The Many Faces of Peace: Rule of Law, Justice of the Peace, and Everyday Life in Haiti

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In Haiti, Justice of the Peace (JP) courts are supposed to promote peace by mediating local disputes. However, Haitians often bypass the courts due to inefficiency and safety concerns. People look to community leaders or religious figures for help instead. The Haitian concept of peace ("lapè") is complex and carries the weight of a violent history. JP courts seem distant from daily life, both geographically and in terms of language and procedure. Judges and clerks face limited resources and potential bias within their communities. Despite these challenges, Haitians continue to seek peace in their everyday lives.

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A Goat, Theft, and Evidence[1]

It is December 14, 2018; a gathering is taking place in the shadow of a leafy almond tree, in the courtyard of the Justice of the Peace (JP) court in a communal section in the lower Artibonite Valley. Nowadays, the infrastructure is out of use. In 2012, the department that was tasked with justice reform of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) had "renovated" the existing buildings and built a few others in order to enhance the court's capacity: a hearing room that would accommodate up to 20 people, a reception room, and an office for the appointed judge, the deputy judge, and two court clerks. The UN peacekeepers described their mission in these terms: "to counsel and provide technical support … to enhance the capacities of magistrates, judges of the peace, court clerks, and bailiffs, and to accompany the modernization of the Haitian legislation."[2] Only six years have passed and the floors of the building have already collapsed. Some members of the public who were standing on it when it collapsed were wounded. Moreover, the equipment furnished by the UN, especially the four air conditioners and a 32 kW generator, are broken, out of use, or stolen. The buildings were haphazardly planned and made, with scandalous negligence, out of cheap, precast material. The damage is such that hearings can occur only outside, under the blistering sun, and must be rescheduled if it is raining. In the face of the failure of the joint work of the state and the UN, the court employees and a group of citizens had come together in a collective effort and, without any help from the state, and had invested their own time and money to repaint the walls surrounding the yard and make it look "good." They also bought a new generator.

When Frederic, my host and friend, and I enter the courtyard, about 30 or 40 people are standing in a compact circle around two wooden benches, on which the conflicting parties are seated. Behind each one, two armed policemen wearing bulletproof vests, obviously bored, are slumped in metal chairs with earphones inserted in their ears, looking at their phones. The judge and the court clerk are seated in front of the contending parties. At his side, two attorneys are handling their notes and wiping the sweat off their faces. The plaintiff, a woman in her late 20s

or early 30s, complains that one of her goats (*kabrit*) is missing. She explains that she had inquired with the CASEC (Conseil d'Administration de la Section Communale) of the zone. The CASEC is the communal supervisory board, the very end of the chain of officials. People usually call the board members themselves "CASEC," and often confer with the chief of the board if they have any issue or grievance before they go to the police or to court. During their inquiry, the CASEC had found witnesses who had told them that this man, the accused (sitting on her left-hand side), had sold it and that the people who had bought it had already butchered and eaten the animal. Thus, she accuses that man, who is of more or less the same age, of having stolen one of her goats. Her attorney goes on to explain that in order to sell the goat, the legal procedure requires that the man would have needed a pass for the animal, as well as his own ID or birth certificate, which he had said he had lost. The title of acquisition of the animal is called *lese-pase pou bèt* ("pass for animals") and is issued by the Ministry of the Interior and Territorial Communities and the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development. Every commercial, as well as non-commercial (gifts, inheritances) transactions involving animals is supposed to be formalized by this mandatory document, which specifies the characteristics of the animal: the sort of animal in question (cow, mutton, horse, goat, donkey, mule, or pig), its official register number, its sex, color, and tagging, and its origin and destination. The document is numbered, and it declares where the transaction took place: in which communal section of which commune and in which department. The owner (*mèt bèt la*) has to write down his name, national identification number, address, and signature, as well as a testimony (*temwen*). It is also mentioned which CASEC is in charge of the communal section (with his/her phone number); the document is dated, of course.

In this case, it seems the man had usurped or invented another identification number, either because he did not want to be identified or actually had no ID, as he had claimed (the judge checks the ID the man had used to sell the goat and finds it does not exist in the records). The police arrested the man after the woman filed a complaint. The accused provides a line of defense that the woman has no evidence whatsoever and no proof of what she purports; her accusation is thus said to be totally unfounded. His lawyer asks bluntly, "Where is the body of the offense? Where is the corpse of the animal? You said that your goat had been stolen, sold, and slaughtered [insinuating that she might be lying and using the court to take advantage of his client]. Are you at least able to show us the skin so that we can certify that it is indeed your goat? No, you're not." She replies that she obviously does not have it, because she is not the one who slaughtered it, and time has passed, and the skin is now lost. The man's lawyer proceeds, "but then what makes you say that it's your goat?" Her lawyer replies that she knows that it's hers because of her inquiry with the CASEC and the corroboration of witnesses.

The contention evidently revolves around the problem of adducing evidence—the pass, the skin, and testimonies—which are the missing pieces. The man goes on to claim that the goat was his, that he had bought it when it was small and raised it, but that unfortunately the title had been lost. He adds that he also lost his ID and his own birth certificate (one of which at least is required to lawfully complete the transaction). At the time of the investigation, the woman who had bought the goat from the accused had showed the police agent that she did possess a pass, but it turned out that the registration number of the animal inscribed on it did not exist in the official register; nor did it match the number the man gave to the court.

Given the contradictory claims and the confusion—which triggers some jokes from the attorneys and the judge, and laughter from the audience—the judge decides to keep the man in

custody while an investigation is conducted. He had previously orally requested some hearings with the witnesses and the buyer, but they had all refused to show up in court. So, he now instructs the clerk to produce a formal invitation letter (which is the official way of summoning someone to the JP court). If they still refuse, the judge says, he will issue a subpoena and give the order to the police to coerce them to come to the court. However, that is surely no easy job, because they first have to find them and make it happen.

After everyone has left, Frederic and I sit down in the shade with the judge. We had asked him if he would be kind enough to spare us a moment, and he was happy to oblige. He tells us that he is highly suspicious of the man, because it seems very unlikely that he has suddenly lost all three documents at once (the pass, his ID, and his birth certificate). He also mentions the attitude of the man, which is not quite trustworthy, whereas the woman seems to speak with outright earnestness. Nevertheless, he adds, he is a judge and does not want to rely on his own impressions. Still, he tells us, it is quite clear to him: according to the way both parties pleaded, it looks to him like a common case of theft and the usual strategies of exculpation. The case will be easily settled in court, he says; yet he adds that the settlement might well not be that easily accepted by the parties, and that further issues could arise. That is not his problem anymore, though, unless they come back to the court.

