Position in the Organizational Field Matters: Analyzing International Organizations' Perceptions and Responses in Global Food Security Governance

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International organizations (IOs) are affected by developments taking place within their environment. This article posits that an IO's position (core vs. periphery) within an organizational field, as a specification of the IO environment, affects how an IO perceives developments such as proliferation and overlap. Following the notion that if situations are defined as real, they are real in their consequences, the article contends that these perceptions influence how IOs respond. Accordingly, the research question is: Given different positions in the organizational field of food security governance, how do IOs perceive and respond to developments in the field? Theoretically, the article builds on sociological institutionalism and field theoretical approaches. Empirically, it concentrates on the organizational field of global food security governance and analyzes the perceptions and responses of three IOs, namely the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) as core IOs, and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) as a peripheral IO. Building on a qualitative content analysis of a wide range of organizational documents, the article finds that as organizational perceptions differ, so do organizational responses. While the core IOs respond by attempting to strengthen coherence, delineate roles and establish a division of labor, the peripheral IO focuses on mobilizing resources and defining a niche.

Introduction[ii]

International organizations (IOs)[iii] are part of an environment and are affected by developments taking place within that environment. Global food security governance serves as an illustrative example,[iv] in which developments such as proliferation of actors, fragmentation and incoherence, as well as overlap between IOs' mandates and activities have historical origins and are also indicative of the current governance architecture (Candel 2014; Clapp 2014; Clapp and Cohen 2010; Gaus and Steets 2012; McKeon, 2015). These developments have an effect on IOs in the field. For instance, the creation of new bodies in the aftermath of the 1974 World Food Conference was seen as a "dismantling" of functions which had been entrusted to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and as part of a contestation of FAO's governance authority (McKeon 2015, 16, 98-99). Adopting an understanding of IOs as "agentive and autonomous actors" (Ellis 2010, 14) and which responses IOs develop to deal with developments in their environment becomes an important question. This is especially the case as many of these developments, such as overlap and fragmentation, are seen as alarming and as detrimental to the effective provision of food security (e.g., Clapp 2014, 649–651).

Against this background, the approach of this article is two-fold. First, the article draws on field theory, which, in essence, contends that a field and its elements interact and that elements are shaped by forces in the field (Martin 2003). Specifically, the article builds on two directions of field theory, one inspired by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) focusing on the organizational field, referring to "those organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life" (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, 148), and the other inspired by Bourdieu (1992), emphasizing the struggles between actors in a field for influence and the role of an actor's position in the field. The article conceptualizes IOs as being part of an organizational field, a specification of the organizational environment often used in sociological approaches to study IOs (Franke and Koch 2017, 178). For instance, Vetterlein and Moschella (2014) use an organizational field approach to explain varieties of organizational change and argue that the position of an IO within an organizational field influences speed and scope of policy change. The organizational field positions IOs within a web of ties to other actors or inter-organizational structures. Which position an actor has within this organizational field depends on "the resources available and relevant to the field" (Vetterlein and Moschella 2014, 150). Two types of position based on (the level of) resources an IO holds may be distinguished: core and periphery.[v] In reality, the position of an IO within an organizational field may more plausibly be approached as being more at the core or more at the periphery with many variations in between; however, for the purposes of this article the core-periphery categorization offers analytical leverage and the opportunity to more clearly work out the importance of positions as such.

Second, the article follows the notion that IO perceptions matter for how an organization acts (Broome and Seabrooke 2012). Illustrated by the "seeing like" metaphor, previous research has established the role of perceptions, how actors seek to make their environments legible and the consequences this has for ensuing action, be it with regard to states (Scott, 1998) or IOs (Broome and Seabrooke 2012; Vetterlein 2012). Given that IOs are embedded within an organizational environment "filled with opportunities, resources, threats and constraints, both material and nonmaterial and at various scales" (Brechin and Ness 2013, 22), perceptions are decisive. Whether a situation emanating from the environment is understood as an opportunity or as a threat depends to a certain degree on the perceptions within the IO.[vi] Perceptions thus encompass the ways in which an IO sees the organizational field; they are shared interpretations of the environment within the IO.

Given that previous research has identified the importance of the (position within an) organizational field (Vetterlein and Moschella 2014) and of perception (Broome and Seabrooke 2012) for organizational action, the objective of this article is to combine them in the argument that an IO's position in a field shapes, via organizational perceptions, the IOs' responses to field developments such as proliferation and overlap. Responses are, in a broad sense, the strategies IOs develop to deal with field-level developments. The article's research question is as follows: Given different positions in the organizational field of food security governance, how do IOs perceive and respond to developments in the field?

Hence the article empirically investigates, firstly, whether and how different IO positions in the field are associated with different perceptions of overlap and proliferation and secondly, how IOs respond to these field developments. To establish IOs' position within the organizational field of food security governance, indicators for different kinds of capital are utilized to classify an IO as being either (more) at the core of the field or (more) at its periphery. "Core" and "periphery" as used here are not based on dependency theory, but

rather on the idea that some IOs play a central role for particular issues while others are involved with issues but secondarily. This study identifies the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) as core IOs because food security is their main focus, and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) as a peripheral IO since it works with food security but it is not its primary focus. Then, IO perceptions and responses are inductively approached through a qualitative content analysis of a range of organizational documents. This approach allows for staying close to and concentrating on the organizational perspective. On the one hand, these documents serve as written manifestations which reflect how IOs see the field. On the other, they constitute a "symbolic representation of social action" (Mochmann 2003, 2161) and as such convey information on responses and IO actions. Therein, documents may constitute an IO action in and of itself (e.g. a signed Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) which establishes an inter-organizational partnership).

