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Contact Information

UN Studies Association, c/o coconets, Hannoversche Str. 2, 10115 Berlin, Germany
David M. Kennedy Center for International Studies
Brigham Young University, Provo, UT 84602, USA

E-mail: editors@journal-iostudies.org  Web: http://www.journal-iostudies.org
ISSN 2191-2556 (print)  ISSN 2191-2564 (online)
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ISSN 2191-2564 (online)
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## REVIEW

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Peter Kotzian is an assistant professor at the University of Düsseldorf and studied social sciences at the University of Mannheim, where he received his doctorate for a thesis on public-private negotiation systems in the European pharmaceutical sector and the integration of national pharmaceutical markets by means of EU policies. Kotzian’s research interests include comparative institutional analysis and comparative research methods. He has worked on public support for social and political institutions, as well as the roles of civil society actors in international governance.

Beate Kohler-Koch is professor emeritus of political science at the University of Mannheim and the project director at the Mannheim Centre for European Social Research (MZES). Kohler-Koch has been coordinating the EU-funded Network of Excellence CONNEX on “Efficient and Democratic Governance in a Multi-Level Europe” and also coordinated the DFG-funded Priority Program on “Governance in the European Union.” Her current research interests are European governance and civil society organizations (see Kohler, B., & Quittkat, C. (2013). De-Mystification of Participatory Democracy. EU Governance and Civil Society, Oxford University Press) and business lobbying in the EU.

Bessma Momani is an associate professor at the University of Waterloo and Balsillie School of International Affairs, a senior fellow at the Center for International Governance Innovation, and a 2015 fellow at the Pierre Elliott Trudeau Foundation. Momani has authored and co-edited eight books and sixty scholarly, peer-reviewed journal articles and book chapters that examine the International Monetary Fund (IMF), economic liberalization throughout the Arab Gulf and the Middle East, and Arab youth.

Mark Hibben is an assistant professor of political science at Saint Joseph’s College of Maine. Hibben’s research is focused on the IMF and low income countries (LICs) has been recently published in the Journal of International Relations and Development. His book forthcoming in 2016, Poor States, Power, and the Politics of IMF Reform, examines what drives cases of IMF LIC reform in the post Washington Consensus period. Hibben’s current research investigates how the IMF’s support of the new sustainable development goals could reshape its relationship with LICs. At Saint Joseph’s College, he teaches courses on international relations and globalization.

Rafael Biermann is professor and chair of international relations at the Friedrich Schiller University Jena in Germany. Biermann has previously taught at the Naval Postgraduate School and served in the German Ministry of Defense and chancellor’s office. He is co-editor of the forthcoming Palgrave Handbook on Inter-Organizational Relations and author of Years of Trial in Kosovo: Failure of International Crisis Prevention before the Outbreak of War, published by Ferdinand Schöningh in 2006 (in German).


Susanne Lütz holds the Chair for International Political Economy at the Otto-Suhr Institute for Political Science at the Freie University in Berlin. Previously, Lütz was a professor of
regulation and governance at the Open University Hagen (2001–08) and research fellow at
the Max-Planck Institute for the Study of Societies in Cologne (1993–2001). She has pub-
lished extensively on problems of regulation, particularly focused on finance and corporate
governance, in both a comparative and multilevel perspective. Currently, Lütz is conducting
a research project on the Troika-debtor government interaction in European credit lending.
Her latest publications include the special issue of the *Review of International Political
Economy* titled “Back to the Future? The Domestic Sources of Transatlantic Regulation”
(2011) and “The European Rescue of the Washington Consensus? EU and IMF Lending to
Central and Eastern European Countries” with Matthias Kranke (2014).

Bob Reinalda is a senior researcher at Radboud University in Nijmegen, Netherlands. Rein-
alda has published the *Routledge History of International Organizations: From 1815 to the
Present Day* (2009) and has edited the *Ashgate Research Companion to Non-State Actors*
(2011), as well as the *Routledge Handbook of International Organization* (2013). He is an edi-
tor of *IO BIO, Biographical Dictionary of Secretaries-General of International Organizations*
(www.ru.nl/fm/iobio).
Holding International Governance to Account: Do Civil Society Organizations Have a Chance to Exert Accountability?

by Peter Kotzian, University of Düsseldorf, and Beate Kohler-Koch, University of Mannheim

In a growing number of domains, international organizations shape the daily life of citizens, but how can citizens make sure that decisions are made in their interest? Civil society organizations have come into focus as intermediaries holding international organizations accountable. Accountability is widely considered to be a key element in international good governance, making sure an international organization carries out its mission to the best advantage of all stakeholders. This paper explores whether the necessary prerequisites for exerting accountability are met: Do international organizations provide the necessary information and are they open to evaluations and dialogue so that civil society organizations may review their activities and pass judgment? Our findings are based on an empirical survey comparing twenty-eight international organizations and twenty-one directorates-general of the EU. The results are mixed. While international organizations and the EU are in principle and in practice ready to provide information, to undergo evaluations, and to engage in dialogue, the overall constellation is frequently such that an effective review of their activities is difficult.

Introduction: Civil Society Organizations as Creators and Facilitators of Accountability

The spread of global governance and the deepening of European integration have increasingly raised concerns over an erosion of democracy. Theories of associational and deliberative democracy presented convincing arguments that civil society, embodied in civil society organizations (CSOs), can make a decisive contribution to render international governance more democratic (Bohman 1999; Kuper 2004). Whereas research on global governance was early on interested in the role of CSOs in public accountability (Scholte 2004), the focus in EU studies has been mainly on CSO participation (Della Sala and Ruzza 2007; Steffek and Nanz 2008). Empirical research has provided ample evidence that CSO participation falls short of democratizing international governance (Tallberg and Uhlin 2012; Kohler-Koch and Quittkat 2013). So is it more realistic to expect that CSOs will be successful in improving at least the accountability of international organizations (IOs), which is regarded as a main pillar for democratic governance? This paper presents a first evaluation based on empirical findings using a large-N comparative study.

The paper does not delve into the vast literature on accountability debating the many manifestations of accountability, the variations in purpose, and in form and substance (Lindberg 2013; Bovens, Goodin, and Schillemans 2014) but rather starts from the parsimonious concept of accountability suggested by Bovens (2007) and the widely shared opinion that information and evaluation are essential to clarify responsibilities. The paper explicates the potential role of CSOs in public accountability and draws attention to the necessary organizational preconditions. It develops criteria and indicators to test empirically whether or not these preconditions are met by scrutinizing the statutory provisions and respective policies of...
IOs. Findings are based on a comparative evaluation of forty-nine organizations with functional specific competences. About half of these IOs belong to the UN family; the other half is constituted by EU directorates-general (DGs) in charge of corresponding policy domains. We want to know when and how IOs provide information and communicate with CSOs in a way to enable CSOs to exert accountability.

