Regime Complexity and a Galvanizing Idea: Development Goals and Intergovernmental Organization Coordination

Melanie H. Ram

When rules and institutions governing specific issue areas overlap, cooperation and coordination may be enhanced or competition may ensue. Sometimes competition leads to a coordinated division of labor. Most explanations for regime complexity outcomes focus on state interests and decision-making. Relatively little attention has been given to intergovernmental organization agency or the role of ideas in fostering cooperation. This article examines how the emergence of shared development goals prompted increased coordination among intergovernmental organizations by providing a framework for action and interaction on international development. It examines the coordination efforts from 2000-2018 of the largest multilateral aid donors - the European Union, the United Nations, and the World Bank – and finds that shared ideas, enhanced attention to aid effectiveness, and expanded resources galvanized cooperation among existing institutions but paradoxically also led to a proliferation of institutions.

Introduction[i]

Better donor coordination has long been a stated goal of development practitioners in order to reduce duplication of effort, inefficiencies, and high transaction costs. Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) partially address the donor coordination problem by bringing together multiple bilateral (state) donors and pooling their resources in support of common projects, programs, or priorities. The need for countries to coordinate their foreign aid continues to grow due to the proliferation of bilateral and multilateral donors, the involvement of more partners in the private and nonprofit sectors, broader development agendas, and the continued overlap of donors' work. These circumstances have also made coordination between IGOs necessary to achieve better development outcomes, or at least provide aid more efficiently. According to the academic literature, however, we would not expect IGOs to choose to cooperate with each other when their work overlaps. Using a qualitative examination of IGO statements, reports, agreements, funding trends, decisions, and practices, this paper explores whether the adoption of the 2000-2015 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and preparation for the subsequent Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)[ii] fostered deeper IGO-IGO collaboration on development and more efficient aid delivery. At the same time, it seeks to better understand how IGO agency and shared ideas may affect the outcomes of regime complexity.

The paper proceeds as follows. First, I discuss the academic literature on inter-organizational collaboration and competition and regime complexity as it relates to IGOs. Second, I examine the increased coordination[iii] since 2000 among the three largest players in multilateral aid - the European Union (EU), World Bank, and United Nations (UN).[iv] Third, I investigate factors motivating their cooperation. Finally, I consider the implications of formal cooperation mechanisms and converging goals for the broader objectives of reducing aid fragmentation and increasing aid effectiveness – or addressing the negative impacts of regime complexity in development.

Inter-organizational collaboration, competition, and regime complexity

Most literature on intergovernmental organizations, international regimes, and inter-organizational collaboration focuses on member states' role and influence in IGOs, their forum-shopping among IGOs and creation of new IGOs, the degree of autonomy of IGOs, or the impact of IGOs or other institutions on state behavior. Research on the MDGs largely assesses the design and achievement of the goals or their implementation in or impact on developing countries. Little discussed in either body of literature is the agency of IGOs in the development and promotion of development goals or the cooperation between IGOs in their quest to meet these goals.

With overlapping rules and institutions governing a variety of issue-areas in global affairs today - and no overarching authority to manage conflict between them - "regime complexity" has recently received a lot of academic attention.[v] Scholars have explored the reasons such complexity has emerged and its consequences, focusing especially on the role of states in the development of overlapping legal agreements and institutions. In terms of impact, some have found that regime complexity strengthens cooperation and effectiveness, others that it promotes competition and inefficiencies (Alter and Meunier 2009; Gehring and Faude 2013). For example, Gehring and Faude (2014, 473) explain that in the case of overlapping regulatory institutions, the power and interests of constituent states may lead to mutual adaptation and an "inter-institutional division of labor." On the issue of migrant return, Koch (2014, 917) found that the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) initially clashed, but competition eventually gave way to cooperation and a division of labor. On the other hand, regime complexity may lead to different organizations addressing an issue in different ways to the detriment of effective outcomes. For example, Margulis (2013) found that the regime complex that emerged on food security, with its diverging rules and norms, produced conflict between key IGOs involved and ultimately had a negative impact on food security.

While most literature examines the development of a regime complex among a small group of institutions on a particular issue, a few scholars have tried to parse out which factors contribute to particular outcomes. For example, Gest and Grigorescu (2010) examine the role of funds, expertise, prestige, and organizational culture on whether and when seventeen IGOs working on anti-corruption issues cooperated or competed. Faude and Fuss (2020) consider how the reason a new institution is created influences whether it cooperates or competes with a preexisting institution. Clark (2021) investigates how IGO staff may have an affinity for some information sharing and co-financing partners over others based on the organizations' key state stakeholders.

Literature on organizational overlap tells us that cooperation between IGOs may be induced (or in some cases deterred) as a result of resource needs, powerful member state preferences, asymmetrical power relations, executive heads, organizational culture, trust, or a quest for legitimacy (Biermann and Koops 2016, 22). Less studied and potentially influential are political shocks or crises and a previous history of cooperation (Biermann and Koops 2016, 22). A relatively small segment of the literature explores the autonomous agency of

IGOs in their decisions to cooperate or compete. Resource dependence theory tells us that organizations aim to maintain their independence and develop "niche capabilities" but will cooperate if necessary to gain needed resources, financial or otherwise (e.g. expertise or legitimacy) (Franke and Koch 2016, 173). According to Brosig (2011, 148), IGOs will also make adaptations in response to changes in their external environment such as "increased actor density, dispersed competencies and organizational overlap." Generally, we expect organizations "will try to avoid performing exactly the same tasks in the same policy field for the same membership base" and will avoid the "mutual dependency" and restricted autonomy that cooperation or coordination creates unless they deem it essential (Brosig 2011, 148-9, 160). Biermann (2008, 154) agrees that "organizations are extremely reluctant to give up autonomy through substantial cooperation" and each organization will try to obtain or maintain centrality in an inter-organizational network. In the case of post-Cold War security cooperation, for example, he found that "cooperation [between the EU, NATO, OSCE, and WEU] emerged out of necessity, to prevent failures that would reduce credibility of all involved organizations" (Biermann 2008, 159). Frey (2008) takes a broader "market"-level view of organizations and similarly argues that international organizations (including IGOs and international non-governmental organizations) try to prevent entry of new organizations into their fields of expertise. As a result, he finds that competition in a particular field is limited, but argues it should be encouraged to achieve better outcomes.

Building on these literatures, this paper considers whether and how ideas (such as shared goals) may stimulate IGO-IGO cooperation by providing a framework for action and interaction. A galvanizing idea or common framework may help overcome the logistical and bureaucratic challenges of cooperation (e.g. different rules and procedures and different organizational cultures) and reduce concerns about risks to autonomy. Moreover, the potential of new tangible or intangible resources (essential or not) that may result from powerful ideas may incentivize cooperation; in certain circumstances, IGOs may in fact seek out rather than avoid cooperation, even though their mandates could be achieved without cooperation and their survival is not at risk. Coordination may then reduce the complexity and increase the efficiency of the regime by bringing various actors and institutions together under the same mandate (see Figure 1). In this way, the development of shared goals may temper a regime complex and lead to greater efficiency or better outcomes.

