

What Difference has the Government of Haiti Made for Tourism Development?

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This research examines the actions that the Haitian government has taken to develop and sustain tourism within their borders. My premise is that governments, through state institutions and policies, can implement branding strategies that impact and change existing country image perceptions. Expanding on the determinants of tourism demand literature, I present a theoretical framework for how government institutions collaborate to create a favorable country brand by investing in the development of functional benefits {public safety and infrastructure quality}. The functional benefits are then supplied to the mass tourist market, who demands them in order to visit, lodge and spend money in the country. The findings of this study confirm that a causal relationship exists between a country's level of stability and tourism arrivals and receipts, further establishing this study's theory that high levels of investment in infrastructure quality and nation branding can positively influence country image perception to generate arrivals and receipts. Surprise outcomes regarding crime's impact on arrivals and receipts present future opportunities to advance the literature.

Keywords: Infrastructure Investment, Nation Branding, Political Stability, Government Policy

Introduction

For many low-income developing countries like Haiti, with limited natural resources to competitively trade globally, tourism can serve as a vital economic driver. To that end, it is in the best interest of governments to make attempts to attract private sector investment, to generate tourist arrivals and travel receipts, with the hopes that an abundance of tourism development will create linkages with other sectors to produce growth in their economy. The reliance on this industry is paradoxical, as governments of many poor nations habitually underestimate their role as the key stakeholder in determining the acute strategies which will attract, grow, and retain tourism demand. Furthermore, government leaders of developing countries may desire to generate economic growth through tourism channels; however, they fail to consider that tourism is as particularly sensitive to political factors as it is to economic and environmental ones. Moreover, governments must understand that their country projects an image that potential investors and tourists may perceive as feasible for investment and travel. The global perception of a country is partially exogenous and beyond a government's control. However, there are preemptive measures that governments can take to attract tourism and to contribute to a positive perception of their country as a viable travel destination. Governments in developing countries, who are successful at generating a thriving tourism sector, work to create safe and stable political environments, invest a tremendous amount of state capital in tourism sustainability, hire destination managers, execute sound tourism public policies, and consult with public relation firms to assist in the process. Conversely, governments, who fail at fostering a sustainable tourism industry and remain in economic jeopardy, can attribute as reasons political instability, insufficient security policies, and deficient tourism promotion strategies, along with a lack of capital expenditure investment in developing quality infrastructure.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this paper is threefold. First, it explores key arguments in the literature on the determinants of tourism demand to provide a more comprehensive theory and methodology for measuring security, infrastructure, and marketing promotions' impact on tourism arrivals and receipts in Haiti. Secondly, it evaluates the Haitian government's effectiveness in developing a sustainable tourism sector in the context of those main tourism drivers. Thirdly, it provides recommendations for expanding understudied hypotheses in future scholarship on Haitian tourism. The main question this paper seeks to answer is what difference the Haitian government institutions make to develop the tourism sector within Haiti. Ultimately, the paper expects the answer to this question to help solve the conundrum for why Haiti's once thriving tourism sector deteriorated in the early 1980s and has not rebounded.

Background on Tourism in Haiti

Having a sustainable tourism sector often appears to be beyond Haiti's grasp. From a historical perspective, the tourism industry in Haiti is categorized as having uneven development that was marred by many "setbacks" (Lundhal, 2004). Tourism began in the mid-1940s with around 5,000 visitors (Lundhal, 2004); and, by 1956, Haiti had reached 67,700 travelers (Séraphin, 2011). During the 1950s and early 1960s, Haiti was perceived by travelers as a good place to visit. And, subsequently, during that time, Haiti experienced one of the fastest growth rates of visitors in the Caribbean (Séraphin, 2011). However, violent unrest during the cruel dictatorship of Francois "Papa Doc" Duvalier led to a sharp decline in visitors in 1963. After that, Haiti was considered unsafe by travelers and a country to avoid. The negative country perception ended when Jean Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier became president in 1972, and tourism experienced a revival. Tourist numbers peaked at 300,000 visitors by 1980 (Steif, 1985; Fass, 1988). However, this upsurge was temporary as a rumor developed in 1982 that AIDS originated in Haiti; and then Duvalier's dictatorship was overthrown in 1986. Except for cruise ship tourism in Labadee, Haiti's mass tourism potential collapsed after the 1986 coup, and a series of political and socio-economic problems began to plague Haiti that had lasting effects well into late 2010. In late 2010, after a 7.0 earthquake hit the country, the Haitian government began making serious efforts to revitalize tourism (Séraphin, 2011). Foreign investors began constructing hotels in Haiti to cater to the country's new brand of travelers: aid workers, missionaries and businesspeople. There is recent legitimate hope that the country may finally capture a small portion of the mass tourism market of overnight visitors. However, whether Haiti can convert hope to reality largely depends on the approach the Haitian government takes to drive and maintain its tourism sector for the long-term.

Tourism Demand Determinants Literature

The literature on determinants of tourism demand has established that a country's tourism sector is driven by numerous factors. A panel data analysis study of Latin American and Caribbean countries establishes three main classifications for the determinants (Pivčević et al, 2016): 1) pull (or attractive) factors—the characteristics of the inbound travel destination which includes destination promotional programs, destination attractiveness, social and cultural ties, climate, events; 2) political and social factors—indicates that political stability is important for security in that the higher the political stability, the higher the tourism demand (Eugenio-Martin, Morales and Scarpa, 2004 as mentioned in Pivčević et al, 2016); and 3) pull-tourism competitiveness factor—

an inbound country determinant of tourism demand that includes nation branding/marketing promotions. From the three classifications, political stability, tourism infrastructure investment and nation branding are the most positive, statistically significant and correlated relationship with creating sustainable tourism demand (see Table 1.1). These preliminary causal factors provide the basis for a more precise theoretical framework for how governments can utilize tourism drivers as mechanisms for sustainable tourism demand.

Table 1.1 Most Significant Determinants of Tourism Demand Identified in Literature

Causes/Influences	Tourism Demand Determinants	Independent Variables in the Literature
Political and Social Factors	Political Stability/Security	Political Stability
Pull Factors	Destination Attractiveness Infrastructure	Tourism Infrastructure Expenditure
Tourism Competitiveness Factors	Marketing Promotions	Nation Branding

1. Political Stability as a Security Determinant

Hall (1994) determined that political stability is a "fundamental precondition" to establishing a successful tourism sector. Baker contends that "modern mass tourists tend to long for relaxing, safe, and unconcerned vacations when they travel" (Baker, 2012, p. 91). Generally, any evidence of unrest within a country will deter visitors from traveling to that destination. Therefore, political instability, the inverse of stability, within a country produces a negative effect on both tourism demand and tourism sector development.

Political instability often generates negative publicity; and, because of deleterious travel reports, tourism demand decreases (Thapa, 2003). The decline in tourism arrivals comes from the fact that political instability creates the perception of a safety risk for travelers (Lepp, 2003). Therefore, the perceptions of political instability and safety become the prerequisite for tourists to travel (Hall and O'Sullivan, 1996). Governmental leaders underestimate political peace as the primary and fundamental precondition for tourism development (Nyaruwata, 2013). Ultimately, tourists seriously consider safety and security problems when choosing travel destinations (Nyaruwata, 2013). Therefore, it is the government's responsibility to create a politically stable environment to attract and retain a thriving tourism industry for the purposes of economic development (Nyaruwata, 2013). Causevic and Lynch (2013) point out that there is a void in the research with studies focused on how governments handle challenges with political instability within their borders. Most specifically, literature is still lacking on regulations and laws which are created to manage tourism development post-conflict or counteract the decline in tourism demand caused by political instability (Causevic and Lynch, 2013).

2. Tourism Infrastructure Expenditure

Much of the tourism determinants literature focuses on infrastructure quality as a vehicle to develop tourism and attract tourism demand. Few tourism driver studies specifically investigated spending on infrastructure directly or a country's critical role in securing investors. The literature on this subject is important for two reasons: 1) establishing that infrastructure is a prerequisite for maintaining a successful tourism sector; and 2) incidentally linking the importance of spending

on infrastructure to tourism demand. An important study that included Haiti discovered that tourism increases if three key factors are established: infrastructures, education and safety (Eugenio-Martin et al, 2004). Furthermore, capital investment in infrastructure and safety, factors which are essential for attracting tourist investors and tourists, will lead to an increase in tourism development (Eugenio-Martin et al, 2004). Giap et al. (2016) contend that government expenditures on tourism promotion and infrastructure, specific to the enhancement of airport facilities, are the main determinants of tourism demand in Malaysia. Similar studies on developing countries also identify infrastructure quality as either an important factor or the most vital determinant of tourism demand (Khadaroo-Seetanah, 2007; Dwyer and Spurr, 2011; Assaf and Josiassen, 2011; Seetanah et al, 2011; Giap et al., 2016 and Jovanovic and Illic, 2017). However, the authors conflict on the type of infrastructure most relevant for tourism.

3. Nation Branding as a Marketing Determinant

An ongoing scholarly debate highlights a misperception about nation branding solely being a marketing tool versus a concentrated strategy which governments can actively implement with the help of tourism promotional agencies. Challenges exist on how to measure or conceptualize nation branding, as governments often confuse it with public relations. As a result, nations often employ promotional advertising campaigns instead of improving the structural problems within their country that contribute to their brand image (Anholt, 2011). Despite the dispute, the consensus of authors across all disciplines is that nation branding is a determinate of tourism demand.

