The laborer who took part in a friend's konbit expects that the latter in turn will come and help when he organizes his own. Such expectations is understood and carried out *among peasants of the same social standing*[4] (emphasis added).

Thus, to be sure, reciprocity in cultivators' expectations does not preclude konbit work parties from being asymmetrical. It all depends on the rank of the cultivators involved in such transactions, as Mitchell (1991, p. 205) reminds us: "Reciprocity relationships among even ostensible equals are also frequently asymmetrical…" In the same vein, studying the issue of rank and conformity or non-conformity to group norms, such as sociological theorist William Goode (1978, pp. 23-24) has observed that "people of higher rank can get away with more deviation… [because] they have more resources with which to protect themselves when they are accused of not conforming." Laguerre (1975: p.16) has explicitly made the case for the Haitian peasantry when he said that the low class had "no necessary means to organize konbit" but participated "in konbit organized by others;" the middle class organized konbit with little cash and went to konbit; and the high class only organized but did not go to konbit.

Contrary to Laguerre's evocative prolegomenon, food and drinks provided by the host to his guests for their labor have led many students of agrarian economy to retain erratically the konbit only as a punctual, unilateral and asymmetrical event, thereby overlooking its concealed reciprocal nature. In what follows, first, I will revisit the Haitian konbit by questioning its alleged non-reciprocal nature. Second, I will contrast the effect of the norm of reciprocity with that of rank on konbit transactions. Finally, in line with the declarations above, I shall see whether commitment to the norm of reciprocity, which is the core of agrarian reciprocal or exchange labor group (or sosye), ramifies itself out into festive work parties, regardless of the cultivators economic rank.

Festive Labor Party and Reciprocal or Exchange Labor Groups in Agrarian Economies

Students of various agrarian economies from Asia, Africa, and Latin America generally agree that the exchange of labor against labor, or food and beverages against labor are fundamental criteria of respectively reciprocal labor and festive labor (Moore, 1975; Ames, 1950; Herskovits, 1952; Siebel and Massing, 1974; Orlove, 1977; Patterson, 1984; Suehara, 1983). Thus, in the 1950s, Ames (1950, pp. 228-229) noted that among the Woolof of Gambia and Senegal, festive labor participants (kompin) performed agricultural work for a host for food, kola nuts, and cigarettes, while headed by a chief (the bota). Two years later, Herskovits (1952, pp.105-06) found the hando (a reciprocal labor group) and the hawek (a non-reciprocal labor organization) in Indonesia. Similarly, in the 1970s Siebel and Massing (1974, pp. 49-56) reported that in Liberia, reciprocal labor was practiced among the tribes of the western zones (Mano, Kpella, Gbandi) and festive labor among the eastern ethnic groups (Kru, Sapo, Kran); and Orlove (1977: pp. 204-205) described how in the Andean communities labor was also exchanged against labor (Ayna) or against food (Mink'a). More recently, after studying the Bidayuk of Bau in Malaysia, Lynn D. Patterson (1984: pp. 55-56) observed that their labor exchange system was characterized by "cooperation between households" (festive labor) and "reciprocal exchange" which required "exact repayment in kind." For her, this system fostered a series of rights and obligations which embedded local households into a wider support network.

In the same vein, based on his field research in Collectivé Buloho in northeastern Zaire, Tatsuro Suehara (1983, pp. 67-70) presented a threefold description of labor exchange: the "likilimba" whereby labor was exchanged against labor with no formal contract (reciprocal labor); the "lukoo" which was a "gift of labor" that younger members of the village gave to the eldest; and the "kwanza" or an exchange of labor for food and drink exclusively (i.e., konbit). Although he described more extensive and various forms of reciprocity in Quinua (Peru), William P. Mitchell (1991) also discussed the differences between *ayni*, "a form of balanced reciprocity used to obtain services and goods," and the *minka*, which is a festive work group used by large landowners against music, coca leaves, alcohol, and food to obtain labor. While predicting the decline of these two forms of cooperative labor on the basis of the monetization of local economies (Mitchell, 1991) or the communal shrinkage of such material resources as land and labor power (Erasmus, 1956; Swindell, 1985; Moore, 1975), students of agrarian labor contend that festive work parties occur mainly between well-off and poor cultivators whereas exchange labor takes place among economic equals (Moore, 1975; Siebel and Massing, 1974; Mitchell, 1991).

The Haitian Case

Students of Haitian culture have depicted festive work party (locally named konbit) generally with the same perspective, which is a non-reciprocal, nonsymmetrical collective labor event whereby a host (usually a well-off cultivator) provides obligatorily food and drink to his guests (usually poor cultivators) for a working day (Herskovits, 1952; Métraux, 1951; Erasmus, 1956). As opposed to the konbit work party, there is a much smaller and horizontal exchange labor group where reciprocity occurs on a rotating basis without any obligation of food and beverages (Erasmus, 1965; Métraux, 1951; Murray, 1977).

