

Multiple Actors and Centers of Agency? Examining the UN as a Competitive Arena for Norm Change

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Processes of norm change in international organizations have begun to be unpacked and evidence of “dysfunctional behaviour,” “pathologies,” or “organized hypocrisy” has been displayed. However, norm change processes often meet obstacles in the form of political bargaining and horse-trading, turf battles between UN entities, and bureaucratic resistance to implement change. In this article, I will look at the UN as a competitive arena where states, think-tanks, academia, and NGOs form informal policy alliances or “linked ecologies” to further norm goals. These processes aim to circumvent spoiling and turf battles between UN entities and strengthen informal consultations to avoid political horse-trading on difficult issues. As a case study, I will look at the process of establishing the integrated missions concept in UN peacekeeping.

Introduction

Existing theory looking at agency in international organizations (IOs) has so far mostly been concerned with the interests of states—particularly, powerful ones. In recent years, increasing autonomy and indirect agency has been accorded to IOs in constructivist literature, looking at how IOs at times act in contradiction to prescripts set by their constituencies—the member states (Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 2004, Lipson 2007, Weaver 2008). This volume takes a further step in this direction and explores how UN actions can be understood as bureaucratic spoiling, dissent-shirking, obstruction, sabotage, pathological behavior, and organized hypocrisy. This article will not deny that this kind of behavior takes place, but it will try to better explain the conflicting norm pressures that exist and how these norms evolve and change.

Looking at UN peacekeeping, this article argues there is a need to further refine the analysis to discern who the main actors with agency are (see also Avant et al. 2010). I argue that norms wax and wane in the international system, and that small and large member states, academic institutions, think-tanks, and individuals at key positions may play a central role in the norm change processes that are taking place. To theorize the interaction between these actors, I turn to the sociology of professions to describe how different professional environments may make policy alliances to advance new norms, prescripts, rules, and concepts. To conceptualize the location of these alliances, I use the concept of arena and argue the UN can be seen as a competitive arena in a narrow and a wide sense. In a narrow sense, member states come together and discuss matters of common concern inside the UN. In a wide sense, I argue that to circumvent spoiling, bureaucratic turf battles, and political horse-trading, informal policy alliances are formed, partially outside the UN, to form consensus in informal fora before advancing a norm on the global agenda.

To exemplify these theoretical arguments, the advancement of the concept of “integrated missions” is used as an empirical example. Although generally considered a concept and not a norm, I show the integrated missions concept had staunch supporters and opponents. The supporters were trying to improve the ability of the UN system to deliver assistance in a more effective and coordinated manner and improve accountability to host populations. Those

opposing the concept were doing this based on their conviction that humanitarian aid should not be politicized or securitized, which are strong norms in the humanitarian domain. Thus, I argue the process is a valid case study for understanding the processes of norm change within the UN.

Finally, I turn to the question of legitimacy of the norm development processes. If norm development is not the result of the common will of the member states of the UN but rather a result of policy alliances formed to advance particular norms, are these norms then legitimate? I argue that indeed, even if the norms may be the result of the work of a limited number of actors that may not be representative of the collective will of the organization, there also has to be a certain ripeness for a new norm to emerge. If not, counter pressures will be sufficiently strong to stop the advance of the norm in question.

Understanding Norm Change in International Organizations

During the last three decades, the manner in which the norms for international organizations change has come under increasing scrutiny. So far, IOs' existence has been explained by neorealists as being created to reflect state preferences and that powerful states ultimately decide outcomes in IOs (Waltz 2000: 26, Waltz 1979, Krasner 2009). According to Mearsheimer, neorealists view the international system as a "brutal arena where states look for opportunities to take advantage of each other. . . . International relations is not a constant state of war, but is a state of relentless security competition" (1994: 9). Based on economic and rational choice theory, Keohane argues that, out of self-interest, states cooperate and establish international regimes to realize common interests, reducing transaction costs and limiting uncertainty (1984: 13). Rational institutionalism treats IOs as mechanisms through which states act to reduce transaction costs, uncertainty and deter cheating (Koremenos et al. 2001).