Figure 1. Expectation of impact of shared ideas on IGO cooperation



Aid coordination between IGOs has received relatively little donor or scholarly attention. For example, the 2015 Development Co-operation Report of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) on "Making Partnerships Effective Coalitions for Action" emphasizes the growing importance of coordinated action among a "growing diversity of partners" (OECD 2015a, 18) but ignores the coordinated action needed between IGOs themselves, focusing on the central role of states in multi-stakeholder partnerships that include the private sector in particular.[vi] Even the OECD's latest Multilateral Aid report (2015b) gives relatively little attention to aid coordination by and between IGOs, focusing instead on coordination of bilateral aid through IGOs. It does, however, acknowledge the need to address IGO coordination in the future, noting that "increasingly, it seems that multilateral organisations have opportunities to work together and contribute more collectively than individually – but no mechanism exists for assessing this" (OECD 2015c, 20).

Post-2000 IGO-IGO Cooperation on Development

Formal cooperation and coordination between major IGOs on development has expanded and deepened since 2000. Such cooperation is not a natural or expected phenomenon, and it has only recently emerged in a meaningful way in international development. In fact, the international development goals that were enumerated in the 2000 A Better World report and subsequently incorporated into the MDGs were the result of "unprecedented collaboration" among the UN, World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), and OECD, the staff of whom wrote the report. Never before had these organizations jointly agreed on an assessment and vision for global poverty reduction (UN Department of Public Information 2000, cited in Ram and Toda 2005, 66). Moreover, this initial cooperation was not universally applauded, but rather highly controversial among some civil society groups (Fukuda-Parr and Hulme 2011, 24-25); one group criticized the UN's involvement in this effort as "a propaganda exercise for international financial institutions whose polices are widely held to be at the root of many of the grave social problems facing the poor" (World Council of Churches 2000). IGO-IGO coordination expanded following the development of the MDGs and alongside the increased focus on aid effectiveness. Both the MDGs and aid effectiveness were incorporated into IGO cooperation discussions.

In 2001, just months after the MDGs were formulated, the European Community (EC) and World Bank first signed a Trust Funds and Cofinancing Framework Agreement to formalize their cooperation. At this point, the Bank had already begun to integrate the international development goals into its priorities and cooperation with other organizations like the IMF (see for example World Bank and IMF, 2001). The 2001 agreement with the EC was revised in 2003 and replaced in 2009. The new agreement in 2009 took account of "the need to focus on achieving the MDG's [sic] as a central policy, and on advancing the aid effectiveness agenda" (European Commission and World Bank 2009). The strategic partnership was replaced in 2014 and "upgrad[ed]" in 2016 (European Commission and World Bank 2016), after which the parties agreed to annual strategic dialogues to coordinate their approaches and plan joint operations in order "to bring a decisive contribution to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development" (European Commission 2016). Later that year, they further committed "to strengthen joint action" to increase development impact in fragile states, especially where achieving the SDGs may be threatened and "stronger and better partnerships among international actors have a particularly important role to play" (World Bank 2016).

Increased EU cooperation with the UN on development was similarly formalized following the emergence of the MDGs. In its 2001 Communication on "Building an Effective Partnership with the United Nations" in development and humanitarian affairs, the European Commission (2001, 2) indicated the two parties could "improve efficiency and coherence" in their cooperation. Improved cooperation was "a major priority" in part because the Millennium Declaration "reaffirmed the UN global role" and the international community's commitment to the UN's effective role in development. A joint agreement regarding European Community financing of UN programs and projects was concluded in 2000 and subsequently replaced by a Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement signed in April 2003 to

"enhance their cooperation including programmatic partnership" (EC and UN 2003, preamble). Previously, the EU's cooperation with the UN in development was in the form of financing agreements on individual projects or programs "on a case by case basis," rather than any "programmatic, longer-term cooperation" (EC and UN 2003, 5). The first annual EU-UN partnership report in 2005 already recounts "a rich collaboration that has grown considerably in recent years" and is "guided by" the Millennium Declaration and MDGs. By 2015, the two organizations report cooperation in more than 170 countries (up from 90 in 2005) and over $1.7 billion euros channeled from the EU through the UN, over four times the amount in 2000 (UN Brussels 2006, 6, 43; UN Brussels 2017).

While the 2003 Framework Agreement with the European Community already applied to more than a dozen UN programs and funds, the European Commission subsequently signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) in 2004 (after UNEP opened an office in Brussels in 2001) and separate "strategic partnership" agreements with at least eight UN programs and specialized agencies: the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Health Organization (WHO), the International Labor Organization (ILO), and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in 2004; UNHCR and the World Food Programme (WFP) in 2005; UN Women and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 2012 (European Commission, EuropeAid n.d.).[vii] The MDGs also provided an impetus or focus for some, if not all, of these agreements. For example, the overarching goal of the Commission's agreement with the WHO was to "accelerate the fight against poverty and work towards the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)" (European Commission 2004). The Commission (2004) noted that choosing WHO as one of its strategic partners in development "underlines the EC's commitment to the MDG's [sic] and recognises the critical role that must be played by the UN's specialised agencies in achieving them." The MOU between the European Commission and UNESCO (2012) aimed to increase efficiency, coherence, and impact in the areas in which they cooperate, noting that they "share the objectives of development through the promotion of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and other internationally agreed development targets."

The World Bank has long had a formal cooperation agreement with the UN as a specialized agency of the organization, but collaboration between the institutions increased after the MDGs were adopted (World Bank n.d., "Sustainable Development Goals"). In 2000, as indicated above, the Bank issued a joint report with the UN, IMF, and OECD outlining shared international development goals. Although not yet redrafted into the MDGs, this report stated that "our institutions are actively using these development goals as a common framework to guide our policies and programmes and to assess our effectiveness" (UN, World Bank Group, IMF, and OECD, 2000). Staff from the World Bank subsequently worked with staff from the UN and the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) to formulate the goals from the Millennium Declaration and earlier documents into the eight MDGs with specific targets and indicators (Fukuda-Parr and Hulme 2011, 24).

In 2017, the World Bank and UN agreed to a new partnership framework for crisis-affected situations, following a UN General Assembly resolution encouraging such cooperation and updating a 2008 agreement with this focus; this complemented the European Commission-UN Development Group-World Bank Joint Declaration on Post-Crisis Assessments and Recovery Planning. The Bank and UN aimed to make international responses "more effective and sustainable" in crisis-affected situations, which present "one of the most pressing challenges captured in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development" (UN and World Bank 2017, 1). As a guiding principle, the agreement emphasized that the two organizations' efforts "must be mutually reinforcing," despite different mandates and comparative advantages (UN and World Bank 2017, 2).

Tempering the Development Regime Complex

Several factors appear to have motivated the increased coordination and cooperation between the UN, World Bank, and EU on development in recent years: the shared goals and framework of the MDGs (and later SDGs); the focus on aid effectiveness (precipitated in part by the growing number and variety of participating actors); the opportunity to strengthen their image, impact, and/or influence; and the potential for expanded access to resources. Each of these factors are examined below.