Contrary to this tendency, Laguerre (1975, pp. 24-26) maintains that reciprocity of festive work party exists even though he lacked data to support his view and did not specify in which types of konbit reciprocity occurs. He categorized four types of konbit according to the density of relations among participants under the labels of: "direct invitation," "opened invitation," "mixed invitation" and "indirect invitation" (Laguerre 1975: pp. 11-15).[5] For instance, in the case of direct invitation, relations among participants are dense because the host invites his parents and close friends; whereas in the case of open invitation, the relations are loose because the guests usually bring along with them other non-kin participants. Moreover, to secure labor, a looking-for-labor-power host quite often accepts and hires an agricultural squad along with other guests while at the same time providing food and beverages for everyone (Laguerre, 1975, p.25).

As opposed to the konbit work party, there exist in Haiti small exchange labor groups of no more than seven cultivators, largely based on trust, where reciprocity of labor occurs on a rotating basis among cultivators without any obligation of food and beverages (Erasmus 1965; Métraux, 1951; Murray, 1977, pp. 280-290). Locally named "sosye" in the Central Plateau, these groups ensured labor reciprocity among their members by ostracizing those who deviated from the norm

of reciprocity. Selling labor collectively as a squad with the pay going alternately to group members is one of the main characteristics of those groups. Thus, their prime function is to rapidly raise an important chunk of cash for group members (Murray, 1977; Pierre, 1992, p. 146). "Networks of norms and trust, which tie members of those groups "facilitate cooperation for mutual benefits" (White and Smucker, 1998, p. 3). Hence, while redefining festive labor reciprocity, the following essay in accordance with Goodes' role strain theory (Goode, 1968) that cultivators' individual commitment to returning agrarian festive work parties is not enough to explain konbit exchange transactions as an ongoing process. Consequently, social commitment as expressed by pressure coming from reciprocal labor groups on their affiliated members[19] also play a role inasmuch as it helps maintain conformity to the norm of reciprocity in konbit exchanges in spite of cultivators' rank, which is a potential source of deviation from the norm (Goode, 1978, pp.23-24).

Festive Labor Party Revisited

In field observations that I carried out in the Central Plateau of Haiti during the years of 1987, 1992, and elsewhere in 1998, revealed that in a konbit, many of the guests expected not only food and drink but also labor in return from their hosts. Whoever was a host today was expected to become a guest tomorrow, regardless of his economic rank. I witnessed the continued declaration of the well off peasant:

> **Question**: What if you don't show up [after someone has come to your konbit]?
> **Response**: There is nothing wrong provided there was a good excuse beforehand. The host will not blame you; he won't say anything against you since you did not lie to him. He will realize you were willing... He did not see you; it wasn't your fault.
> **Question**: What if you had lied to him?
> **Response**: He will still invite you another time... just to see if you are reliable. If you lie a third time, he will never invite you to his konbit work party, you and he won't have anything in common anymore. And, whenever you organize a konbit, he will not show up... which means the two of you are no longer friends. You do not want to cooperate with him... He too will do the same (translation of verbal communication, Feb. 1991).

Such findings run against all expectations that one could draw from the literature on agrarian labor. A twenty-five year old cultivator weeded his red beans gardens in December 1989 with a small festive work party of ten workers, five of whom were members of his sosye group. Augusmé reciprocated five konbit, three of them to his sosye peers. He did not return konbit to the other participants because he claimed not to have been informed on time. This case is an illustration of many others. In the Central Plateau, in addition to receiving food and beverages, the guests also expected the host to provide him with labor at a future date. Therefore, a host most likely will end up providing not only food but also labor in the long run if only because he wants to obligate others to return labor he previously invested in their gardens.[6] Laguerre (1975: p. 6) found the same tendency in other regions of Haiti: Mirebalais (Center Department), Léogane (West), Pont Sondé (Artibonite), Fonds-des-Nègres (South), and Ile de la Gonâve (West).

Such patterns of conduct in konbit exchange fits theoretically, on the one hand, with what Molm, Quist and Wiseley (1994: p. 102) noted recently about reciprocity:

> Reciprocity consists of "three elements: (1) each actor's behavior is *contingent* on the other' s (2) acts are repaid by *functionally equivalent* acts (good by good …) and (3) the values of the outcomes received by each actor are approximately *equal*".

On the other hand, it also fits empirically with what Laguerre (1975: p. 24) observed, that is: "[konbit] reciprocity can exist at four possible levels: labor-power, money, material amenities, or favors… The most important reciprocity is that of labor power against labor power…"

In light of the above, festive work party has to be seen as an event with another event as "functional equivalent," both events being organized by two sets of cultivators whose level of commitment to the norm of reciprocity forcibly varies.[7] Thus, Moore errs by equating social relations among people (as it occurs in reciprocal labor group and konbit) with their value orientation (people's commitment to the norm of reciprocity) across two different kinds of collective labor transactions: either konbit or exchange labor. His perspective goes against that of such theorists as Goode (1968, p. 102) and Wallace (1974). The first because he advocates that priority be given to the process of exchange transaction qua exchange over normative commitment (or value orientation) in explaining social conduct; the second because he considers as social "who is doing what with or against whom" and as cultural (or normative) "who is thinking, feeling or perceiving with or against whom[8]." Following the above, one can see that the issue of reciprocity should be recast in such a way as to *not* be coterminous or fused with the nature of a particular group (sosye versus konbit). Whereas an exchange labor (or reciprocal labor) group can be used as proxy for *social* commitment to the norm of reciprocity, it cannot be used as a standard to measure the level of reciprocity in konbit.