Accountability in International Governance

International governance is highly valued as an effective response to problems transcending national borders, but it creates problems of accountability that undermine democratic legitimacy. The pooling of decisions at the international level is spreading responsibilities, and the delegation of powers to international organizations is tantamount to the delegation of decision making to actors, who are neither elected (and thus cannot be voted out of office) nor are under public scrutiny (Vibert 2007). In international governance, the (electoral) chain of delegation from citizens to decision-makers is longer than in any other political setting and both the incentives for and the capacities of citizens to get informed and take action are less pronounced. All this raises the question of how to assure that institutions of international governance, and notably the IOs’ bureaucracy, act in line with citizens’ preferences, given the well-known fact that agents more often than not tend to follow their own agenda (Le Grand 2003).

The democratic accountability of IOs is a persistent subject of international relations studies. Goodhart (2011:45) distinguishes three approaches. The “pessimists,” as he calls them, follow Dahl (1999), arguing that in the absence of a taken-for-granted demos, democratic accountability beyond the state is impossible; “cosmopolitans” imagine a new kind of demos constituted by all stakeholders affected by international policy decisions that ought to be empowered through cosmopolitan institutions (Held 2004; Held and Koenig-Archibugi 2004; Koenig-Archibugi 2010); “pluralists” (Keohane and Nye 2003; Grant and Keohane 2005) agree with the pessimists that the familiar notions of democratic accountability do not work in the international arena but argue that we can design mechanisms that can effectively curb the abuse of power. Accordingly, accountability is a constant theme in the organizational design of IOs (see Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001; Koppell 2010), and a multitude of approaches have been developed and tested to render international governance more accountable. They range from mechanisms of managerial accountability (Kingsbury and Stewart 2008; Kuyama and Fowler 2009; Koppell 2010; Wouters, Hachez, and Schmitt 2011) to arrangements that are more promising in terms of reaching out to the public (Goodhart 2014: 296–300). Further, the deficiencies and the dilemmas of accountability, in particular at the international level, have been widely addressed (see for many Buchanan and Keohane 2006; Ebrahim and Weisband 2007; Ferejohn 2007).

In contrast to many studies on principal-agent relations in private or national public governance, the emphasis in international accountability studies is not on hard sanctions like disciplinary measures. Rather, the international accountability approach pays special attention to the social dimension of control. It has been convincingly argued that accountable behavior in international governance is not (and cannot be) induced by threats and pressure. Rather, the idea is that it has to be achieved by creating a social relationship between the agent and the principal and by establishing a normative disposition, a soft constraint on the agent inducing compliance. The agent’s behavior is not only about avoiding sanctions, which in no way would be sufficient to achieve optimal outcomes on behalf of the principal, but also about “pro-social behavior” (see Le Grand 2003). Accountability, in terms of an agent perceiving himself as accountable to some other actor, so the argument goes, improves the quality of decisions and actions, in that the agent identifies himself with the principal, anticipates possible reservations, and critique of the latter (Tetlock 2002: 455). Accountability, conceptualized as social phenomenon (Weisband and Ebrahim 2007: 2) is still consistent with the basic concept of accountability, but it is blurring the line between participation and accountability and makes an empirical assessment difficult. Even though we acknowledge that the “social-
behavior approach” is providing new valuable insights, we follow Goodin (2003: 361) and opt for assuming a critical distance between the actors who exert accountability and those who are held accountable.

The promises and pitfalls of CSOs as agents of public accountability and democratizing international governance has attracted wide scholarly attention both in global (for many see Bexell, Tallberg, and Uhlin 2010) and in EU governance (Kohler-Koch and Quittkat 2013). They have been conceptualized as “transmission belts” (Steffek and Nanz 2008) or as key actors in “surrogate accountability” (Rubenstein 2007). Whereas many authors have lauded the democratic potential of CSOs (for many see Macdonald 2008), critics have raised concern especially on the ground that they lack accountability and are susceptible to being used strategically in an IO’s accountability management (see Kohler-Koch 2010).

For years accountability was “an ever-expanding concept” (Mulgan 2000), and a recent meta-analysis of empirical studies reaches the conclusion that “considerable variation remains in conceptualizations and measurement strategies of accountability” (Biela forthcoming). Nevertheless, authors agree that a “minimal conceptual consensus” has emerged (Bovens, Schillemans, and Goodin 2014). It corresponds to the concept originally developed by Bovens (2007: 450) and is expressed in the definition of accountability as “a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgement, and the actor may face consequences” (Bovens, Curtin, and t’Hart 2010: 35). Based on this definition, Bovens, Curtin, and t’Hart have developed a parsimonious analytical framework that we used as guideline for our empirical research.

CSOs as Guardians of Accountability?
Accountability exerted by intermediaries is of highest importance when public scrutiny is at its lowest. Even in domestic politics, governmental routine politics, and decision making are below the radar of public scrutiny. This is true even for most of the day-to-day activities of IOs, which explains the demand for societal actors tracking IOs on a more permanent basis. From this perspective, we ask: What can be the contribution of CSOs to holding institutions, bodies, and actors of international governance accountable?

Accountability in international governance is about keeping governing in line with people’s preferences. We suggest differentiating two objectives: 1) linking governance to the people in terms of assuring that governance institutions do what citizens want and refrain from doing what citizens do not want, and 2) that the institutions pursue their remits with success. According to a parsimonious model, international democratic governance is achieved by political delegation, an electoral chain reaching from citizens, via parliaments/governments, to the IO. However, with amalgamating levels of governance and the multiplication of actors, accountability is usually no longer assured by hierarchical chains of delegation (see Agné 2007 or Hupe and Edwards 2012).

CSOs are seen to have two supplementing roles in this setting, complementing the formal chain of control and accountability running via the political route of elected governments:

First, CSOs provide input to international governance, they pass on information from citizens to decision-makers about what citizens want, and they also inform citizens about the IO and its activities in order to allow them to form preferences, as suggested by the transmission belt concept by Steffek and Nanz (2008). A wealth of research, typically under the label of lobbying studies, has been accumulated that, both theoretically and empirically, deals with how CSOs try to influence IOs, what instruments CSOs use, and how successful CSOs are in having an impact (see Price 2003; Dür 2008; Tallberg 2010; Fries and Walkenhorst 2011; Klüver 2013).

Second, the focus of our paper, CSOs may also hold IOs accountable for their decisions or lack thereof, enhancing the formal “accountability” through the conventional chain of elec-
toral delegation. In this function, CSOs contribute to keep agents of international governance in line with their remit and induce them to make every effort to achieve their aims. The potential role of CSOs arises here from the fact that while citizens are “far away” and rationally uninformed, CSOs are closer, more persistent, and better informed to evaluate the actions of the IO. The idea underlying the disciplining impact of CSOs is that they make IOs aware that someone knowledgeable is watching, someone who might alert the public or other actors, which in turn might have a formal control and the option for sanctioning the IO (see Le Grand 2003). Apart from formal or implicit threats of “whistleblowing,” there is a notable peer group effect arising from CSO involvement. The idea is that the very fact of being watched, of having to explain and justify decisions, activities (or inactivity), in front of an informed audience, increases effort and quality of the actions by an agent. Arguably, this is of particular relevance when the IO bureaucracy engages in a continuous dialogue with CSOs. To summarize our conception: CSOs have a strong role in holding IOs accountable 1) when the CSOs are informed about what the IO does, either because the IO gives the information or because the CSOs can demand and receive the information and 2) when the CSOs may pass judgment on the IO, either because the CSOs are engaged in an established dialogue with the IO or the CSOs have other means to pass judgment, such as addressing the public or whistleblowing to member states.