In today's globalized world, nations and brand image integrate in the minds of potential customers and investors creating a "country of origin" effect (Van Ham, 2009). The country of origin effect is where a nation's reputation influences consumer purchasing power or foreign direct investment (Van Ham, 2001; 2009). A state's good reputation and image are part of its "strategic equity" (Van Ham, 2001) where a country, much like a company's products, relies heavily on consumer and investor confidence based on their interpretation of that brand's quality.

Theoretical Framework

Governments of developing countries, like Haiti, can manage the main drivers of tourism by implementing policies that impact country image perceptions to attract more visitors and travel receipts. It is probabilistic that tourism arrivals and receipts are generated when travelers perceive a country's image as positive and viable for travel based on a combination of three main drivers of tourism demand: public safety, infrastructure investment and nation branding. Government institutions can employ strategies to create a favorable country brand by investing in the development of functional benefits (public safety and infrastructure quality, as foundation for destination's appeal) to meet the demand of potential travelers to incentives them to visit, lodge and spend money in the country (Anglade, 2018). The theoretical framework of this study is based upon an expansion of the most statistically significant tourism demand determinants identified in the literature, namely political stability and security, infrastructure quality and nation branding as the vehicle for marketing promotions. Table 2.1 outlines the expansion of the most significant determinants of tourism demand that is used as the basis for this paper's independent variables.

Table 2.1 Theoretical Expansion of the Determinants of Tourism Demand Literature

Causes/Influences	Determinants of Tourism Demand Literature	Theoretical Expansion of the Determinants of Tourism Demand
Political and Social Factors	Political Stability	Public Safety Crime rates Political stability
Pull Factors	Tourism Infrastructure Expenditure Destination Attractiveness Infrastructure	Infrastructure Investment Government spending on infrastructure Private sector investment in infrastructure
Tourism Competitiveness Factors	Nation Branding Marketing Promotions	Nation Branding Public tourism promotion investment Public Private Tourism Promotion Partnerships

Public Safety Theory

Safety and security are prerequisites for successful tourism development, as tourists desire to travel to destinations that are safe, and where security is assured (Mansfield and Pizam, 2006). If travelers believe a destination is unsafe, it will cause them to develop a negative impression of that destination, thereby causing tourism demand to decline (George, 2010; Ghaderi et al., 2017). Political stability is a positive determinant of tourism demand, and a converse relationship exists when instances of political instability threaten safety and security at tourist destinations. The measurement of security must be expanded to include the examination of other potential security threats that may serve as deterrents to travel. Four types of security threats often cause tourists to avoid a travel destination: 1) crime-related incidents; 2) terrorism; 3) war; and 4) civil/political unrest (Pizam, 2006). Terrorism, war and civil/political unrest and other violent occurrences are often linked and classified under political instability by researchers. Crime-related incidents are important, but not collectively considered as political stability in terms of its relationship to tourism demand (Ghaderi et al, 2017). However, crime-related incidents or the perception that a destination has a high level of crime could potentially render a destination unsafe.

The findings on crime rates and tourism indicate that theft is often the most widely reported crime against tourists (Glensor and Peak, 2004). Yet, in the event tourists do not report crimes against them, crime rate levels will indicate the overall safety of the travel destination. Crimes against tourists typically occur in areas that experience higher overall crime rates. Travelers are at risk of other crimes in addition to thefts such as assaults, homicides, robberies, scams and credit card fraud. Moreover, the assessment of crime rate levels indicates the effectiveness of the government providing tourism security (Glensor and Peak, 2004). To address the gap in the literature that excludes crime rates and solely focuses on political instability as creating a security risk for tourism demand, the public safety variable includes the measurement of crime rates as well as political stability.

Infrastructure Investment Theory

Previous literature has measured investment in public infrastructure through infrastructure rankings that assess the quality of a nation's infrastructure. Undoubtedly, a quality and modern infrastructure is an important driver of tourism development (Sakai, 2007; Jovanovic and Ilic, 2016) as infrastructure facilitates the commerce of tourism (Sakai, 2007). Infrastructure makes the

private distribution of tourism services more efficient. In addition, all forms of transportation infrastructure (road, air and sea) are important for travel to and within a destination, especially for countries with remote attractions to offer. Moreover, overnight tourists serve as temporary residents of a destination; therefore, the demand for physical infrastructure such as water, sewer, electricity and communication is also important for investment. Public infrastructure is a fundamental function of the government (Hodge and Greve, 2017), who will allocate public capital on infrastructure if tourism is intended to be a vital part of the country's economy. The level of public expenditures the government allocates is directly correlated with its intention to actively develop its infrastructure (Sakai, 2007; Jovanovic and Ilic, 2016). In addition to public investment in infrastructure, it is important that the private sector is given incentives to invest in infrastructure.

While the state is directly responsible for transportation and environmental infrastructure, social tourism infrastructure (rooms to accommodate tourists and other supportive physical structures that facilitate activities and services to attract tourists such as hotels, stadiums, convention centers and galleries) (Jovanovic and Ilic, 2016), as part of the overall tourism infrastructure framework, requires extensive investment from the private sector (Jovanovic and Ilic, 2016). Vives, Benavides, and Paris contend that nearly all public infrastructure endeavors will need the participation of the public and private sectors; therefore, infrastructure projects are generally public-private partnerships (2010, p. 412). To effectively assess the government's role in building and improving infrastructure, this paper uses government's spending on infrastructure and private sector investment (including public-private partnerships in infrastructure) as the measurements for the infrastructure investment variable

Nation Branding Theory

Nation branding has been a challenge for scholars to define and measure. The dispute on the conceptualization and operationalization has led to the creation of a country brand index which is more of a measurement of country image quality than it is on effective branding efforts. This paper bypasses the debate on how branding is operationalized to provide a simpler measurement for tourism promotions. The goal of nation branding is for countries to self-evaluate, conduct a situation analysis of the country's strengths and weaknesses, and recognize what needs to be achieved to make the country more attractive as a destination (Nawaz & Hassan, 2016). For countries, this involves investing heavily in the factors that drive tourism, developing policies to encourage tourism and then promoting the country brand through marketing initiatives. The public sector is responsible for building a country brand image and the promotion of its tourism sector outside of the country (Nawaz and Hassan, 2016). The level of capital investment from the public and private sectors signifies the priority governments place on building a positive image of their country. At the beginning of tourism development, government authorities from the national and regional level take a primary leadership role promoting tourism. To that end, the government is the pioneer in all facets of tourism development including marketing endeavors (Nawaz and Hassan, 2016). However, as tourism successfully develops through later stages, effective nation branding causes the public sector to partner with the private sector in its nation branding efforts (Göymen, 2000; Mckercher and Ritchie, 1997; Nawaz and Hassan, 2016). The evidence of public sector expenditures on tourism marketing and public-private sector partnerships to promote tourism will serve as the variables that comprise nation branding in this paper.

Country Image Perception (Intervening Variable)

Country image perception is discussed in numerous scholarly reports on tourism development. This is because the perception of a country can contribute to its overall reputation over time in the mass tourism market based on the continual information potential travelers receive. The perception of a country's image ultimately influences travelers' decision to visit that destination. For travelers, a strong positive country brand image projecting a destination's appeal will likely create a higher demand for travel to that destination over other possible destinations with weaker and negative brand images (Ezeudiji et al., 2016). Country image perception is often caused by the image projected to and developed emotionally by travelers (Lopes, 2011; Rajesh, 2013; Ezeudiji et al, 2016). The traveler's perception derives from direct travel experiences (Lopes, 2011; Ezeudiji et al, 2016) or from external information sources about a destination (Tasci and Gartner, 2007; Ezeudiji et al, 2016) that is then conveyed to the public. The destination travel information may take the form of a traveler's country travel warning reports, mass media reports or by public comments made available to them from seemingly credible sources such as, for example, United States' President Donald Trump's "shithole" comment about Haiti. The information received about a destination, which affect tourist perceptions, are exogenous to the inbound travel destination; and, therefore, it is beyond the destination's control. However, there are internal country image management strategies, in the form of nation branding, that destinations can implement to influence how their country is perceived.

Country image perception originates from tourism demand based on a traveler's desire for destination attractiveness. Therefore, for a tourist destination, its supply (or its country's brand essence) must project a positive country image to satisfy tourism demand. Crouch (2011) stated that it is up to the country to supply destination attractiveness, which is comprised of important elements: "the reality of the destination's attributes and qualities (destination's appeal), and how this reality is communicated to and perceived by tourists (destination's knowledge and understanding), in comparison to the other information received about other destinations" (Crouch, 2011; as discussed in Ezeudiji et al., 2016). The country's brand essence provides the "functional and emotional benefits of a brand" (de Chernatony and Harris, 2010, as discussed in Ezeudiji et al., 2016), as well as establishes the country's competitive advantage over its potential competitors in the mass tourism market.

As the costs associated with travel are large and infrequent, potential travelers will likely choose a destination with a positive image over one that is unfavorable, and they will favor the destination that can offer the functional and emotional benefits demanded for traveling outside of their usual habitat (Ezeudiji et al, 2016). While the emotional benefits (i.e. visiting family, attending business events, sight-seeing and visiting attractions) (Ezeudiji et al., 2016) are acknowledged, the focus of this paper will be on the functional advantages that the destination can supply to meet a tourist's demand. The functional benefits are tangible in nature, serve as the basis for a destination's appeal and positive country image, and those benefits are comprised of a country's physical characteristics such as tourism security, quality infrastructure and facilities (Pawitra & Tan, 2003; Vengesai, 2003; Ezeudiji et al., 2016). Ultimately, to match tourism demand and exceed traveler's destination costs, destinations need to provide a balance of functional and emotional advantages by producing a positive country brand.