We are here at the core of ordinary matters. Goat theft and killing are major issues in this region. People still practice free breeding on a large scale, even though it is formally forbidden by the law. Goats freely go about with three long sticks hanging around their necks in the shape of a triangle to prevent them from going through bushes and gates into the gardens. They still manage to find ways and do enter the fields. When they damage the plantations, the owner of the plot often either kills the animal, which might trigger a contention with the owner of the goat or reports the incident to local officials. If the animal was slaughtered, an agreement is usually found informally by negotiating the share of meat each party is to receive. The aggrieved party might also capture the animal and call the CASEC, who will keep the animal in a gated yard that precisely serves this purpose until the case is settled. However, it often happens that goats are also stolen. People might seek reparation for the wrong, but they might also be prompted to seek vengeance, or both. Theft easily triggers fury and rancor, which might not be easily diffused.

In a previous paper (Motta, 2020), I was interested in the effects of a murder committed as the result of a dispute over the irrigation of pea fields. In particular, I paid heed to the thresholds of violence and the thin line that marks the difference between concepts such as "dispute settlement" or "conflict resolution" and the everyday efforts to maintain a sustainable life, which cannot be spoken of in terms of "settlement" or "resolution." Rather, the making of a livable life often means having to go on, despite unavoidable violence and without being able to "resolve" anything. This norm is epitomized in expressions such as *nap brase* ("we're struggling"), or *nap goumen* ("we're fighting"). The focus was on seeing some conflicts as the visible face of long-lasting silent wars simmering beneath the surface. Many people have a history with each other, as well as with the state—a history fraught with violence of all sorts.

In this essay, I would like to take the matter up again by looking, this time, more closely at the concept of peace at work in the everyday lives of the people I met, as well as in the discourses promoting the rule of law and peacebuilding projects. A tenacious prejudice about Haiti is that the violence perpetrated on the island is endemic and deep-rooted: in other words, violence is culturally specific (Trouillot, 2003). Such a view not only tends to naturalize Haiti as a violent place, but also eclipses the role played by unending political ostracization, massive foreign

meddling in domestic policies, and unquestioned paternalistic discourses that invalidate Haiti's capacity to govern itself, all of which serve to keep Haiti subordinated. Ironically, this perception prompts foreign funders to sponsor programs and reforms supposed to contribute to ending the violence, which ostensibly hinders the development of what is called a "war-torn" or "post-conflict" (or "failed") state into a democracy; yet, as I will show below, the violence is sometimes stimulated, if not created, by these same funders' policies.

Haiti is known to have endured the presence of one of the biggest and most enduring UN peacekeeping forces in world history. In particular, between 2004 and 2017, the MINUSTAH occupied the republic, in the name of peace, with no less than 10,000 soldiers. The first sentence of the UN Peace Operations Year Review of 2004 reads, "[t]he year 2004 witnessed an unprecedented surge in UN peacekeeping operations, widening prospects for ending conflicts and raising hopes for peace in war-torn countries." Seemingly galvanized by the 2001 Nobel Peace Prize attributed to the UN and Kofi Annan "for their work for a better organized and more peaceful world,"[3] the review praises the UN's success at bringing "peace and democracy to Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique, and East Timor." Haiti is next.

As I continued reading more documents produced by UN agencies and other organizations, as well as academic articles on the subject, it soon became evident that a certain rhetoric on "peacebuilding" actually not only reinforced the belief that Haiti's main problem was its own culture of violence, but also promoted the rule of law as the necessary and unavoidable means by which Haiti would attain sufficient peace (or "stabilization," which is another word of the UN lexicon) to enable a democratic transition. Since Haiti was pictured as incapable of doing so itself, it needed the "help" of foreign forces. Hence, one aim of this paper is to expose the underpinnings of such discourse, as well as its effects on the ground. First, I will provide some details of the Haitian justice system and the way the Haitian people relate to it, in order to show empirically how the concept of peace is lived out in practice in this context. Second, this view from below will enable me to shed light on the structure of the argumentation, as well as on the assumptions underpinning international discourses, in order to show how far such a view is from what actually happens. The discrepancy between the ideology promoted from above and the daily reality that the people live in should inspire us to reflect on how such a mismatch actually enables forms of violence. I would like to finish by depicting another conceptual landscape. People carry on even in the ruins left behind by foreign "aid" (Katz, 2013; Schuller, 2012). They do not give up. They still strive for something they call *lapè* ("peace"), searching for moments of calm and quietude between the spans of overwhelming tension. The search for the fragile equilibrium that makes life livable continues interminably (Beckett, 2019). However, the Haitians' hopes are also often dashed, which can lead to violence (Kivland, 2020). Here, I argue, we must acknowledge the connection between foreign meddling and devastating disappointment.

The Justice of the Peace in Haiti

JP courts are particularly important as somewhat intermediary spaces between the people and the state. They operate in a gray zone; they are neither fully in line with the promotion of the rule of law conveyed by the Ministry and the Council in charge of the judiciary, which partly espouse the UN's incentive, nor do they fully adopt an alternative, more informal way of handling local issues. The JP courts comprise a kind of privileged theater in which the tensions related to the various inflections given to the concept of peace become visible.

The official and primary scope of the JP courts are to maintain relative peace within the community by offering a space for conciliation and mediation in local civil affairs. Their function is to adjudicate civil cases, settle disputes, and mediate arrangements supposed to prevent the escalation of tensions into private vengeance. Their mandate is to ensure civil peace and prevent civil conflicts from turning into criminal cases. As one might suspect, matters are far more complex. What "peace" actually means here is unclear; thus, it cannot be as evident as some might think that the courts necessarily contribute to maintaining it within the community, nor that people go to the courts to find some kind of peace (Rubbers and Gallez, 2012). To compound matters, in Haiti *lapè* is also a word that bears the weight of a long and dark history of violence.