This conception of the role of CSOs does not assign them a formal role in the chain of accountability linking IOs and citizens. Nor do we presume that CSOs are per se democratically or morally legitimized. CSOs may play a dubious role in instances of stakeholder management and population shaping (see Cullen 2005; Tallberg 2010; Liese 2010), where IOs foster a population of co-opted, even dependent CSOs, to manufacture the appearance of civic involvement. Our aim is not to scrutinize the quality of accountability or its effect on IO policy or performance, which is hard to assess even in case studies based on thick description and process tracing. Nor do we aim at a general evaluation of CSOs’ contribution to democratizing international governance or try to assess the democratic legitimacy of the CSOs themselves on this subject (see Collingwood and Logister 2005). Rather, we look for evidence that CSOs can fulfill this role, while keeping in mind that their ability depends on certain preconditions. Accordingly, we concentrate on the preconditions enabling CSOs to hold IOs accountable in the way outlined above. Given that we aim at comparing a larger sample of IOs, we focus on preconditions embodied in organizational features that are relatively easy to survey: 1) the provision of information, which can be used by any CSO, critical as well as co-opted ones, and 2) the establishment of a dialogue with CSOs. Based on information provided by IOs and their own permanent scrutiny, CSOs, in particular when they are engaged in an established dialogue with the IO, make the IOs aware that they are scrutinized, and thus create a “climate of accountability” (Chouinard 2013).

We begin by presenting factors that we expect to affect the organizational preconditions on the part of the IOs and the organizational features of CSOs that set the terms for being successful in demanding accountability. The following section gives the operationalizations and empirical data on the levels and factors influencing the preconditions granted by IOs, and the last section concludes.

Factors Having an Impact on the Preconditions for Accountability

IOs have a strong position in shaping accountability relations and their transparency (see Grigorescu 2007 for an empirical study on IO transparency and its causes). Their primary obligation is giving account and information to member states. Many other actors may also pressure an IO to give account, but the degree to which an IO accounts for its activities (or inactivity), engages in explanations and justifications, and in relation to whom, is largely up to the IO. One assumption underlying both the agency approach and the accountability approach is that the IO staff is self-interested, striving for autonomy, and does not want to be held accountable or
be scrutinized. IO staff will always prefer to act independently, and thus, will give an account only if and when deemed appropriate and useful or considered to be unavoidable. Giving account is something that comes neither natural nor easy to IOs (see Le Grand 2003; Zweifel 2006; Vibert 2007). Accordingly, our question is: what factors may explain the readiness of a specific IO to be open to the scrutiny of a third party? Based on the broader literature on cooperation of CSOs and IOs (see Martens 2005; Liese 2010; Steffek 2010, 2013; Tallberg 2010) and factors explaining IO transparency (Grigorescu 2007). We propose to distinguish factors originating in (a) The Institutional Setting of the IO, (b) The Distinct Properties of the Policy Field, (c) The Tasks and Activities of the IO, (d) The Properties of the CSOs, and (e) The Structure of the CSO Population Tracking the IO.

Institutional Setting of the IO

The first argument is that the institutional structure and the context of an IO influences the setting of accountability relations. The legal framework and statutes constitute internal systems of checks and balances and also determine the tension between autonomy and accountability in relation to external actors. The formal legal framework may force the IO to render account, i.e., to give information and explain its activities to members and maybe also to CSOs. Equally important are rules governing the practical implementation of information provision. Institutional rules may encourage and legitimize CSOs to demand an account although accountability may not be formally institutionalized in the IO’s constitution. This holds true, for example, in the case of the EU. The new provisions of the Lisbon Treaty (Title II, Art. 11) do not formally obligate EU institutions to render account to CSOs, but the requirement that EU institutions ought to engage in an open dialogue with representative associations and civil society gives CSOs a strong leverage to ask for accountability. CSOs may also profit from provisions for internal checks as it provides opportunities to bring transgressions to the attention of controlling institutions and in some highly institutionalized settings, typically at the national level, CSOs may resort to legal action (see Hilson 2002).

Our first hypothesis is that—ceteris paribus—EU institutions are more open to granting necessary preconditions for accountability because of the EU’s denser regulatory network of rules on CSO participation and in particular the legal entitlements for societal actors.

The Policy Field of the IO

The conventional wisdom that “policies determine politics” (Lowi 1972) and recent research has confirmed that policy-related factors are strong determinants for IO–CSO interaction (Klüver, Braun, and Beyers 2015). IOs are in charge of policy issues that differ significantly in terms of public relevance, international visibility, and political controversies. However, even issues of high political relevance do not necessarily attract public attention. Rather, the international visibility of an IO arises from the polarization of an issue. Policy fields are subject to attention and media cycles and are thus under changing public scrutiny. CSOs can benefit from high levels of awareness when calling an IO to be accountable, and they can also strive for raising publicity by engaging in international public campaigns (De Bruycker and Beyers 2015). It is interesting to note that IOs are increasingly sensitive to their public appearance, which makes them vulnerable to public contestation especially when it draws intense media coverage. This induces pro-active behavior in the provision of information, albeit only in policy fields where there is a public audience. In some policy fields the activities of an IO are shielded from the public eye by the technical complexity of its work; this is particularly true in the case of economic regulation concerning standard setting or market access.

Our second hypothesis is that IOs are less inclined to fulfill preconditions for accountability when active in economic policies than in policy fields more visible to the public and the media. As policy fields, we compared economics, environment, social issues, and development, and we hypothesized that the level of accountability granted is lower in the domain of economic policy.
Tasks of the IO

IOs are, irrespective of their specific policy field, entrusted with quite different tasks. Depending on the nature of the task, an IO benefits to varying extents from the input and cooperation of CSOs. IOs and CSOs are typically in an exchange relation that sometimes is so close that the IO regards CSO participation as a matter of “working together” with corresponding consequences for their accountability relation (Wolff 2013: 235pp). Accordingly, the readiness of an IO to create favorable conditions for accountability should differ with its tasks. We selected tasks that differ in profile and put the focus on those that are, in our sample, the most frequent ones, namely regulating (19 IOs), monitoring (5), implementing (17), and coordinating (4) (for a similar though slightly deviating typology, see Koppell 2014: 372). Even though we run the risk of oversimplification, we attributed only one task to each IO choosing the one that is most characteristic for its profile.

Regulatory IOs typically affect a range of societal and public actors with their policies. Even where the ultimate decision remains with the states, IOs have a role in informing decisions, providing information, problem analysis, and impact assessment. Thus, regulatory IOs are in need of information, usually from those subjected to the regulations, i.e., most often societal actors. This makes IOs more information-friendly and open to communication, paving the way for intensive accountability relations.

IOs in charge of monitoring agreements also require information but of a different kind and on a different footing. As most infringements of agreements hurt some actor directly, it is in the interest of the latter to bring the infringement to the IO’s notice. The IO does not need to give information in exchange for receiving a complaint. Consequently, the preconditions for accountability are more restricted.