The article is structured as follows: First, literature on global food security governance is briefly discussed to set the stage for the empirical analysis. Then, the article's theoretical framework is developed by building on field theory, sociological institutionalism and Bourdieu's work on fields, positions and capital. Next, case selection and methods are elaborated upon, before turning to the article's empirical section, where the perceptions and responses of IOs with different positions in the organizational field of global food security governance are analyzed. Importantly, core and peripheral IOs have different perceptions of and responses to overlap in global food security governance. Finally, a conclusion and an outlook on future research directions are provided.

The field of Food Security Governance - an empirical prelude
What is food security, and what is global food security governance? According to a commonly used definition, food security exists "when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life" (FAO 1996, § 1). The definition encompasses the four pillars of food security: food availability food access (including physical, economic and social access), food utilization, and the stability of all three dimensions over time (Barrett, 2013).

While the literature on global food security governance is abundant (Clapp 2010, 2012, 2014; Duncan 2015; Margulis 2013, 2017; McKeon 2015; Shaw 2007, 2009) and offers insightful conceptualizations of food security governance (e.g., food security as a regime complex, c.p. Margulis 2013), a literature review nonetheless notes that "it is not very clear yet what food security governance entails, what its essential characteristics or features are, and how it could be enhanced" (Candel 2014, 586). Given that food security is a highly complex issue, even a "wicked problem" (Peters and Pierre 2014), with multiple drivers across various levels and with linkages to numerous other issue areas (Candel 2014), this is not necessarily surprising. While uncertainties and ambiguities do exist, there are also recurring themes in the literature that can be organized around the notions of divergence and convergence. Literature on divergence points out the complexity of food security (Duncan 2015; McKeon 2011; Peters and Pierre 2014). Global food security governance is "highly fragmented in practice" and "characterized by a poor coordination of tasks" (Clapp 2014, 645). Fragmentation has also been observed with regard to global political authority and called out as a "most harmful and outrageous deficiency of the current food governance regime" (McKeon 2015, 103), given

that economic power in global food security governance has been increasingly concentrated within a limited number of multinational enterprises (McKeon 2015). Furthermore, overlap (multiple IOs doing the same work) is seen as a pervasive feature of food security governance: regarding IOs' mandates (Clapp and Cohen 2010), regarding operational activities and instruments (Candel 2014; Gaus and Steets 2012), and regarding rules and policies (McKeon 2015). The underlying and often implicit assumption is that these features, or developments, in global food security governance are problematic and lead to a disintegration of the field. Thus, it becomes more difficult for IOs or other actors to engage in food security governance.

Negative effects of overlap, proliferation and density (multiple IOs working in the same issue area) have also been discussed for other issues areas besides food security, e.g., economic governance. One example is the overlap between the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which led to ambiguity regarding each organization's responsibilities and, ultimately, decreased efficiency and effectiveness, and a deteriorating performance (Freytag and Kirton 2017). A further example comes from the NGO sector, where Cooley and Ron (2002) argued that uncertainty, competition and insecurity given organizational proliferation led to dysfunctional outcomes. Finally, on a theoretical level, Drezner (2009) identified three problems which result from proliferation and international regime complexity: focal points lose power as their number increases, the degree to which actors feel compelled to comply with rules may weaken, and transaction costs can rise. Proliferation and regime complexity would thus make it more difficult and costly for actors to negotiate issues of common concern.

However, complexity, fragmentation and overlap are not necessarily undesirable and "bad", as some of the language around these concepts suggest (Heucher 2019). Rather, the question of the effects of complexity, fragmentation and overlap is an empirical one and needs to be studied as such rather than answered a priori. For instance, overlap could also lead to a kind of competition between IOs, which leads to innovations in project design and implementation, rather than to all-consuming turf wars.

A second strand in the literature on global food security governance, but also on global governance in general, discusses processes of convergence, or of integrative developments that bring the field back together. In the field of food security governance, this often comprises the creation or reform of mechanisms aiming at coordination among governance actors. Examples include the establishment of the World Food Council (WFC) in the aftermath of the 1974 World Food Summit (Shaw, 2010), the reform of the Committee of World Food Security (CFS) into a multi-stakeholder governance mechanism (Duncan 2015), the 2008 High Level Task Force on the Global Food Security Crisis (HTLF) (Stewart and Manaker Bell 2015), or the creation of the cluster system, which aims to coordinate food security responses in emergencies (Maxwell & Parker 2012). Underlying these efforts at improved coordination and cooperation are meta-governance norms of harmonization which may induce convergence among IOs. This constitutes a centripetal movement in global governance, and has been argued with regard to the global governance of health (Holzscheiter 2014). Overall, global food security governance is characterized by both, centrifugal and centripetal forces, which influence IOs' actions.

Theoretical Framework
The section begins by situating this article within institutionalist approaches, which are applied to study IOs. It then elaborates upon IOs as semi-autonomous actors embedded within

an organizational environment, before developing a theoretical framework by drawing on two directions of field theory (Martin 2003): sociological institutionalist approaches focusing on inter-organizational relations (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; W. Scott 2014; W. Scott and Meyer 1994) and the work of Pierre Bourdieu, therein integrating the concepts of position and capital (Adler-Nissen 2013; Bourdieu 1993; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992).