Examining IOs as bureaucracies, Barnett and Finnemore give examples of IOs and their staff acting autonomously in ways unintended and unanticipated at their foundation, showing that IOs are capable of creating their own norms, rules, and practices independent of, and unintended by, their creators (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). Bureaucracies are composed of rules and are constantly reinterpreting old rules and producing new rules, defining the behavior of the organization, its officials and member states alike. Rules are explicit or implicit norms and regulations guiding, proscribing or prescribing action, defining the world and are constitutive of the identity and culture of the organization. The relationship between rules and bureaucrats is mutually constitutive and dynamic, and at any given time several rules may be applicable. Dysfunctional behavior based on bureaucratic culture may occur when the IO must make difficult choices where several imperatives may apply at once. The authority of the organization establishes the basis for autonomous action and IOs may choose ways to solve problems that may not be in line with espoused goals.

However, by employing the concept of bureaucratic culture and stressing the uniformity of action this imposes on UN staff, Barnett and Finnemore disregard the potential impact other actors have on the norm formation of peacekeeping. The secretary-general may act as a norm entrepreneur and use high-level panels composed of statesmen, member state diplomats, and prominent researchers to advance thinking on topics of particular concern (Annan 2007: xii, Johnstone 2007). In recent years, there has been a broadening of the perspective by which actors may be considered to have agency in global governance. Studies have investigated how advocacy networks, private companies, and NGOs may be considered as global governors (Weiss et al. 2009, Jolly et al. 2009, Avant et al. 2010). However, while this literature supports the claim of this article that there is a need to look at classes of actors other than member states, a theoretical framework for explaining how these classes of actors interact is still missing.

Sociology of Professions as an Analytical Framework

According to Abbott, "Professions are exclusive occupational groups applying somewhat abstract knowledge to particular cases" (1988: 8). Control of the occupation relies on control

of the profession-specific practices and concepts or, in other words, the generation of doctrine and policy guiding practices. Similarly to Weber, Abbott identifies jurisdiction as the central connecting element between a profession and its work (*Ibid.*: 20).¹ Drawing upon Weber, Barnett and Finnemore look at how IOs as bureaucracies establish “jurisdictional competency” or rational-legal authority in their areas of expertise (Barnett and Finnemore 1998). However, they are excluding from their analysis how bureaucratic control of a policy area tends to be created in close cooperation with think-tanks, donor governments, and other actors who have similar interests in the area of discussion. Barnett and Finnemore do make reference to the importance of the external environment but do not investigate this matter at any depth.

In the area of peacekeeping, the UN has been reliant upon funding and support from donor governments to develop doctrines and best practices since the end of the Cold War (Benner and Rotmann 2008). Staff has been moving through “revolving doors” between being practitioners in IOs, policymakers at think tanks, and officials in government institutions. Middle powers and donor governments like the UK, Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden have pushed the development of a doctrine for peacekeeping, with dedicated government offices having peacekeeping on the agenda and funding the development of policy reports, discussions around new concepts and recommendations, and even best-practices positions on peacekeeping at UN headquarters (*Ibid.*, Benner et al. 2007). Taking into consideration the close interaction between these actors, a closer look at how this dynamic has evolved and what consequences it has for the development of doctrines and evolving practices within the UN is called for. Building on the sociology of professions, it is possible to argue the jurisdictional competency of the UN peacekeeping bureaucracy is partly being dictated by the development of a profession of peacekeeping and the staff that makes up this new profession (Abbott 1988, Abbott 2005, Fourcade 2006).

Applying Abbott on the development of peacekeeping as a profession, we see the importance of developing the concepts, diagnosis, and prescripts—in essence the doctrines that guide peacekeeping operations—to establish jurisdictional claims on the area of peacekeeping. External actors from different institutional contexts such as think tanks, donor officials, and academics have been essential in this process. According to the conceptual framework of Abbott, these different institutional contexts may be called “ecologies.”

Building on Abbott, Fourcade, studying the transnationalization of economics, has identified how professions achieve jurisdictional competency and claims on a global level. Fourcade identifies transnational connectedness as one of the dimensions underlying the globalization of the economics profession (Fourcade 2006: 168), and it is also a constitutive dimension of concept formation within the area of peacekeeping. Increased movement of staff between various government institutions, think tanks, and UN offices is also a characteristic trait in the area of peacekeeping.