Thus, rather than assuming that reciprocity is loose or absent in konbit and stringent in exchange labor groups as Moore suggested above, the perspective which is taken here will analyze konbit transactions by looking at what happens between actors with forcibly varying levels of *personal* commitment to the norm of reciprocity, *as expressed by their status as konbit organizers or konbit contributors*. Thus, instead of taking reciprocity in festive labor as a given, it becomes rather an emergent property of exchanges occurring between konbit organizers. This new perspective will search for the elasticity of the reciprocity process in konbit transactions among sets of cultivators with forcibly differing ranks and personal commitments to the norm of reciprocity. Therefore, one can talk about reciprocity proper in konbit where cultivators are both organizers of, and contributors to, konbit with food and beverages being exchanged against labor.

To what extent did commitment to the norm of reciprocity (as indicated individually by cultivators' status as konbit organizers or konbit contributors) sustain konbit exchanges? Were konbit organizers more likely to contribute konbit after they had organized one, regardless of their rank? And, were well off cultivators less likely to contribute konbit than their counterparts if they had organized one, even if they were affiliated with a reciprocal labor group? Did group commitment to the norm of reciprocity (as indicated by sosye membership), countervail the potential subverting effect of rank upon konbit exchange?

This set of questions leads to the analysis of the dynamics interplay of konbit contribution and konbit organization in the light of local stratification system and local groups' commitment to reciprocity. Thus, if, for example, one were to place organizers and non-organizers of konbit under different conditions with respect to their affiliation with sosye, and could show that both tended to contribute konbit less as non-members, one would be in a position to confirm definitely that sosye group pressure (which originated outside cultivators' statuses as organizers or non-organizers of konbit) was responsible for konbit reciprocity or unilateral konbit contribution and not their personal commitment to the norm of reciprocity[9] (Blau, 1983: pp. 76-98).

Working Hypotheses

From the above, I draw the following two hypotheses: Since members of sosye were the prime advocates of labor reciprocity, I expect those who had organized konbit to contribute konbit more than those who did not (H-1). Since people with larger material means can get by with more deviation than others, I expect them to contribute konbit less after they had organized one, even if they were members of exchange labor groups (H-2). As stated earlier, these hypotheses will be tested in the context of the Central Plateau of Haiti.

Research Setting

The Central Plateau, one of the nine geographical departments of Haiti, is located in the Center Department.[10] Its population numbered some 485,725 inhabitants in 1987, that is roughly 8% of the country's total population of 6.4 million.[11] Of the seventeen watersheds delineated by the Organization of American States (OAS) mission in the Central Plateau of Haiti, I carried out field research in five of these: Cange, Félician, Thomonde, Rio Frio and Fond Bleu. The first four watersheds form the lowlands and Fond Bleu, the highlands. About 70% of the local residents lived in the lowlands (from Cange to Rio Frio) and 30% in the highlands, Fond Bleu. All of those watersheds regrouped many villages; one of the three villages located in the highland of Fond Bleu by the name of Figuier stood out as being a reservoir of sellers of labor. Figuier harbored a more extensive collective practice of labor and a larger pool of food staples as compared to the other villages; according to local residents, it was better off on the whole.

The data revealed that the heads of households cultivated an average of 1.71 carreaux[12] in the lowlands, and up to 2.64 in the highlands; cultivated, on the average, 2.27 plots in the lowlands, and up to 2.83 in the highlands. About one half of the respondents (N=840) were small peasant landowners with no more than two carreaux of land; one eighth of the sample was large landowners with more than two carreaux; however, a substantial minority of cultivators (14%) were owners and renters, or small owner-sharecroppers. Most of the watersheds' residents grew corn, sorghum, beans, sugar cane and coffee on small, scattered plots (of less than one hectare) using rudimentary technology such as hoes and machetes and sold their produce on three local markets of which two were located in the highlands, Madame Joie and Maissade, and Thomonde in the lowlands.

Research Methods

In 1987, I carried out a rural socioeconomic survey of 840 people over a seven day period in five of the above watersheds on behalf of a local organization (Haitian Center for the Development of Human Resources), which had selected them as being the most representative of the seventeen of the Central Plateau watersheds. After drawing a systematic sample from an incomplete listing of the heads of households, I led a team of 30 local interviewers that I had previously trained into conducting questionnaire interviews in the lowlands and in the highlands. To account for "interval deviations" in the sampling method, an experienced statistician weighted the sample according to type of soil and size of population. Thus, the team collected a total of 840 heads of household questionnaires with 60% in the lowlands and 40% in the highlands. Preliminary analysis of the data led me to carry out qualitative interviews on various labor transactions three years later in order to depict their inner dynamics.

A Creole questionnaire facilitated its use by the local interviewers whose level of education did not go beyond high school. All labor forms were measured over the agricultural season preceding the interviews and coded as dummy variables. For instance, for reciprocal labor and festive work party, I directly asked the following questions: (1) did you participate in any sosye this season? (2) did you participate in any konbit this season? and (3) did you have people coming in any konbit this season? Positive answers received a score of one; negative answers a score of zero. I built an economic scale to analyze the data on the basis of land that cultivators bought and inherited[13] and their main gardens because of the special "treat" they usually gave to that plot. Animals and tools[14] that cultivators owned were added to the scale, after I dichotomized them as one (1) indicating ownership of a tool or animal and zero (0) non ownership. The access to cash scale built with those items had a reliability of 0.62.[15] The scale varied from 1 to 12 with a mean of 4.84 and a standard deviation of 2.05. Values 1 to 4 (below the mean) indicate <u>low</u> access to cash (N=407). Values of 5 and 6 (up to one standard deviation above the mean) indicate <u>medium</u> access to cash (N=229), and the values of 7 to 12 (more than one standard deviations above the mean) <u>high</u> access to cash (N=191).