Institutionalist Approaches to the Study of IOs
Institutionalist approaches share the starting point that "institutions matter" (Schieder 2017).[vii] This places them in contrast to (neo-)realist approaches that are not concerned with the role of institutions in world politics. Institutionalist approaches pose similar, fundamental questions, e.g., why and how international institutions come into being (i.e., their origins and institutional design); how international institutions shape the behavior, interests, and identities of actors (i.e., their effects); and why and how institutions develop over time (i.e., institutional change). Commonly, three different analytical approaches to the study of these questions are grouped under the umbrella term "new institutionalism", namely rational choice institutionalism, sociological institutionalism, and historical institutionalism (Hall and Taylor 1996). Whereas rational choice institutionalism concentrates on IOs' micro-foundations and is often concerned with individual IOs (e.g., relations between principals and agents, see Hawkins, Lake, Nielson & Tierney 2006), historical and sociological institutionalism, both argue that the creation and development of IOs does not take place on a "clean institutional slate," but, rather, that there is an existing, socially constructed world already "out there" that influences subsequent developments. Sociological institutionalism, in particular, emphasizes that IOs are not in a vacuum, but, rather, that there is an embeddedness in and interlinkages to a broader environment. Historical institutionalism goes back in time to provide a richer, deeper account of the development of an individual IO (e.g., Hanrieder 2015); whereas sociological institutionalism provides more nuance by widening the picture to include environmental phenomena and other actors in the environment (e.g. Koch and Stetter 2013).

Sociological institutionalism accordingly emphasizes the study of IOs as actors embedded within and interacting with a wider environment and is thus one of the main theoretical foundations for this article. Importantly, analyzing IOs within a field rather than as an isolated entity has the advantage of providing a more holistic understanding of organizational action. For instance, Barnett and Coleman (2005) argue that IOs as strategic actors are embedded within an environment that places specific, even conflicting demands on them. Their analysis of Interpol demonstrates that investigating IOs and the environmental pressures they are confronted with allows for a more holistic account of organizational change than would otherwise be possible.

Only because IOs are partially autonomous and agentive actors[viii] embedded within a broader environment (Ellis 2010; Koch 2014; Koch and Stetter 2013), do their perceptions matter. As Broome and Seabrooke (2012) argued, IOs identify and establish policy issues through their own internal entities and in inner-organizational processes. These perceptions of the social environment and of member states then influences how IOs act, for instance when developing policy solutions and interacting with states to persuade them to follow their policy advice (Broome and Seabrooke 2012). Accordingly, organizational behavior cannot be explained only in terms of member states' interests or organizational mandate. Rather, IO perceptions of environmental developments and the IO's own role within the environment have an effect on organizational action. This does not entail discounting material factors or

power considerations; to the contrary, material factors such as an IO's economic capital and its budget are important to understand an IO's position within a field. However, the article argues that by introducing perceptions as a factor linking an IO's position in a field and its responses to environmental developments allows for a better understanding of IO strategies and inter-organizational relations.

International Organizations and Their Environment - Combining Two Directions of Field Theory
IOs are embedded within an organizational environment, which is "filled with opportunities, resources, threats and constraints, both material and nonmaterial and at various scales" (Brechin and Ness 2013, 22). IOs, as do other actors who share the same space and are shaped by the same normative requirements (e.g., meta-governance norms), perceive developments and changes within their environment. Whether a situation emanating from the environment is understood as an opportunity or as a threat depends to a certain degree on the understandings within the IO itself. Thus, the environment can have both enabling and limiting effects on organizational action, depending on intra-organizational processes of sense-making (Weick 1995). While IOs are shaped by the environment, their behavior can also feed back into the environment indirectly, or IOs may directly aim to change the context within which they act. Accordingly, the environment is not solely exogenous, rather, it is also socially constructed by organizations themselves (Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta and Lounsbury 2011).

While the concept of an (organizational) environment allows one to capture a broad spectrum of organizational interaction and behavior, I posit that by applying the concept of a field one can more adequately analyze inter-organizational relations as well as organizational responses. Accordingly, the article draws on two main directions of field theory (Martin, 2003). On the one hand, this encompasses the Bourdieu-inspired direction of field theory focusing on stratification or domination (Bourdieu 1993; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). On the other, this includes the field theory of inter-organization relations (or, sociological institutionalism, DiMaggio and Powell 1983).

To think in terms of fields, as Bourdieu stated, is to think relationally (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). Fields are about the relations or linkages among actors, be they individuals or institutions, and in particular about struggles for power and influence (Bourdieu 1993). A field, according to Bourdieu, "defines itself by (…) defining specific stakes and interests" (Bourdieu 1993, 72). Agents engage in a specific field to pursue their interests. To do so, they draw on different types of capital at their disposal (see also section 3.2), wherein capital is always specific to a particular field. The field is structured in a way that it reflects the power relations among those struggling with one another; actors are engaged in competition and employ certain strategies (Bourdieu 1993). Fields are established around concrete objects or stakes, and there are numerous fields with different logics of functioning. Also, fields are dynamic: as they are objects of struggle and contestation, they constantly change. Thus, every attempt to map or visualize a field only provides a snapshot of a specific moment in time, as the field is constantly evolving.

This Bourdieusian notion of the field is closely linked to the direction of field theory which DiMaggio and Powell (1983) developed. Notably, DiMaggio and Powell established the concept of an organizational field, in which different organizations engage with each other. In their seminal definition, an organizational field is understood as "those organizations, that,

in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce similar services or products", thus, "the totality of relevant actors" (1983, 148). An organizational field emerges through the activities of those actors within it. In a process of structuration, the field evolves and is defined (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Organizations that join the organizational field at a later point in time are then substantively shaped by what is already established in the field – the homogenizing effect of the field. Like Bourdieu, DiMaggio and Powell understood the organizational field in terms of the relations among the field's members. In contrast to Bourdieu, who focused on the struggles and contestations in the field, DiMaggio and Powell placed more emphasis on the effects of the field on its participants, in particular by distinguishing three mechanisms through which isomorphic change occurs (coercive, mimetic and normative, cp. 1983, 150–156).