Fourcade has shown how actors within different ecologies form coalitions or “hinges” with like-minded actors to influence practices and gain control over a policy “location” (Fourcade 2006). Building on these, Seabrooke and Tsingou argue that an alliance of actors will then “influence how certain policy problems are understood and inform broader norms on how policy problems should be legitimately addressed” (Seabrooke and Tsingou 2009: 3). Linking this argument with the concept of norm entrepreneurs, I argue that an alliance of actors from linked ecologies may form a policy alliance to advance a new norm.

In the area of peacekeeping, the UN is the primary arena for advancing norms. To locate the interaction of these ecologies, I use the arena concept, in a somewhat different way than neorealists and rational institutionalists do, by looking at the UN as a competitive arena for informal norm change alliances. It will employ two understandings of arena—a wide and a narrow. In the narrow sense, member states come together in the UN, discuss matters of

1. According to Weber, an official in the bureaucratic hierarchy is a person with expert training who has “jurisdictional competency” and executes his or her tasks according to “*calculable rules* and without regard for persons” (Weber et al. 1946: 197, 215).

common concern, and establish regimes along the lines described by rational institutionalism. Informal policy alliances or linked ecologies compete to frame issues and build support for new norms, concepts, and rules. These norms, concepts, or rules may be advanced on altruistic grounds to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the organization, or to strengthen the sovereignty of member states. In a wider sense, member states, along with many other actors, pursue policy agendas and prepare their arguments outside of the “official” UN with the ultimate aim of advancing norms inside the organization. In the case study on integrated missions, I will pursue this argument further and show how the wider understanding of the UN as a competitive arena is an important addition to how we understand norm change processes in the international system.

Case Study: Establishing the Integrated Missions Concept

With the expansion of UN involvement in internal conflicts after the end of the Cold War, the issue of how the different parts of the UN should work together on the ground quickly surfaced. In the years prior to taking up the assignment as secretary-general in 1997, Kofi Annan had a series of postings that gave him a clear insight to the challenges the UN was confronted with in this area. He launched a reform program that, *inter alia*, sought to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of UN peacekeeping operations on the ground in order to better serve host populations (United Nations 1997). The peacekeeping and special political missions were headed by special or personal representatives of the secretary-general, and these would “have authority over all UN entities” (*Ibid.*: 39, bold in original). The combination of the peacekeeping mission and the other UN entities would constitute an “integrated mission.”

Following the decision to better integrate peacekeeping missions with the other UN entities on the ground, the secretary-general issued a Note of Guidance in 2000 (United Nations 2000), where the initial statement that the special representative of the secretary-general (SRSG) “will have authority over all UN entities” (United Nations 1997: 39) was significantly watered down. Instead, the guidance only gave the SRSG/RSG the authority to establish the political framework and the responsibility to provide overall leadership to the UN Country Team, which is composed of the UN agencies, funds, and programs present in the country. The direct authority vis-à-vis the UN Resident Coordinator (RC), who is responsible for all development activities undertaken by UN agencies in a country, and the UN Humanitarian Coordinator (HC), who is responsible for all humanitarian activities undertaken by UN entities in a country, as well as coordinating with other humanitarian actors, was diminished and delegated to the UN headquarters (HQ) who would decide on the level of integration on a case-by-case basis: “The RC/HC will, whenever feasible, serve as Deputy Special Representative/Representative of the Secretary-General, on the basis of a decision at UN Headquarters” (United Nations 2000: 2). As a general guideline, the RC should “keep the SRSG/RSG informed” and the “information-sharing among the SRSG/RSG and the RC/HC is essential” (*Ibid.*: 1).

With these rather loose and ad-hoc-based guidelines, integration of UN activities on the country level took many shapes in the years that followed. The issuance of the guidance coincided with the second large expansion of peacekeeping operations after the Cold War. From 1999 and onward, the UN deployed a number of new missions to countries like Timor Leste, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Haiti, and Liberia. By 2004, the troop deployment numbers had reached the previous high of the nineties and kept climbing.² By 2006, twenty Department of Peacekeeping Operations-led (DPKO) operations were ongoing around the world, with more than 100,000 troops and civilians deployed.