When the main task of an IO is implementing projects, the relationship with and the reliance on external, societal actors may be higher for two complementing reasons. First, implementation on the ground makes IOs dependent on societal actors for project execution as the IO usually does not have the staff to do so. Dependence on CSOs is high, and we would expect an IO to maintain close communication, which then furthers accountability. Second, project implementation is closely linked to the distribution of funds and one can expect that all potential recipients and their CSO advocates have an interest in watching the IO closely and pressure for relevant information and evaluation. In particular, the argument on the IOs need of information also applies for regulatory IOs, which we would expect to be similar to implementing ones.

IOs that are primarily coordinating the activities of states are less dependent on CSOs as the predominant actors are the states and the functions of the IO are that of a forum. The actors actually in charge of policies are the member states, lowering the requirement for the IO to provide information and evaluation to a broader public.

Our third hypothesis is that IOs with the task of monitoring or coordinating are more restrictive in handing out information and engaging in dialogue, so the preconditions for accountability are not as good as in the case of IOs tasked with regulatory or implementing functions.

Properties of CSOs

Holding decision-makers in international politics accountable is a matter of interest and capacity, be the latter formal or informal. CSOs act in the interest of their members and/or have a mission they want to pursue. While some “cause groups” are directly committed to issues of international accountability and public responsibility of IOs, most CSOs engage in holding an IO accountable, because inadequate performance would harm their own or their constituents’ interests (see Kellow 2002; Martens 2005; Willetts 2011, for typologies and systematizations of NGO by their properties and activities at the international level). CSOs’ capacity to do so depends both on their resources and on the provision of information and explanation on the part of the IO (Steffek 2013). Drawing from theories of international interest interme-
diation (Bouwen 2004), we can assume that properties of the CSO have a strong impact on IO–CSO accountability relations. CSOs differ in their capacity to build up pressure and their ability to evaluate and judge the performance of an IO. They dispose of different organizational resources, levels of expert knowledge, influence on constituencies in society and overall political weight and last, but not least, their capacity to harm the IO by interrupting the mutually beneficial cooperation. We are well aware from our own empirical research that the equation of strong CSOs with groups representing focused economic interests, a group we denote for lack of a better word as “business,” and weak CSOs with NGOs of the norms- and value-based type is an oversimplification. Nevertheless, it is a fair though rough approximation to reality.

Our fourth hypothesis is that IOs dealing with CSO populations dominated by well-organized and resourceful CSOs, representing focused material interests, “business” will be more open to provide the necessary preconditions for accountability than IOs dealing with CSO populations dominated by NGOs of the norms- and value-based type.

The Structure of the CSO Population

IOs face a different structural constellation of the CSO population, and this may have an impact on their readiness to engage in a well-functioning accountability relation and to provide the necessary prerequisites.

The population of CSOs tracking an IO may be fragmented, representing a wide range of interests and views, unable to take a unitary stance vis-à-vis the IO. The position of the CSOs may also be concentrated given that the CSOs engaging with the IO are more or less having the same concerns, confronting the IO with a unified position. Notably in labor policy and social policy, and also in environmental policy, the CSO population engaging with the IO has a bipolar structure with opposing coalitions. Also other policy fields are characterized by cleavage structures and, more often than not, contested issues will relate to long-standing political cleavages entrenched in well-organized interests. When opposing interests are highly organized and, above all, make for a bipolar structure of conflict constellation it is more likely that IOs are exposed to stringent scrutiny. This obviously is the case in labor relations, but also concerning conflicts about environmental issues and, more recently, about public health. The situation is quite different when the IO’s activities affect diffuse general interests and when these interests are hardly organized and at best are represented in pluralist, overlapping structures.

Our fifth hypothesis states that IOs dealing with bipolar or concentrated interests will provide more information than IOs dealing with diffuse, fragmented interests.

Explanatory Variables

Having identified factors with varying impacts on the preconditions of accountability, we now proceed to operationalize our explanatory variables. It entails features of the IO as the actor having to give an account and features of the CSOs as the actors demanding an account. To capture the effect of variations in the substance of policies, the scope of activities, and the institutional setting, we compared EU institutions across specific policy areas with those of UN institutions operating in the same policy fields:

a) The Institutional Setting of the IO. As to the institutional setting of the IO, we distinguish primarily EU and UN institutions, arguing that in the EU context, the roles and rights of CSOs are stronger in substance and more firmly institutionalized thanks to the more participatory governance regime of the European Commission and the most recent revision of the EU treaty (Title II, Art. 11 EU Treaty of Lisbon). Nonetheless, the factual usage of the entitlements differs greatly among DGs. In the UN context and in most of its special organizations, the role of the CSOs is, at least formally, much less institutionalized and much less substantive. The variable institutional setting is coded as UN, EU, or stand-alone IOs.
b) The Distinct Properties of the Policy Field. Regarding the tasks of the IOs, the IOs in our sample are classified according to their main function: coordinating, implementing, regulative, or monitoring. Though we are well aware that IOs mostly have several tasks, we treat them as if they were unitary actors. Otherwise, the attempt to cover the activities of each issue specific unit of the IO would multiply the required data collection, effectively rendering our effort unfeasible.

c) The Tasks and Activities of the IO. The policy field was assigned according to the predominant theme of the IO: environment, development, social issues, or economics.

Regarding CSOs as the actors demanding accountability, we use the following features to describe the constellation:

d) The Properties of the CSOs. Properties of CSOs and stakeholder type—we distinguish between groups defending the economic interests of their members, such as trade associations, professional associations, and trade unions which we labeled “business,” and CSOs which claim to be rights- and value-based and to defend the concerns of “weak interests” we labeled “NGO.” The classification was based on the declared purpose of the CSO.

e) The Structure of the CSO Population Tracking the IO. This refers to the cleavages among societal actors in the field of the IO’s main activities. Societal actors engaging with the IO may be motivated by the same interest and speak to the IO with one voice or have overlapping or even opposing interests. We distinguish the following three constellations:

• Concentrated interests denotes a constellation where, despite different organizations, the demands of the core actors add up to a consistent policy request.

• Diffuse interests is when different organizations demand a mix of at times overlapping but at times also differing and opposing policies from the IO.

• Bipolar interest structure is when two coalitions of interest confront each other, as is mostly the case between employers and trade unions in the field of labor policy or between environmental organizations and industry in environmental policy.

The empirical differentiation is based on the analysis of conflict constellations in EU consultations in an earlier project (Democratic Legitimacy via Civil Society Involvement?, see Kohler-Koch and Quittkat 2013).