Findings and Discussion

Overall Labor Situation in the Central Plateau

Whereas about one-third of all cultivators (32%) sold labor, close to one half of them reported having bought labor (45%). Overall, there were locally more buyers than sellers of labor, the reason being cultivators could go elsewhere to sell labor. Those who bought labor were roughly equal in the highlands and in the lowlands (respectively 45%, N=335; and 42%, N=503). Those who sold labor in the highlands represented more than twice those who did in the lowlands (respectively 50%, N[16]=334; and 19%, N=494). The general availability of food in the highlands added to its "surplus" of manpower which led to a rather extensive practice of collective labor in one of the highland villages, Figuier. Of all the cultivators in the watersheds studied, about half (52%, N=837) had organized konbit; close to half (46%) were members of reciprocal labor groups; two fifths (42%) had contributed konbit. There again, the highlands differed from the lowlands: in the highlands, almost two thirds contributed konbit (63%), four fifths (83%) organized konbit, two thirds (67%) were affiliated with an exchange labor group, whereas in the lowlands, only one third (32%) organized konbit, one third were members of reciprocal and less than one third (28%) contributed konbit.

The Haitian Konbit

I will depict the Haitian konbit by contrasting it to the Haitian sosye since both are collective labor endeavors, which gives rise to the disbursement of material amenities. Melville Herskovits (1952: pp. 100-01), for example, provides a vivid description of the traditional Haitian konbit in the following terms:

> A working party is organized when a person having a field to be cleared passes the word that he wishes to have a *combite*, as such a group is termed, to come do the work. At the same time the host prepares food for a feast... As the workers gather, their labor is supervised by one individual… The workers, each with his hoe, form a line, and there is always at least one, sometimes two and, in a very large *combite*, three drums to mark the rhythm for the songs and to set the beat for the hoes. In a single afternoon a field of several acres can be completely denuded... by a group of <u>sixty-five</u> workers (emphasis added).

The traditional konbit, as described by Herskovitz, was still in existence in the Central Plateau (CP) under the name of gwo konbit (large konbit). As a voodoo priest and traditional carnival band leader of 51 years of age who resided in the lowlands, Marc declared having organized in 1990 a konbit of 60 people. On the other hand, as a younger cultivator of 21 affiliated

with the Baptist Church, Jacques organized at the same time a small konbit with about 17 people in the lowlands, many of whom were members of his sosye group. These two konbit organizers reported having musicians playing in their festive work parties; they both hired travayè[17] to polish up the job done by the konbit.

Whereas in the Central Plateau of Haiti a konbit was generally an occasional gathering of cultivators, a sosye was a group of no more than seven people who were exchanging labor among themselves. Participants in a konbit exchanged a day of labor for food and beverages; members affiliated with a sosye rotated days of labor among themselves *qua* cultivators with food and beverages being optional. In addition to raising cash, sosye members very often sold their labor as squad and rotated the total cash collected among them. The differences extended also to the functions these two labor groups fulfilled. Cultivators mobilized a konbit work party in the Central Plateau when they needed to rapidly remove hard weeds from their plots. They usually divided the workload among themselves by using a rope to ensure that all participants contribute their share to the total labor output needed for the job (bay pak). Such a strategy allowed them to control free riders and hangers on;[18] nothing of that sort occurred in a sosye, since it had a small size and the work performance was based largely on trust. Thus, the contribution of the latter became readily visible as well as their skills and reliability as agriculturalists. The events, which took place during a konbit, also showed its difference with sosye. Sosye members cooked their own food and did not hire musicians while they were working, whereas konbit participants did not cook their own food but had women doing the job and usually hired musicians to mark the rhythm of their work. In spite of all the differences, there was still some common ground between reciprocal labor group and festive labor work party. Although trust was not as binding in konbit as it was in sosye, local informants maintained it also sustained the process of reciprocity in konbit. To be sure, for the exchange of konbit between cultivators to withstand, one can presume that it had to be based on a certain amount of trust and commitment; however, to what extent were these criteria enough? The following analysis will put such speculation to the test.

***Testing Hypotheses about Konbit Reciprocity**:*

Hypothesis 1

To reiterate, H-1 stipulated that konbit reciprocity was a positive function of cultivators' membership in exchange labor. Thus, I expect members of sosye who had organized konbit to contribute konbit more than non-members.