According to Espen Barth Eide, who was one of the two lead writers of the *Report on Integrated Missions*, the work “started with the reform agenda of Kofi Annan in 1997 and it coincided with the broader system-wide coherence reform agenda during 2000s” (E.B. Eide,

2. All statistics are from <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/>.

personal communication, 20 June 2011).³ Jan Egeland, the UN under secretary-general for the Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) at the time, argues that the integrated missions concept was based on the Brahimi Report, which should become active policy (J. Egeland, personal communication, 29 May 2011).⁴ The Brahimi Report had been issued in 2000 and became the main reference for the reform process for peacekeeping operations during the next decade.⁵ Egeland felt there was strong common agreement within the UN that the “UN pulled in too many directions and the result was unclear” (*Ibid.*). The integrated missions concept was the elongation of the One UN concept, where the RC and HC should have a stronger role and the UN should be co-located. The SRSG should coordinate military, political, development, and humanitarian efforts. Against integration were first and foremost some of the development agencies and, more so, NGOs. The most fundamental critique came from the IASC (Inter-agency Standing Committee) where the NGO-alliance (part of the IASC) was strongly against integration. MSF (Médecines Sans Frontières) said they would break off contact with the UN if integration went too far (*Ibid.*).

From 2003, all missions were supposed to be integrated in the field, but according to Egeland, “this was a controversial move by the SG” (*Ibid.*). Eide informed that they “found that the practices on the ground in many cases were far more advanced than the policy debate in New York” (E.B. Eide, personal communication, 20 June 2011). However, they also saw there “was a tension between the ‘old’ and ‘new’ UN, i.e., the existing funds, agencies, and programmes on the ground and a peacekeeping mission. The old often have a closer relationship to the host government while the peacekeeping mission comes in with a lot of resources and insists on impartiality” (*Ibid.*).

Practices in the field varied widely. As an example, both Eide and Egeland mentioned the discrepancies between the neighboring countries of Sierra Leone and Liberia. In Sierra Leone, SRSG Alan Doss was perceived as capable of achieving more integration and providing an example for other countries, while SRSG Klein in Liberia had great difficulties in achieving integration with the humanitarian organizations (J. Egeland, personal communication, 29 May 2011).

While some of the reasons for the lack of integration were substantive, such as the fear of humanitarian actors losing their impartiality, others were rooted in internal UN politics and turf battles. This did not only come to the fore in the field (Blume 2007) but also at headquarters:

Both mission and UNCT personnel pointed out to the Study Team that some of the limitations to integration in the field actually flowed from the fact that headquarters itself remain[ed] fragmented. Frequent turf battles in HQ were an example cited by many as a constraint on more effective integration, beginning with the prospect of system-wide planning processes. It was argued that the actors in the field couldn’t be expected to solve these issues on their own while receiving contradictory signals from their respective headquarters. (Eide et al. 2005: 18)

A research team was put together in 2003–04 and visited a number of countries in 2004 to assess how integration was working in practice, to record challenges, and to assess best practices.⁶ The team was led by Espen Barth Eide, the director of the UN Programme at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and a former deputy minister of foreign affairs, and Randolph Kent, a former UN humanitarian coordinator in Somalia. Their findings were presented at a conference in Oslo in May 2005 (*Ibid.*: 47).

3. Eide was the deputy minister of foreign affairs, Norway, at the time of the interview, and later the minister of foreign affairs until October 2013.

4. Jan Egeland was at the time the director of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), where the author is employed.

5. While the Brahimi Report did not mention integrated missions per se, it underscored the need to harness all the resources of the UN to consolidate peace and reestablish a stable and legitimate government that can provide the essential services to its population. United Nations (21 August 2000): *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* [Brahimi Report], UN doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809. The report became known as the Brahimi Report after the name of Chairman Lakhdar Brahimi.

6. The team visited Burundi, Cote d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. The remainder of the countries with a peacekeeping mission was covered by desk studies and interviews. See Annex 1: Terms of Reference (Eide et al. 2005: 47).

The Follow-Up Process to the Report on Integrated Missions

Norway is explicit about its view of the organization as an arena where norms are formed and the responsibility of the organization is to further these norms: “A UN-led world order is in the interest of Norway. We need a UN that functions as a global arena, norm-setter and executive body” (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012). Eide, who became the deputy minister of defense only months after finishing the study, argued Norway “wanted a more efficient and effective UN that could work together” (E.B. Eide, personal communication, 20 June 2011). Within the Norwegian government, there was significant substantive capacity among the rest of the top leadership, understanding the needs of both the UN to work more efficiently, and for humanitarian actors to keep their impartiality. Raymond Johansen, who was then deputy minister of foreign affairs, used to be head of one of the main NGOs, the Norwegian Refugee Council, and Jonas Gahr Støre, the minister of foreign affairs, had previously been head of the Norwegian Red Cross.