**Case Selection**

Given the multitude of IOs a full sample is beyond the reach of a comparative study. For this reason, the sample was chosen in a way that allows statements about the explanatory factors, by making sure there is sufficient variation in the sample regarding these factors (see for the underlying research design King, Keohane, and Verba 1994: 134pp). Starting from the EU as a template of organizations, which share a common legal framework but highly different structures and processes in the policy fields covered, we supplemented the EU directorates with the thematically corresponding UN organizations. This way we could analyze the potential effect of the UN and the EU setting and of the various policy fields and tasks associated with the IOs. The selection was complemented by three stand-alone IOs, NATO, OECD, and OSCE, serving as a reference group. Our quantitative comparative study covers in total forty-nine international organizations: twenty-one operative DGs of the EU, twenty-five special organizations of the UN system with a similar thematic profile, and three stand-alone organizations (see appendix for the IOs covered).

**Measuring Preconditions of Accountability**

How can we measure whether favorable conditions for an effective accountability relation are in place? For our operationalization, we start out from the conception of Mark Bovens (2007) and focus on the organizational preconditions of accountability. As stated above, the first
and most basic precondition for accountability is the **provision of information** (Lord and Pollak 2010). The second is **evaluation**, which implies, above all, open access to the IO’s internal and external evaluations, which usually provide the kind of information that is of utmost importance to pass judgment on the IO’s activities. The third is the **establishment of a dialogue** where CSOs can pose questions to the IO, utter critique, and pass judgment directly, a setting where the IO engages in a communication with CSOs about its activities, performance, and achievements.

While these organizational preconditions do not guarantee accountability, their absence deprives CSOs, especially those critical and at distance to the IO, of their chance to exert accountability. When lacking information and the possibility to engage with the IO, CSOs cannot hold an IO accountable. Hence, it is unnecessary to expand our analysis to the other key element in Bovens’ definition of accountability, namely whether or not an actor may face consequences. For the purpose of this paper, the preconditions of accountability are measured by the degree to which the IO:

a) informs about decisions and actions, and how these relate to the IO’s aims,  
b) provides evaluations concerning the degree to which the IO has achieved its aims, and  
c) installs settings and procedures bringing the IO and CSOs into dialogue.

How can the organizational pre-conditions of accountability be operationalized in a way to distinguish degrees across a larger and heterogeneous sample of IOs?

ad a) Information, the core element in effective accountability, can be measured by the detail and quality in which information is provided: Are aims and working plans, which can serve as a yardstick for achievement, published in advance? Does the IO report on the usage of funds? Even if such documents exist, they may be classified and only accessible to member states. For example, some IOs and some DGs in the EU publish little information about what they are currently doing, let alone what they want to do and how they intend to pursue their targets. An observer can hardly assess whether the IO is on track. By withholding information, these institutions prohibit the informational precondition of accountability.

ad b) Accountability is also about reporting achievements (or the lack thereof) and evaluating how decisions and actions taken contribute to achieving the aims of the IO, be they operational or regulatory. Does the IO report on problems encountered during implementation and the degree to which it achieved its aims? Is achievement measured in a valid way, is the IO even evaluated by an independent third party? Does the IO refer to performance indicators and benchmarks?

ad c) An accountability relation between IOs and CSOs differs from formal and legally binding accountability procedures as established in IO–member-state relations. Rather, it takes the form of peer pressure and public scrutiny; either with the CSO commenting on the IO from the outside, or, presumably more effective, by a dialogue between the IO and the CSO. This dialogue may range from a situation in which the IO retains unilateral control over the discourse, stating its views while avoiding critical questions, to a genuine discourse in which the IO calls for evaluations and comments and engages in explaining and justifying its decisions. It is important whether the CSOs can raise issues and ask questions and whether such a dialogue is a routine affair so that IO staff is aware that it will have to explain and justify its activities on a regular basis.

Based on these considerations, we used the following list of indicators to conduct an Internet search of the IO web sites, screening them for whether the information specified was available.

**Indicators of the Extent of Information Given**

The first set of indicators concerns information about substantive activities of the IO, e.g., policies and activities, money spent, and plans for future activities.
Annual Reports—Does the IO publish general or specific annual activity reports? Thus, providing information about past activities, which allows for detecting if the activities are in line with the remit of the IO.

Working plans/Management plans—Is the IO giving information about its future activities, how the IO wants to tackle the tasks at hand, how and for what purpose it wants to spend the money, so that the public and CSOs can check for the appropriateness and the plausibility of the working plans?

Financial Information—Does the IO inform about the sources and the use of financial resources available? For instance, by way of a detailed budget.

**Indicators for Evaluation of Programs and Policies**

Evaluating activities is a critical source of information for holding actors accountable; therefore, we screened for whether there is an evaluation of the policies and decisions taken by the IO.

Evaluation may be organized internally, e.g., by a specialized department formally in charge of evaluating the activities of the other departments. Evaluation may also be outsourced to third parties (and is then typically performed by contractors, like universities or consultancies), while some IOs have both, EvaluationInternal and EvaluationExternal.

EvaluationReports—In order to hold an actor accountable, evaluation reports must be publicly available and should be easily accessible.

PerformanceIndicators—Passing judgment is easier when the IO does not just give a descriptive report but provides data and, if possible, refers to performance indicators for measuring progress or the lack thereof.

**Indicators of a Dialogue between CSO and the IO**

The establishment of a dialogue is measured here by the following organizational features.

EvaluationCSO—Does the IO involve CSOs in the evaluation? For instance, by asking them how they evaluate the activities of the IO or where they see progress or problems.

CSOInstitutionalized—Is there a constitutional role for CSOs stated in the charta of the IO? Or is there a document stating that CSOs have a role and how the interaction between the IO and CSOs will be handled? This institutionalization varies. A case of strong institutionalization is given when CSOs are members of a committee and when the composition and recruitment are formally settled in an official document (for instance the Trade Contact Group of DG Trade), whereas less institutionalized forms are documents defining when and how CSOs might get a certain status enabling them to attend meetings or conferences.

CSOConsultations—Does the IO consult at all with CSOs? The ways to do so are manifold. At first, we just want to establish whether or not some regular consultation processes exist, whatever the form.

CSOConferences and CSOWorkshops—Does the IO hold conferences/workshops with CSOs to consult about activities (new programs, strategies, or evaluation of programs or policies)? Contrary to other forms of consultation where CSOs may only submit statements, the direct encounter allows for a dialogue where CSOs can utter critique and confront the IOs in a direct way.

CSOAgendaQuestions—Are CSOs in the course of consultation allowed to pose questions, and are CSOs also entitled to put items on the agenda? Or is the IO fully in control of the agenda and can thus avoid any mention of failings?

**Preconditions of Accountability: Levels and Determinants**

Do the IOs of our sample differ in the degree to which they offer preconditions for accountability, and do the preconditions correspond in a meaningful way with the explanatory factors listed above? When screening IO web sites for relevant information, the first lesson is that even within a single organization the presentation is far from coherent and information some-
times is given in a rather haphazard way. Furthermore, the differences in how the IOs and even individual directorates-general (DG) of the EU handle their public appearance were found to be striking. As for the EU, there is no common format to present and organize the information. Not only is each DG different, but some DGs, notably the DG for Health and Consumers (DG SANCO), operate for all practical purposes as factually several organizations, each with a style of presenting information, a mode of interaction with sets of stakeholders, and degrees of comprehensiveness and detail in their presentation of information. As this applies to all types of information, including the labeling of documents and types of information, finding the relevant information by screening the web sites is time consuming and no easy job; it boils down to checking every page of the site. The analysis will proceed by looking at the levels and patterns in the organizational preconditions for accountability, then testing the proposed hypotheses.