Adoption of shared goals (MDGs as a galvanizing idea)

The turn of the millennium in 2000 and a summit of world leaders gathering at the UN to mark this milestone provided a unique opportunity for the UN to highlight an issue of importance to the international community. The UN Secretary-General's office initiated the discussion of the summit's focus with a carefully crafted report that "set quantifiable and time-bound targets for poverty eradication… around clear, simple, and morally undeniable goals" (Annan 2012, 222-223). The goals that appeared in the 2000 Millennium Declaration grew out of this We the Peoples (UN 2000) report and were subsequently formulated into the MDGs. Setting development goals was not a new endeavor for the UN; the MDGs followed the elaboration of international development goals in DAC's new development strategy in 1996, the First UN Decade for the Eradication of Poverty (1997-2006), and various goals agreed at UN conferences in the 1990s (Ram and Toda 2005, 64-5). In fact, the UN had marked almost every decade since its establishment and decolonization as a/the "development decade," each with its own prescriptions, which were revisited and refined the following decade (Ram and Toda 2005, 64). Given the limited follow-through on previous development pledges by UN members, former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan (2012, 227) surmised that some member states may have even "unwittingly" signed on to the Millennium Declaration expecting it would "suffer the same quick death" as its predecessors.

Although the MDGs were not the first goals for development to be adopted, they marked the first time that developing countries and donors agreed to work together on a common framework to meet specific development goals within a specific timeframe. Despite various critiques of the goals themselves and the goal-setting process (especially its top-down nature) and the initial reluctance of major donors like the US to recognize them, over time the MDGs became incorporated into a plethora of bilateral and multilateral development programs. They provided a central focus of all UN programs and specialized agencies involved in development, from the UN Development Programme (UNDP) to the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA).[viii] They were also officially incorporated into the programs and/or missions of the EU, World Bank, IMF, OECD, WHO, Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Asian Development Bank (ADB), and African Development Bank (AfDB), among others.

Some of these organizations proclaimed the centrality of the MDGs to their development work. For example, as early as 2001, the World Bank established a Strategic Framework to align its work "with the international development goals, recently confirmed in the

Millennium Declaration," goals it "fully endorses" (World Bank 2001a, 1). Its website declared that "the World Bank is committed to helping achieve the MDGs because, simply put, these goals are our goals" (World Bank 2018). The European Commission states that "the EU has been committed to the MDGs since their adoption in 2000 and has progressively adapted its development policy to help achieve them" (European Commission 2018). Meanwhile, the head of UNDP was tasked with "implementing and advocating the goals worldwide" (Annan 2012, 226). Reflecting on these developments, Kofi Annan, the former UN Secretary-General, proclaimed that the MDGs "became the overarching framework for the entire international development agenda. . . with every development organization dedicated to them, every government engaged, and countless other partners and businesses geared toward their delivery in every part of the planet" (Annan 2012, 227). The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) adopted in 2015 garnered similar statements of support from a large number of IGOs. The endorsement of shared goals as a focus of IGO development strategies, regardless of the extent of their actual policy changes, enabled and may have necessitated more direct cooperation and coordination between IGOs.

Enhanced attention to aid effectiveness

Since the initial establishment of formal foreign aid programs and institutions after World War II, the number of donors, their agendas, and the overlap in their work has grown, thereby focusing more and more attention on the need for donor coordination for effective aid delivery.[ix] Aid effectiveness found renewed attention following the 2000 Millennium Declaration (with agreed development goals) and the 2002 International Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey, Mexico, which discussed how to fund the internationally agreed-upon goals (UN 2003). Donors and partner countries subsequently met in four High Level Fora on Aid Effectiveness to develop joint principles for improving aid effectiveness. This effort "grew out of a need to understand why aid was not producting [sic] the development results everyone wanted to see as well as to step up efforts to meet the ambitious targets set by the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)" (OECD 2018a).

Reflecting on the development goals and the Consensus adopted in Monterrey, the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness emphasized that not only the amount of aid must expand in order to achieve the MDGs, but "aid effectiveness must increase significantly as well" (OECD 2005/2008, 1). Developing countries have often been forced to spend considerable time and human resources meeting with numerous donors and addressing their individual idiosyncratic requirements rather than doing the actual work of development. Such inefficiencies have also meant that funds that could be used to address poverty or development are instead spent by donors on the administration of their aid. The Paris Declaration recognized harmonization as one of the key principles for making aid more effective and donors aspired to "implement common arrangements," "simplify procedures," and adopt a "more effective division of labor." This would entail country-level coordination at all stages – from planning to evaluation and reporting – with the aim of reducing aid fragmentation[x] and avoiding unnecessary duplication and transaction costs (OECD 2005/2008, 6). The Paris Declaration followed the 2003 High Level Forum on Harmonisation in Rome at which development institutions and partner countries agreed to increase their collaboration and harmonize their requirements, practices, and procedures in order "to improve the effectiveness of development assistance, and thereby contribute to meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)" (OECD 2003, 10).

As the number of multilateral institutions involved in development and the resources they manage has grown in recent years, addressing these issues requires coordination between not just donor states but also IGOs. In their Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation agreement (4th High Level Forum, 2011, 7), DAC members agreed to "reduce fragmentation and curb the proliferation of aid channels" and "make effective use of existing multilateral channels." Moreover, it was agreed that "multilateral organisations, global funds and programmes will strengthen their participation in co-ordination and mutual accountability mechanisms at the country, regional and global levels." Absent coordination, aid provided multilaterally runs the risk of no longer meeting one of the key purposes it purports to serve – reducing aid fragmentation and transaction costs of a large and growing number of bilateral donors and bilateral aid agencies.

Opportunity to strengthen image, impact, and influence

Another motivation of IGOs for development co-ordination is the opportunity to enhance their image, impact, and influence as an organization or partner; they can do this in part by showcasing their efforts to improve aid effectiveness and to achieve global goals. When James Wolfensohn became World Bank President in 1995, he took the helm of an institution that (along with the IMF) was highly criticized, both for its policies and the effectiveness of its projects. Protestors at the 1994 annual meeting of the World Bank and IMF called for the institutions' abolishment under the slogan "Fifty Years is Enough" (World Bank n.d., "James David Wolfensohn"). When Kofi Annan became UN Secretary-General in 1997, the UN's effectiveness and legitimacy were also questioned following its failed peacekeeping missions in Somalia in 1992-3, the Rwandan genocide in 1994, and the Srebrenica massacre in Bosnia in 1995 (Annan 2012, 32). Cooperation on popularly supported shared development goals and an emphasis on efficiency could enhance the image of these and other development institutions, as would a demonstration of greater impact.