Tourism Arrivals and Receipts (Dependent Variable) Theory

Tourism demand is often measured in the literature by “international arrivals” per year indicating overnight stays or “international visitors per year” that includes all visitor types (i.e. cruise arrivals) if overnight arrival data is unavailable. This study expands on most of the literature’s operationalization of tourism demand and creates a new dependent variable called “tourism arrivals and receipts.” Tourism arrivals and receipts consists of two components: 1) the international arrivals per year and 2) international receipts per year. As the case study on Haiti in this paper will conduct an analysis over a time series, over which Haiti departed the mass tourism market to evolve into a niche tourism market (which includes an extensive cruise tourism sector), it is important to evaluate the actual growth rates of tourism over time.

The Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) method¹ is used to calculate the growth rate either annually or per tourism period (depending on the available years for statistics on arrivals and receipts) in Haiti. Then, the growth rate is calculated either yearly (where available) by the entire tourism period (to show the total rate of growth for that time). The value of the arrivals and the receipts, respectively, at the end of the period in question is calculated by its value at the beginning of that period, raising the result to the power of one divided by the period length, and subtracted one from the subsequent result. After the conversions, graphs were developed to show the variation of tourism arrivals and receipts per period. For the dependent variable, the starting point for all tourism arrivals and receipts rating scales covering the tourism time periods in this paper (1940-2016) is to place any number under the “average growth rate” given for the Caribbean region under the “low” category. Any number within 2% over the average growth rate is “moderate” and 3% over the average growth rate is high.

Figure 2.1 below is a visual overview of the theoretical framework of this paper and how the independent variables interact with country image perception to generate increases in tourism arrivals and receipts. Tables 2.1-2.4 provides how each of the variables are operationalized.

Figure 2.1 Theoretical Model - How the Main Drivers of Tourism Demand Interact with Managing a Country Image to Increase Tourism Arrivals and Receipts




Table 2.2 Independent Variables (Public Safety / IV1 and Infrastructure / IV2)

Independent Variables	Definition & Hypothesis	Measurement	Subject judgment operationalization
Public Safety (IV1)	State security measures taken to protect people against safety and security risks such as crime and unintended consequences of an involuntary nature such as political instability ² .	Crime rates – the total crimes complied to “assess the effectiveness of a crime control policy, and the impact of the policy on the risk of crime victimization” ³ .	Ratings scale of low, moderate, high and critical for homicides per capita reported (various country reports & Overseas Security Advisory Center/OSAC) Low = 0-500 Moderate = 500-1,000 High = 1,000 – 2,000 Critical = 2,000 – above Premise – the higher the rate of homicides, the more unsafe the country
	Public Safety (IV1) Hypothesis - The lower the level of crime rates and the more political stable the country, the higher the public safety which produces a positive country image perception that attracts more tourism arrivals and receipts	Political stability – Following Hurwitz, political stability is the: “(1) absence of violence; governmental longevity/duration; (3) existence of a legitimate constitutional (4) absence of structural change; and (5) a multifaceted societal” ⁴	Ratings scale based on World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators’ (WGI) percentile rank measurement definition: Unstable (active unrest/violence) = 0-49 Moderate (some unrest or conflict) = 50-89 Stable (no unrest) = 90-100 Premise – per WGI, the closer the percentile rank to 100, the more stable the country
Infrastructure Investment (IV2)	Public and private spending on all the facilities used to deliver energy, water, sanitation, telecommunication and transport (land, air, and sea	Public spending — state, regional and local spending on infrastructure services in six sectors: irrigation, energy (primarily power), transport, communication, wastewater management, and water supply ⁵	Ratings scale for the level of public spending on infrastructure from various country Reports & World Bank’s PPP Knowledge Lab (in millions) Low = \$0-500 Moderate = \$501-1,000 High” = \$1,001-above Premise –the higher the level of public spending on infrastructure, the higher the infrastructure investment
	Infrastructure Investment (IV2) Hypothesis – The higher the level of public spending and private sector investment in infrastructure, the higher the investment in infrastructure which produces a positive country image perception that attracts tourism arrivals and receipts	Private sector investment - capital investments in a) full privatization or standalone infrastructure developments; or b) public-private partnerships (PPPs)-partnerships between public sector organizations and private sector investors for designing, planning, financing, constructing, providing and/or operating infrastructure, facilities or related services ⁶	Ratings scale based on capital investment from country reports & PPP Knowledge Lab (in millions) Low = a \$0-500 Moderate = \$501-1,000 High = \$1,001-above Level of hotel rooms investment Low = 0-7,999 Moderate = 8,000-19,999 High” = 20,000-49,999 Very high=50,000 and above Premise –the higher the level of public spending on infrastructure (capital or hotel rooms), the higher the infrastructure investment

Table 2.3 Independent and Intervening Variables (Nation Branding / IV3 and Country Image Perception / IV4)

Independent Variables	Definition & Hypothesis	Measurement	Subject judgment operationalization
Nation Branding (IV3)	The coordinated government efforts to manage a country's image in order to promote tourism, investment and foreign relations ⁷ (Volcic & Andrejevic, 2011). Nation Branding (IV3) Hypothesis: The higher the level of public tourism promotion investment and public-private partnerships, the higher the nation branding which produces a positive country image perception that attracts tourism arrivals and receipts.	<u>Public tourism promotion investment</u> — National, regional and local government expenditures spent to advance tourism promotional activities including tourism promotion, marketing, visitor information services, administrative and other public services related to tourism development ⁸ .	Ratings scale of low, moderate, and high percentage of government spending on travel and tourism percentage ⁹ statistics from the World Bank's World Trade and Tourism Council data set ⁹ Low = 0-9% Moderate = 10 - 19% High = 20 % - above <u>Premise</u> - the higher the public tourism promotion investment percentage, the more effective the nation branding strategy
		<u>Public-private tourism promotion partnership</u> — a partnership between the public and private sector to develop, position and execute destination branding, tourism promotion and marketing activities ¹⁰	Ratings scale of low, moderate, and high based on classifications from various data sources on public-private tourism promotion partnerships <u>Premise</u> – the higher the level of investment, the more effective the nation branding strategy
Country Image – Intervening Variable	Country image perception - the sum of beliefs, ideals, and impressions people have toward a certain country based on interpreted information received regardless of the nation's real character ¹¹ .	<u>Travel Destination Information (TDI)</u> — interpreted information received by potential visitors about a country from secondary (induced, organic and autonomous information compiled from other people or through organizations) sources that creates a perceived image of the country as a travel destination and influences potential visitors' travel behavior ¹² . TDIs include-mass media reports; travel guides; travel destination surveys; travel reviews and country safety rankings	TDIs (as available) from 1940-2017 <u>Premise</u> – more favorable the travel destination information (mass media reports, surveys, travel reviews and country safety rankings), the more positive a potential traveler's perception of a country's image as a viable travel destination.

Table 2.4 Dependent Variable

Dependent Variable	Definition & Hypothesis	Measurement	Subject judgment operationalization
Tourism Demand	Total number of people who travel or desire to travel, and the total amount of money they spend to use tourist facilities and services at their travel destination -which is located away from their places of work or residence	Number of international tourism arrivals –	Ratings scale established from the World Trade Organization Reports on classifying the average growth rate (percent) of international tourism arrivals for the Caribbean Region <u>For 1950-1980</u> Low = 0-6.99% Moderate = 7-9.99% High = 10% - above <u>For 1980-1995</u> Low = 0-4.99% Moderate = 5-7.99% High = 8% - above <u>For 1995-2016</u> Low = 0-2.69% Moderate = 2.7-4.99% High = 5% - above
		International tourism receipts per year –	Ratings scale from global, country or regional reports and World Bank data classifying the average growth rate of tourism receipts for the Caribbean Region <u>For 1940-1990</u> Low = 0-9.99% Moderate = 10-12.99% High = 13% - above <u>For 1990-2000</u> Low = 0-12.99% Moderate = 13-17.99% High = 18% - above <u>For 2000-2016</u> Low = 0-3.89% Moderate = 3.9-5.99% High = 6% - above

Methodology and Case Study Analysis

A qualitative analysis case study method is employed to evaluate the theoretical arguments of this paper. The years when tourism was in the nascent stage of development in the test country, Haiti, to the present (1940-2017), is divided in block of twenty-year periods: 1940-1960; 1961-1980; 1981-2000; and 2000-2017, for most of the variables identified in this paper (where information was available). The evolution of Haiti's tourism sector is examined in a time-series comparison evaluating the individual relationship between public safety, infrastructure investment and nation branding on tourism arrivals and receipts. The focus of the case study is to determine the level of interaction of the independent variables to create a positive country image that generates more tourism arrivals and receipts.

The statistics on the variables which comprise the independent (public safety, infrastructure investment and nation branding), intervening (country image perception) and dependent (tourism arrivals and receipts) variables of this study come from multiple data sources (regional reports, country data, world indicators, etc). For each test variable of this paper's theoretical argument, data is compiled into tables as follows. First, public safety is comprised of crime rates and political stability percentile ranks for 1940-2017, the major crime incidents and threats to political stability for the four periods of Haiti's tourism development are organized into tables and graphs that indicate the crime rate and political stability level. Secondly, infrastructure investment consists of

public expenditures, private sector and public-private partnership capital investments in infrastructure for 1940-2017 (into the four tourism development time periods), the data on infrastructure investments, classify the type of investment and the level of investments in tables and graphs. Thirdly, nation branding data on public and private tourism promotion investment are arranged in tables and graphs for the tourism period and categorized by the investment type and level.