**Information about IO Activity**

What level of information do the IOs grant in their Internet presence? Table 1 reports the values of an index of information provision regarding the activity of the IO. The InformationIndex summarizes whether or not the IO provides Annual Reports, Working Plans, and Financial Information (in particular on its budget). Accordingly, the InformationIndex has a range from 0 to 3, the latter indicating the most comprehensive provision of information. Regarding the level of information provided, the overall situation indicates that information is provided freely, at least with regard to availability without examining the quality. As for the components of the InformationIndex, 82% of IOs provide some kind of annual report; 92% publish working plans detailing how they want to tackle their tasks in the next period, but only 65% provide information about their available financial resources, how they plan to spend them, and how they allocate resources to each of their tasks.

Table 1: Information Provision by IO Properties and CSO Structure

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Remark: Mean of InformationIndex, ranging from 0 to 3, by category of IO; overall mean for all forty-nine cases is 2.39.

Given the mean of 2.39 on a 0 to 3 scale, the level of information provision is, in a quantitative perspective, very high. Do the patterns in the information provision correspond with the arguments made above? As the findings reported in Table 1 indicate, contrary to hypothesis 1, the level of information granted is actually higher in the less institutionalized UN setting than in the EU, although the EU is formally more committed to transparency, and the role of CSOs is more institutionalized. The stand-alone IOs are more similar in their information policy to the UN than to the EU.

Regarding the societal actors the IOs are engaging with, IOs dealing primarily with organizations representing material interests, our “business” category, are less informative than those dealing mostly with NGOs. It is also noteworthy that information provision is lower
where the interests concerned are concentrated or bipolar and higher in cases of diffuse interests. Here, as in all following comparisons by categories referring to CSOs, we omitted the group of four IOs that do not have a population of CSOs they engage with in a meaningful way. The interpretation of both findings may be that IOs confronted with business CSOs are reporting to the organizations directly, in a non-public way, whereas the IOs confronted with a diffuse set of interests do communicate via the web, publicizing information more broadly.

Information provision of IOs covering social affairs and development policies is higher than that of IOs covering economic or environmental issues. From a more qualitative perspective, the sheer quantity of information differs, measured by the length of the reports. For example, the DGs EuropeAid and Social Affairs stand out with much more encompassing reports. Information provision is roughly similar for IOs tasked with monitoring, implementing, and coordinating. The lowest level of information provision is actually found in regulatory IOs. This runs counter to the argument made above in hypothesis 3, that regulatory IOs affect a larger set of actors, while coordinating IOs are more or less a forum for member states, which then bear responsibility for implementation, so that holding IOs accountable would not be addressing the right target. With regard to these differences, only the lower level of information provided by EU institutions (compared to their UN equivalents) and by regulatory IOs is statistically significant (significance level of 5% or lower).

Evaluation of Programs and Activities

When holding an IO accountable, one important aspect is whether or not the IO subjects itself to scrutiny, in particular by having its activities evaluated and by reporting the results of these evaluations. Some IOs are evaluating their activities, policies, and projects and are reporting the findings. These reports, as well as the reports of the IOs to their member states, constitute an opportunity for critical observers, such as the CSOs tracking the IOs, to check the facts presented by the IO and holding them accountable regarding their achievements and performance.

Evaluation can be organized differently. Some IOs evaluate themselves, having a separate department, usually assigned to the organization’s top leadership in charge of evaluating policies adopted or the activities of the operative departments. Some IOs commission external evaluation reports, which are then conducted by academics, experts, or commercial consultants. While evaluations are often mentioned, evaluation reports are not published in all cases. Another aspect is if the IO refers to indicators of performance when evaluating its activities. IOs do have defined tasks, and one aspect of accountability is to report the degree to which these tasks are achieved, ideally with reference to performance indicators, be it quantitative, such as trade statistics, or qualitative, each of which helps to define the achievement clearly. The availability of performance indicators differs among areas as some tasks are easier to translate into performance indicators. Interestingly, the factual usage of performance indicators does not vary correspondingly. Some IOs, even those with little quantitative information at hand, still report some kind of indicator, while other IOs, where statistics would be quite easy to come up with, do not.

The EvaluationIndex presented below covers the evaluation activity of IOs and the provision of information related to the evaluation. The elements of the index, ranging from 0 to 4, are the occurrence of an internal evaluation (conducted by the IO, typically by a separate department of the IO), an external evaluation, the publications of the evaluation reports delivered by the evaluators, be they internal or external, and last, the use of some kind of qualitative or quantitative performance indicator.

Regarding the use of evaluation, 63% of the IOs conduct internal evaluations and to the same extent they commission external evaluations. Eighteen IOs in our sample conduct both internal and external evaluations; five conduct no evaluation at all; thirteen only conduct an external; and thirteen only an internal evaluation. Evaluation reports are published in 82% of the cases, which is to say that if evaluations are conducted, the reports are usually published,
too. Only four of the 44 IOs conducting evaluations in some form or other do not provide the reports; 88% of IOs reporting on their activities refer to some kind of performance indicator. The use of evaluation is similarly frequent in both the EU and the UN, and this sharply contrasts with the three stand-alone IOs, which hardly engage in evaluating their work.

Table 2: Usage and Documentation of Evaluation

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Remark: Mean of Evaluation Index, ranging from 0 to 4, by IO category. Overall mean for all forty-nine cases is 2.96.

Evaluation is frequent and well organized in IOs covering social affairs and development, less so in the economic and environmental domains. In the field of environment, evaluation is used least often, despite the high impact and the amenability of activities to a critical evaluation of their impact. IOs implementing projects are typically evaluating their work, IOs with other functions much less so, a finding in line with the argument of hypothesis 3 above.

IOs dealing predominantly with NGOs are evaluating and reporting the evaluations more frequently than IOs interacting predominantly with business organizations, an indication that the presence of NGOs actually increases the likelihood of accountability.

Interestingly, the evaluation is less developed among those IOs where the constituencies are championing the same positions and have similar demands (concentrated interests). One might presume that in this situation, the IO and its constituency are so much in line regarding what will be done that they regard an evaluation of the IO’s performance and the actual impact of its activities as superfluous.

Again, only few differences are statistically significant: evaluation is better organized in IOs dealing with social issues and in IOs dealing with NGOs (i.e., dealing predominantly with NGOs or also with NGOs) and where the interests represented are diffuse.