Overall, organizational fields encompass (power) relations and interactions among organizations around a specific object or issue which is at stake and in which the organizations have an interest. The organizational field is structured by norms and rules which have a taken-for-granted quality for the actors involved in the field. For its participants, the organizational field is about struggle and contestation, but it may also be about collaboration. In general, the field is about inter-organizational relations and interaction among actors, here, IOs, who perceive themselves to be a part of a "recognized area of institutional life" (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, 148).

Positions Within (Organizational) Fields
Within an organizational field, each organization occupies a specific position, which depends upon the capital with which it is endowed (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). This position can be defined as "the status granted to an organization in solving a collective problem at a specific point in time based on the capital an actor holds" (Vetterlein and Moschella 2014, 150). Bourdieu differentiated several kinds of capital, e.g., economic, social, and symbolic capital. An actor's capital can be further analyzed as it pertains to its volume and structure, what Bourdieu compares to the numbers and types of "tokens" an entity has (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). For instance, one organization may have several green tokens (economic capital), but only some blue tokens (cultural capital), while it is the opposite for another organization. Thus, both the number and the composition of an actor's capital matters when thinking about capital and accordingly the position of an actor within a field. This notion of "tokens" fits nicely with Bourdieu's understanding of field dynamics as "games" in which actors engage and in which they use their capital to make specific moves and to defend or even further advance their own position.

Positions are not static; organizations do not have one position permanently. Rather, organizations employ strategic moves and stances ("position-takings"; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) in order to improve their standing in the field. The strategies organizations employ aim at different objectives: First, they can attempt to acquire more "tokens", i.e., more capital. Second, they can strive to diversify their "portfolio" of tokens. For instance, if one organization has a high level of economic capital, it may seek to diversify and attempt to increase symbolic capital. Third, organizations can try to change the value accorded to different types of capital within a specific field, e.g., attempt to discredit one type of capital over another. In addition, they can also try to modify the "exchange rates", meaning at which rate one type of capital is converted into another type of capital. Capital, therein, is field-

specific: As Bourdieu and Wacquant underline "a capital does not exist and function except in relation to a field" (1992, 101).

By applying these strategies, organizations typically seek to conserve or improve their position within the organizational field, individually or collectively. What their strategy is aimed at tends to depend on the position they occupy within the field at a certain point in time: If organizations have a core position, they apply conservatory strategies to maintain and defend this position against others. If, on the other hand, organizations are newcomers or peripheral to the field, they seek to improve their position within the field. Organizations can even aim to establish a monopoly over a specific sub-part of the field to achieve a secure and unique position. This can be understood as an attempt to reduce competition and to distinguish oneself from one's competitors (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). While this can be characterized as an attempt of "niche-building", organizations can also seek to establish a status as a "linking-pin" organization, meaning to be that organization which connects other organizations to each other and thus establishing oneself as a broker within a network or field of organizations (Jönssen 1986). Importantly, position and perception are connected. As Bourdieu and Wacquant put it "the point of view they [the actors] take on the field [can be understood as] a view taken from a point in the field" (1992, 101).

Overall, organizations occupy specific positions within their organizational field depending on the type and composition of capital with which they are endowed. Organizations strive to reach or maintain a central position as it accords them the opportunity to shape the field in terms favorable for them. Positions in the organizational field matter: They shape how organizations perceive developments in the field and other actors within it, which then informs how they respond and which strategies they apply. While the position an organization occupies is to some degree defined by the resources it has, organizations may also attempt to discursively create, sustain, and defend their positions vis-à-vis other actors within the organizational field. Organizations are constantly engaged in struggles and in (re-)negotiations of their positions in, and thus their influence on, the organizational field.

Case Selection and Method

Global food security governance as an organizational field encompasses a variety of different actors, including IOs, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), states, bilateral development agencies, firms and research institutions. Among this plethora of actors, IOs assume a central role: as member state organizations, they are tasked by the international community to tackle an issue of common concern, namely, that of food insecurity and hunger in the world. Thus, they are mandated to work towards securing a global public good – freedom from hunger. While others are part of the organizational field or the "totality of relevant actors" (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, 148) as well, not all other actors are exposed to the same (normative) demands: IOs, in particular within the UN-system, are confronted with meta-governance norms on harmonization and on better coordination. Consequently, IOs are attributed a special responsibility to contribute to a coherent and ordered global architecture in response to allegations of fragmentation and overlap within the field, more so than NGOs or other actors. Furthermore, the focus on one type of actor allows for analyzing those who perceive each other as alike or similar (Dingwerth and Pattberg 2009), and thus those actors who are likely to engage in struggles with each other more so than with others.

There are numerous IOs whose work falls within the realm of food security. A 1990 World Food Council document noted that the activities of "well over 30 multilateral institutions are in a significant way related to hunger and malnutrition issues" (World Food Council 1990, 2). This has not changed significantly: the High Level Task Force on Global Food and Nutrition Security (HLTF), which was established in the context of the 2007/08 global food crisis, has over 25 members (UN HLTF 2015).

Those IOs that are HLTF-members constitute the "pool" from which to select cases. To be able to analyze whether the position of an IO within an organizational field matters for how it perceives and responds to fragmentation and overlap, the issue of core or periphery is central. Accordingly, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP) are selected as core IOs, while the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) qualifies as a peripheral actor in the field of food security governance. First, pertaining to FAO and WFP, IOs at the core of the organizational field had to exhibit the following characteristics: membership in the HLTF, a mandate specifically mentioning food security and/or hunger, long-standing presence or organizational seniority in the field, a sizable share of the financial budget dedicated to food-security related interventions, and a primus-inter-pares role, e.g., the lead of food security working groups or clusters. All these criteria hold for FAO and WFP. Second, pertaining to UNIDO, IOs at the periphery of the organizational field are classified as follows: membership in the HLTF, a mandate mentioning food security and/or hunger at the margins and/or activities dedicated to/with implications for food security and hunger, and a short presence/newcomer status in the field. While these criteria hold for several IOs in the HLTF, UNIDO, having joined in 2015, stands out as the most recent member of the HLTF.