The World Bank has emphasized the need to coordinate to achieve greater efficiency and impact. For example, in its 2001 Strategic Framework the World Bank (2001a) repeatedly underlines the need for better aid coordination, selectivity, and a division of labor between organizations to ensure greater impact and cost-effectiveness and reduce overlap. Improving cost-effectiveness and efficiency was also a critical goal given budget woes the Bank was facing at the time, which constrained its work, made it difficult to meet all the commitments of its expanded agenda, and put undue burdens on staff (World Bank 2001a, 4, 13). The Bank's Comprehensive Development Framework along with the international development goals would help achieve these objectives, with the goals providing "a common understanding which we can use to build even more effective partnerships" (World Bank 2001a, 8, 12). Opportunities to further expand collaboration with the UN and increase the institutions' collective impact would emerge from the Millennium Declaration (World Bank 2001a, 13). Today, the Bank hopes its cooperation with the UN "contributes to effective development outcomes while preserving the distinct mandates of each institution" (World Bank n.d., "Sustainable Development Goals").

In its 2000 Communication on its development policy, the European Commission also emphasized the need for a more focused approach, concentrating on a "more limited number of core areas" where it could add value (including the value of a coordinated Community

policy) (European Commission 2000, 6). In other areas, the Commission indicated it should allow other donors (including EU Member States) to take the lead and should support their activities (European Commission 2000, 24). Endorsing the idea of a division of labor among donors, the Commission stated that "Community development cooperation must do fewer things and do them better in order to ensure greater impact" (European Commission 2000, 24). These views provided a foundation for the EU's cooperation with other IGOs. For example, in its 2001 Communication on cooperation with the UN, the Commission (2001, 8) indicated that "enhancing the dialogue and building a strategic partnership with selected UN partners will improve the effectiveness of its development and humanitarian assistance as well as the quality of UN delivery" and it intended to identify potential funding areas where EC and UN policy priorities match and the UN has a comparative advantage. The Community could thereby use the UN's data, knowledge, and expertise to help achieve its own development objectives (European Commission 2000, 5). In 2007, the EU developed a Code of Conduct on Division of Labour and subsequently (as part of its Fast Track Initiative) held joint consultations on programming with many of its Member States in over two dozen countries (OECD 2011, 68). In their 2009 agreement, the European Commission and World Bank also stated their intention to enhance their cooperation in accordance with aid effectiveness efforts, in line with the Paris Declaration (European Commission and World Bank 2009).

As a regional IGO for which development is only one focus of its work, the EU's cooperation with other IGOs is also motivated by the potential to enhance its image and visibility as a global actor; the visibility of its contributions to other IGOs is therefore an essential factor in its cooperation. "Visibility" is a standard part of agreements (and cooperation) between the World Bank and European Commission, while "lack of visibility of Community financing of operations carried out by the UN" served as a deterrent to deeper cooperation between the EU and UN in the past (European Commission 2001, 5). A related motivation for EU-IGO cooperation is the "global projection of European values of democracy, social justice and sustainable development" as well as "increased European influence" (European Commission 2000, 10, 14). The EU has repeatedly emphasized its goal of increasing its voice as an institution within the UN system and in speaking as a single voice with its Member States in international fora.[xi] In its 2003 Communication on its cooperation with the UN and "the choice of multilateralism," the Commission laments that the EU's "real influence – and its ability to project European values – on the world stage still falls short of its economic and combined political weight, or indeed its contribution to the funding of UN organisations" (European Commission 2003, 3). It further states that "the EU should adopt a determined 'front-runner' approach to the negotiation and implementation of important UN initiatives in the fields of sustainable development, poverty reduction and international security" (European Commission 2003, 9). The goals of its cooperation with the UN are "greater efficiency and impact" and "promoting the EU's values and interests effectively in the UN system" (European Commission 2003, 11, 16). Thus, cooperation with other IGOs is motivated in part by the opportunity to enhance the EU's image and visibility, promote its values, and increase its influence.

Cooperation with other IGOs also provides a means to achieve better internal coordination, thereby increasing the IGO's impact, image, and influence, and that of its members. Although the "double delegation" of aid from the EU's members to the EU and then from the EU to another IGO like the UN may seem puzzling (since members could instead send funds directly to the second IGO), internal (EU) coordination of these funds has added benefits for the EU and its members, increasing their individual and collective "political weight" (Michaelowa et.al. 2017, 523). In a different way, the same could be said for the UN's development activities, which have long suffered from internal coordination issues, competition, and resultant inefficiencies, with the problem growing over time (Browne 2017). Internationally agreed development goals and cooperation with other IGOs provided opportunities to coordinate the development work of the UN's multitude of institutions and thereby strengthen the UN's image, impact, and influence.

Expanded resources

While convergence around the MDGs and the increased attention to aid effectiveness provided a framework and incentive for coordination, the expanded resources that resulted from the shared goals was another factor supporting IGO-IGO coordination. Shared development goals, if marketed successfully, could motivate both states and the general public to support aid at a time when such support had diminished and criticism of development approaches supported by the World Bank, IMF, and the "Washington Consensus" persisted (Fukuda-Parr and Hulme 2011, 25, 32). Common, publicly supported goals could precipitate more resources for foreign aid overall and thus for all multilateral organizations involved in implementing it.

The total net Official Development Assistance (ODA) of DAC members indeed increased significantly during the fifteen-year term of the MDGs, from approximately $75 billion in 2000 to over $136 billion in 2015, adjusted for inflation (OECD n.d., "Net ODA"). Although the MDGs cannot be credited entirely for this,[xii] the previous fifteen years saw relatively little increase from the $68 billion in ODA in 1985 (OECD n.d., "Net ODA"). IGO resources for development also increased as a result of the MDGs and the concomitant pressure on bilateral donors to provide more aid. For example, UNDP saw its annual resources double from 1999-2005 with the launch of the MDGs. At the World Bank, "the MDGs spurred a major budgetary expansion for the International Development Association" (McArthur 2013, 158). The EU institution's ODA (not including Member States' bilateral ODA) also more than doubled from 1999 to 2015 (and increased by 25 percent in real terms the following year) (OECD n.d., "Total Flows," Table 1). Today, the European Commission (2015, 24) emphasizes that – together with its Member States – the EU "collectively provide[s] more aid than all other donors combined" and with these funds it is "leading the way internationally in supporting the new Sustainable Development Goals." Large new funds were also established specifically to support development goals included in the MDGs, most notably the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria established in 2002 and funded with almost $4 billion a year (Global Fund n.d.).

The major development organizations clearly benefited from the expansion of funds. Overall, multilateral ODA (un-earmarked aid provided by states to multilateral organizations) increased by 64 percent in real terms from 1991 to 2011 (OECD 2018c, 5). Today there are as many as 200 multilateral agencies and global funds (OECD 2018b) receiving 41 percent of Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members' total gross ODA. Sixty percent of these multilateral aid flows went to three organizations – the EU, World Bank Group, and United Nations funds and programs (OECD 2015b, 17). In 2016, over $63 billion in aid went to and through multilateral institutions, including almost $14 billion in core funding to EU institutions and $9 billion to the World Bank; $4.6 billion went to Regional Development

Banks and $8.5 billion to other multilaterals (including $3.4 billion to the Global Fund and $1.7 billion to the Green Climate Fund) (OECD, OECD.stat 2016).