The French system of the JP courts (*tribunaux de paix*), also called "proximity justice" (*justice de proximité*), was adopted in Haiti by President Jean-Pierre Boyer, who ruled between 1820 and 1843. The administration of the newborn country required the adoption of codified laws and a judicial system capable of not only managing internal affairs, regulating agriculture, and enforcing nationwide order, but also of streamlining production. The JP system, in coordination with the constables, the rural police, and the military, enabled him to quickly organize property rights and rationalize agriculture in order to generate wealth. In fact, his country was under great pressure after he had ratified the decree of April 17, 1825, issued by King Charles X, which stated that the inhabitants of the French part of the Saint-Domingue island had to pay off 150 million francs in order to indemnify the colonial settlers against compensation for what they had lost. Thus, Boyer, having neither time nor the means to invent and elaborate his own codes, implemented the Civil Code in 1825, the Rural Code in 1826, and the Penal Code in 1835, all largely drawn from the Napoleonic codes and other precedents. He slightly adapted them, though without any major changes. They have been amended many times, but never fully reformed, with the exception of the penal code (Collot, 2007; Dayan, 2004; Maguire and Freeman, 2017; Paisant, 2003; Ramsey, 2011; Schneider, 2018).

The JP courts were created in France in 1790 and, notably, conceived to uniformly enforce the new Civil Code on the whole territory, apply standardized procedures, and manage small litigation that would not threaten public order: that is, to keep in check potential disruptive conflicts (Follain, 2003). Their mandate was to handle all sorts of ordinary contentions by attempting to mediate, negotiate, and arrange situations rather than imposing sanctions or using coercive force. This new jurisdiction was characterized by simplicity, rapidly executed procedures, gratuitousness, and an effort to treat all parties equally.

In Haiti, the JP courts are presently at the forefront of the judicial system and play an important role in communal life, along with other institutions or habitual ways of handling contentions. People primarily defer to kin, friends, and neighbors, but also to the local notables, depending on the issues (Montalvo-Despeignes, 1976; Motta, 2020). Notables are usually older and respected men within the community, more rarely women: a retired official, a schoolteacher, an *oungan* ("Vodou priest"), a *manbo* ("Vodou priestess"), or a *doktè fèy* or *pè savann* ("old herbalists" and "wise men" considered to be guardians of traditions and ritual formulas); a priest, a pastor, or any clergyman; a CASEC; or the court clerk, the bailiff, or the *jij de pè* ("judge of peace"). Litigants rarely file a complaint at the police station because the police are not only feared by many and known to be inefficient but are generally absent. In most communal sections with which I am familiar, there is no police station to which one can report, except in my example, where it turns out that the court is a block away from the precinct. What prompts people at times to appeal to the court rather than to settle dispute with the help of other community leaders is a

complex matter. Before I explain it, let me briefly provide a few details about the overall organization of the judiciary, and the operational principles at the end of the chain.

The JP courts are managed by two institutions. First, there is the Ministry of Justice and Public Security (MJSP), whose mandate—fixed by a decree issued in 1984 under Jean-Claude Duvalier's fading dictatorship—is mainly to submit bills, organize the judiciary system, and control the courts. Second, there is the Superior Council of the Judiciary Power (CSPJ), created in 2007 under the occupation of the MINUSTAH and the second mandate of Préval, whose task is chiefly to nominate the magistrates; manage the material and financial funds; receive the magistrates' grievances; and provide information and recommendations about the state of the magistracy. According to a document produced in 2015 by the CSPJ, national territory is organized into 18 jurisdictions, each administered by a lower court. There are four main judiciary offices: the JP courts, the lower courts, the courts of appeal, and the court of cassation. Additional courts exist with specific functions: a juvenile court, a chamber for commercial matters, two special land tribunals, a labor tribunal, the superior court for auditors and administrative disputes, and a military court.

The territorial authorities of the Haitian state are organized in concentric circles. The smallest administrative unit is the communal section, the district and, finally, the department. The commune, in which I mainly conducted my research, has six communal sections and two JP courts. At the very end of the chain of officials are the CASEC and the communal supervisory boards, which are usually composed of three men: a chief, an assistant, and a secretary-cum-treasurer. Communal sections are, in fact, the backbone of social, administrative, political, and economic life in Haiti, even though it is nowadays largely marginalized and left behind.[4] Communal sections paradoxically place the CASEC at the forefront. They are usually people from the zones, elected by residents, and have a deep knowledge of the problems plaguing the community. They work closely with the JP courts and police (if any) and provide essential help with investigations and arrests.

A Blurry Concept of Peace

One morning, roughly a week after the session in court described above, I was waiting out in the courtroom of another section of the same commune. It was quiet. The sun was already pounding down hard on the tin roof. A court clerk was reading some documents in the office. The judge had not yet arrived. A lone woman, waving a piece of paper in front of her face, was patiently waiting for her case to be heard. She eventually left when it became obvious that the other party was not going to show up. The head of the three court clerks working in that JP court was also lingering, obviously bored, so we started to chat. He told me that he had been working in that particular tribunal since 2005. The court was full during his first years of work. "Now," he said, "people don't come any more. There is too much insecurity, and trust has been lost." He went on to explain that people feared bringing their disputes before the court not only because the courts and the police could not guarantee their safety, but also because appealing to the judiciary might worsen the issue. "Settling" a dispute in court might not be settling anything. Once the court sessions were over, he said, resentment between parties usually deepened. People often attacked each other afterwards, in one way or another, even though the case was supposed to be resolved. The court could not prevent people from getting even, and it did not have the means to be coercive. The clerk told me the accused, even when found guilty, often resisted and refused to comply. The judge, the clerks, or sometimes the police, could do nothing to force them to cooperate. Some

litigants just walked away under the eyes of the officials, ready to use force or violence to escape the clutches of the judiciary. According to him, people had no respect for the laws because they did not fear the institutions and tended, more and more, "to dispense their own justice" (*bay tèt yo jistis*).

A couple of weeks later, Frederic organized a one-day seminar on the theme, Democracy and Social Justice. In fact, he had been active in the community for many years, mentoring adolescents and organizing occasional activities for children, public forums, and workshops of many kinds. His commitment to the community had taken a new turn since, a few years before, he had opened his *lakay pen an* ("house of bread"), which he called a "social bakery." Not only did he welcome many young people, who came to buy sacks of bread or pass the time and with whom he had time to chat individually, but with the money he earned and the reputation he acquired, he also organized events he perceived to be mutually educational and, thus, a contribution to a peaceful community. His conviction was that education, knowledge, and awareness would help appease some of the tensions that plagued the community. Hence, he seized the opportunity of my presence to invite teachers, nurses, lawyers, artists, notables, and community leaders, many of whom I had come to know more or less already, for a one-day seminar held in a classroom of the school owned by his wife Angeline's uncle. He asked me to conduct the seminar, which I did.