A brief introduction of each IO substantiates these choices. FAO is the first IO to have received a mandate in global food security governance (Gaus & Steets 2012). Founded in October 1945 (Liese 2012), it is the most senior IO in this field. The organization's overarching goal is "a world without hunger" (FAO 2016a). FAO is most commonly known for its role as an agricultural knowledge agency and a provider of policy advice, as a norms and standards setter and for its emphasis on technical assistance. FAO enjoys symbolic capital, in particular through its flagship publications, The State of the World, and its prestige as a knowledge agency.

WFP is a second IO at the core of the organizational field of food security governance. WFP's mandate also focuses specifically on food security as "the mission of WFP is to end global hunger" (WFP 2013b, 3). WFP is especially known for its role in delivering food assistance during emergencies and as a provider of last resort. While WFP as a food aid organization had little competition from other agencies for the same kind of resources, WFP's transition to food assistance has led to an increasing demand for financial resources, which is why a shortage of cash resources is characterized as the organization's "Achilles heel" (Shaw 2009, 81). As "the world's largest humanitarian agency" (Shaw 2011), WFP enjoys respect for its prominent role in emergencies, and thus has symbolic capital. At the same time, WFP has a large partnership network with ties to numerous NGOs, businesses, foundations and other IOs (Shaw 2011), pointing to the organization's social capital.

UNIDO is "the specialized agency of the United Nations that promotes industrial development for poverty reduction, inclusive globalization and environmental sustainability" (UNIDO 2016). Some of UNIDO activities may be located within the field of food security governance, in particular regarding the food availability dimension. For instance, UNIDO implements projects on agribusiness that aim at enhancing food security. To do so, UNIDO engages in partnerships that promote agricultural business development to achieve food

security. One example is the 3ADI (Agribusiness Development for Food Security and Poverty Reduction), a project which UNIDO conducts in collaboration with other IOs, e.g., the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). In comparison to FAO and WFP, UNIDO has neither a high degree of symbolic or social capital, nor is it endowed with substantial economic capital. Thus, UNIDO is at the periphery of the field.

As it pertains to methods, a computer-assisted qualitative content analysis was conducted (Früh 2011; Mayring 2010; Schreier 2012, 2014). The core of the empirical material are organizational documents, documents produced by IOs or authored by IO-staff. These documents, covering a time frame from the beginning of the 2000s to 2019, include strategic plans, mission statements, evaluation reports, corporate strategies, Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) among two or more organizations, flagship or other publications, and reports on collaboration prepared for the IOs' governing bodies. With these different documents it is possible to investigate IO perceptions of the organizational field of food security governance, IO inter-organizational relations, as well as IO claims regarding their own role and position within the field of food security governance. Analyzing these documents thus allows for shedding light on organizational understandings of the organizational field as well as on organizational responses.

Empirical Analysis
This section begins with FAO and WFP, analyzing both how they perceive the field and how they respond to developments in the field. Then, the section turns to UNIDO, a focusing on perceptions and responses.

FAO and WFP – IOs "At the Core"
FAO and WFP are confronted with a dynamic and changing organizational field. WFP used a single word in its 2013 Strategic Plan to describe its environment: crowded. The organization observed a proliferation of different actors whose diversity and sheer number may "increase the risk of fragmentation, duplication, and competition" (WFP 2013b, 7). FAO shared WFP's assessment that the field is dense with a number of different actors competing "in the same areas of work and, to some extent, for the same resources" (FAO 2013, 3), thus specifying that competition is about resources. Although the observation is similar, there is a difference between FAO and WFP: According to FAO, the competition is not only due to a proliferating actor landscape, as WFP states, but can also be traced back to IOs extending their mandates or spheres of activity so that they overlapped with those of FAO (FAO 2013). Thus, FAO goes a step further and locates the responsibility for organizational overlap with other IOs: because they went beyond their own mandate, we now have a situation of overlap within global food security governance. In this understanding, the actions of other IOs are undermining FAO in its mandate and authority as the premier IO in global food security governance.

This hints at one of the debates within global food security governance, namely that on the causes of overlap. On the one hand, overlap can be located at the level of IO activities, meaning the sphere of work of an IO. In that case, the approach to deal with overlap could be in ensuring that every IO "stick to" its mandate. On the other, overlap can be seen a problem on the level of mandates, with member states having given IOs overlapping mandates and not ensuring clear responsibilities and roles for each IO at the moment of their founding. If mandates are seen as documents that are negotiated at a particular moment in time and reflect contested opinions on a respective IO's role, the mandates become open for a certain degree

of interpretation. In that case, the question of whether or not IOs have expanded on their mandate and thereby encroached on that of FAO is not solely a technical question, but a political one. Even FAO's own mandate is ambiguous; it reflects different options of how the organization could best carry out its objective, which go back to disagreements among the founding members. These roles ranged from FAO as a "technical clearinghouse" to a more active "technical assistance organization" (Staples 2006, 79).

While FAO and WFP both perceived the field of food security governance to be characterized by organizational density which comes with risks such as duplication or competition (in part with each other, but also with other organizations and actors), both IOs simultaneously engaged in numerous collaborative activities. First, FAO and WFP engaged in information sharing. The two organizations are the co-leads of the global and national food security clusters, which have the objective of enhancing coordination and partnership in emergencies. One of the core tasks is constituting a forum for exchange and providing information on which organizations are conducting which projects in which country. Second, FAO and WFP, together with IFAD[ix], were involved in sharing resources, for example by sharing office premises at the country level. Third, FAO and WFP collaborated in joint action and conducted assessments together, be it joint baseline surveys in Niger (FAO, IFAD & WFP, 2015) or emergency food security assessments in Western Côte d'Ivoire (WFP 2013a).