The need – or opportunity – for more funds has only grown with the adoption of the SDGs, for which there is an estimated investment gap of some $2.5 trillion (UN Development Group). Calling for UN members to contribute $290 million per year to the new UN Joint Fund for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the UN Secretary General indicated he was "counting on Member States to financially incentivize scaled up impact at the country level, driven by a more integrated UN response" (UN Development Group n.d.). The amount of ODA mobilized for development by - or alongside the emergence of - the MDGs and the huge sums that will need to be mobilized to achieve the SDGs would appear to be a boon to the multilateral organizations that hope to manage and implement some of these funds, whether individually or in cooperation. Thus, coordination on and attention to development goals has come with substantial monetary incentives. At the same time, increased funds precipitated increased attention from donors to their effective use (OECD 2018c, 1).

Besides increased funding for development from member states with their adoption of shared development goals, IGOs had the prospect of gaining additional funds by working with each other, especially since the EU is a donor to IGOs itself. The EU's willingness to provide funds to other IGOs certainly incentivized organizations to seek EU cooperation. For example, as UNESCO (n.d.) acknowledges on a webpage devoted to its cooperation with and support from the EU, "the EU remains the largest single multilateral donor of Official Development Assistance (ODA) in the world and there is still great potential for strengthening the cooperation with UNESCO in the years to come." Similarly, the World Bank mentions the EU as "a natural partner" for the Bank given the size of the EU's multilateral aid program as well as its overall ODA and trade with developing countries (World Bank 2003, 18). From 2010-2015, the European Commission contributed over two billion euros to World Bank trust funds, making it the third largest contributor (European Commission and World Bank 2016). The World Bank was also the single largest recipient of EU institutions' multi-bi (earmarked) aid in 2012 (Michaelowa et.al. 2017, footnote 6). Likewise, the European Commission provided about two billion euros to the UN for its external assistance activities in 2015 and the EU together with its Member States is "the single largest financial contributor to the UN system" (EU, European External Action Service 2017, 2).

Rather than resource dependency necessitating organizations to reluctantly collaborate, this appears to be a case of potential resource expansion incentivizing cooperation and in some cases necessitating it.[xiii] While resource scarcity may lead to competition and specialization among IGOs (see for example Brosig 2011), resource expansion (or the potential for it), along with shared goals, may promote harmonization and cooperation.

Cooperation facilitators

While shared goals; enhanced attention to aid effectiveness; an opportunity to improve their image, impact, or influence; and growing resources were important factors in precipitating coordination, we should not overlook the role of individuals within these IGOs. IGO executives often play an important role in initiating or facilitating an organization's partnerships. While this article does not examine their interactions, it should be noted that the heads of the UN, UNDP, and World Bank during the time the MDGs were launched were all interested in greater and more effective coordination on development strategies and operations (Fukuda-Parr and Hulme 2011, 24; Annan 2012, 221). Moreover, many of those involved in fostering coordination between IGOs had prior experience working in or with their partner organizations. For example, UNDP Administrator Malloch Brown came to the UN from the World Bank, where he had served as Vice-President for External Affairs and Vice-President for United Nations Affairs and his work included facilitating cooperation with the UN; when he moved to the UN, he was charged with leading efforts to help achieve the MDGs (UN 2006). His successor at UNDP in 2005, Kemal Derviş, also previously worked at the World Bank, where he had been responsible for global poverty reduction programs and coordination with the UN system, IMF, and World Trade Organization (UNDP n.d., "Biography"). With the launch of the SDGs, the World Bank now has a Senior Vice President for the 2030 Development Agenda, UN Relations, and Partnerships responsible for creating and managing intergovernmental and interagency coordination.

World Bank Chief Executive Officer Kristalina Georgieva (the World Bank's first ever CEO) moved to the Bank in 2016 from the European Commission (after moving to the Commission from the Bank in 2010). Since 2010, she served as European Commissioner for International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response and then European Commission Vice President for Budget and Human Resources (with oversight of the Commission's ODA). Prior to her seven-year stint at the EU, she held various positions at the World Bank since 1993 (World Bank n.d., "Kristalina Georgieva"). Prior to returning to the Bank in 2017, she was also an official candidate for the position of UN Secretary-General. Georgieva's planned move back to the World Bank actually raised concerns about a conflict of interest at the European Commission, given that it occurred only six months after the new 2016 cooperation agreement between the two organizations was signed. That agreement adjusted the calculation of management fees the Commission pays to the Bank to manage its multi-bi aid and critics argued it could result in much higher fees being paid to the Bank (Paravicini 2016). Having internal leaders, supporters, or champions of coordination with the knowledge and experience to move it forward may be another overlooked factor supporting increased IGO-IGO coordination.

Convergence and Complexity (Competition and Fragmentation)

Although cooperation between development IGOs has been boosted purportedly to improve aid effectiveness with the emergence of the MDGs, the increased ODA levels to meet the MDGs contributed to growth in the number of institutions (including new global funds and new trust funds within existing IGOs), greater aid fragmentation, and thereby – it seems - less aid effectiveness.[xiv] In other words, while common goals alongside attention to aid effectiveness fostered greater coordination between IGOs (including a number of formal cooperation agreements and joint activities) with the potential of better aid outcomes, they paradoxically expanded regime complexity despite - on the surface - appearing to reduce it (see Figure 2).

Figure 2. Findings



With a large and growing number of institutions involved in aid, a large and growing amount of resources under their (partial or full) control, a growing number of issues on their agendas, and a proliferation of trust funds for specific purposes, increased aid inefficiencies are almost inevitable. Transaction costs, competition, and duplication of work can be reduced when aid is provided multilaterally rather than bilaterally (if, for example, multiple donors for a project or program are replaced by one), but multilateral programs tend to supplement rather than supplant bilateral ones.

A number of studies have attempted to measure aid effectiveness since 2000 and their findings are generally not positive. For example, one OECD study tracking progress since the Paris Declaration found that "both in-country aid fragmentation and donor proliferation increased considerably from 2005 to 2009" (Bürcky 2011, 31). An OECD aid effectiveness progress report similarly found an increase in aid fragmentation and little progress in making aid management less burdensome for developing countries. Nor did it find division of labor efforts like the European Union's to have borne much fruit so far (OECD 2011, 68-70). The OECD summed up the problem this way:

> As donors invest more in multilateral co-operation, **the multilateral system is becoming increasingly complex**. Today, it comprises over 210 major organisations and funds as well as numerous smaller trust funds. In turn, these organisations and funds have an ever increasing number of operations in developing countries, resulting in increasingly fragmented funding and activities. For recipient countries, the transaction costs and administrative burden associated with this proliferation are significant (OECD 2018c, 1, emphasis in original).