The report Eide had co-authored established that there was a wide range of practices in the field with regards to integration and how its implementation still varied widely. In terms of achieving the policy goal of establishing integrated missions as the default option, it was, however, slow. Micropolitics, bureaucratic turf battles, and political horse-trading were show-stoppers for change, for which, in principle, there was support. According to Jostein Leiro, who was the head of the UN section at the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the time, the integrated missions concept was a clear and simple idea, and while there was a need and wish to discuss the issue, there were relatively few arenas where the issue could be discussed in an open and informal manner. Commenting on the work to develop policy for peacekeeping operations that was on-going concurrently, he argued there were internal limitations to these processes. UN reform processes regularly meet a number of obstacles—turf battles and sticking to established positions—so it was advantageous that the integrated mission discussions were taking place outside the UN in an informal setting (Karlsrud 2013a). Moving the debate to the outside arena and making informal consultations to prepare the discussion on the inside arena helps to avoid politicizing the subject: “It is about fifteen countries in the world that has a continuing and substantive debate about the UN at the domestic level. For other countries it is the delegation to the UN and the MFA that sets the agenda, and often substantive issues will be secondary to other political objectives that the countries want to achieve or espouse at the UN” (E.B. Eide, personal communication, 20 June 2011).

Norway chose to engage in an informal manner and funded consultations and workshops in Beijing, Addis Ababa, Geneva, New York, Johannesburg, and Brussels during 2006 and 2007. The consultations ended with a two-day conference in Oslo in 2007, named *Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations: Trends and Challenges*.⁷ This enabled states to discuss the issues in an informal manner and share their experiences. During the consultations, participation was at times surprisingly high with people from a variety of backgrounds. The consultation in Beijing yielded the somewhat surprising result that China could share its experiences in integrated response to domestic natural crises (J. Leiro, personal communication, 27 June 2011).⁸ Establishing support for the concept of integration on a regional level before starting the policy debate at UN headquarters was essential to the success of the process, according to the interviewees. Establishing support by member states also significantly reduced the chance of the reform effort falling prey to internal turf battles between UN entities.

According to Eide as well as Leiro, the follow-up process was a resounding success. Leiro argued there were only a few countries interested in conceptual change in the UN system and that have diverted resources over time to increase the knowledge about the organization, both in-house as well as to research institutes and think tanks (*Ibid.*). Continued

7. For more about the conference, the agenda, and the participants, visit <http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/selected-topics/un/integratedmissions.html?id=465886>.

8. Leiro was deputy director general, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway, at the time of the interview.

engagement with the topic gave Norway the necessary know-how. This, combined with the relatively large financial contributions that Norway has been giving to various UN entities, and being perceived as a relatively impartial state, positioned Norway to engage itself in policy change processes within the UN. Other countries have since launched similar policy processes with peacekeeping operations as the main focus, but these have been more formal than the follow-up process on integrated missions, according to Leiro (J. Leiro, personal communication, 27 June 2011).⁹

Leiro also argues there is a need for a good network to draw upon the various actors engaged in the issue and that need to contribute to and own the solution. Through engaging these actors and involving them throughout the process, their ownership would be strengthened. Policy, practice, and academia should be involved and could contribute to connecting experiences and knowledge from different institutional backgrounds.

Part of this network was built through the close relationship that had been established over time between the working-level staff in the various organizations. According to Egeland, it was David Harland, then head of DPKO Policy Best Practices Service, and Mark Bowden, who had the equivalent position at UN OCHA Policy Development and Studies Branch, who suggested that Espen Barth Eide at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) should, together with Randolph Kent, be the main authors of the report (J. Egeland, personal communication, 29 May 2011).¹⁰ According to Mark Bowden, Eide was chosen by DPKO. He was then the head of the UN Programme at NUPI and had a string of publications on peacekeeping operations and other UN-related issues (M. Bowden, personal communication, 3 September 2012). Kent had been the HC in Somalia, Kosovo, and Rwanda and knew both Mark Bowden and David Harland from earlier assignments, while he was still part of the UN (R. Kent, personal communication, 7 September 2013). This shows the level of influence that working-level staff has on these kinds of policy processes. They can identify individuals who enjoy credibility among the stakeholders and who are perceived to take into consideration the views of all the actors.