Table 1: **Percent Contributing Festive by Organizing Festive by Membership in Reciprocal Labor Group**

M.	Members	Non-Members	Percentage Difference Total	Member-Non
Organizers	86% (289)	23% (149)	64% (438)	+63%
Non-Organizers	38% (97)	10% (305)	17% (402)	+28%
Total	74% (386)	15% (454)	41% (840)	+59%
Percentage Difference Organ.-Non Organiz.	+47%	+13%	+47%	
Gamma	.81	.44		
Chi square	.00	.00		

Table 1 column 3 shows that organizers of konbit contributed konbit almost four times as often as non-organizers (64% versus 17%; rows 1 and 2). The strong overall effect of being an organizer of konbit or contributing konbit is indicated by the total percentage difference between the two rows (+47%; see column 3, row 4). Such results support Laguerre's thesis about the existence of an *individual* commitment to the norm of reciprocity in konbit as well as the declarations of Central Plateau informants. However, factoring the sample according to whether people were members or non-members of reciprocal labor groups, one can see that the effect stays the same among the members (+47%; see column 1, row 4), whereas it declines sharply among the non-members (+13%; see column 2, row 4). Thus, the strong positive effect of organizing konbit on contributing konbit was highly conditioned by cultivators' being members in a reciprocal labor group. Such an effect is social inasmuch as it was the group commitment that reinforced cultivators tendency to return konbit (86% versus 38% as opposed to 23% versus 10%; see columns 1 and 2). That is the reason why, once the social effect is removed (via non-membership), the individual level of commitment to the norm of reciprocity (as expressed by cultivators' status as organizers of konbit) dramatically decreased (from 86% to 23%). The above considerations strongly support hypothesis 1 (H-1) which predicted that sosye members would act as advocates in ensuring konbit reciprocity.[19]

The fact that among non-organizers of konbit (row 2), group commitment to the norm of reciprocity (as expressed by affiliation with a sosye group) increased cultivators' contribution to konbit (38% versus 10%) had to do with the competitive edge that members of sosye gained on the rural labor market as agricultural workers who sold labor in squads. Indeed, group commitment to contributing konbit had a very positive substantial effect (+28%), holding constant individual status as non-organizers of konbit. On the other hand, looking at row 1 of table 1, one can see that the effect of being a sosye member on contributing konbit among organizers of konbit (in other words, konbit reciprocity) was very strong, as accused by the high percentage difference between members and non-members (+63%). This is due to the fact that members of reciprocal labor group contributed konbit almost four times more than non-members (86% versus 23%; row 1). This finding is an extension of Laguerre insofar as it takes the effect of labor exchange-group membership (i.e. social commitment) on konbit reciprocity. But what explained empirically such a result?

To be sure, being a member of sosye increased the chance of participating in konbit since the demands to do so could come from various close associates who themselves were contributing. Given the small size of exchange groups (no more than 5 to 7 members), the constraint to reciprocate konbit may have been very strong on each member to conform to the will of the group. After all, participating in a konbit was not an isolated act: as members of the same squad, participants joined their sosye group in contributing konbit because they probably expected to be hired as laborers by konbit organizers. This interpretation is valid insofar as the effect of membership in a reciprocal group upon konbit contribution, among konbit organizers, got stronger as their socioeconomic rank increased. To show such a pattern, I inserted the rank of konbit organizers in the original three-way relationship; this allows me at the same time to test the second hypothesis that reciprocity of konbit would vary with rank.

Hypothesis 2

The second hypothesis stipulates that reciprocity of konbit would vary with rank. More precisely, high ranked cultivators should be less likely than low ranked to contribute konbit after they had organized one, even if they were members of reciprocal labor groups. To test this hypothesis, access to cash was introduced into the original three-way relationship so that comparisons could be made across rank, while controlling for reciprocal labor affiliation.

Table 2a: Percent Contributing Festive by Festive Work Parties by Access to Cash and Reciprocal Labor

Panel A : Non-member of Reciprocal

	Access to Cash				
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
	Low	Medium	High	Total	Percentage Difference
1) Organizers :					
	33%	25%	15%	24%	-18%
	(45)	(44)	(59)	(148)	
2) Non-Organizers :					
	11%	10%	10%	11%	-1%
	(167)	(61)	(71)	(299)	
Total	16%	16%	12%	15%	-4%
	(212)	(105)	(130)	(447)	
3) Percentage Difference: Non-Organizers	+22%	+15%	+5%	+13%	
Tau b:	.00	.04	.25		

Panel B : Member of Reciprocal

	Access to Cash				
	Low	Medium	High	Total	Percentage Difference
4) Organizers :					
	88%	76%	94%	80%	+6%
	(133)	(91)	(54)	(298)	
5) Non-Organizers :					
	55%	13%	0%	38%	-55%
	(58)	(31)	(6)	(95)	
Total	78%	60%	85%	69%	+7%
	(191)	(122)	(60)	(393)	
6) Percentage Difference: Non-organizers:	+33%	+63%	+94%	+42%	
Tau b:	.00	.00	.00		