Administrative costs of donors have also reportedly been rising (Hashmi et.al. 2014) and progress on harmonization has been uneven with the "overall burdens of aid management" even increasing in some cases (for example due to multi-donor trust funds) (Wood et.al. 2011, xv). Multilateral aid agencies that manage trust funds also charge their donors administrative fees for this service, and they may have higher administrative costs overall than bilateral agencies (Easterly and Pfutze 2008, 47-8). One study estimated that UNDP's administrative budget exceeds the amount of aid it provides (Easterly and Pfutze 2008, 48). The increase in multilateral aid and the proliferation of multilateral organizations involved has also led to new inefficiencies like a ballooning of uncoordinated assessments of multilateral organizations' aid delivery, over 200 of which were conducted by DAC members in 2012-2014 alone (OECD 2015b, 79).

New aid fragmentation and aid effectiveness concerns have grown especially due to a significant increase in multi-bi aid (non-core, i.e. earmarked funding to IGOs) since the MDGs were adopted (OECD 2015b, 31-2). This is aid from donors (including from the EU) entrusted to a multilateral organization to implement for specific, agreed purposes, which may include particular countries or sectors. In essence, the multilateral institution agrees to implement a donor's aid, either individually for that donor or through a multi-donor trust fund, according to specifications provided by the donor and in exchange for a management fee. Almost non-existent in 1990, multi-bi aid has steadily grown since 2000 and now accounts for close to 60 percent of multilateral aid and 20 percent of bilateral aid; some organizations like the UNDP have become largely dependent on it (Reinsberg et.al. 2015, 528, 537-8). While about one third of all ODA supports core funding of multilaterals (OECD 2018b), single or multi-donor IGO trust funds have proliferated to manage the non-core funds; for example, the World Bank (2009, 1) was managing over 1000 trust funds in 2009. The European Commission (2001, 11) sees multi-bi aid as the only appropriate way for EU institutions to support UN agencies, programs, and funds. Most studies, however, suggest this type of aid likely increases aid inefficiencies (Reinsberg et.al. 2015, 531).

Although multi-bi aid enables bilateral donors to showcase what appears to be multilateral cooperation while maintaining more control over and visibility of their contributions (Reinsberg et.al. 2015, 530), it also engenders competition among (and within) IGOs to host these funds and gain the extra resources and responsibilities from donors. Nor are IGOs likely to reject establishing the less-efficient single-donor trust funds (SDTFs) that donors tend to favor over multi-donor funds.[xv] As an independent evaluation of World Bank trust funds concluded, "the deployment of trust fund resources does not consistently work in accordance with the Paris Declaration aid principles of country ownership and donor coordination" (Thomas 2011, p. v).

With the emergence of the SDGs in 2015 as the new focus of global development efforts, there are new opportunities for both aid coordination and aid fragmentation. Creating joint goals has the specific benefit of encouraging convergence around key issues to address in development. The SDGs, however, replaced eight goals with seventeen and twenty-one targets with 169, making it unclear if it will encourage convergence or divergence. Brand new multi-donor funds have already been created to coordinate the global response, with the SDG Fund being established in 2014 as a UN development cooperation mechanism for addressing and implementing the SDGs "through integrated and multidimensional joint programmes" (UNDP n.d.). New funds or institutions may be established to address specific SDGs. The UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund's office, which importantly enables multiple UN partners to work as one, providing funding for shared priorities and/or countries, already hosts 75 Multi-Partner Trust Funds as Administrative Agent, three Multi-Window Funds, five National Multi-Partner Trust Funds as Administrative Agent, 52 Joint Programmes as Administrative Agent, and three Fiscal Agent and Other Funds (UN n.d.).

Conclusion

The research presented here suggests that shared development goals have helped foster aid coordination between IGOs as well as attention to the need for aid effectiveness to effectively use expanded resources to achieve stated goals. At the same time, the shared goals and expanded resources that came with them contributed to more institutions delivering their aid in more ways, thereby not likely diminishing the transaction costs for administration of aid or for developing countries. Competition, cooperation, convergence, coordination, aid fragmentation, and some division of labor all continue to coexist.

Cooperation has increased since 2000 between major IGOs working on development – particularly the World Bank, United Nations, and European Union – due in part to the shared goals of the MDGs (and subsequently the SDGs) and related opportunities to expand their resources and/or bolster their role and reputation (and thereby their influence). Increased cooperation was also closely intertwined with (and justified by) addressing concerns about aid effectiveness, with donor coordination and harmonization (including IGO-IGO cooperation) a stated means of improving development outcomes. Moreover, cooperation was facilitated by leaders within each organization who were intimately familiar with the workings of other IGOs, sometimes specifically charged with the task of enhancing coordination with them, and often personally interested in achieving this goal. Yet, despite the unprecedented and increasing cooperation between IGOs in development over the last couple of decades including various formal cooperation agreements signed and subsequently enhanced between the largest institutions, the adoption of the MDGs also contributed to an expansion of IGO agendas, IGO resources, IGO administrative units and funds, and the number of IGOs (as well as partners) working in development.

From the perspective of regime complexity and interorganizational collaboration, this research suggests that IGOs consider cooperation if it will potentially increase their resources or enhance their legitimacy, reputation, and/or influence in their areas of expertise. Shared ideas or objectives may play a galvanizing role providing a framework for interaction, without which cooperation would be difficult. When cooperation is pursued, it has the potential to enhance both impact and efficiency. Nonetheless, even when coordination has been increased, complexity may not be reduced and overall efficiency may not be achieved.

REFERENCES

Alter, Karen J. and Sophie Meunier (2009), "The Politics of International Regime Complexity," *Perspectives on Politics* 7 (1): 13-24.

Annan, Kofi (2012), *Interventions: A Life in War and Peace,* New York: Penguin Books.

Biermann, Rafael (2008), "Towards a Theory of Inter-organizational Networking: The Euro-Atlantic Security Institutions Interacting," *Review of International Organizations* 3: 151-177.

Biermann, Rafael and Joachim Koops (2016), "Studying Relations among International Organizations in World Politics: Core Concepts and Challenges," in Joachim Koops and Rafael Biermann (eds.), *Palgrave Handbook of Inter-Organizational Relations in World Politics* (pp. 1-46), London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Brosig, Malte (2011), "Overlap and Interplay between International Organisations: Theories and Approaches," *South African Journal of International Affairs* 18 (2): 147-167.

Browne, Stephen (2017), *Sustainable Development Goals and UN Goal-Setting*, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.

Bürcky, Urs (10 June 2011), "Trends in In-country Aid Fragmentation and Donor Proliferation: An Analysis of Changes in Aid Allocation Patterns between 2005 and 2009," Report on behalf of the OECD Task Team on Division of Labour and Complementarity.

Clark, Richard (2021), "Pool or Duel? Cooperation and Competition Among International Organizations," *International Organization* 75 (4): 1133-1153.

Deutscher, Eckhard (2009), "How Fragmented is Aid?" in *Development Cooperation Report 2009* 10 (1), Paris: OECD: 35-52.

Easterly, William and Tobias Pfutze (2008), "Where Does the Money Go? Best and Worst Practices in Foreign Aid," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 22 (2): 29-52.