Thus, Norway played a significant role in the institutionalization of the integrated missions concept, taking part in the writing of the *Report on Integrated Missions* with Eide as one of the key authors, having Jan Egeland as the USG for OCHA at the time, and funding the follow-up process, which built more ownership for the concept among member states, practitioners from the humanitarian, development and peacekeeping domains, academic institutions, and think tanks. But they would not have succeeded in institutionalizing the concept without building a policy alliance with the other stakeholders. Arranging regional consultations ensured that sufficient knowledge, as well as ownership, among all stakeholders was established.

However, it is uncertain whether the process may be considered a success. The process of establishing the integrated missions concept was fraught with many challenges. First, many member states did not understand what the reform fuss was all about: “Isn’t that what the UN should be doing anyway?” (UN official, personal communication, 2 October 2012). That the UN should be coordinated and under single control in the field seemed self-evident to most member states.

Second, the fact that integrated missions continue to be run along three separate funding schemes, even when they are integrated, limits the level of actual integration that can be achieved in the field. While a formal integrated structure may be put in place, the reality is that humanitarian agencies still obtain their funding through core funding and pledges to the Consolidated Appeals, development agencies have their separate funding arrangements, and the peacekeeping mission has its budget from the assessed budget of the UN Secretariat. Some mitigating factors are the establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Fund and the pledge

9. The following paragraphs are based on the interview with Leiro. UK and France launched the “New Horizon” process in July 2009, looking at reform of UN peacekeeping operations. For more, see <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/newhorizon.shtml>.

10. The main authors were supported by Anja Kaspersen from NUPI and Karin von Hippel, who had worked with the UN and EU in Somalia and Kosovo.

to fund gaps identified between these actors through the Integrated Strategic Framework, but these sources are small compared to the regular funding streams of humanitarian and development actors.

Third, the actual implementation of the concept on the ground has never managed to realize the spirit of the underlying intentions. As noted, according to one respondent, it “went from a nice idea to a checklist SOP (Standard Operating Procedures) and was caught in the HQ loop, dumbed down to what HQ departments can deal with” (*Ibid.*). Although “integrated planning” in principle sounds very good to all involved, it can easily become a rather pointless and demanding exercise if there is no funding attached to the planning. In recent years, with the implementation of the Integrated Strategic Framework planning process, efforts have been made to link the planning process with funding, creating some incentives to get involved in the planning process. There have been some changes in how operations are structured, but, for the above reasons, these are often only skin deep.

The Contribution of Linked Ecologies to Norm Change

Taking into account the relatively small number of actors involved in advancing the norm of the integrated missions concept, a lingering question would be whether this norm development process is legitimate? Avant et al. have taken agency in global governance as a starting point and looked at who and what classes of actors may be considered “global governors” (Avant et al. 2010). They define global governors as “authorities who exercise power across borders for the purpose of affecting policy” (*Ibid.*: 2) and include NGOs, private companies, states, and international organizations among these authorities. When examining the legitimacy upon which the authority of these actors rest, they find that authority generally has several components, including institutional, delegated, expert, principled, and capacity-based authority (*Ibid.*: 11–14). This article agrees with this classification of various types of authority that global governors may draw upon but would add that authority is intimately dependent on the constituencies that global governors are communicating with and accountable to, which at any given time are multiple and diverse in nature. In the case of integrated missions, the main rationale behind the integrated missions process and the policy alliance driving this process was to make the UN deliver more efficiently and effectively to the countries hosting peacekeeping missions. Member states from the Global South were another set of constituents, perhaps more concerned with whether this process was imposed by Western states. Regional consultations provided a better anchoring of the concept. The humanitarian community felt threatened by the potential securitization and politicization of humanitarian aid that could follow from integrating the management of humanitarian, peacekeeping, and development pillars, and their concerns needed to be heard and accounted for in the process. The legitimacy of the process must consequently be evaluated from the viewpoints of all these groups, and to consult these various constituencies was a key part of the process.

Finally, through the case study it has become clear that the working level is particularly important, something also highlighted in the article by Trettin and Junk in this issue. Individuals on working levels are establishing connections with colleagues. Interaction between different ecologies opens up different perspectives and stimulates the policy debate that percolates up to the state level over time. An officer in the DPKO Policy and Best-Practices Service (PBPS) argued that “academics can analyse issues much more frankly, which allows for provocativeness and frankness. This is helpful for us—it is easier for someone external to say something, and this can be used to start a broader policy dialogue” (UN official, personal communication, 17 June 2011).