Table 2a shows that, among members of reciprocal labor group (panel b), high ranked konbit organizers (contrary to hypothesis 2) contributed konbit *more* than low and medium ranked (respectively 94%, 88% and 76%; compare columns 1, 2, 3 and row 4). Such a pattern runs contrary to all expectations. Why would high ranked organizers of konbit end up contributing konbit more than low ranked, once they were members of reciprocal labor groups? Among members of reciprocal labor groups who had organized konbit, the effect of high rank increased but only slightly konbit contribution (+ 6%; row 4, last column of panel b), that is, konbit reciprocity. Such a conclusion gives a severe blow to hypothesis 2, which predicted that high ranked konbit organizers would be more prone not to reciprocate konbit, even if they were members of reciprocal labor groups. This conclusion stands out even more, when one looks at the effect of rank on contributing konbit among organizers who were *not* members of reciprocal labor groups (panel a). Indeed, one can see the opposite pattern prevailed: konbit contribution overall decreased as a result of rank differentials (-18%; row 1, last column). Thus, high ranked konbit organizers contributed konbit less than low and medium ranked (respectively 15%, 33%, and 25%), a pattern which supports hypothesis 2. Thus, as expected, access to cash had a negative effect on konbit reciprocity, but only among non-members of reciprocal labor groups. Indeed, the more organizers of konbit had access to cash, the less they contributed konbit, provided they were not members of reciprocal labor groups. The declining level of konbit reciprocity (not the effect as indicated by percentage differences), however, tended to be low as compared with that of panel b (see 15%, 25%, 33% versus respectively 94%, 76%, 88%). Such a finding helps specify the key place that reciprocal labor groups have in the understanding of konbit reciprocity dynamics; they seem to have made all the differences. Still, why would high ranked cultivators reciprocate konbit more than low or medium rankers, once they were affiliated with an exchange labor group? This finding goes against *all* theoretical expectations in view of the fact that high rankers should resist pressure on contributing konbit. To interpret such findings, one has to contrast the *effects* of membership in sosye versus that of rank on konbit, and the contributions among organizers and non-organizers of konbit, as indicated by Table 2b.

Table 2b: **Percentage Differences between Members-Nonmembers of Reciprocal in Contributing Festive**

	Access to cash		
	Low	Medium	High
Organizers	+55%	+51%	+79%
Non-organizers	+44%	+3%	-10%

Table 2b shows that in-group pressure and rank tended to have different effects depending on whether cultivators were organizers or non-organizers of konbit: when cultivators were organizers of konbit, the principle of konbit reciprocity got reinforced by being members of reciprocal labor groups, particularly at the extreme height of the socioeconomic ladder. The effect of membership in those groups on konbit reciprocity was intense in all strata but intensified progressively with rank level (+55%, +51% and +79%; see row 10).[20] Thus, deviation from the norm of konbit reciprocity, which should have been induced by higher rank according to hypothesis 2, was severely curtailed by sosye peers who acted as third parties in fostering the return of konbit. Reciprocal group members seemed to have done so more strongly against those

organizers whose rank dictated not to reciprocate konbit. One plausible interpretation relies upon the following: as sosye members could also sell labor as squads, they tended to promote the return of konbit in direct relation to the land resources controlled by konbit organizers, thereby increasing their own chance of getting hired as laborers in future agricultural endeavors. On the contrary, when cultivators were not organizers of konbit, the effect of sosye membership on their contributing konbit declined sharply with increasing rank (+44%; +3%, -10%). In-group pressure coming from sosye peers to contributing konbit was reinforced among low ranked cultivators and dampened among medium and high ranked cultivators since the latter, contrary to the former, were not potential laborers when better off cultivators could be hired for agricultural jobs. Thus, since low cultivators, as sosye members, were most likely to be sellers of labor in squads, the effect of membership in sosye on contributing konbit was strongly reinforced among them (+44%)m even when they did not organize konbit. Therefore, group pressure to contributing konbit faded away with high rank (-10%) in accordance with Goode's theory of deviation from social norms as being a direct function of rank.

Discussion: The Effect of Rank versus Normative Commitment on Reciprocity in Konbit

Subsuming the pattern of konbit reciprocity under theoretical principles, one may reason the following: "given the lack of role differentiation in a peasant society like Haiti, role relations would tend to be unspecific" (Goode, 1968: p.15). Therefore, cultivators who were members of reciprocal labor groups will tend to carry over into konbit the same expectations about reciprocity which permeates those groups. Consequently, they would put pressure on those who had organized konbit to contribute. Hence, the spread of reciprocity should occur in konbit, regardless of rank level. Still, in-group pressure would explain why konbit organizers- qua members of particular sosye group- contributed konbit more than non-organizers, but not why they did so unexpectedly, even much more once their economic rank was on top of the ladder. Therefore, another explanatory principle should be called upon to deal with this contradictory pattern.

The data revealed that whether they were members of a sosye or not, organizers of konbit bought labor more than non-organizers.[21] The competition between various sosye groups for agricultural jobs coming from organizers of konbit induced each group to exhibit the same behavior as its competitors in order to avoid losing an edge to them; contributing konbit was a typical behavior to ensure such an edge. Thus, whenever a sosye group contributed konbit, another group would do the same because all groups expected to be hired as squads by organizers of konbit.[22] As Laguerre (1975, p. 25) reminds us, such hiring occurred also in konbit work party endeavors and not only in agricultural jobs. Thus, the fact that organizers of konbit bought labor more than non-organizers helps to explain the contradictory patterns presented in Table 2b. Among contributors of konbit, who were also members of reciprocal labor groups (that is, where the norm of reciprocity prevailed), the competitive struggle for jobs between structurally equivalent[23] actors was fiercer as one moved up the economic ladder. Therefore, sosye members tended to reinforce the norm of konbit reciprocity because contributing konbit created job opportunities for them, and these opportunities increased with the rank of their potential providers of labor.