How did FAO and WFP respond, given that they perceived their environment to be fragmented, complex and characterized by overlap? One strategy stands out in particular; together with IFAD, FAO and WFP are in a process of delineating their specific roles. The RBAs together invested significantly in their collaboration and attempt to increase their joint efforts, while at the same time individual RBAs often named other IOs as their most important partners, e.g., with FAO listing the World Bank and WHO as "top partners" before IFAD and WFP (FAO 2006, 18). Nonetheless, FAO, IFAD and WFP were engaged in a time- and resource-intensive process since 2009, when the Executive Boards of all three IOs approved a document on "Directions for Collaboration among the Rome-based Agencies". There had been earlier efforts, for example in the form of a regular publication titled "Working Together" – starting in 1999 – which presented examples of RBA-cooperation (e.g. FAO, IFAD and WFP 1999). However, ever since the governing bodies of the three organizations called for increased collaboration (FAO, IFAD and WFP 2009) efforts have increased and become more systematic. There are attempts at mapping operational collaboration at different geographical levels, for different sectors, and in different regions. In addition, the organizations regularly report on their progress, in the form of updates to the governing bodies (e.g. WFP 2016a).

In the 2009 document, the three organizations strove to lay the foundation for their joint work in combating hunger and food insecurity. Therein, FAO, IFAD and WFP drew on the concept of "comparative advantages" whereby they sought to define the features which make each agency unique and which distinguish it from the others, i.e., what are unique competencies of each agency. Accordingly, FAO's comparative advantage is that it is the "world's agricultural knowledge agency for policy development", while IFAD has "knowledge of rural poverty", an "exclusive focus on rural poor people" and "experience in financing", and WFP's strong suits are its "extensive field presence" and its "strong logistics in the delivery and distribution of food" (FAO et al. 2009, 7).

Despite of these joint attempts at delineating spheres and defining comparative advantages, it seems that at least FAO saw an issue of overlapping mandates and in particular activities overlapping in practice. According to the organization: "although they [IFAD, WFP,

ah] were created for very different objectives and should work in close collaboration, taking advantage of clear complementarities, in reality their work has progressively overlapped that of FAO" (FAO 2013, 3). Accordingly, even if agencies try to jointly determine their comparative advantages and to define specific roles, it is still possible that overlap and duplication of mandates lead to competition for funding – a development which is usually seen as problematic by IOs themselves. In reacting to WFP's new Strategic Plan (2017-2021), FAO therefore voiced concern regarding "actual and potential duplication or overlapping with WFP" and took care to note "that WFP does not intend to expand its mandate and that response to food security related emergencies and provision of direct humanitarian assistance shall remain WFP's primary focus" (FAO 2016b). Thus, FAO described a particular role for WFP, with a focus on the delivery of assistance in emergency or humanitarian settings. At the same time, WFP (2016b) explored whether its stakeholders see a larger role for itself in development, specifically in advocacy and as a "thought leader", which comes closer to FAO's role. Furthermore, cooperation does not seem to be straightforward. While earlier updates appeared to be jointly developed reports, 2016 updates carried subtitles such as "IFAD perspective-position paper" (IFAD 2015) or "a WFP perspective" (WFP 2016a). IFAD in particular raised concerns about RBA collaboration, criticizing that "[c]alls for more RBA collaboration from our membership have also suffered from the casual nature of the requests made" and that "too much attention may have been given to collaboration through areas of overlap" (IFAD 2015, 3–4). IFAD then proposed to focus less on joint action and more on "coordinated complementary approaches" with each agency focusing on its own specialization and specific means of intervention (ibid.).

To sum up, FAO and WFP as two core IOs in the organizational field of food security governance collaborated in numerous ways with each other ranging from information sharing to joint action. At the same time, they perceived themselves to be embedded within an organizational field characterized by organizational proliferation and the overlap of mandates and activities, leading to a situation where they have to compete for resources and where they strive to ensure their continuous relevance. This led to attempts by the two organizations to delineate specific spheres of responsibilities and roles for each organization, in particular drawing on the notion of "comparative advantages". Therein, FAO and WFP did not only try to define and defend their own position as central actors within the field but also to assign a certain role to the respective other. Their response encompasses several layers. First, FAO and WFP, together with IFAD, engaged in time- and resource-intensive processes of structuring and defining their collaboration as the Rome-based agencies – those at the core of food security governance. Through this collaborative endeavor, they sought to signal their member states – who called for closer cooperation through the IOs' governing boards – that they are responsive and adaptive organizations who harmonize their activities through a process of inter-organizational coordination. Importantly, FAO and WFP began by attempting to increase order and coherence at the core of the field. Second, while there were joint attempts to define roles and responsibilities, IOs simultaneously also tried to delineate their sphere of influence individually and by drawing on different channels. For instance, FAO used its albeit limited position and influence as one of WFP's "parent" institutions (together with the UN), to voice concerns regarding WFP's 2017-2021 strategic plan to define a role for WFP which can be delimited from that of FAO and does not encroach on what FAO perceived to be its sphere of work.

UNIDO – An IO "at the Periphery"

Within the field of industrial development, UNIDO, comparing itself to the World Bank and overall private sector flows, described itself as a "comparatively small agency" (UNIDO 2013, 5) According to UNIDO, within this field there is an "increasingly complex array of actors, strategies and means of intervention" (UNIDO 2011, 10), as complexity and organizational proliferation lead to an increased need for coordination among actors. The organization saw itself especially well placed to enable such partnerships, in particular along the public-private divide. UNIDO posited that it has a comparative advantage in being an inter-governmental organization – thus having relations to public sector authorities – while at the same time being in a constant exchange with the private sector, due to its focus on industrial development. Accordingly, UNIDO perceived itself as having a "strategic position at the interface of government, industry, science and technology" and a "unique role in addressing coordination failures and fostering convergence of action" (UNIDO 2014, 5).