For the intervening variable, country image perception, there were several forms of travel destination information sources (from mass media reports, travel guides, travel reviews and country safety rankings) that provided either favorable or unfavorable reviews of Haiti and the Dominican Republic, respectively. The data sources are assessed and a categorical scale is provided for the country perception for Haiti divided into ten-year time intervals covering 1940-2018 (see Table 3.3). Finally, the statistics for tourism arrivals and receipts for 1940-2017 were provided by the World Bank and from various country reports on Haiti or Caribbean regional reports. The raw data are produced into graphs to show the variation of tourism demand over designated tourism period covered in this paper. This paper assigns a scale level for international arrivals and receipts for Haiti. For each of the variables of this paper, scaled categories were defined as subjective judgements to compensate for either missing, unreliable or unreported information (see Tables 2.2-2.4). The scaled categories, for each variable, are compatible to make analysis of the relationship between them more transparent. After the designating the scaled ratings for each variable, a summary table of all the variables of this paper and their corresponding rating for Haiti is provided (see Table 3.1) as the basis for the case study analysis.

Table 3.1 Tourism Arrivals and Receipts in Haiti (1940-2016): Scaled ratings based on analysis of data compiled for each variable

Tourism arrivals and receipts in Haiti (1940-2016)									
Tourism Periods ¹³	Independent Variables						Interactive Variable	Dependent Variable	
	Public Safety		Infrastructure Investment		Nation Branding		Country image perception	Tourism arrivals and receipts (average growth rate percentages were calculated) ¹⁴	
	Crime Rates	Political Stability	Public & Public-Private (PPP)	Private	Public Tourism Promotion	Public-private tourism promotion		Arrivals	Receipts
	15								
Pre-Tourism 1930-1940	Low	Moderate	High (1930-1940)	Low	Low	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Golden Tourism 1940-1980	Low	Moderate (1940-1955) Unstable (1956-1971) Moderate (1972-1980)	Low (1940-1960) Moderate (1961-1980)	Moderate	Low	Moderate	Positive (1940-1963) Negative (1964-1971) Positive (1972-1980)	High (14%)	High (14%)
Deprived Tourism 1981-2010	High	Moderate (1981-1982) Unstable ¹⁷	Low	Low	Low	Low	Negative	Low (-)	Low (8%)
Rejuvenated Tourism 2011-2016	High ¹⁶	Unstable ¹⁷	High	High	Low	High	Negative	High (13.9%)	Low (3%)

Haiti Tourism Case Study (1940-2017)

1. Public Safety

From the time that Haiti's tourism sector began developing in the mid-1940s, the Haitian government continually declared that it was crime-free up until 1986 when crime rates began rising considerably. Tourists, prior to 1986, enjoyed attractions and resorts that were "virtually free of street crime" (Library of Congress Country Report, 2001). Moreover, aside from instances where the country experienced political instability: 1) during 1956-57, when President Paul Magloire was overthrown for attempting to extend his constitutional term of office (Haggerty, 1989) and the country experienced five governments within a nine-month period; and 2) during President Francois "Papa Doc" Duvalier's administration from 1962-1971, the country was moderately stable until Duvalier's son, Jean Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier was overthrown in 1986 (Library of Congress Country Report, 2001; Haggerty, 1989). Tourism arrivals and receipts were high through Haiti's "Golden Tourism Period" (1940-1980), with on average a total growth rate of 14% for international arrivals and international receipts. This figure was double the regional growth rate of 7% for international arrivals in the Caribbean, and Haiti was also faring higher than the growth rates for international receipts which was 10% (Country Report, 2001). As there were bouts of political instability, the rate of tourism arrivals and receipts (in terms of international arrivals as international receipts data is sporadic) slowed before picking back up in 1972 after Jean Claude Duvalier instituted many policies favoring private investment geared towards tourism development (Country Report, 2001).

In 1945, when tourism started, Haiti's international arrivals was 5,000. By 1956, arrivals grew to 67,000 (nearly 5.5 times the amount of its 1950 figure-12,000 arrivals). In 1963, during Francois Duvalier's brutal dictatorship, the arrivals fell to under 50,000 but they climbed to over 159,000 by 1972 after Jean Claude Duvalier took office and kept rising until a peak in 1979 with 338,900 (Figure 3.2). From 1980-1986, during which political unrest was beginning to stir leading to Jean Claude Duvalier's ouster in 1986, tourism arrivals and receipts remained at moderate levels; however, the number of arrivals was slowly declining while the tourism receipts from 1979-1984 was steadier (Figure 3.3).

Figure 3-1 Political instability & international arrivals in Haiti (1945-1984)




Figure 3-2 Political instability & international arrivals in Haiti (1995-2015)
International receipts in Haiti between 1950-2015






Figure 3-3 International receipts in Haiti between 1950-2015



Following Jean-Claude Duvalier's coup in 1986, a long-standing history of political instability began to plague Haiti. The country had eighteen regime changes of government between 1986 and 2014 with former presidents Leslie Manigat ousted in a coup in 1988 and Jean Bertrand Aristide overthrown in 1991 (Aristide was restored in 1994 and finished his term in 1996) and in 2004 (after returning to power in 2001) (Library of Congress Country Report, 2001). Furthermore, since the crime rate levels were simultaneously rising around 1986 (and a rumor arose linking the origin of the AIDS virus to Haiti in 1982), tourism arrivals and receipts in terms of overnight visitors severely declined to stagnant levels. While Haiti's cruise ship tourism began to significantly rise in the 2000s, the dynamics of Haiti's tourism sector concerning overnight visitors transitioned from a mass tourism contender to a niche tourism market of diaspora, business and aid/missionary travelers. Haiti's inability to manage public safety since 1986 appears to be a major contributing factor in the decline of overall tourism arrivals and receipts.

Haiti's military forces, the Forces Armées d'Haiti (FAd'H), had been policing the country, as Haiti had no national police force until one was instituted in 1989 (Library of Congress Country Report, 2001). FAd'H found itself unable to combat the severe crime the country was facing, and the security by the late 1980s was inadequate. Despite the Haitian National Police (HNP) finally being instituted, managing crime has remained a major challenge for the country. After Jean Bertrand Aristide's coup in 2004, the United Nations sent peacekeeping forces (MINUSTAH) for 13 years to assist the HNP and bring stability to the country. However, MINUSTAH's legacy is a reported mixture of partial success and disaster. The mission was blamed for bringing the cholera to the country post-Haiti's 2010 earthquake and 134 members of MINUSTAH have been accused of sexual assault crimes (Johnston, 2017). While MINUSTAH has been credited with restoring some stability (the slight rise of which is evident in Figure 3.3 from 2009-2016), the country remains classified as "unstable" according to the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) measuring the likeliness of political instability and/or politically motivated violence. Unfortunately, the classification was confirmed as Haiti's recent bout of violent protests in Haiti stranded several missionary groups, mostly from the United States.

Figure 3.4 - Public Safety: Political Stability Percentile Rank (Haiti)



Percentile Rank (0-100%)	Political Stability Level	Political Stability Level Definition
0-49%	Unstable	Active Incidents of violence, political unrest and political instability No major incidents; but, there may be some random political unrest or temporary instability incidents
50-89%	Moderately Stable	No threat of major incidents, political unrest, violence and political instability is unlikely
90-100%	Stable	


A recent report by the U.S. Department of State on Haiti, indicated that the Haitian National Police has been underreporting the country's crime rates. The underreporting of crime insinuates that Haiti is statistically safer than its Caribbean counterparts (OSAC Report, 2018). Haiti, like many countries in its region, had not been providing reliable data on recorded crimes for several years. In fact, recoding systems for crime reporting were not instituted in Haiti until 2000 (UNODC Report, 2002). For the last seven years that OSAC has reported on Haiti, the U.S. Department of State has been classifying Haiti's crime rate levels as "critical" (OSAC Reports, 2012-2018); however, the scale for crime rates in this paper classifies Haiti as "high" due to its reported

homicide estimates from 1999-2016 as well as the limited data available for other forms of crime (see Table 3.1, Table 3.2, and Figure 3.5 below for Haiti's specific crime rate information).

Table 3.2 – Public Safety/Crime Rate Level (Haiti)

Time Period ¹⁸	Major Crime Incidents	Reported Crime Rate Level
1940-1960	Haiti's military (Forces Armées d'Haiti—FAd'H) inadequately polices the country as Haiti has no national police force	Low
1961-1980	Haitian government continually reports Haiti is "free of crime" ¹⁹	Low
1981-2000	1986—crime levels are continually reported as "rising" (through the 2000s) and undermines the FAd'H credibility 1990s—Haiti tries to build its national police force to combat severe security and crime problems (police force starts in 1989)	Low (reported until 1985) High (since 1986)
2001-2016 ²⁰	2001—2016: Kidnappings (until 2013), homicides, car jackings and robberies are a major crime concern Haiti's overall crime rate is classified as "high" but considered lower than other countries in its region mainly due to a lack of mass tourism and continued "underreporting" (especially of homicide rates 2007-2011) 2010—Nearly 5,000 prisoners escaped from the national penitentiary during the earthquake and only 25% are recaptured 2014—2017: Kidnappings are diminishing (especially incidents against American victims) See homicide (and other crime rate, as available, for Haiti in Figure 3.5)	High (But, OSAC repeatedly reports as Critical ²¹)

Figure 3.5 - Public Safety/Crime Rate Graphs (Haiti)



Number of Incidents

0-500

501-1000

1001-2000

2001-above

Crime Rate Level

Low rate of crime

Moderate rate of crime

High rate of crime

Very high rate of crime

2. Infrastructure Investment

Haiti's overall infrastructure has been considered poor quality and a deterrent to sustainable tourism in terms of increased overnight visitor arrivals (cruise ship travelers are often insulated from being impacted by infrastructure problems as the cruise lines are "all-inclusive" sea resorts where traveler's do not remain overnight). Prior to the advent of the country's tourism sector in 1945, the United States was occupied in Haiti and invested extensively in building Haiti's infrastructure in terms of roads, bridges, canals, public buildings, telecommunications, water and sewage. This massive investment contributed to the start of the country's tourism infrastructure. By 1980, the public and public-private investment in infrastructure continued to grow with paved road projects constructed in Haiti's major cities as well as the construction of an 80-mile from Port au Prince to Cap Hatien, i.e. "Route de L'Amitie Franco Hatienne (Library of Congress Country Report, 2001). Also, private investment in terms of hotel accommodations increased from under 1,000 in 1941 to 2,000 rooms in 1960 to 3,000 rooms in 1980. The rate of hotel development during that time, to accommodate the rate of tourism arrivals and receipts Haiti was experiencing, was rapid as Haiti went from having low number of hotels at the start of its tourism sector to a moderate level. Examining the relationship between infrastructure from 1930-1980, the level of investment in infrastructure appears to be positively correlated with tourism arrivals and receipts which grew high during that period.