**Dialogue between CSOs and the IO**

The key question here concerns the forms and the degree to which a dialogue between the IO and the CSOs is institutionalized. The status granted to CSOs differs among the IOs covered in our sample and so do the forms of involvement and the degree of institutionalization. Our assessment is based on the charta of the IO, i.e., whether or not it mentions CSOs and gives them a defined role. While in the case of the EU the latest treaty revision assigns CSOs a role in EU governance that formally applies to all DGs, the factual handling of the relations between the DG and CSOs differs substantially. Some DGs have institutionalized advisory committees, which predefine, and in some cases, factually set policy, and also have a formal document defining the relationship with CSOs. For others, consultation with civil society is nothing more than taking note of the Eurobarometer opinion surveys (see Quittkat and Kohler-Koch 2013: 52).
The establishment of a dialogue with CSOs is measured by a DialogueIndex, constituted by the existence of the following six organizational features: The involvement of the CSOs in the evaluation process, the consultations with CSOs, in whatever form, conferences and workshops with CSOs participation, the possibility for the CSOs to raise questions and to bring items on the agenda of the IO, and last, but not least, if the IO has granted CSOs a role in its activities.

Regarding the six individual components of the DialogueIndex, 39% of the IOs involve the CSOs in their evaluation, 84% of the IO consult in one way or other with CSOs, the most frequent forms being online consultations (a typical but not exclusive feature of the EU), conferences, or workshops. When interacting with CSOs in some form, only 65% of the IOs allow for the CSO to ask questions or to put items on the agenda, in the other instances, IOs retain full control over the interaction, using forums to present the IO’s positions and views, rather than to open up for input from societal actors. Only half of the IOs surveyed grant some form of institutionalized status to CSOs, either by giving them a role in the charta, or by setting out the terms of the interaction in a terms of reference document. In the other half of the cases, CSO involvement is subject to the discretion of the IO’s administration.

Dialogue with CSOs is established somewhat stronger in the EU than in the UN organizations; in both, it is far better developed than in stand-alone IOs. Still, on average, dialogue falls short of the achievements of some of the IOs, where the dialogue is highly established.

Dialogues are well established in the domain of environmental policy, also in the field of economics and social affairs. It is noticeable that IOs in charge of development are less inclined to engage in dialogue. When taking into account the various tasks of the IOs, types of stakeholders, and interest structures, a coherent pattern appears: entertaining a dialogue with stakeholders is a characteristic feature of IOs in charge of regulation and monitoring. The dialogue is more intense with business than with NGOs or mixed constituencies, and it is most frequent when an IO is faced with concentrated interests. The data suggest that regulating and monitoring IOs pay particular attention to the economic effects of their decisions and want to draw on CSOs’ practical knowledge. This interpretation sounds plausible, but it needs to be borne in mind that only the differences relating to policy areas have statistical significance.

Organizational Preconditions of Accountability: Overall Situation

Our argument is that the chances of CSOs to hold IOs accountable will be highest when substantial information is available and CSOs can engage in a critical dialogue with the IO, which enables them to pass judgment. If CSOs have access to information but have no opportunity

<table>
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<tr>
<th>By Setting</th>
<th>EU</th>
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<th>UN</th>
<th>N</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>By Theme</td>
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<td>economic</td>
<td>environment</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2.63</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4.43</td>
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<tr>
<td>By Activity</td>
<td>coordinating</td>
<td>regulatory</td>
<td>implementing</td>
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<td>By Stakeholder Type</td>
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<td>business + NGOs</td>
<td>NGOs</td>
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<td>By Interest Structure</td>
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Remark: Mean of DialogueIndex, ranging from 0 to 6, by category of IO. Overall mean for all forty-nine cases is 3.78.
to engage with the IO in order to pass judgment, the level of accountability is still low. The same is true for the inverse situation when CSOs can participate in a dialogue but lack relevant information to make use of the opportunity. Crucial are not the levels of information available and dialogue per se, but the combination.

Accordingly, we measured the degree to which IOs simultaneously fulfill all three pre-conditions of accountability: offering information, evaluation, and dialogue. The constitutive components were combined, not in an additive, but in a multiplicative way, which implies that each element is a necessary condition for overall accountability.

By way of an illustration Figure 1 shows the distribution of overall accountability across the forty-nine IOs. High numbers indicate a situation, where all three necessary conditions of accountability are given to a large extent.

**Figure 1: Overall Accountability—Provision of Information and Establishment of Dialogue**

As Figure 1 illustrates, high levels of accountability are rare. Low or even very low levels are a frequent constellation. Interestingly there is a gap in the distribution, implying that at the level of accountability, defined in our sense of a combination of three quite independent features, IOs either go for high or low accountability.

When we analyze the factors influencing our measure of overall accountability, we find that it differs to some degree from the analysis of the components, i.e., when measuring dialogue, evaluation, and information individually (see Table 4). UN organizations provide the preconditions to a higher degree than EU or stand-alone IOs. The same is true for IOs dealing with social issues, tasked with implementing policies and dealing predominantly with NGOs and diffuse interests. Significant are two differences, the one concerning NGOs as a constituency and diffuse interests as the dominant feature of the CSO population.

**Conclusions**

What do the findings tell us about the IO-related conditions enabling CSOs to hold institutions of international governance accountable? And what do they tell us about the factors driving IOs to enable CSOs to hold them accountable?
Prima facie, our screening gives the impression that IOs freely hand out information: the overwhelming majority publish working plans, annual reports, and provide financial reports. Furthermore, the evaluation of activities is well developed, results of evaluations are often reported, and, in addition, many IOs engage in a dialogue with CSOs. The first impression is that CSOs have the opportunity to hold IOs accountable. A more in-depth analysis, however, conveys a different message. The reason for this seemingly surprising and contradictory evaluation is that for accountability to work, all three conditions have to be met, and a high level in one condition alone is not sufficient. The detailed analysis reveals the degree to which information and evaluations are presented and the degrees to which IOs are ready to engage in a dialogue with CSOs vary considerably, and it exhibits important differences.

From a descriptive perspective, and this is essential in view of our research intention, the necessary preconditions for CSOs to hold IOs accountable seldom occur simultaneously. According to our findings, some IOs are exemplary in their openness and engagement, others are pretty much an inaccessible black box. Most are partly open but do not offer all components necessary for holding them accountable. Only some IOs combine openness in information with maintaining a meaningful dialogue with the public and CSOs. Even with respect to just one of the two relevant elements, namely information, by far the most frequent constellation is that an IO gives some type of information but rarely all types of information listed in our InformationIndex. The information required to assess IO’s activities in a comprehensive way is mostly not available. The same picture pertains to dialogue and evaluation. Some building blocks of an accountability relationship are nearly always missing.

Though the dialogue with CSOs is part of the standard repertoire of IOs, there are considerable variations in both form and quality. The same is true for evaluations, where reports are not always available and performance indicators are often dispensed with. Thus, when looking at the full picture, our main conclusion is that the real opportunities for CSOs to come to an informed opinion, to pass judgment about IO’s activities, and to confront the IO with this judgment in a dialogue are limited.