One of the points of discussion revolved around what the court clerk had told me: justice and peace were essentially dealt with outside the courtroom. This point was unsurprising since it was obviously the case in many other parts of the world. Another was the way in which the litigation was addressed, often by notable locals, such as heads of schools, elderly community leaders, retired officials, or religious leaders, in places like someone's courtyard (*lakou*), in churches, in schools, in Vodou compounds (*oumfò*), or near specific sources of water, some of which are the homes of certain spirits (*lwa*) who help people to reach settlements. The participants also mentioned that certain moments of social life were important, such as the *jèn*—a particular Vodou ritual—during which participants create a space called *temwayaj* ("testimony") dedicated to the expression of disputes. This is something I had witnessed myself. Participants also expressed their reservations and a certain anxiety about unofficial means of doing justice, because many of these means were viewed as dangerous, getting easily out of control, potentially and ultimately leading to injustice, death, and further war. This is the case, for instance, when mobs are created and the logic of deadly vengeance is at work or when people recklessly or malevolently manipulate *fòs mistik* (mystical forces). However, it appeared that such dangers and effects had to be reckoned with if the community wanted to handle disputes itself. In the end, all participants emphasized that justice, social order, and cohesion were the product of education, culture, and collective intelligence rather than of law. The court simply did not appear to be such a site at which to find peace.

Yet, the picture is darker than first it appears. Local communities know all too well that the discourse of "peace" is also an instrument of power and a justification of violence that works more often than not against their interests. This knowledge obviously generates much resistance among the population. Indeed, the codification of the law, by enabling the settlement of the standards for homogenization and the rationalization of conduct, served from the very beginning to consolidate the centralized power (Cabanis et al., 1996; Gélin, 2007; Petit, 2003). Historically, "law proceeds from the state, namely from the legislative sovereignty of a prince or a nation" (Supiot 2009, p. 27).[5] Not only is the codification of law intrinsic to the centralization of the administration of power, but it is also partly designed to serve the interests of a ruling elite against those of the poor and the peasants (Payton, 2018).

There are deep historical and internal tensions between centralized authorities—whose attitude is defiant, authoritative, and predatory—and the islanders. However, the turf wars have been fueled largely by the outside. Hence, in such a context, rural residents have often responded by thwarting the state and its allies' attempts at control by creating alternative livelihoods.[6] Plausibly, the JP courts could be used today to keep an eye on local affairs and potential dissidence in areas out of the control of the state. After all, the initial scope of their implementation by Boyer was to keep records of what happened in the countryside (Schneider, 2018, p. 123). People today are generally quite aware of such a possibility, even though many are unafraid of JP courts, since the whole state apparatus lacks the means to enforce control and since the police cannot guarantee the safety of magistrates. This state of affairs strongly conflicts with the JP court's role as a peaceful arbitrator and its position as an actor that is supposed to be close to the population. The so-called justice of proximity is actually often far from home, and peace is often close to war. The courts are not only far from the homes of many people geographically, especially those who live *nan mòn* ("in the mountains"), they are also distant in terms of their language (French) and rationale, which is often alien to the everyday language (Creole) and rationale of the people. My example at the beginning of this paper shows, notably, how potentially alien to the people involved are concepts such as the probative value of a document or the burden of evidence, or a specific conception of causation (notably determined by the appropriateness of criteria). Yet, Haitians are nonetheless subjected to such language and rationales. The strong impression of alienness that emerges in certain key moments when the magisterial (and esoteric) legal language is disclosed in courts adds to the already deeply felt impression of remoteness that is generated by the state itself. Yet, in the JP courts, the use of formal language (usually in French) alternates with colloquialisms, jokes, undertones, sayings, and so on (in Creole), showing that the JP courts, for all the seriousness and technicality of the language of law they convey, are perhaps not so far from the playfulness of ordinary language.

How close to or far are the judges and attorneys themselves from the language of the institutions they represent? I personally witnessed (but it is also systematically underlined in various assessments of the judiciary in Haiti) that jurists sometimes do not possess the codes of law to which they refer, and, if they do, they often do not have the official standard but copies of codes or, even more often, compendiums of codes in which not every law is to be found. This is no surprise since the official codes are sold only in the few big cities and at prohibitive prices. The majority can barely afford the compendiums; thus, even in law schools, the courses are based on the copies and compendiums, since the students will hardly ever have the standard code in their hands. To this must be added the fact that some magistrates have not been to law school. Even if today the superior authorities try to appoint judges who have been lawyers, there is a lack of professional lawyers, according to some observers. However, this state of affairs is not necessarily problematic from the point of view of the people. As long as the magistrates at the level of the JP court can translate the law into their own words (regardless of whether the translation is accurate), it is somewhat acceptable. Furthermore, if the judges consider the specific problems people have (in contrast to high magistrates originating from the bourgeoisie, who often lack sympathy or feel disdain for the poor and the peasants), then it is even better. Most people hardly expect more from the courts. This is why the courts are seen as a buffer zone between the state and the people, also working with the community to forge a common language regarding, for example, respect, theft, dissimulation, reparation, lying, cunning, and so on, that is neither fully the language of the law nor fully everyday language.

Most of the judges and clerks of the JP courts I met tried their best; their effort is not in question. They did strive for peace within the communities in which they often lived. However, they were also subject to enormous pressures. They were themselves citizens and sometimes residents of the villages and neighborhoods in which they worked (or close by), and they were thus part of the everyday life and relationships within those communities. They too were entrenched and bound to cope with many forces they could not contradict. The specific potential for violence embedded in some of the cases could scare off a judge, as mentioned earlier. This is, notably, because the police do not have the means to fulfill their mandate. Many disputes occur far from the precinct, and it happens often that the police never show up as they fear for their own safety. Sometimes they take sides and decide not to intervene for partisan reasons. Often, they just have no gas in their pick-up, so unless someone sends them money via a cellphone transfer system, they will not move, or else, as they themselves told me, they might just be unwilling to sweat in vain.