UNIDO's attempt to define itself as occupying this strategic position became evident in the introduction of a new instrument, the Programme for Country Partnership (PCP) (UNIDO 2011). With the PCP, UNIDO strove to map existing projects by partners within the realm of a specific priority sector or industry. Therein, UNIDO's strategy was to bring together all development partners under the leadership of the respective national government and to define a common approach. In Ethiopia, for instance, UNIDO planned to support the establishment of so-called "agro-poles", thereby placing emphasis on the development of the agribusiness-sector for different food products by linking industry more closely with agriculture – a project that relates to the food availability dimension. Importantly, UNIDO tried to put itself in a steering role for a closely defined sub-sector within the field of food security governance.

As most other IOs, UNIDO described partnerships as a way to heighten the impact of its projects and programmes. In particular, partnerships are expected to "optimize the contribution of each" (UNIDO 2011, 10) and as a means to "enhance synergies (…) while maximizing the development impact" (UNIDO 2015, 5). Although UNIDO oftentimes referred to different types of partners with which they want to engage – ranging from governments, other IOs, development agencies and civil society to the private sector – UNIDO focused in particular on financing actors. UNIDO explained this emphasis by pointing out that financial needs in the sector of industrial development are particularly high; even if UNIDO were to receive more funding from its member states this would not suffice to make a tangible impact for inclusive and sustainable industrial development (ISID) (UNIDO 2013). Therefore, UNIDO had a partnership strategy dedicated specifically to development finance institutions (DFIs). In that, UNIDO differed from other IOs who have either general partnership strategies (e.g. IFAD) or several partnership strategies for different types of partners (e.g. WFP). In that sense, UNIDO sought partnerships to supplement areas where it lacked resources.

How did UNIDO respond to an organizational field characterized by complexity and organizational density, especially given that the organization's financial resources are limited and that it is comparatively small actor? First, UNIDO strove to mobilize resources to be able to implement technical assistance projects. However, within the scope of such projects UNIDO also worked with other IOs, such as the FAO, which did not contribute to financing. In the already mentioned 3ADI grant scheme which is aimed at enhancing investment in the agribusiness sector, the project is managed jointly by the African Development Bank (AfDB), FAO and UNIDO, while funding is provided by development institutions, both bilateral (e.g.,

AFD) or regional (e.g., the West African Development Bank, or BOAD). Given developments in and features of the organizational field - which are associated with an increasing competitive pressure - one of UNIDO's responses can thus be seen in the creation of a strategy aimed at securing adequate financial resources by explicitly targeting development finance institutions. Second, and relatedly, UNIDO sought to create itself as a service provider for other IOs. In its partnership strategy on international finance institutions the organization repeatedly referred to a number of supporting functions it can fulfil, e.g., managing and coordinating processes or providing expertise for the formulation of finance institutions' programs. Third, another one of UNIDO's responses can be identified in the organization's attempts at role and niche definitions. UNIDO tried to define a steering and coordination role for itself at the country level under the label of "inclusive and sustainable industrial development", thus interpreting industrial development in a broader, more holistic way. At the same time, the organization constrained its area of work by explicitly referring to the linkages between industry and agriculture through references to agribusiness development, thus teasing out the connections to industrial development, which is at the core of UNIDO's mandate. Overall, UNIDO as a peripheral actor saw its environment to be characterized by complexity and proliferation and responded by employing a range of responses, such as resource mobilization.

Conclusion

All actors within an organizational field have a specific position, be it (more) at the core or (more) at the periphery. These positions are subject to dynamic changes over time and require constant justification and self-ascertainment by IOs. While the position an IO occupies is to some degree defined by the resources it has, positions are also discursively created, sustained and defended vis-à-vis other actors within the environment. As IOs risk losing relevance in the eyes of their member states and their wider environment, they are quite aware of their position within the organizational field and of developments and changes within it. Against this background, this article addressed the following research question: Given different positions in the organizational field of food security governance, how do IOs perceive and respond to developments in the field?

The analysis provided the following findings: there is some similarity in how core and peripheral organizations perceive the organizational field of global food security governance, in particular pertaining to complexity and organizational density, even overlap. All IOs see the field as extremely complex and crowded due to a proliferation in the number of actors, not just IOs, but also other actors such as NGOs. From the IO perspective, this leads to certain risks, such as duplication of activities or competition. However, there are two relevant differences: While FAO and WFP, both core organizations, perceived these developments to be a problem mainly for those organizations at the core and consequently, they responded by engaging in delineation processes at the core, UNIDO's outlook on the field appears broader. As an organization at the periphery, UNIDO was located at the intersection of the field of food security governance and the field of industrial development. Furthermore, "the core" does not appear to be unitary. FAO viewed that other actors encroaching on its mandate caused overlap. As the most senior member of the organizational field of global food security governance, FAO apparently needs to defend its core position against other IOs and newcomers. WFP, in comparison, does not seem to make similar cause-effect assumptions and does not appear to

be preoccupied with defending its position. Interestingly, although all IOs observed the field to be crowded and dense, they only rarely mention competition between IOs directly.