Since the above interpretation relies on the fact that konbit contributors, as members of sosye, had a better chance to sell their labor in squad to other agriculturalists, it is rather convenient now to test the relation between the sale of labor, konbit contribution, sosye membership, and konbit organization. Given their potential relevance, I have included these other variables in the analysis:

age, context and number of plots. Age because it can determine the energy output of cultivators; context, because sale of labor varied greatly with the dichotomy lowland/highland; number of plots, because I presumed cultivators would prefer to work on their land (to discharge their own workload) rather than sell labor if they could raise enough cash to live.

Effects of Contributing Konbit on Labor Sale

The above analysis holds insofar as the data revealed that konbit contribution and membership in sosye positively determined the sale of labor. Indeed, looking at the logistic regression of labor sale on the variables[24] in Table 3, one can confirm the above interpretation:

Table 3: **Coefficient for the Logistic Regression of the Sale of Agricultural Labor on Selected Predictors**

Predictors	Coefficient	Standard Error	Odds
1. Contributing Festive	.533*	.21	1.70
2. Reciprocal Labor Group	.951***	.21	2.58
3. Age	-.01	.10	.98
4. Context	1.24**	.18	3.47
5. Land Owned	.361	.21	1.43
6. Tenancy	.769**	.20	2.15
7. Sharecropping	1.03***	.27	2.79
8. Number of cultivated p lots	-.499**	.09	.60
Intercept	-2.49***		
Chi square (d.f.=8)	209.1***		
-2log likelihood	824.0		
Initial log likelihood	1033.1		
Number of Cases:	833		

** =p<.01
*** =p<.001

Cultivators who contributed konbit were almost one time more likely (odds=1.70) to sell labor than those who did not. Such findings lend credence to my analysis which sees contributing konbit as opening up opportunities for cultivators who wanted to sell their labor. Because contacts among cultivators in contributing konbit were looser than among sosye members, I can presume with Granovetter (1973), that it generated extensive connections with other cultivators and facilitated cultivators 'quest for agricultural jobs. Individuals as well as groups participated in konbit and were given a chance to prove themselves as laborers by their peer participants. Those who were suspected of being lazy were assigned a piece of grass to till by themselves (bay pak). Therefore, participants had occasions to gauge one another as agricultural workers. This process of reciprocal evaluation was one of the best ways that laborers had to market their skills while contributing konbit.

When cultivators were affiliated with a sosye they sold their labor about one and a half time more easily than otherwise (odds=2.58). Thus, affiliation with a sosye was much more important in securing a job than contributing konbit, probably because sosye members also sold their labor as squads, even though konbit at times (Laguerre, 1975) as indicated above. Cultivators of the highlands were about two and a half times (odds=3.47) more likely to sell their labor as compared with those of the lowlands. This was due especially to Figuier, one of the highland villages which, as I mentioned earlier, harbored a "reservoir" of sellers of labor.

Finally, all land related variables, which indicated poor access to cash (tenancy and sharecropping), had significant effects on the sale of labor. This finding confirms a generally accepted view in the literature on peasantry that poor or medium cultivators were more prone to sell their labor powers than high rank cultivators (Laguerre, 1975; Murray, 1977). It also supports our interpretation of reciprocal group effects on contributing konbit being the strongest upon low ranked cultivators because they were potential sellers of labor.

Conclusion

By recasting reciprocity in konbit as a result of an exchange between two konbit events, this paper discloses the existence of a stringent norm of reciprocity in konbit, in accordance with Laguerre's perspective. Thus, unlike what has been described in the literature on agrarian labor, reciprocity does exist in konbit, once it is seen not only as an isolated event but as an exchange between two sets of konbit transactions, each one including one konbit organizer and many konbit contributors. The fact that organizing konbit determined contributing konbit, and vice versa, this research also supported the existence of reciprocity in festive work party.

The indirect effect of konbit organization (via reciprocal labor) on konbit contribution, however, indicates that individual commitment was not enough to sustain the norm of reciprocity in konbit, but pressure coming from sosye acting as a third party also played its part. Thus, both external constraints from sosye peers and cultivators' commitments were responsible for konbit reciprocity. Whereas individual commitment was curbed by rank in explaining konbit reciprocity, group commitment did not, insofar as it reinforced a rank effect upon konbit reciprocity. Since reciprocal group members sold labor as squads, by contributing konbit they increased their chance of getting hired for agricultural jobs. Members of reciprocal labor groups, therefore, contributed konbit not so much because they owed konbit, but because by doing so, they created obligations on the part of konbit organizers to hire them for future agricultural jobs. Generating obligations in a partner to increase one's chance of getting rewarded by another person is indeed one of the fundamental principles of social exchange (Blau, 1983: pp. 205-31). With no employment agency in the Haitian countryside, cultivators seized the opportunity to prove directly to others how good they could be as agricultural workers in contributing konbit with the expectation of getting hired for future agricultural endeavors.