The importance of working-level participation was also highlighted by Eide with regards to the consultation that was arranged in Beijing: “Nationally, China had strong integration of their support systems and operations for natural disasters, and they could bring this thinking to the table, especially since they brought working level staff” (E.B. Eide, personal

communication, 20 June 2011). The working-level participation ensures informed discussions and helps avoid the discussions reverting to political and principled positions:

It is crucial for the success of a policy process that long-term relationships are built with people in working level positions. In the case of the integrated missions process, David Harland, as head of the Best Practices Section, Salman Ahmed and David Haeri were key interlocutors at the UN. Traditional politics often focus at the top level, but these individuals seldom have all the knowledge needed to understand the issues and will revert to political positions. (*Ibid.*)

According to Eide, the influence Norway wields on policy processes and norm change processes in the UN is due to a long-term engagement and investment in establishing networks and relationships with working level officials, expertise on the nitty-gritty functioning of the UN, and funding policy research in think tanks that have a proven track record of influencing policy processes:

There are few academic networks within the area of peacekeeping. Norway is engaged and knows who are the important actors. The Norwegian MFA spends much money on think-tanks in the US where policy often originates. In the US think-tanks play a major role as agenda setters as there is a tradition for a leaner government sector. It is also very important to solidly anchor the process in the UN, the process need to be with them and for them, not against them, to be allied to make the UN better. Through such partnerships Norway has the ability to shape UN processes. (*Ibid.*)

Another important factor is that Norway is generally perceived as having little negative political ballast, being a neutral and impartial actor with the main aim of improving how the UN works on the ground. While the goal of a policy change process is often to increase the effectiveness of the organization, the question of legitimacy is always present, and should be addressed through regional consultations where member states have the opportunity to share their opinions in informal settings, and the involvement of working-level staff to make sure that the discussions are substantive and don't revert to political positions.

Even though this case study has exposed significant challenges involved in establishing and implementing the integrated missions concept, I would maintain that it also provides a wealth of material for the study of how norm processes in the UN in general, and UN peacekeeping in particular, proceeded in the period from 2003 to 2007 and has continued today. The key features highlighted here are common to most processes and may provide a fruitful framework for analyzing other processes of norm change.

We have identified at least eight key elements of such a process. First, and most important, the UN links up with other actors or ecologies to expand the knowledge base and create informal alliances of the UN, interested member states, think tanks/research institutes, NGOs, and other concerned actors. Second, in this process, the working level is particularly important, as it is here that the UN bureaucracy links up with external actors who actually drive the process forward. Third, think tanks, research institutes, and NGOs that develop concepts and ideas together with the UN may test out ideas with various constituencies in a way that the UN—vulnerable to member-state sensitivities—cannot. In this manner they may also serve as useful intermediary tools for co-optation of activist groups. Fourth, the revolving doors phenomenon, of staff moving between the different ecologies throughout their careers, creates networks of actors that can ensure speedy transmission and discussion of ideas across ecologies, preparing the ground for informal policy alliances or linked ecologies to be formed and ideas to be developed. Fifth, and closely related to several of the points above, the use of expert teams and high-level panels that has come to characterize most norm-change processes over the past decade has mainstreamed and institutionalized the linking of ecologies, on both working and senior levels, and has become a staple ingredient of such processes. Sixth, regional consultations are essential for grounding ideas, and feeding best practices, inputs, and viewpoints from various regions and countries into the process—this may improve the

chances that the norm in question will not fall victim to political bargaining in New York and may increase the buy-in for the substantive arguments of a particular norm. Seventh, donor countries remain important drivers of norm-change processes because of the funding they provide as well as the institutional and substantive capacity they often bring to bear on a particular issue. Eighth—and this is an enduring point—the environment must be ripe for a norm to proceed, and often there may be only a temporary window of opportunity.

Conclusion

The UN has two main functions: It is an arena where member states meet and establish regimes for global governance, and it is an actor (or indeed several actors) that implements the tasks entrusted to it by member states. This article has tried to nuance and deepen the understanding of how norms are changed in this setting and who are the important actors in this process.