Turning to organizational responses, the analysis demonstrated that FAO and WFP, as core organizations, were engaged in a process (together with IFAD) of jointly delineating roles and responsibilities in response to complexity, fragmentation and overlap. Thus, they aimed to enhance coherence and a division of labor at the core of the field. Although the three RBAs now revolve more closely around each other – even though there may be challenges when implementing the strategy for more cooperative engagement among them – it may be that the RBAs engage less with other actors. IFAD, for instance, already cautioned that "RBA collaboration should not be exclusive" (IFAD 2015, p. iii) and should rather draw on the extensive partnerships and networks of each individual agency. While the inter-organizational relations among the three RBAs at first tightened, a broadening and an increasing inclusion of other actors seems to be occurring. At first, however, the IOs at the core of the organizational field of global food security governance were occupied with ordering relations among themselves.

UNIDO, on the other hand, occupies a rather peripheral position in the organizational field of food security governance. The organization showed a range of different responses with which it reacted to a complex and dense organizational field. These included developing a strategy on resource mobilization, defining itself as a service provider for other IOs, especially DFIs, and establishing itself within specific niches (e.g., agribusiness development) and with specific roles at the country level (e.g., steering and coordination). UNIDO, therefore, sought to define a unique role for itself.

Overall, this article compared the perceptions and responses of core (FAO and WFP) and peripheral (UNIDO) IOs in the organizational field of food security governance. The article's strength is that it combined two strains of field theory, emphasizing the embeddedness and interaction of IOs with a wider environment, the organizational field, and focusing on the role of positions for organizational responses to developments in that field. Importantly, the article demonstrated the importance of perceptions as a factor for understanding and linking an IO's position to organizational action. The role of both positions and perceptions have previously been understudied. However, the theoretical framework developed here cannot yet account for competing explanations of organizational action and, thus, requires further refinement. Also, the focus on organizational documents may a limitation of the article. While documents are a central source for investigating IOs, they may carry a potential bias. They may reflect organizational "talk" more so than IOs' "real" perceptions. Even if this were the case, the documents would still be valuable because they allow us to draw conclusions about how the IOs think they should see the world.

To conclude, three additional future research directions are identified. First, competition seems somewhat absent in the organizational perceptions as they are reflected in IO documents. It could be that competition is infrequently referred to because cooperation norms are so strong that IOs find it inappropriate to mention competition "publicly", even though it is taking place. This would warrant further investigation. Second, if IOs at the core of the field of food security governance are revolving more closely around each other, the question arises as to how this effects peripheral IOs and other actors. Finally, the "success" of the organizational responses identified (and criteria to measure the presence or absence of this success) also constitutes a fruitful pathway for further inquiry. In particular, it is important to study the effects of these responses on field-level developments such as overlap,

fragmentation and other changes taking place within the environment. IOs are inherently located in this environment, they are influenced by it and likewise shape the environment through their actions. Consequently, the organizational field will continue to change and evolve, as will the IOs within them.

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ENDNOTES

i.   The content of this article is unrelated to evaluation activities of the German Institute for Development Evaluation (DEval).

ii. This article was first presented at the 33rd EGOS Colloquium in July 2017. I thank the

iii. Following Archer (1988), I understand IOs as permanent, structured entities established through a formal agreement between members for the purpose of realizing a shared objective. I focus on IOs whose membership is restricted to states, and thus on international *governmental* organizations. IOs are further understood to be agentive and autonomous actors; there actorness, here, assumes a taken-for-granted quality (Ellis, 2010). In the following, I use the terms "IO" and "organization" interchangeably.

iv. As an organizational field, global food security governance is constituted around food security as the central issue at stake (cp. Vetterlein and Moschella, 2014, p. 149). The organizational field includes actors ranging from IOs to NGOs to states and multinational corporations, to name just a few, all directly or indirectly working on or whose work has implications for food security. While the field includes these many different types of actors, the emphasis in this article is on IOs.

v. The language of "core" and "periphery" may remind the reader of Immanuel Wallerstein's world system theory. The article relates to Wallerstein's work in the central notion that the behavior of one element within a system can only be understood in reference to the elements' position within said system and its relations to other elements. Wallerstein has a holistic perspective that emphasizes the interdependencies between elements in the world system (Nölke, 2010). That being said, there are three notable differences: First, whereas Wallerstein focuses on states as central actors, I concentrate on IOs. Second, Wallerstein's work is situated at a macro level with its emphasis on the world system and the capitalist world system. In contrast, the article focuses on IOs located within the meso-level structure of the organizational field. Third, Wallerstein is specifically interested in the role of capitalism and dominant classes within the world system, which the article is not.

vi. With that, I do not claim that every member of the IO bureaucracy needs to share these perceptions; some members of staff or communities within the IO may have fundamentally different understandings of the environment. Rather, a perception should be widespread enough to have a certain taken-for-granted quality within the organization.

vii. The terms "institution" and "organization" are often referred to interchangeably; they should, however, be kept apart. Whereas an institution "can be understood broadly as a relatively stable collection of social practices consisting of easily recognized *roles* coupled with underlying *norms* and a set of rules or conventions defining appropriate behavior for, and governing relations among, occupants of these roles" (Jönsson 2017, 54, emphasis in original), an organization is defined as an entity "that normally possess physical locations, offices, personnel, equipment, and budgets" (Jönsson 2017, 55). Centrally, organizations are understood to possess actor quality, whereas institutions do not.

viii. Following this conceptualization, IOs are neither *instruments* of their (powerful) member states, nor are they neutral *arenas* used by member states to negotiate issues of common concern. Rather, IOs are *actors* in their own right with a certain degree of agency, in particular through their bureaucracies or secretariats (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004).

ix. The International Fund for Agricultural Development is the third so-called Rome-Based Agency (RBA) next to WFP and FAO. IFAD was founded in the aftermath of the 1974 World Food Conference. The organization's objective is to advance rural development and enhance the rural poor's food security situation by providing loans to member states.