Since 1980, public investment in infrastructure (which, in the indices of this paper on infrastructure level, is combined with public-private partnerships (PPI) in infrastructure; this is because infrastructure projects (electricity, transportation, ports, water and sewage) are usually funded by a combination of public and public-private-partnership capital) has been rated low (see Table 3.1 in the Methodology section). During 1981-2000, infrastructure projects did not exceed \$500 million (Preeg, 1996; Library of Congress Country Report, 2001). According to the PPI Index, private participation in infrastructure, which is important for governments to secure to finance the extensive capital required for infrastructure projects, totaled just \$129 million (to illustrate the stark contrast in investment, a comparison with the Dominican Republic's PPI investment will be discussed in the third case study of this paper). Also, private investment receded when the number of hotel rooms decreased from 3000 in 1980 to 800 by 1999 due to a loss of tourism arrivals and receipts (to be explained further in the discussion on the interactive effects of country image perception). Moreover, for the period 2001-2017, a high level of private capital was allocated to build or improve infrastructure in Haiti, especially after the 2010 earthquake. However, only a fraction of the amount allocated was disbursed, and accordingly few infrastructure projects pledged were executed (PEMFAR Accountability Report, 2008; U.S. Government Accountability Office (GOA) Report, 2013). For example, the United States Congress granted \$1.14 billion, and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) pledged \$651 million to building Haiti's infrastructure which had amassed nearly \$13.2 billion in damages (IADB Country Report, 2013; GOA Report, 2013). Despite this allocation, only \$203 million was disbursed by the end of the accountability of funds period in 2013. Further, a \$260 million project proposed in 2013 to develop ecotourism in Ile-la-Vache was halted in 2015. Haiti did have some success with its telecommunications sector due to the Haitian government signing a public-private partnership with the Vietnam telecommunication company, Viettel, for nearly \$100 million to upgrade infrastructure and services. Post-earthquake, it was one of the highest delivered capital investment in infrastructure projects to be completed.

Pending infrastructure amounts pledged and outstanding amounts allocated, but not yet disbursed, represent opportunities for increasing tourism arrivals and receipts for Haiti. During the 2000-2017, private investment in terms of hotel accommodations increased from 2,000 rooms in 2010 to nearly 4,322 by 2015 (Export.gov, 2017). After the earthquake, several hotels needed to be rebuilt, and aid workers and missionaries involved in the reconstruction needed lodging. Minister of Tourism Stephanie Villedrouin acknowledged the post-earthquake growth in a 2015 article with the Haitian publication, *Le Nouvelliste*, and indicated that direct investments to tourism were \$345 million (a moderate level amount according to the scale of this paper) (*Le Nouvelliste*, 2015). Further, she stated that Haiti saw a 40% increase in hotel rooms from 2011 to 2015 and claimed that the total number of hotel rooms was 9,280 (with 4,861 classified rooms of international standard of 1 to 5 hibiscus rating, in 177 hotels). Despite the disparity in the number of reported hotel rooms, private investment infrastructure from 2011-2018 has been rated as high. Tourism arrivals and receipts (the most recent numbers for all types of arrivals) for 2014 show Haiti had 1,127,577 visitors (662,403 cruise passengers and 465,174 regular tourists) with a reported increase of nearly 11% in the number of regular tourists compared to the prior year. In 2014, Haiti's rate of increase for tourism arrivals was 13.9 percent, over 5 times the regional average of 2.7%.

3. Nation Branding

Haiti's nation branding efforts from the inception of its tourism sector prior to the time where it experienced public safety challenges, during the 1940-1980 period, mostly relied upon public-private tourism promotion. The government allocated public funds to promote tourism. However, according to a 1973 Organization of American States (OAS) Audit Report, Haiti's tourism promotion budget was poorly allocated (OAS Audit Report, 1973). Nearly 60% of the total budget went to the salaries of the large staff that was employed at the National Tourist Office (OAS Audit Report, 1973). Due to the misallocation, only a small amount remained for promotion, public relations efforts, publicity and literature (i.e. advertising brochures, flyers). As a result, public spending on marketing promotions was low. Reported public-private partnership in tourism promotion involving mostly private sector funding was at a moderate level in the form of airlines, hotel investors and travel agencies. During the initial period of Haiti's tourism sector development, it experienced a high growth rate of tourism. While its arrivals and receipts (tourism arrivals and receipts, this paper's dependent variable) were at moderate levels compared to its region by 1956 with 67,000 visitors, from the time tourism started in Haiti in 1945 with 5,000 visitors to 10,788 in 1951, it grew tremendously in just over 10 years (Seraphin, 2011). Haiti received nearly 6 times the number of visitors in a five-year period 1951-1956.

During 1981-2010, public investment in marketing promotions continued to remain at low levels. Haiti had experienced setbacks in its tourism sector development, and tourism arrivals and receipts had stagnated. There appeared to be several reasons for this unfortunate reversal. In 1982, a rumor associated the origin of the AIDS disease to Haiti (Library of Congress Country Report, 2001). By then, political unrest had begun against President Jean Claude Duvalier's dictatorship culminating in his ouster in 1986 and decades of political instability and increasing crime levels (World Bank Country Report, 1987; Library of Congress Country Report, 2001). In response, the Haitian government retreated their nation branding efforts instead of employing nation branding crises management promotional strategies. Once tourism stagnated, the country closed its tourism offices in 4 locations globally namely, New York, Miami, Paris, and Canada

(Library of Congress Country Report, 2001; Fass, 1988); removed its Ministry of Tourism department in 1986; and reduced its allocated budget for tourism promotion by 1994.

In terms of thousands of visitors from 1987 to 2004, Haiti saw a reduction of 54% of arrivals (from 239,200 of all arrivals to 108,868) (Seraphin, 2011). Haiti attempted to revitalize its tourism industry in the mid-1990s and early 2000s prior to the 2010 earthquake, but nation branding strategic efforts such as promoting the city of Jacmel were continually hampered by the country's public safety and infrastructure weaknesses (Seraphin, 2011). After the earthquake in 2010, the country began attempting to revitalize tourism with more concrete results evident in its level of arrivals and receipts outside of its more successful cruise sector. In 2011, the government appointed Stephanie Villedrouin as Minister of Tourism, who quickly began strong efforts to rebrand Haiti in the wake of proposed and received aid to rebuild the country. The "Why Not Haiti" slogan was initiated and began appearing on the Ministry of Tourism website as well as promotional advertising literature. Within five years, Haiti was included in World Economic Forum's Competitiveness Index for the first time, but it was ranked low for tourism marketing promotions. Assessing the amount that the Haitian government spends on tourism promotion, based on the percent share of total tourism expenditure for 1995-2017, the WEF Report (2015) showed that Haiti's levels ranged from 1.7% in 1995 to 3% from 1999 to 2017. Consistent with the scale of this paper on nation branding (public spending on tourism promotion) levels, the percentages demonstrate a continued trend of low public investment in marketing promotions. By contrast, public-private tourism marketing (another component of nation branding tourism promotional investment) has been high in terms of branded hotel promotions built after the 2010 earthquake and continued cruise ship promotions during the 2011-2017 period.

4. Interaction of IVs with Country Image Perception

Examining tourism arrivals and receipts in Haiti from 1940-2016, as indicated in Table 3.1, at times, there appears to be a correlated individual relationship between each of the independent variables and tourism arrivals and receipts except for the public safety variable level in Haiti's most recent tourism period (2011-2016). For public safety, during 1940-1980, when crime was reported as low, tourism arrivals and receipts were high. Furthermore, when crime was high during the time tourism was deprived (1981-2010), Haiti's tourism sector had a -0.30% average tourism arrivals and receipts rate. Political stability, the other measurement of public safety, created much variance with the dependent variable throughout Haiti's tourism periods. Tourism arrivals and receipts were affected each time the country experienced political instability. Likewise, the infrastructure investment levels, public and private, seemed to be correlated with tourism arrivals and receipts; however, there was no evidence that infrastructure investment made a direct change in tourism arrivals and receipts. This could be attributed to the periods where there was political instability (a public safety issue) and the overall tourism arrivals and receipts were adversely affected during those periods because of the reduction of arrivals and receipts. Likewise, during that time, nation branding strategies to counteract the effect of the public safety situation were at moderate levels (with moderate investments invested by the private sector for tourism promotion and low investments coming from the public sector). Despite the modes of instability during the first half of Haiti's tourism sector development, the overall perception of the country remained positive and tourism was growing at a high rate.