I have demonstrated how existing theories have significant shortcomings in grasping how anomalous behavior may be theorized and how norms are formed in the international system. The sociology of professions can augment constructivist theory to account for how other actors affect norm formation in organizations.

As has been demonstrated, the UN is reliant on donors, think tanks, and academic institutions to develop and implement reform processes. This gives these actors a more central role than previously argued in the evolution or codification processes of norms in the UN. In the process of advancing the integrated missions concept, it was underscored by the Norwegian diplomats that they were successful because they, as one of a handful of states, had invested time and resources in acquiring knowledge about the UN as an organization and wanted to improve how it was working through relatively low-visibility reform efforts. Another important factor was engaging with member states through informal regional consultations to build knowledge and ownership to avoid that the reform process should fall victim to political horse-trading at the UN headquarters.

In the article, the UN has been described as a competitive arena on two levels, with a focus on process. First, looking at the preparation phase of advancing norm change, I studied the process of the integrated missions study and the following regional consultations, allowing for framing of the issue and building knowledge and ownership around the concept. This improved the chances to advance the integrated missions concept on the arena of the UN in New York, where states formally discuss issues of common concern, and establish and modify rules guiding the operations of the organization. In this manner, I have also added conceptual depth to the arena concept as understood in international relations.

The main rationale behind the integrated missions norm process and the policy alliance driving this process was to enable the UN to deliver more efficiently and effectively to the countries hosting peacekeeping missions. Member states were a further set of constituents, perhaps more concerned with whether this process was something imposed by the West. Regional consultations provided for a better anchoring of the concept in national Ministries of Foreign Affairs before moving to discussions between member states at the UN headquarters in New York and implementation in the field. The humanitarian community was uneasy about the potential securitization and politicization of humanitarian aid that could follow from integrating the management of humanitarian, peacekeeping, and development pillars, and these concerns needed to be heard and accounted for in the process. The legitimacy of the process must be evaluated from the viewpoints of all these groups, so consulting these various constituencies was a key part of the process. The integrated missions study noted frequent turf battles as a constraint to integration and the inability of the system to solve this problem on their own (Eide et al. 2005: 18). The choice to arrange regional consultations stemmed from a wish to circumvent spoiling, bureaucratic turf battles between various UN entities at UN headquarters in New York, Geneva, and elsewhere, and build knowledge and consensus with member states to avoid political horse-trading where substantive issues may well fall prey to political positions.

The issue of legitimacy has also been discussed, considering that this view on norm development and change involves informal policy alliances who advance their ideas partially outside of the UN. However, as Eide also argues, the timing of furthering a new norm is key to success; there has to be a certain ripeness for the issue to stick to the agenda and be accepted by the stakeholders: “The timeliness of the initiative was important, there was ripeness in terms of most actors seeing a need for change in the UN system. Norway worked into this stream and tried to steer it rather than oppose it” (E.B. Eide, personal communication, 20 June 2011). If the timeliness and ripeness is not in place, the counter pressures will be sufficiently strong to silence and stop the advancement of a new norm.

The role of working-level officials, practitioners, and researchers who link up and exchange views on an issue is under-researched and under-theorized (Felix da Costa and Karlsrud 2013; Karlsrud 2013b; Schia and Karlsrud 2013). Various theory approaches have investigated the role of NGOs but without systematically identifying how several other classes of actors also engage in norm-change processes and how these ecologies interact with each other, particularly at the working level. The UN relies on donors, think tanks, and academic institutions to develop policy and analysis capacity. This gives these actors a role in the processes of norm evolution and codification in the UN that is more central than previously argued. Linked ecologies, often through the working level, act as powerful drivers of change in the UN system. Various factors working together are important for the success of a policy process: consultations with substantive input and discussion, ripeness of the topic, and political and personal contacts. And here, human agency should not be underestimated. The ability of working-level officials to have agency in norm change processes also supports the overall argument of this issue.

In sum, there is a need for a more pluralistic and complex understanding of norm development in IOs, “foregrounding agency” to illuminate what “functional and structural accounts obscure” (Avant et al. 2010: 370). While there are clearly many examples of dysfunctions, pathologies, and organized hypocrisy, there are also instances of practical innovation to achieve change and bend existing rules. States are not the only actors. NGOs, academic institutions, think tanks, sections within the UN, and powerful individuals are active constituents and guardians of the values of the organization.

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