The pressures on the *jij de pè* come from all sides. They are intimidated by the parties or the people in their surroundings. The bullying can be verbal, but also physical to some extent. For instance, the judge might be unable to reach the place he is supposed to inspect because a few men are standing firmly in the way with hoes, shovels, machetes, and hammers. Some judges I spoke to told me that sometimes men even push them physically, such as malevolently knocking their foreheads with their rigid index fingers, to make them step back. A common kind of threat used in the Artibonite is deemed "mystical" (*mistik*), which can take many forms. It is actually extremely telling that on the official webpage of the CSPJ, in the section devoted to presenting the professions linked to the JP courts, the *hoqueton*[7] is said to be the one who is not only is the janitor of the court, but also the "one who makes sure that nobody puts *pwa grate* and other sorts of spells [*sortilège*] in the office of the judge."[8]

Magistrates are also intimidated by the lawyers, who are known to also use occult means to pressure them and to influence a decision or a judgment. *Yo sonde w* ("they probe you"), which means they are influencing the power relation "on another level." Then *yo fè bagay* ("they do things"), implying that they use occult forces. If the judges are not careful enough, or not protected, they can easily succumb to the pressure. These are not small matters in Haiti. In addition, a major menace for their integrity comes from the streets and the political circles of influence that leverage their position with either bribes or direct physical threats (at the hands of henchmen). In the communal section in which I am conducting my research, the CSPJ suspended the appointed judge from the bar for five years after he ignored pressure from an influential senator and went on adjudicating a case involving that senator's nephew. The CSPJ was quick to suspend the judge, and most of the other judges and court clerks were muzzled. In more-serious cases, it is not uncommon that judges, clerks, bailiffs, or lawyers are assaulted, wounded, or sometimes killed. No later than August 28, 2020, Monferrier Dorval, the President of the Bar of Port-au-Prince, was assassinated in front of his home by anonymous shooters. Earlier this year, on June 19, Fritz Gérald Cerisier, the substitute for the government commissioner at the Port-au-Prince lower court, was shot dead in his car while driving through Bel Air. On March 3, two unidentified bikers shot dead bailiff Jean Fenel Monfleury close to Petionville's court of the peace. On January 7, Deputy Judge Antoine Luccius was similarly shot dead in Tabarre. This happened exactly a week after bailiff Bob Dolcine was killed by several shooters in front of the gate of Port-au-Prince's courthouse on Bicentenaire.

On January 8, 2020, the National Association of Magistrates and the Professional Association of Magistrates called for institutional guarantees for safety and a harmonious functioning of the judiciary. However, it is not clear who could guarantee the safety of jurists when policemen

themselves attack jurists. On January 19, 2020, the offices of human rights activist Samuel Madistin were attacked, and six vehicles in the parking lot were burned by hooded and armed men who were part of a violent crowd of angry policemen demonstrating in the streets in favor of the creation of a police syndicate and demanding the payment of unpaid wages. On March 9, Durin Duret Jr., a judge at the court of appeal of Port-au-Prince and a member of the CSPJ, was assaulted in his car by armed uniformed policemen demonstrating again for a union—they shot at his car while he was inside it, violently hit it, punctured the tires, and took his keys.[9] These are only a few examples among the many that show how pressured the actors of the justice system are.

The oppressive and deceptive character of the state is something most people are aware of and contend with on a variety of levels. Their disillusionment incites some to simply avoid all contact with the judiciary as much as possible, others tactically use these institutions for their own purposes, and still others fight them violently. Nevertheless, many express a strong yearning for a functional justice system, equal rights, and democracy. The dream of and hope for peace and a fair justice system working on behalf of the interests of the poor and vulnerable, rather than safeguarding the power of the elite, are very much alive (Appadurai, 2007; Kivland, 2020). These people aspire to something other than a justice system in tatters.

Some Deeply Rooted Assumptions About the Rule of Law

The particular role the JP courts are to play in society is notably defined by a certain conception of "peace"—and thus of what constitutes an offense, a settlement, a punishment, and so on—which may be more or less ideologically inflected, depending on who conceives it. Official discourses usually take the form of a "philosophy" of the justice of proximity: the JP system is said to contribute to the peace within the community because it said to be close to the people (attentive to their particular problems), simple (there is little paperwork), rapid (the aim is quick resolution), rather inexpensive, and equitable. Yet, the long-lasting foreign presence in Haiti has had considerable effects on the Haitians conception of peace. The money and energy invested in Haiti, especially by the UN, profoundly modified national institutions. For example, under the UN's supervision, the Haitian National Police force was created in 1994, then armed, trained, monitored, and developed with the assistance of foreign agencies, as remains the case today. Another example is the penal code, disclosed on June 24, 2020, which is soon to be followed by a new code of criminal procedure; several UN and bilateral agencies have contributed substantially to drafting them. A final example is the Magistrate School, provided by the Constitution of 1987, but which acquired legal status only on December 20, 2007, essentially under the UN's guidance. Some of these changes have been, from a certain point of view, a remarkable step forward (Carey, 2001). For instance, the Magistrate School is for women's rights, and their progression within the profession is an important achievement. The outdated penal code no doubt needed to be adapted to the reality of today, although there are serious doubts about the new version's adequacy. Moreover, a modern state is certainly unlikely to function without an adequate police force. That these were important matters to take care of in a modern state is hard to contest.

Besides institutional changes, the vocabulary used to describe the issues at hand was also modified. In recent years, the notion of "rule of law"—be it in the documents produced by governments or private agencies, or in the tremendous proliferation of academic journals and books (even though critical)—has become unavoidable (See, for instance, Albrecht, Aucoin, and O'Connor, 2009; Carey, 2012; Donais, 2015; Greenburg, 2017; Hauge, Doucet, and Gilles 2015;

Humphreys, 2010; Krever, 2011; 2017; Marcelin and Cela, 2020; McPherson, 2012; Mobekk, 2017; O'Connor, 2015; Wilets and Espinosa, 2011). The justifications for "peace-building" projects increasingly took the form of a promotion of the rule of law, which is supposed to guarantee human rights, enable good governance, lead to democratic transition, and stimulate the market economy. One domain of reform privileged by this liberal view is the justice system. Today, the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH in French) "will work, in an advisory capacity, with the Haitian authorities and the United Nations Country Team in Haiti in the area of governance, in particular by… assisting in the reinforcement of the Haitian justice system."[10]

After the end of the Cold War, but above all in the past two decades, this lexicon of constitutional liberalism entered the language of mainstream political discourse and international affairs, abandoning, "in the same gesture, another key aspirational vocabulary of the postwar settlement: social welfare and an accompanying register of solidarity, economic equality, social justice, and so on" (Humphreys, 2010, xii). The United States Institute for Peace (USIP), which is active in Haiti, could not be clearer; subsection 7.2 of the "Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction: Rule of Law," is titled, "*Why is the rule of law a necessary end state*?" In Haiti, government agencies (e.g. the UN Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC]), international financial institutions (e.g. the World Bank), bilateral aid agencies (e.g. U.S. Agency for International Development [USAID]), private foundations (e.g. the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation), NGOs (e.g. CARE), and the main organs of the UN (e.g. BINUH), all speak with one voice when it comes to promoting peace and decent human existence: the only path towards it is the rule of law; there is no doubt about that. In order to achieve that end, the judiciary needs to be monitored and reformed, and the courts have to be buttressed (UNODC, 2011).