During the 1981-2010 "Deprived Tourism" period, it is evident that there is a greater impact that public safety levels have on tourism arrivals and receipts with the additive effect of low

infrastructure investments (from both the public and private sectors) and a retreat in the country's nation branding (characterized by low tourism promotion investments by the public and private sectors) on the image of the country. Travel destination information had reached potential international visitors during that time about Haiti's political instability problems. Crime levels were not highlighted in the travel destination information reviewed for this paper. However, political instability reports, along with the AIDS rumor, appeared to be sufficient to create the perception that the country posed a threat to public safety (as tourism arrivals and receipts plummeted during that time). While the public safety challenge appears to persist, according to reports from OSAC and country safety rankings, there seems to be some steady increases of tourism arrivals and receipts—especially since the 2010 earthquake. Strong infrastructure investments from the private sector in terms of increased hotel rooms to accommodate the significant number of projects developing to rebuild the country is likely a contributing factor. However, nation branding promotions in terms of public-private tourism promotion can also have an impact as Haiti has recently been included in country rank indexes on global competitiveness. Furthermore, the travel destination information sources, which make up the country image perception interactive variable in this study, had some positive information mixed with the mostly negative reviews of the country during the 2010-2017 period (see Table 3.3).

The Igarape Institute reported on Haiti's recent tourism potential that “given the relatively low incidence of criminal victimization, the perception of Haiti at arrival to departure...overall tourists felt safer than expected during their stay.”²² In line with the theory of this paper, there were no positive travel destination information discovered for 1990-2009 when public safety infrastructure investment and nation branding were at low levels that corresponded to the lowest growth period in Haiti's tourism history.

Table 3.3 – Haiti's Country Image Perception Scale

Haiti Country Image Perception 1940-2018²³			
Time Period	Travel Destination Information Source	Review of Travel Destination Information Source	Country Perception
1940-1949	Missing data	Later sources reveal a perception that covers this period	Positive
1950-1959	Missing data	Later sources reveal a perception that covers this period	Positive
1960-1969	<u>Travel guide</u> ▪ Fodor's Guide to Caribbean (1960)	Favorable – Haiti is viewed as “fascinating” with much to offer tourists (29-page review)	Positive (1960-1963) Negative (1964-1969)
1970-1979	<u>Mass Media reports</u> ▪ Sports Illustrated article (1973) ▪ New York Times article (1974) ▪ New York Times article (1976) ▪ People Magazine article (1977) <u>Travel guide</u> Fodor's Guide to Caribbean (1974)	<u>Mass Media reports</u> Favorable on tourism surge in Haiti Favorable on Haitian art (including souvenirs) Favorable – Haiti is fascinating and safe Favorable – Baby Doc to undo father's damage <u>Travel guide</u> Favorable—Haiti is still “fascinating” as 1960s	Negative (1970-1971) Positive (1972-1980)
1980-1989	<u>Mass Media reports</u> New York Times article (1982) Washington Post article (1984) New York Times article (1984) New York Times article (1986)	Unfavorable--AIDS link to Haiti- tourism decline Unfavorable--AIDS, instability causes decline Favorable—Haiti still has allure for business FDI Mixed—AIDS stigma killed tourism; FDI hopeful	Negative
1990-1999	<u>Mass Media reports</u> Baltimore Sun article (1994) New York Times article (1995)	Unfavorable - Club Med Haiti's loss of tourists Favorable – Haiti tries to revive tourism	Negative
2000-2009	<u>Mass Media reports</u> ▪ BBC News (2004) ▪ Christian Science Monitor (2008) ▪ The Independent-UK (2008) ▪ Reuters online article (2009) ▪ The Tyee (2009)	Unfavorable – Haiti: an economic basket case Mixed – Haiti is safe; negative image hurts tourism Mixed review -Haiti a mix of fun & poverty Favorable – Cruise ship boost tourism in Haiti Unfavorable – Haiti's brand is cursed	Negative
2010-2017	<u>Mass Media reports</u> World Nomad blog (2011) BBC article (2013) Haiti Hub website Lonely Planet (2015) USA Today (2018) <u>Travel guide</u> (2016) Fodor's Guide to Caribbean <u>Travel reviews:</u> TripAdvisor <u>Country Safety Rankings</u> SafeAround (2017) UL Safety Index (2017)	<u>Mass Media reports</u> Unfavorable—Haiti has safety issues Unfavorable—safety warnings about Haiti Favorable—Haiti is as safe as others Favorable—on the best places to visit in Haiti Unfavorable—Advises Haiti is dangerous <u>Unfavorable – Haiti: no longer included in Guide</u> Favorable—travelers claim Haiti is as safe as others Unfavorable – Haiti is ranked 118/128 Unfavorable—Haiti: below average 40/100	Negative

Conclusion and Future Study Recommendations

In Haiti's case study, this paper assessed the effectiveness of the country's government institutions in providing functional benefits, such as public safety and infrastructure investment, as part of their country brand offering to satisfy the demand of their target market of potential travelers. The paper's theory was that higher levels of the independent variables, public safety (which was comprised of political stability and crime rates), infrastructure investment (comprised on public, public-private partnerships and private sector investment {hotel rooms}) and nation branding worked to create a positive brand image. The favorable country brand is what countries promote

to potential travelers to influence their travel decisions, as well as to counteract any negative travel destination information they may receive from outside sources. Countries that were successful would experience a rise in international tourism arrivals and receipts. Considering the literature had already established an individual correlation between political stability, infrastructure investment and nation branding with tourism demand, the expectation was that the newly operationalized independent variables and dependent variable would indicate a better causal relationship to explain how countries generate increases in tourism arrivals and receipts.

The findings of this paper were not entirely as expected. Political stability, one of the variables used to measure the level of public safety in each test country, was the only variable which produced a strong causal relationship with the dependent variable, tourism arrivals and receipts. Generally, over the different tourism periods for Haiti, whenever political instability was evident, tourism arrivals and, in most times, receipts declined significantly. Furthermore, when Haiti transitioned from a period of instability to moderate levels of political stability, the tourism arrivals and receipts increased to high levels. The exception to that finding was during Haiti's most recent tourism period (2011-2016), during which the government took steps to revitalize tourism with extensive infrastructure and nation branding public and public-private sector investments. In that time, crime (the other measure for public safety) was high, and the country was classified as unstable (at a percentile rank ranging from 17.54/100 in 2011 to 22.38/100 in 2016, according to the levels on political stability described under the World Governance Indicators (WGI) on "*Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism*" that was used to determine the level of security risk. However, over the 2011-2016 period, Haiti experienced an average increase of 13.9% in tourism arrivals that was over five times the annual average with a 2.7% increase for arrivals in the Caribbean region overall. During the 2011-2016 period, tourism receipts grew an average of 3% for Haiti, about less than 1% of the annual average for receipts in the Caribbean. This unexpected outcome indicated that there was likely an additive effect coming from the inclusion of the other independent two variables in the theoretical framework, which will be discussed further in the conclusion.

For this study's intervening variable, country image perception, the outcomes were mostly as expected. Country image perception for Haiti was directly impacted by information pertaining to the political stability level of the country. In nearly every instance, when Haiti was categorized as unstable, the rate of arrivals and receipts declined. When the country was at least at a moderate level of stability, Haiti experienced high levels of increase in arrival and receipts. In Haiti's case study, during the 1940-1980 and 1981-2010 periods, when country image perception was positive (Haiti was described by a 1976 New York Times article as "exotic and fascinating, possessed of a rich culture, a tempestuous past and a smiling, friendly populace"²⁴), the country experienced high increases in arrivals and receipts (see Table 3.1). Predictably, when perception of the country was negative (according to the 1994 Baltimore Sun article "Haiti has been so messed up for so long, it can't even do tourism anymore"²⁵), tourism was negatively impacted as tourism arrivals and receipts declined by -30% for the entire period (see Table 3.1 and Figure 4.3). However, in Haiti's most recent tourism period, the country image perception is still negative; a 2012 L.A. Times article was titled "*For troubled Haiti, tourism is a tough sell*"²⁶). Despite this, the country experienced a high increase in arrivals (see Table 3.1), and tourism receipts were just slightly under the regional average. As country image perception, from the demand side (i.e. potential travelers), is influenced by travel destination information sources, the results for Haiti indicated that it was possible that information was coming from the supply side (i.e. the potential travel destination) that could explain the difference in Haiti's case. The outcome revealed that there was

an impact from the independent variables that seemed to bypass the normal effects of the intervening variable, country image perception, on the level of arrivals and receipts.

There were periods where a correlated relationship was predictably evident between individual independent variables and the dependent variable, tourism arrivals and receipts. However, for the public safety independent variable, findings indicate that crime rate levels did not appear to impact tourism arrivals and receipts as expected. As a security measure, no apparent causal relationship with tourism arrivals and receipts could be determined in the case study analyses for Haiti. It appeared that there were times that high levels of crime were correlated with low levels of tourism arrivals and receipts. Alternatively, there were times when crime was at low levels in a period while increases in tourism arrivals and receipts were high. Yet, after evaluating Haiti's tourism periods, crime proved not to be a causal factor. High percentages of arrivals and receipts were still generated during periods when crime was high in Haiti (see Table 3.1.).