EU, European External Action Service (13 September 2017), "The European Union at the United Nations," https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eu-un_relations_fact_sheet.pdf.

European Commission (6 April 2000), "The European Community's Development Policy," Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, 2COM(2000)212 final.

European Commission (2 May 2001), "Building an effective partnership with the United Nations in the fields of Development and Humanitarian Affairs," Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, COM(2001)231 final.

European Commission (10 Sept. 2003), “The European Union and the United Nations: The choice of Multilateralism,” Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament,” Brussels, COM(2003) 526 final.

European Commission (2 July 2004), “Health in developing countries – Commission and World Health Organization join forces to deliver on development goals,” press release, IP/04/844.

European Commission (2015), *The EU’s Contribution to the Millennium Development Goals*.

European Commission (10 July 2016), “European Commission and World Bank Group to strengthen partnership further,” https://ec.europa.eu/

European Commission (25 July 2018 update), “EU & Millennium Development Goals,” https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/policies/european-development-policy/eu-millennium-development-goals_en.

European Commission, EuropeAid, “International Cooperation and Development: International Organisations,” http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/node/13864, accessed 31 May 2017.

European Commission and UNESCO (8 Oct. 2012), Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the establishment of a partnership between the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation Secretariat and its subsidiary bodies and the European Union,” Paris, http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/BSP/pdf/UNESCO-EU_MoU_8_October_2012.pdf.

European Commission and World Bank (20 March 2009), “Trust Funds and Cofinancing Framework Agreement between The European Community, represented by the Commission of the European Communities and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Development Association and the International Finance Corporation,” https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/node/62882.

European Commission and World Bank (25-26 May 2009), “The new Framework Agreement between the European Commission and the World Bank Group,” World Bank Group Donor Forum: Partnerships, Programs and Trust Funds, Paris, France.

European Commission and World Bank (15 April 2016), “European Commission and World Bank sign agreement to boost development cooperation,” press release, https://ec.europa.eu/.

European Community (EC) and UN (2003, 29 April), Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement, https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/procedures-fafa-un-ec_en.pdf.

Faude, Benjamin and Julia Fuss (2020), “Coordination or Conflict?: The Causes and Consequences of Institutional Overlap in a Disaggregated World Order,” *Global Constitutionalism* 9 (2): 268-289.

4th High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (29 Nov. – 1 Dec. 2011), “Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation,” Busan, Republic of Korea, available at https://www.oecd.org/development/effectiveness/busanpartnership.htm.

Franke, Ulrich and Martin Koch (2016), “Sociological Approaches,” in Joachim Koops and Rafael Biermann (eds.), *Palgrave Handbook of Inter-Organizational Relations in World Politics* (pp. 169-187), London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Frey, Bruno S. (2008), “Outside and Inside Competition for International Organizations—from Analysis to Innovations,” *Review of International Organizations* 3: 335-350.

Fukuda-Parr, Sakiko and David Hulme (2011), “International Norm Dynamics and the ‘End of Poverty’: Understanding the Millennium Development Goals,” *Global Governance* 17: 17-36.

Gehring, Thomas and Benjamin Faude (2013), “The Dynamics of Regime Complexes: Microfoundations and Systemic Effects,” *Global Governance* 19: 119-130.

Gehring, Thomas and Benjamin Faude (2014), “A Theory of Emerging Order within Institutional Complexes: How Competition among Regulatory International Institutions Leads to Institutional Adaptation and Division of Labor,” *Review of International Organizations* 9: 471-498.

Gest, Nathaniel and Alexandru Grigorescu (2010), “Interactions among intergovernmental organizations in the anti-corruption realm,” *Review of International Organizations* 5: 53–72.

Global Fund (n.d.), “Global Fund Overview,” https://www.theglobalfund.org/en/overview/, accessed 16 Sept. 2018.

Hashmi, Nabil, Nancy Birdsall, and Homi Kharas (21 July 2014), “The Quality of Official Development Assistance 2014,” Center for Global Development.

IAEA (29 July 2018), “Our Work: Millennium Development Goals,” https://www.iaea.org/technicalcooperation/Partnerships/Relation-UN/MDGs/, accessed 29 July 2018.

Koch, Anne (2014), “The Politics and Discourse of Migrant Return: The Role of UNHCR and IOM in the Governance of Return,” *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 40 (6): 905-923.

Margulis, Matías E. (2013), “The Regime Complex for Food Security: Implications for the Global Hunger Challenge,” *Global Governance* 19: 53-67.

McArthur, John W. (2013), “Own the Goals: What the Millennium Development Goals Have Accomplished,” Brookings Institution, *Foreign Affairs* 92 (2): 152-162.

Michaelowa, Katharina, Bernhard Reinsberg and Christina Schneider (2017), “Multi-bi Aid in European Development Assistance: The Role of Capacity Constraints and Member State Politics,” *Development Policy Review* 35 (4): 513—530.

OECD (Feb. 2003), *Rome Declaration on Harmonisation*, in *Harmonising Donor Practices for Effective Aid Delivery* (pp. 10-12), Paris: OECD.

OECD (2005/2008), *The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness* and the *Accra Agenda for Action*, Paris: OECD.

OECD (2011), *Aid Effectiveness 2005-2010: Progress in Implementing the Paris Declaration*, OECD: Paris.

OECD (2015a), *Development Co-operation Report 2015,* Paris: OECD.

OECD (2015b), *Multilateral Aid 2015: Better Partnerships for a Post-2015 World*, Paris: OECD.

OECD (2015c), *Multilateral Aid 2015: Better Partnerships for a Post-2015 World: Highlights*, Paris: OECD.

OECD (2018a), “The High Level Fora on Aid Effectiveness: A History,” http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/thehighlevelforaonaideffectivenessahistory.htm, accessed 12 August 2018.

OECD (2018b), “Multilateral Aid,” http://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-topics/multilateralaid.htm, accessed 24 July 2018.