There is an optimistic tendency among advocates of the rule of law to view the judiciary as the first line of defense against mayhem. For instance, Wilets and Espinosa (2011), by relying on a conception of the rule of law defined essentially by the World Bank and the United Nations[11], perceive the law as being simultaneously predictable, transparent (thus legible), and coercive, which enables governance and promotes order. As these authors write, "the United States and the United Nations have begun establishing conditions to promote and create the rule of law in Haiti" (Wilets and Espinosa, 2011, p. 211). Their article ends on an enthusiastic note:

> "The United States has played a significant role as well in promoting the rule of law in Haiti, and the U.S. has provided the means so that international organizations can conduct seminars advocating the rule of law and reinforcing fundamental principles of governance" (Wilets and Espinosa, 2011, p. 206).

America's imperialism has not yet uttered its last word (Katz, 2013; Schuller, 2012).[12] Moreover, their article makes clear that the promotion of the rule of law accompanies the promotion of capitalism and liberal values so that, faithful to the World Bank's injunctions, investments are encouraged. In short, the implementation of the rule of law in Haiti appears as the Trojan horse that smuggles in the laws that stimulate international free trade and secure (foreign) corporate interests, however, this trend is not new.

U.S. meddling persistently favors U.S. businesses. A telling example is Bill Clinton's farm bill—the Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 (the FAIR Act)—that stipulated the shift from subsidies to direct payment programs, notably for rice crops. Among the effects was an increase of export to Haiti, where the rice coming mostly from Arkansas (Clinton's home state) was underpriced and took over the local rice market (Kivland, 2020, p. 234, note 28):

> "Since 1995, when [Haiti] dropped its import tariffs on rice from 50 to three percent as part of the structural adjustment program run by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank [and under the influence of the U.S.], Haiti has steadily increased its imports of rice from the north. Today, it is the fifth-largest importer of American rice in the world… Haiti today imports over 80 percent of its rice from the U.S." (O'Connor, 2013).

By contrast, in 1980, Haiti was still self-sufficient. The adjustment plan was called the *plan lanmò* (death plan) by Haitian farmers. Another example of America's profitable trade provision is the "Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement Act of 2008" or the "HOPE II Act," subtitle D, part 1, titled "Extension of certain trade benefits," of the Public Law 110-246 enacted on June 18, 2008, by the 110th Congress. What I am rather interested in here is why this kind of ideological perspective on the rule of law is also seen as "essential to building peace in post-conflict states" (Wilets and Espinosa, 2011, p. 186), as if without the rule of law, "the written words of the Constitution [would be] trumped by political practice" (Wilets and Espinosa, 2011, p. 191). Are the authors surmising that Haitians are incapable of self-government?

This idea that the (ex-)colonized populations are not yet mature enough for self-government, and thus need the "help" that is given to them through structural adjustments plans, humanitarianism, the training of administrators, and so on, is not as outdated as some might think; it underlies many of the writings promoting the rule of law and peacebuilding (Humphreys, 2010). This paternalistic promotion of rule of law is itself the product of precisely the political maneuvering it is supposed to keep in check. Interestingly, but unsurprisingly, Wilets and Espinosa's perspectives relies on Manichean dichotomies that oppose, on the one hand, the government and the judiciary (as well as the police) and, on the other, "criminal gangs" (Wilets and Espinosa 2011, p. 196) and "criminal enterprises" (Wilets and Espinosa, 2011, p. 200); or, if you will, the good and the bad guys. Of course, the rule of law is meant to keep the good guys in. The authors' simplistic view justifies and legitimizes the promotion of a certain conception of peace that derives directly from their imagining the rule of law to be the superior and necessary device that secures order against anarchy, a view consistent with the Hobbesian idea that what makes the Law supreme is its unsurpassable capacity to prevent dog-eat-dog warfare.

In slightly different terms, this is the line followed by the authors of two briefings sponsored by the United States Institute of Peace—which also hosts the International Network to Promote the Rule of Law Community of Practice (Albrecht et al., 2009; O'Connor, 2015). The purported characteristics of backwardness are roughly described as being "endemic poverty," "corruption," "malfunctioning and weakness of the justice system," "high level of crime," "drug trafficking," and "uncertainty about what the law is." In short, the picture is this; Haiti, being in a state of anarchy and chaos, is a "failed state," hence, Haiti needs foreign aid to bring some law and order to this mess (Benda-Beckmann, 2007; Comaroff and Comaroff, 2006).

Old habits die hard. These prejudices, at best, exhibit their deep entrenchment, but they say very little about the everyday hardships Haitians face and even less about the extent to which foreign intervention engenders such chaos, not to mention the crimes committed by successive UN peacekeeping forces and state officials alike. These crimes include corruption, rape and sexual abuse, summary executions, property violations, theft, abuse of authority, illegal weapon resales, arson, drug trafficking, and false testimony, among others.[13] An example is given by Wikileaks documents dating back to November 20, 2006, that target the senator of the Artobonite

Youri Latortue, who is highly suspected of being implicated in drug, weapon, and other contraband trafficking, to be in cahoots with illegal armed groups (notably the Cannibal Army gang), to own illicit businesses (nightclubs and movie theatres), not to mention theft (of telephone poles and utility boxes), unfair competition, embezzlement (notably during the large-scale flooding of September 2006, when he intercepted and stashed food supplies and then redistributed them on his behalf for political interests). Latortue was President of the Senate when I met him a few times in 2017 and 2018. I have testimonial evidence that he used to grant favors to women who slept with him, such as giving them cash or helping them to find jobs.