To explore this puzzle further, this study examined the individual impact of the remaining two variables in the theoretical equation and their impact on tourism arrivals and receipts in Haiti. There were varied levels of public spending, public-private partnerships and private sector investments in infrastructure throughout each period of their tourism sector development. Despite the different levels of investment, they did not create any apparent variations on the dependent variable in each period. In one period (1981-2010), there was a general correlation between infrastructure investment and tourism arrivals and receipts. During that period, low levels of public spending, public-private partnerships and private sector investments in infrastructure corresponded to low levels of tourism arrivals and receipts. That relationship was not as clear in the previous period (1940-1980), though, where similarly low levels in public and public-private partnerships still generated a high increase over time in arrivals between years where growth rate figures were available: 24% in 1950, followed by 41% in 1956, and 6% in 1960 (see Figure 4.1). Tourism receipts for 1960 indicated a 14% increase over time from 1950 figures. Furthermore, despite public and public-private private sector investment in infrastructure being at moderate levels during this period (1940-1980), tourism arrivals declined in 1963 and dropped to -24% for tourism arrivals and -53% for tourism receipts from previously recorded figures (see Figure 4.2). This meant that changes in the level of another independent variable was likely creating that variance.

Figure 4.1 – Tourism Arrivals in Haiti (1940-1980)






Table 4.2 - Tourism Receipts in Haiti (1940-1980)**Table 4.3 - Tourism Arrivals in Haiti (1980-2010)**

For the nation branding independent variable, the impact of public tourism promotion and public-private tourism promotion in terms of generating tourism arrivals and receipts varied across time periods in Haiti. Between 1940 and 1980, public tourism promotion was low; however, public-private tourism promotion was at a moderate level. Despite the low level of public tourism promotion, it appeared that a moderate level of public-private tourism promotion was sufficient to produce high levels of tourism arrivals and receipts (see Table 3.1). During the next period (1981-2010), when public and public-private tourism promotions were both at low levels, tourism arrivals were at low levels as expected. In Haiti's final tourism period, public tourism promotion was low while public-private tourism promotion was high, and this resulted in a high level of tourism arrivals while tourism receipts were at low levels (see Table 3.1). Therefore, some level

of nation branding is strongly correlated with tourism arrivals and receipts. However, a causal relationship between nation branding and tourism arrivals and receipts is not as evident as it is with political stability.

The results of the intervening variable, country image perception, helped clarify the nature of the relationships between the independent variables of this paper. In terms of interaction between the independent variables in Haiti, it was observed that when the country experienced political instability and a low level of public safety (where crime and instability simultaneously existed as in Haiti's case), high levels of infrastructure investment and nation branding (only high levels of public-private tourism promotion for Haiti) appeared to offset the perception of the security threats. This is where the previously discussed outcomes, for country image perception, indicated that certain variables were interacting to offset any negative information being provided to outbound potential travelers (which often deterred their decision to travel). Despite the potential threat that a high crime level and political instability in Haiti could pose, tourists still chose to visit Haiti during 2011-2016. However, it was unclear whether the overcompensation was based on a combination of high levels of infrastructure investment and nation branding, or if high rates of one variable were creating the overcompensation. It was not determined if the high level of nation branding (or a high level of one component of it), as the promotional component this paper's theory, was sufficient to offset the perception of security risk for travelers.

In Haiti, the public spending measure of the nation branding independent variable, remained at low levels across all time periods; however, moderate levels of the public-private component of the nation branding seemed sufficient to help counteract the negative country image impact that political instability caused during the 1940-1980 period. After the political instability period passes, the country image perception intervening variable becomes positive. This indicates that a moderate level of investment in public-private tourism promotion in Haiti can be sufficient to impact perception. In comparing the interactions between the variables in both cases, the country image perception only changed from negative to positive when political stability was moderate and nation branding investment was at least moderate in one of its variables (public-private promotion in Haiti's case). The sustainability of this additive relationship indicates the following: 1) with high levels of nation branding and infrastructure investment, and moderate political stability, governments can create a favorable country brand; 2) the country brand is strong enough to project a positive country image that generates high levels of tourism arrivals and receipts - even when the crime rate is high.

While the hypothesis tests were not completely confirmed (the prediction was that all three independent variables would be high to generate a high increase tourism arrivals and receipts), the theoretical framework concerning the necessary, additive relationship between the independent variables, and their ability to influence country image perception by providing functional benefits (reduction of security risk via at least moderate stability and infrastructure) to generate tourism arrivals and receipts is confirmed. What this means is that government institutions can effectively manage the level of security risk by providing adequate infrastructure that insulates travelers from unsafe conditions created by crime and/or some level of political instability.

Future studies on tourism development or demand should conduct a comparative study among test countries with similar backgrounds of conflict like Haiti. Furthermore, in the comparative analysis, the number of independent variables may be expanded to compare the level of governance among the countries. Moreover, political stability should be treated independent of crime rates or solely as a determinant of security risk. In this study, because public safety was

being measure, only the WGI were used for political stability/absence of violence. An expansion of the independent variables in a comparative study may find that the level of governance is significant to explain why some countries in the region maintain a successful tourism sector while Haiti has struggled. Haiti has had eighteen governments in less than 30 years. The frequent change of governments makes it difficult to produce policies that require continuity, persistent investment, extensive planning, and financial accountability as tourism development does. In recent years, studies show that Haiti's level of governance has increased, even if the global community still classifies the country as "unstable" from the political instability/absence of violence perspective. Expanding the literature in the future would be helpful in seeing the variance levels of stability in Haiti and countries like it. The theoretical framework provided in this study allows for future scholarship to build upon the arguments to provide further explanations for how governments can effectively manage their country brand, tourism development and global perception to generate increases in tourism arrivals and receipts.

Future scholarship may also consider exploring alternate hypotheses for why the Haitian government was not as successful in securing higher levels of foreign private investment for tourism as other countries in the region. In an interview with political scientist Dr. Henry "Chip" Carey, Haitian economist Gabriel Verret presents some compelling arguments concerning the level of foreign tourism investment in the Dominican Republic which was not experienced by Haiti especially after tourism declined in the early 1980s (Verret and Carey, 2020). Verret questions why two countries with similar backgrounds did not enjoy similar beneficial outcomes when it comes to the successful tourism development evident in the Dominican Republic versus Haiti. He further argues that the attitudes of the elites in the Dominican Republic were open to foreign capital investment in tourism to help advance the industry and, subsequently, create more economic growth for the country. By contrast, Verret noted the protectionist attitudes of local Haitian resort owners, which arose during close ties with the Duvalier era, may have persisted across subsequent regime changes to contribute to the Haitian government's hesitation to promote and secure higher levels of foreign capital investment when the need was most dire. Future studies may focus on researching the literature to obtain evidence of Haitian government policies to limit or restrict foreign capital investment in tourism development. Alternatively, absent government restrictive policies against foreign investment, the tourism literature on Haiti should be explored to evaluate the impact of local elite attitudes that may have informally influenced a lack of government capital investment promotion outside country borders.

Finally, the findings of this study produced a unique problem concerning the measurement of crime rates for public safety, the main independent variable of this paper, and its impact on tourism arrivals and receipts. This quandary serves as an opportunity for further studies to provide more concrete explanations for the variance concerning what creates the perception of a threat to safety in this paper's findings. While political stability is used as a common measure for security risks, the expectation was that including the crime rate as a variable for public safety would be an even more important indication of the level of security risk in each country.

In conclusion, this study highlighted the issue of underreported crime and the lack of national crime statistics system in many countries. The scarcity of reliability of crime data information explains why literature on tourism demand determinants tends to exclude it as a measurement for security. Political instability is widely reported by most country's media sources. Therefore, travel warnings or information about the volatile environment within a foreign destination is more accessible. To advance the literature in this area, there are several

variables that can be used to determine why crime is underreported and how it impacts travel safety when tourists are given misinformation about crime abroad. For destinations where crime is being or has been underreported, it will be important to look at corruption levels, governance, the strength of and reliability of the country's security institutions (such as their national police).

ENDNOTES

1. <https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/cagr.asp>.
2. Public safety definition—is my conceptual definition based on a combination of definitions from the tourism determinants literature defining safety and security. My conceptual definition is derived from this link: <https://erl.ucc.edu.gh/jspui/bitstream/123456789/3157/1/GETRUDE%20POKU.pdf>.
3. Crime rate definition—<https://definitions.uslegal.com/c/crime-rate/>.
4. Political stability definition—Hurwitz, L. (1973). "Contemporary Approaches to Political Stability," *Comparative Politics* 5(3): 449-463.
5. Public spending on infrastructure: The conceptual definition comes from the Public Spending on Infrastructure guide available at the World Bank website: <https://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/abs/10.1596/1813-9450-5905>.
6. Private sector investment in infrastructure definition: The conceptual definition for private sector investment in infrastructure comes from the World Economic Forum Infrastructure Investment Participation Blueprint (Wyman, 2014); and Public Private Partnerships (PPP) definition: The conceptual definition for PPP comes from Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation report: <http://www.cpppc.org/u/cms/ppp/201711/30162729estl.pdf>.
7. Volcic, Z., & Andrejevic, M. (2011). "Nation branding in the era of commercial nationalism," *International Journal of Communication* 5: 21.
8. Public tourism promotion investment definition: —the conceptual definition is based on the World Trade and Tourism Council's definition on government collective spending: <https://www.wttc.org/-/media/files/reports/economic-impact-research/regions-2017/world2017.pdf>.
9. https://tcdata360.worldbank.org/indicators/govt.tat.spend?country=HTI&indicator=24661&countries=DOM&viz=line_chart&years=1995,2027
10. Public-private tourism promotion partnership definition— is my conceptual definition based on the World Travel and Tourism Council discussion on private sector's marketing role in conjunction with the public sector http://www.ontit.it/opencms/export/sites/default/ont/it/documenti/archivio/files/ONT_2003-08-13_00163.pdf.
11. Country image perception—the conceptual definition is developed following a combination of concepts from the country image literature (Nagashimu, 1970; Shields, 1991; Martin and Eroglu, 1993; and Haider et al., 1994).
12. Travel destination information (TDI)—the conceptual definition is developed through a combination of concepts from the following source: Marine-Roig, E. (2017). "Measuring Destination Image through Travel Reviews in Search Engines," *Sustainability* 9(8): 1425.
13. The names of each tourism period are loosely based on Hugues Séraphin's 2016 study on marketing to diaspora community, which categorized the level of tourism that existed during those times.
14. Tourism growth (in terms of absolute numbers over time)—no figures available prior to tourism starting in Haiti in 1945.