OECD (13 March 2018c), "What Do We Know about Multilateral Aid: The 54 billion dollar question," http://www.oecd.org/development/financing-sustainable-development/13_03_18%20Policy%20Briefing%20on%20Multilateral%20Aid.pdf.
OECD (n.d.), "Net ODA from DAC Countries from 1950 to 2020," https://www2.compareyourcountry.org/oda?cr=20001&cr1=oecd&lg=en&page=1#, accessed 22 Sept. 2021.
OECD (n.d.), "Total Flows by Donor," https://stats.oecd.org/, accessed 16 Sept. 2018.
OECD, OECD.stat (2016), "Members' total use of the multilateral system," https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MULTISYSTEM#, accessed 24 July 2018.
Paravicini, Giulia (2 Dec. 2016 update), "Conflict of interest fears over Georgieva's World Bank dealings," *POLITICO*, https://www.politico.eu/article/conflict-of-interest-fears-over-georgievas-world-bank-dealings/.
Ram, Melanie H. and Takao Toda (2005), "On Setting and Reaching Development Goals," *Journal of International Development Studies* 14 (2): 63-76.
Raustiala, Kal and David G. Victor (2004), "The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources," *International Organization* 58 (2): 277-309.
Reinsberg, Bernhard, Katharina Michaelowa, and Vera Z. Eichenauer (2015), "The Rise of Multi-bi aid and the Proliferation of Trust Funds," in B. Mak Arvin and Byron Lew (eds.), *Handbook on the Economics of Foreign Aid* (pp. 527-554), Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
Thomas, Vinod (2011), "Foreword," in Independent Evaluation Group, *Trust Fund Support for Development: An Evaluation of the World Bank's Trust Fund Portfolio,* Washington, DC: Independent Evaluation Group, the World Bank Group.
UN (27 March 2000), *We the peoples: the role of the United Nations in the twenty-first century*, report of the Secretary-General, UN doc. A/54/2000.
UN, Department of Public Information (26 June 2000), "Poverty Can be Significantly Decreased by 2015 Report Four Major International Organizations," press release, PI/1261, http://www.paris21.org/sites/default/files/betterworld-pressrelease.pdf.
UN (2003), *Report of the International Conference on Financing for Development, Monterrey, Mexico, 18-22 March 2002*, UN doc. A/CONF.198/11.
UN (3 March 2006), "Secretary-General Appoints Mark Malloch Brown as Deputy Secretary-General," SG/A/984-BIO/3745, https://www.un.org/press/en/2006/sga984.doc.htm
UN (n.d.), Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office, http://mptf.undp.org/, accessed 30 July 2018.
UN, Brussels Office (2006), "The partnership between the UN and the EU: The United Nations and the European Commission working together in Development and Humanitarian Cooperation," https://www.unbrussels.org.
UN, Brussels Office (2017), *Saving and Empowering Lives: Partnership between the United Nations and the European Union in 2014-2015*, https://www.unbrussels.org.
UN and World Bank Group (22 April 2017), "United Nations-World Bank Partnership Framework for Crisis-Affected Situations."
UN, World Bank Group, IMF, OECD (2000, June) *A Better World for All: Progress towards the international development goals*, available at http://www.paris21.org/news-center/news/better-world-all.
UN Development Group (n.d.), "Joint Fund for the 2030 Agenda: About the Joint Fund," https://undg.org/joint-fund/, accessed 16 Sept. 2018.

UNDP (n.d.), "Biography: Kemal Derviş, UNDP Administrator 2005-2009," http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/operations/leadership/administrator/kemaldervis/, accessed 28 July 2018.
UNDP (n.d.), "SDGF," http://www.sdgfund.org/who-we-are, accessed 28 July 2018.
UNESCO (n.d.), "UNESCO-European Union Partnership," https://en.unesco.org/UNESCO-EU-Partnership?language=en, accessed 18 Aug. 2018.
Wood, Bernard, Julia Betts, Florence Etta, et.al. (May 2011), *The Evaluation of the Paris Declaration, Final Report*, Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies.
World Bank (24 Jan. 2001a), *Strategic Framework*, available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTABOUTUS/Resources/strategic.pdf
World Bank (2001b), *The World Bank Annual Report 2000*, Vol. 1, World Bank: Washington, DC.
World Bank (2003), *The World Bank Annual Report, 2003, Vol. 1: Year in Review,* World Bank: Washington, DC.
World Bank (Nov. 2009), "Trust Funds at the World Bank: A Guide for Donors and Partners."
World Bank (14 June 2016), "European Commission and World Bank Group to Accelerate Joint Action to Tackle Fragility, Conflict and Violence," press release.
World Bank (2018), "Millennium Development Goals," available at http://www.worldbank.org/mdgs/, accessed 29 July 2018.
World Bank (n.d.), "James David Wolfensohn," http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/archives/history/past-presidents/james-david-wolfensohn, accessed 18 Aug. 2018
World Bank (n.d.), "Kristalina Georgieva, Chief Executive Officer," http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/people/k/kristalina-georgieva, accessed 28 July 2018.
World Bank (n.d.), "Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the 2030 Agenda," http://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/sdgs-2030-agenda, accessed 29 July 2018.
World Bank and IMF (18 April 2001), "Fighting Poverty and Strengthening Growth in Low-Income Countries," Joint Memorandum from the President of the World Bank and the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund," DC2001-0011.
World Council of Churches (28 June 2000), "Geneva 2000: WCC General Secretary Writes to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan," press release, http://www.wcc-coe.org/wcc/news/press/00/22pu.html.

ENDNOTES

i. Versions of this paper were presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meetings in August 2019 (Washington, DC) and October 2021 (Seattle) and at the Central and East European Studies Association - International Studies Association (CEEISA-ISA) joint conference in June 2019 (Belgrade, Serbia).

ii. The MDGs were a set of eight development goals that the international community agreed in 2000 to work together to achieve by 2015. They were replaced by seventeen SDGs in 2015.

iii. The terms cooperation, coordination, and collaboration are used here - as they are by the donors discussed - to include sharing of information and resources, joint projects and programs, and other coordinated or joint activities and mechanisms.

iv. These are the largest IGOs engaged in development as measured by the percentage of

Official Development Assistance (ODA) for which they are responsible.

v. On the concept of regime complexity, see Raustiala and Victor (2004, 279).

vi. Recent development literature has a similar focus. While the rise of public-private partnerships and multi-stakeholder partnerships occurred concurrently and is an important focus of analysis, the literature overlooks important changes in the relationship between traditional institutions (which remain central to development aid) and the causes and implications of those changes.

vii. Following the initial partnership agreements, additional agreements have been signed with many of these organizations as well as with others.

viii. The IAEA (2018), for example, notes that "the adoption of the MDGs as the central part of the global development agenda has ushered in a period of extraordinary collective action and coordination among UN organizations, and the IAEA is proud of the part it plays in this endeavor."

ix. Donor coordination has also been necessary to enable country ownership of development priorities.

x. The OECD describes aid as "fragmented" when it "comes in too many small slices from too many donors, creating high transaction costs and making it difficult for partner countries to effectively manage their own development. . . Making aid less fragmented means making it more effective" (Deutscher 2009, 35, 36).

xi. See for example its 2001 and 2003 agreements with the UN.

xii. The 2001 terrorist attacks on the U.S. and subsequent aid to partners in the US "war on terror" also account for some of the post-2000 increases, especially for the US.

xiii. In terms of necessity, Michaelowa et.al. (2017, 522) found that the EU looked for partners because it did not have the human resources to effectively implement the (growing) amount of ODA it controlled. For this reason, it did not develop its own trust funds (until 2014) and instead sent money to other IGO trust funds, especially the World Bank.

xiv. The MDGs and expanded resources are not the only reasons for increased fragmentation; new institutions were also created to incorporate new partners from the corporate and non-profit sector into new multi-stakeholder partnerships.

xv. Over 70 percent of all multi-bi aid from 2006-2012 and about 85 percent of the EU institutions' multi-bi aid went to SDTFs, according to estimates (Reinsberg et.al. 2015, 540; Michaelowa 2017, 527).