The logic of the discourse is quite clear: law is supposed to guarantee order, order brings stability and security that leads to peace, and peace facilitates the transition to a democratic nation, which is the prerequisite for beneficial trade (Carey, 2005; 2012; Fatton, 1999; Krever, 2011). "The expressed intent" of building the rule of law in Haiti, according to the one briefing, is "crucially" to "ensure that the justice system serves all the people of Haiti (rather than the rich and powerful)" (Albrecht et al., 2009, p. 5). Such an endeavor is consistent with the 17 global objectives defined by the UN for sustainable development in the world, but also with the necessary conditions to achieve the rule of law defined by the USIP.[14] Most of these objectives are those of the BINUH in Haiti, among which is the promotion of "Peace, Justice, and Efficient Institutions" (objective 16) to guarantee the access of all to the judiciary. Such a tendency to view the judiciary as a privileged and democratic site, where litigations among citizens are resolved rests on a few conventional assumptions about disputes that I would like to challenge here.

The main idea from which this tendency derives is that peace is the product of a "resolution" or "settlement." Thus, first, it is assumed that a dispute has a definable beginning and ending. Second, that it can thus be precisely characterized. Third, once clearly characterized, decisions can be taken, and judgments made. Fourth, that through decisions and judgments, the dispute can be properly resolved. Fifth, that once resolved, it is over. Sixth, that the courts are exactly the place where this happens. And finally, that the courts necessarily contribute to the establishment of peace and order in the community. Such a view is coextensive of the broader dogmatic, transcendental, and functionalist picture of the Law as that which is vital, and thus necessary, to the regulation of human society: without it, society would be gripped by generalized civil war (Supiot, 2009, p. 24). But, have we forgotten that this picture was imagined by Hobbes as a working hypothesis, a fiction meant to elaborate a theory—a myth? However, disputes cannot be that easily defined; they are often signs of deeper conflicts. In fact, a feud might have started long ago and might continue long after. Sometimes, internecine divisions have existed for so long that one does not even know anymore why the people are fighting, and sometimes the unending cycle of grudges has begun only recently. At other times, issues are not so serious and are resolved rather quickly. In my initial example, we do not know when the contention really began or when and where it will end. Did it start with the theft? Or with the complaint? Or did the parties have former issues? Is one of them really seeking reparation or preparing to retaliate? Or is it a warning? And how sure can we be that, after a judgment and a punishment, the fight will not go on or even worsen? How much do we know? There is no doubt that delimiting the boundaries of a case is a matter of authority. In everyday life, there are no such clear-cut boundaries.

The normative perspective on the rule of law is of little help to understand the issues at stake in concrete cases or the complexity of the intertwining of power relations. To be sure, there are many cases in which the attitudes and actions taken by courts do exactly the opposite; that is, they contribute to blurring the characterization of a conflict. Moreover, not only do they sometimes *not*

contribute to resolving disputes, but they actually feed the feud and participate in the production of inequality, disorder, and violence. In a case I describe elsewhere (Motta, 2020), the court performs by its absence; the judge's refusal to take up the challenge posed by the conflict—his "wimpiness," according to the people outraged by his defection—contributed to the escalation of tensions. The doors and windows of the courthouse were nailed shut with wooden planks by one of the conflicting parties, firearms circulated freely among litigants, and the police did not dare to arrive, even though they were insistently called upon (which imparted an additional layer of impunity to those ready to be violent). Although bloodshed was avoided in this case, the judge's inaction could have led to a disaster. Obviously, it happens that the so-called peace court triggers hostility, deepens differences and inequalities, and conflicts with local ways of re-establishing some sort of calm and ordered coexistence (Beckett, 2019; James, 2010; Kivland, 2020; Marcelin and Cela, 2010). Are we so sure that we know what peace looks like and where it is to be found (in JP courts)?

Alternative Peace-Making

Conceptual boundaries are not as clear-cut as people often believe (Brandel and Motta, 2021). At some point, it becomes difficult to distinguish formal from informal—or official from unofficial—laws and procedures. Even if we can, they do meet at some point and absorb each other in the ordinary (Das, 2020, ch. 8). As shown in the examples, the court partly integrates everyday language and habits and unofficial ways of handling conflicts, and the people learn and incorporate into their lives some official procedures and ways of conceptualizing law and conflict resolution. Furthermore, legal actions can have the face of crime, and crime can be viewed as fully legitimate, as much as the law can be used to suspend rights and even institute the suspension of rights (Agamben, 2005). Similarly, peace might at times become the physiognomy of violence and oppression (Armstrong, 2014; Branch, 2014). Kivland (2020) shows, with much delicacy, how much young men in the *geto* desire justice, peace, and emancipation. She equally shows how these aspirations can themselves become modes of aggression and oppression that work against their goodwill. In the name of peace, violence is often said to be necessary. How else does one imagine *defans lejitim* ("self-defense") and the achievement of *jistis*? As Roland, a leader and political figure of the Bel Air *geto* says, "politics has never been about peace. How can you be about peace when the majority of people live in hunger? This is an agent of misery, not peace! ... we are here to defend our right to democracy. In Haiti, that means not just what's on paper but also who controls the bayonet. And for us the bayonet is the force of the street" (Kivland, 2020, pp. 112-113). Indeed, many poor people's claim to democracy goes with a sharp awareness that force and violence might be necessary to contest an unequal social order partly fueled by international meddling. I fully agree with Kivland when she questions "the presumed separation of violence and democracy" and aims to understand "the manifold and conflicting ways in which violence—as sign and practice—has been part and parcel of imagining, making, and maintaining contemporary democracies" (Kivland, 2020, p. 114).