15. The ratings for each scale are reported except as footnoted as there may be deviations in terms of how data sources report their scaled statistics inconsistent with the scales used in this report.
16. OSAC (2012-2017) Reports on Haiti rated the crime level as “critical” in their scale whereas the scale of this study classifies it as “high” instead.
17. WGI indicators indicate levels of political stability for Haiti that would classify the country as “unstable”. However, the indicator is based solely on measuring “absence of violence” as a security risk measurement; this indicator does not indicate the potential governance level which would provide a better measurement for stable government (such as governance and the effectiveness of its government institutions, rule of law and corruption levels).
18. Political Instability Task Force (PITF) *Consolidated Problem Set* version 2016, <https://web.stanford.edu/group/ethnic/Random%20Narratives/Dominican%20RepublicRN1.2.pdf> https://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/Dominican%20Republic%20and%20Haiti%20Study_1.pdf and https://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/Dominican%20Republic%20and%20Haiti%20Study_4.pdf?ver=2012-10-11-163239-190.
19. Report that Haiti is crime free: Country Report, 2001 and NY Times article (1976) <https://www.nytimes.com/1976/11/21/archives/whats-doing-in-haiti.html>.
20. Based on OSAC (2006-2018) Reports.
21. Based on OSAC (2006-2018) reports that classify crime rate levels as “critical” mainly based on the homicide rates and other violent crimes such as kidnappings, rapes, assaults, shootings and carjackings.
22. <https://igarape.org.br/en/is-tourism-haitis-magic-bullet-an-empirical-treatment-of-haitis-tourism-potential/>.
23. The country image perception references are listed in a separate page in the Works Cited section of this paper.
24. <https://www.nytimes.com/1976/11/21/archives/whats-doing-in-haiti.html>.
25. http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1994-10-09/news/1994282027_1_haiti-club-med-luisetti.
26. <http://articles.latimes.com/2012/nov/22/business/la-fi-haiti-tourism-20121122>.

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APPENDIX

Country Image Perception Data Sources (Haiti, 1940-present)

Haiti (1940- present)

1) 1940s-1950s

a. Missing data

2) 1960s

a. Travel Guide

- i. Fodor's Travel Guide to Caribbean (1960) incl. 29 pgs. on Haiti (positive review)

3) 1970s

a. Mass Media Reports

- i. Sports Illustrated - incl. report of tourism surge in Haiti (1973) <https://www.si.com/vault/1973/05/21/618336/to-hell-with-paradise>
- ii. US/NY Times report incl. Haiti's art (1974)-<https://www.nytimes.com/1974/09/08/archives/haitian-primitives-from-art-form-to-souvenirs-art.html>
- iii. US/NY Times report incl. safety (1976)- <https://www.nytimes.com/1976/11/21/archives/whats-doing-in-haiti.html>
- iv. People Magazine report on Papa Doc instability/tourism impact (1977)- <http://people.com/archive/papa-doc-terrorized-and-pillaged-haiti-now-his-son-aims-to-undo-the-damage-vol-8-no-20/>

b. Travel Guide

- i. Fodor's Travel Guide to Caribbean (1970)

4) 1980s

a. Mass Media Reports

- i. NY Times report on impact of AIDs rumor on Haiti's tourism (1983)- <https://www.nytimes.com/1983/11/29/world/for-haiti-s-tourism-the-stigma-of-aids-is-fatal.html>
- ii. UK AIDs report on Haiti (attributed to tourist going to Haiti vs originating there—confirms it's rumor vs real-2008 re 1982): <http://www.progressio.org.uk/sites/default/files/HIV-AIDS-in-Haiti.pdf>
- iii. AIDs and Unrest Image cause tourism to drop (1984) https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1984/06/13/riots-follow-liberalization-in-haiti/0bab2e94-47e5-4f4a-a2f1-75d7ecd7da0e/?utm_term=.00c352c61418
- iv. US/NYT Haiti attractive for business (1984) <https://www.nytimes.com/1984/06/17/business/haiti-s-allure-for-us-business.html>
- v. NYT (1986) FDI industry hopeful post-Duvalier <https://www.nytimes.com/1986/02/17/business/duvalier-flight-leaves-haiti-industry-hopeful.html>

b. Travel Guide

- i. Fodor's Travel Guide to Caribbean (1980)

5) 1990s

a. Mass Media Reports

- i. Baltimore Sun article on Club Med Haiti's loss of tourists (1994) <http://articles.baltimore.com/1994-05-14/1994-05-14>

- baltimoresun.com/1994-10-09/news/1994282027_1_haiti-club-med-luisetti
- ii. NYT on Haitian tourism (1995)- <https://www.nytimes.com/1995/03/12/travel/travel-advisory-correspondent-s-report-haiti-makes-effort-to-revive-tourism.html>
- 6) **2000s**
 - a. *Mass Media Reports*
 - i. 2001 country report on Haiti's non-existent tourism sector since 1990: <http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/x9800e/x9800e10.htm>
 - 7) **2010s**
 - a. *Mass Media Reports*
 - i. World Nomad Blog report on Haiti's safety, crime, and travel (2011 and 2018)
 1. <https://www.worldnomads.com/travel-safety/caribbean/haiti/haiti-safety-tips>
 2. <https://www.worldnomads.com/travel-safety/caribbean/haiti/haiti-high-crime-and-chaos>
 - ii. BBC article on Haiti's safety for travel (2013):
 1. <http://www.bbc.com/travel/story/20130110-is-haiti-safe-for-travellers>
 - iii. Haiti Hub website (2013) Is Haiti Safe?:
 1. <https://haitihub.com/is-haiti-safe/>
 - iv. Lonely Planet (2015)
 1. <https://www.lonelyplanet.com/haiti/travel-tips-and-articles/ten-things-to-know-about-visiting-haiti/40625c8c-8a11-5710-a052-1479d2762896>
 - b. *Country Rankings*
 - i. Safe Around website (country danger ranking-2017)
 1. <https://safearound.com/americas/haiti/>
 - ii. Social Progress Index (2017)-
 1. <http://www.socialprogressindex.com/assets/downloads/scorecards/en/HTI-Scorecard.pdf>
 - c. *Travel Reviews*
 - i. Trip Advisor Reviews (2010-2018)
 1. https://www.tripadvisor.com/ShowTopic-g147306-i747-k11014825-Haiti_Safe_in_2017-Haiti.html
 2. <https://www.tripadvisor.com/Tourism-g147306-Haiti-Vacations.html>
 - a. *Mass Media Reports*
 - i. USA Today (2018): <http://traveltips.usatoday.com/dangers-travel-haiti-102649.html>
 - ii. UK Travel Advice on Haiti (2018): <https://www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice/haiti>
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Leveraging the Power of the People

Isabelle Clérié

This paper is a detailed account of the three-year process undertaken between Haitian civil society and the United Nation's Office of the Human Rights Commissioner to determine if and how Haiti can address past crimes through transitional justice mechanisms and tools. The process found that Haiti's dysfunctional government and judicial sector made past crimes an unrealistic undertaking, however, community organizations within civil society are an overlooked and highly valuable conduit for reshaping narratives about the present by shedding light and insight on the truths of the past.

Keywords: transitional justice, truth-seeking, asset-based approaches, civil society, impunity

Introduction

In 2018, the Haitian government submitted a report, Rapport de l'État haïtien au CIDCP, to the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in response to the Council's 2014 report that presented a series of recommendations to the Haitian government (Rapport de l'État haïtien au CIDCP 2018). The Council's initial report urged Haiti's government to resume the Duvalier legal case, to which the Haitian government very briefly listed a few steps taken in this case specifically and then stressed the need to "revitalize" the *Cour de Cassation*, Haiti's highest court. The Council went on to recommend that the Haitian government review and implement the recommendations of the Commission Nationale de Vérité et Justice, the National Truth and Justice Commission, of 1995 which included its obligation to try any person accused of serious human rights violation. The Haitian government responded to this last point by appealing to national reconciliation, instead of justice for the victims of the Raboteau massacre:

With regard to the recommendations of the Truth and Justice Commission, since they are linked to the Raboteau trial and that subsequently, victims and executioners coexist in harmony in a relatively lasting social peace, the Government has deemed it necessary not to stir the ashes of the past by resuming the trial (CIDCP, para. 135).

This is demonstrative of the absolute lack of political will to pursue any form of justice or truth seeking on the part of the Haitian government. So, in light of this and the pervasive culture of impunity, within the Haitian state, what can realistically be done to face the past? In recent years, more attention is being given to the events leading up to our current state. What happened to allow our government to be so dysfunctional not only in criminal justice, which is part of a larger pattern in governance generally? In recent years, international agencies have allocated significant resources towards strengthening the rule of law. Inter-governmental organizations like the United Nations (UN) or international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), such as Lawyers Without Borders Canada, have partnered with public sector entities like the *L'Office du Protecteur du Citoyen* (OPC – Office of the Ombudsman) to bolster the Haitian state's capacity in criminal justice through training in international law, strategic litigation, advocacy, and more. The success of such programming is debatable, but it has increased discussion within Haitian civil society about citizen rights and participation. Most of such interventions to date have sought to effect institutional