ENDNOTES

1. That is owned or occupied as renters (for example).
2. Local lexicon varies per region for labor forms.
3. After the Haitian Revolution against the French in 1804, some Haitian Generals tried unsuccessfully to mobilize labor for agriculture via force. For a full description of such cases, see Paul Moral (1978, pp. 17-40) ; they are not included in the following analysis because they seem to occur rather incidentally.
4. 'Le combite n'est pas un simple don de son temps de travail sans réciprocité de la part du propriétaire. Ce don exige de la part du propriétaire un contre-don effectif ou latent… Dans le combite nous sommes au cœur d'un système de réciprocité… Le travailleur qui prend part au combite de son ami s'attend à ce que cet ami vienne l'aider quand il organisera son propre combite, Cette attente se fait et est comprise quand les paysans sont de même statut social.'
5. Thre are:'Invitation fermée', 'invitation ouverte', 'invitation mixte', 'invitation par le bouquet'.

6. The commitment is social in view of the fact that primary group is 'characterized by intimate face-to-face association and cooperation… The result of intimate association, psychologically, is a certain fusion of individualities in a common whole, so that one's very self, for many purposes at least, is the common life and purpose of the group' Cooley ([1909] 1962: 23ff) cited in Burt (1982, p. 37).
7. Thus, obviously, there has to be a limit on the quantity of festive a host could return to his guests due to time constraints on agricultural cycles. Thus, not all the hosts will return labor to their guests; neither could all the guests expect labor in return.
8. All things being equal, what Moore and the other students of agrarian labor cited above have depicted as reciprocity in festive labor would be according to Alvin Gouldner (1960, p.169) a mere case of complementarity and not of reciprocity because whereas the former requires that "…one's right" [say, in this case food and beverages] are another's obligation [labor]," the latter connotes that "…each party [the host and the guests] has both rights and duties [that is, the host should give food and beverages to the guests for labor and receive the same in return]…"
9. Wallace (1983: pp.54-132) refers to the first as "interorganismic physical behavior regularities"; and, to the second, as "interorganismic psychical behavior regularities.
10. This consideration draws upon Blau's "structural effects" (Blau; 1983, pp. 76-98).
11. Administratively, Haiti is divided into four concentric units: the Département, the Arrondissement, the Commune, and the Communal Section. The latter counts several unofficially recognized abitasyon which represent small compound of peasant households. Plateau Central, one of the nine Départements, is located in the center between the West and the Artibonite Départements.
12. Unofficial data from the World Bank reveals a similar figure for 1998.
13. 1 carreau=1h29 or about 3 acres.
14. I coded land inherited and bought after adding them up under three categories: 0=none; 1= up to 2 carreau; 2=more than 2 carreaux. Main garden gained a score of 1 for up to one half of a carreau ; a score of 2 for larger size.
15. Animals retained in the scale after I had conducted a reliability analysis included goat, chicken, horse, donkey, and mule; tools included pickaxe, axe, mattock. I coded goats as follows: 1=up to 2, 2=more than 2; chickens: 1=1-12; 2=more than 12. Horse, donkey and mule was coded as dummy variables with zero (0)equals none and 1 equals at least one.
16. That is the relationship between that scale and all other possible 8 item scales that one can build.
17. N=335 represents the total, which is those who bought and did not buy labor in the highlands. It is the same for all the Ns.
18. Agricultural worker working on a daily or a task basis.
19. Free riders would be those who managed to put in less of their labor power ; hangers on, those who just came along with friends. Note that passersby could also get into a work session. My personal observations in the countryside revealed that people usually tended to do that, particularly when the food was ready.
20. When the table was run with festive organization as the dependent variable, the same pattern was obtained (Data available upon request).
21. These figures are the percentage differences in contributing festive between members and non-members of reciprocal group across rank (Table 2a, row 4 minus row 1).

22. Available upon request.
23. According to Burt (1987: p. 1291), "The more similar egos and altar's relations with other persons are-that is, the more that alter could substitute for ego in ego's role relations...-the more likely it is that ego will quickly adopt any innovation perceived to make alter more attractive as the object or source of relations."
24. Burt (1983, pp. 362-363) has established the difference between patterns of interaction which focus on the reciprocal feelings of actors in a network (cohesion) versus that which describe common position of a dyad with respect to a third party (structural equivalence). For him, similarity of behavior and attitudes can occur even among people having no relation with one another as a result of their competition for rewards coming from a third party (Burt 1987, p. 1291). Therefore, when it came to selling their labor, all sosye members were structurally equivalent players insofar as they were enmeshed in a similar relational pattern vis-a-vis festive organizers who could also buy their labor. They all depended upon festive organizers because they had to compete as sellers.
25. Age is introduced because old cultivators cannot contribute festive as much as young cultivators ; context because the highlands were more fertile than the lowlands, they could facilitate participation in cooperative endeavors more than the latter ; number of plots are used because they represented cultivators' workload. Age has three categories : -35, 35 to 50, 50+. Number of plots vary from 1 to 8. Context is a dichotomy with highland equals 1. Cultivators receive a score of 0, if they did not have any land of their own (inherited or bought) ; a score of 1 if they had up to 2. 50 ha ; a score of 2 if they owned bore than 2.50 ha. Tenancy receive a score of 0 for cultivators who had no rented land ; a score of 1 for those who had up to 1ha 29 ; a score of 2 for those who had more than that. Sharecropping was coded as dummy, with 0 indicating no sharecropped land and 1 some sharecropped land.

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