This is why we should not be too quick to consider the JP court as the locus at which peace is to be found. We should be mindful that, if people dare to venture into a courthouse, they do not leave their ordinary lives outside the door. Moreover, once the session closes, peasants hurry back to the fields to irrigate before dusk; the youth hang around the crossroads, make jokes to pass the time, and wait for job opportunities; mothers start the fire to get the next meal ready before the children come home from school; some men look forward to finding a drinking companion to sip

rum and play dominos within the shade of a flame tree while others nervously think of a plan to retaliate. Despite all the goodwill of the judges, lawyers, and court clerks, the answer to the question of what will in the end diffuse a conflict and bring some kind of peace, no matter how provisory or durable, is out of their reach. This does not mean, of course, that they do not play a role. Rather, I should say that peace is not so much the result of the enforcement of the rule of law, than the slow and unending work of the community, within the community. The enforcement of the rule of law, contrary to what is emphasized in the conventional discourses, harms the less advantaged people more than it helps them. Above all, it conveys a picture of the role and place of law in our human lives that is misplaced; we do not comply because we are threatened and do not obey because we are coerced (Shauer, 2015). In my example, the threat of punishment would not have prevented the man, if found guilty, from stealing the goat, nor would it necessarily prevent him from committing further infractions. The witnesses who are reluctant to show up in court might not be more willing to show up *because* they are suddenly coerced—some will, others not. Perhaps it is even the threat that encourages illegal behavior, and some will all the more be tempted to transgress or escape when they are threatened or coerced. That the correct application of codes of conduct and standards of procedures will lead to peace and order is just a story we tell ourselves. Things are different on the ground.

It is no surprise, then, that informal or customary justice, as was the case during European colonization in Africa, is often perceived as problematic by those who promote the rule of law, and that, in the end, it is perceived as what hinders democracy and the progress of a certain civilizational project (Humphreys, 2010; Greenburg, 2013). Whether we like it or not, extrajudicial means of handling conflicts and informal ways of safeguarding relationships between humans who have all sorts of reasons to express their indignation, wrath, grudges, and claims are nonetheless what makes it possible for them to ease their suffering and might lead to some kind of pacification. The people I met did aspire to live together in relative serenity, but they also knew that moments of calm alternated with moments of turmoil, upheaval, and havoc. Moreover, not all of them were ready to compromise in order to find peaceful solutions. Some will fight harshly.

Frederic, the litigants, and the judge all improvise in the face of unending hardships. Sometimes they succeed, sometimes they fail. Nevertheless, they keep on going. If they were applying predetermined criteria to solve their problems and progress in their ordinary affairs, as advocates of the rule of law argue they should, they would just not be able to live, simply because these *a priori* criteria could not have accommodated all possible projections in further contexts. They would stumble at every step over the hardness of reality. People know very well that no *a priori* criteria exists that can assist them and, thus, also how little they can rely on the judicial rationale to solve anything at all. The Haitians give us quite a different picture of peace when it is seen more as an aspiration to move forward and keep heads up. In everyday life, indeed, *nap brase* ("we're struggling"); *nap goumen* ("we're fighting"); *nap kenbe* ("we're still standing"); and *nap swiv* ("we'll see what happens").

ENDNOTES

1. I am indebted to Chip Carey for having encouraged me to take the bull by the horns and dare write a text about peace in Haiti. I also wish to express my gratitude to Grégoire Hervouet-Zeiber, Basile Despland, Marianne Tøraasen, Chelsey Kivland, and Chip Carey for their

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2. See https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/minustah
3. See https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2001/summary/
4. Many factors contribute to hindering the functioning of the CASEC system. In particular, the combined effects of the political non-recognition of their competence and responsibility, and the systematic back wages (often of several months) not only preclude the CASEC from engaging fully in their task, but also prompt them to avoid doing their jobs (such as collecting taxes or taking care of the estate), if not squarely encouraging them to accept bribes. On January 18, 2018, President Moïse created a media spectacle by welcoming the CASEC at the presidential palace (in front of journalists), and promised to give them 570 motorbikes to facilitate their work; take care of the four-month payment backlog; make available the funds for the implementation of rural police in areas where there were none; build social housing; and distribute 171,000 food kits to the needy. Needless to say, most of these promises have not been kept, except the distribution of Chinese motorbikes, which had already been bought at the time of the promise.
5. A point perhaps better understood if one imagines that the canon Roman Law conceived the state as that which reflects the pontifical council; that is, as a legislator state.
6. The organization of the *lakou* is probably the most compelling example of a way of living that is at the same time a way of resisting the attempts on part of the centralized power to control them.
7. The name *hoqueton* in French ("acton" in medieval English), was originally a padded vest or jacket made of cloth or leather and worn under armor during the Middle Ages. It then became the name of a function and a profession: the caretaker of the court, who is also the doorman, or the guardian.
8. See the definitions on the official website: http://www.cspj.ht/index.php/les-cours-et-les-tribunaux/cspj-haiti-mnu-tribunaux-et-cours-personnel
9. The issues with police are complex matters, and I cannot go into details here. To make a long story short, this was the time when some police officers created a group called "Fantom 509" and demonstrated violently (and armed) in the streets several times. The nebulousness around this group, which actually looks more like an armed guerilla or a gang, worries many people, especially since February 24, 2020, when a massive gunfight erupted on the Champs-de-Mars (the city center) between Fantom 509, the newly constituted army, and other armed men (contributing to the cancellation of a carnival). In June the same year, a fired policeman (yet still in the professional circuits) named Jimmy Cherizier, alias Barbecue, who was known to be the head of an armed group in the areas of Delmas 2-6, and who was, according to several reports by FJKL (https://www.fjkl.org.ht/) and the RNDDH (https://web.rnddh.org/), involved in several massacres of civilians, notably in the slums of La Saline and Bel Air, created a federation of armed groups called the "G-9 *an Fanmi e Alye*" (the G-9 Family and Allies), ostensibly to enforce security and peace and to restore a decent life to the ghetto. Even if he publicly denied it, he was said by many to be close to the president's party, the Parti Haïtien Tèt Kale (PHTK); elections were near; and Jovenel Moïse, like other presidents before him, supported illegal armed groups to leverage his position through the political influence these heads of armed groups were capable of exerting (or to negotiate) in their neighborhoods.
10. See https://binuh.unmissions.org/en
11. Their main reference is the Working Paper no 37, 2006, of the network of the Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit in the Social Development Department of the Sustainable Development Network of the World Bank, as well as the UN's official position on the promotion of the rule of law. This is not surprising, given that the World Bank was the prime sponsor of this vocabulary from 1989.
12. Another component of American and international interventionism I cannot discuss here, but which is of utmost importance, is humanitarian aid.
13. Examples can be found in Beckett (2019), Coughlin and Ives (2011), Katz (2014), Kivland (2020), Lee and Bartels (2019), and Payton (2017, 2019).
14. See https://www.usip.org/guiding-principles-stabilization-and-reconstruction-the-web-version/rule-law

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