As for the factors, which we presumed to affect the existence of the preconditions for accountability, the analysis documents a high level of variation between IOs, particularly in relation to their tasks and fields of activity. Few of our hypotheses on structural factors could be confirmed. Most interesting are the differences between the UN and the EU. Despite the substantial difference in the institutional and legal setting, which would suggest that the EU is more ready, or indeed obliged, to grant CSOs the role of a critical observer, UN institutions
are actually more willing to grant CSOs such a role. One explanation is that in the context of the EU, the role of CSOs as legitimate agents of public accountability is contested. The European Parliament, despite its own close contacts to civil society, claims to be the only legitimate representative of the European public. The other explanation is that with the political upgrading of the European Parliament, since the Lisbon Treaty, it is more rewarding for the European Commission to forge an alliance with the parliament instead of seeking the support of CSOs. Another explanation could be that the European Commission is less committed to spread information to the broader public because EU directorates usually have direct and informal links to their constituencies, an interpretation that is confirmed by the patterns of contact between economic lobbyists and EU institutions (Kohler-Koch, Quittkat, and Kurczewska 2013). This explanation is also supported by the fact that IOs active in the domain of social policy and dealing primarily with NGOs representing diffused and fragmented interests are more information friendly.

By way of an outlook, we suggest to complement this quantitative comparative research by a qualitative approach. It goes without saying that the manifest organizational features do not provide sufficient information about the practice and the substance of implementing accountability. It is not sufficient to find out whether or not IOs are obliged to and actually provide information and explanations. Rather, the comprehensiveness, content, and frequency of reports and exchanges have to be investigated. When in the course of future research the quality of reporting and dialogue are taken into account, the present impression of a haphazard approach to public accountability may change.

REFERENCES


APPENDIX

List of IOs and EU DGs in the Sample

The dataset covers the following UN organizations: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), International Labour Organization (ILO), IMF, ITU, OCHA, UNAIDS, UNCDF, UNCTAD, UNDP, UNEP, UNESCO, UNFCCC, UNFPA, UN-HABITAT, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNIDO, UNISDR, UNRISD, WFP, WHO, WIPO, World Bank Group, and the WTO. The stand-alone organizations are NATO, OECD, and OSCE. The EU DGs (as of 2012, the time of conducting the survey): Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI), Climate Action (CLIMA), Communication (COMM), Communications Networks, Content and Technology (former DG CONNECT), Competition (COMP), Economic and Financial Affairs (ECFIN), Education and Culture (EAC), Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion (EMPL), Energy (ENER), Enterprise and Industry (ENTR), Environment (ENV), EuropeAid Development & Cooperation (DEVCO), Health and Consumers (SANCO), Humanitarian Aid (ECHO), Internal Market and Services (MARKT), Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (MARE), Mobility and Transport (MOVE), Regional Policy (REGIO), Research and Innovation (RTD), Taxation and Customs Union (TAXUD), and Trade (TRADE).

Classification of Interest Group Populations

IOs with no interest group population constantly tracking the IO: COMM, UNISDR, UNRISD, and NATO. We arrived at the following distribution when screening the available information about the CSOs the IO is mostly engaging with the following:

Stakeholder Type

IOs with predominantly business CSOs population: MARKT, RTD, TRADE, MARE, MOVE, ENTR, COMP, ECFIN, IMF, World Bank, WTO, IAEA, OECD, ENER, and AGRI.

IOs with a mixed business/NGO CSOs population: EMPL, SANCO, CONNECT, CLIMA, ENV, FAO, ILO, ITU, UNIDO, WHO, WIPO, and UNFCCC.

IOs with a CSO population constituted predominantly by NGOs: EAC, DEVCO, ECHO, REGIO, TAXUD, OCHA, UNAIDS, UNCDF, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNCTAD, UNDP, UNESCO, UNEP, UN-HABITAT, UNFPA, WFP, and OSCE.

Interest Structure

This relates to the predominant cleavage structures in the CSO population.

Cases with a bipolar population structure are: EMPL, CONNECT, CLIMA, ENV, ILO, WHO, WIPO, UNFCCC, World Bank, WTO, IMF.

Cases of concentrated interest structures: MARKT, ENER, RTD, TRADE, AGRI, MARE, MOVE, ENTR, COMP, ECFIN, ITU, UNEP, OSCE, IAEA, OECD.

Cases with diffuse interests: EAC, DEVCO, SANCO, ECHO, REGIO, TAXUD, FAO, OCHA, UNAIDS, UNCDF, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNCTAD, UNDP, UNESCO, UN-HABITAT, UNIDO, UNFPA, WFP.

For the criteria underlying the classification see section on explanatory variables.
Cooperation or Clashes on 19th Street? Theorizing and Assessing IMF and World Bank Collaboration

by Bessma Momani, University of Waterloo, and Mark Hibben, Saint Joseph’s College of Maine

Conventional wisdom holds that the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund function as “Bretton Woods twins,” working effectively together to maintain and extend the contemporary global economic order. A historical overview of IMF–World Bank relations reveals that the bank and fund are more aptly characterized as sibling rivals, characterized in part by low-quality collaboration. Despite this trend, formal collaboration continues to increase and intensify between the IMF and World Bank. Informed by a theoretical framework that gives organizational culture purposive value in the study of international organizations, this article tests how distant cultural proximity and low inter-organizational trust undermine high-quality collaborative work between the two institutions.

Introduction

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank are perceived broadly as highly cooperative institutions characterized by a shared worldview that champions liberal market macroeconomic policy and development. Upon cursory analysis, this is a reasonable assertion. The “twin sisters” of Bretton Woods, formed nearly seven decades ago to resurrect and manage the post–World War II global economic order, have worked in tandem on a broad series of initiatives. Concrete collaborative efforts take many forms, including coordination of joint annual meetings, participation in the IMF–World Bank Development Committee, and joint staff work on low-income country initiatives. In addition, both organizations’ articles of agreement mandate the two organizations “shall cooperate” with other international organizations “having specialized responsibilities in related fields.”

World Bank and IMF collaboration during the controversial Washington Consensus period also reinforced notions of a seamless relationship between the Bretton Woods twins. As a Financial Times journalist described it, the two institutions were broadly perceived as “twin faces of the hydra-headed monster of the ‘Washington Consensus’ dedicated to the defense of global capitalism and oppression of the poor” (Crooks 2002).

Far from monolithic “neoliberal” clones, the Bretton Woods twins are more accurately described as rival siblings, each characterized by a distinct organizational culture that impacts collaborative efforts. Given the power and influence of these institutions, ineffective collaborative work can produce serious problems for member states, particularly low income countries (LICs). Studies show that when the IMF and World Bank communicate mixed signals to its members, this can lead to conflicting demands and advice, strains on borrowers’ bureaucratic capacity, and duplication of conditionality, all of which generally have a negative effect on borrowers (Feinberg 1988; Bradlow and Grossman 1995; Easterly 2002; Dreher 2009). Ineffective collaboration also increases the leverage of country authorities disinterested in undertaking difficult macroeconomic and structural reforms.

1. See IMF Articles of Agreement, Article X and World Bank Articles of Agreement, Article X, Section 8a.
A series of initiatives adopted by the IMF and World Bank since the late 1990s have increased the IMF–World Bank collaborative demands. Both the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) initiative and Financial Sector Assessment Programs (FSAP) require joint IMF–World Bank work. Kicked off in 2007 and reviewed in 2010, the Joint Management Action Plan (JMAP) also has developed a series of specific procedural reforms to further tighten inter-institutional coordination. A worst case scenario that could emerge in the early twenty-first century therefore involves increased episodes of poor quality IMF–World Bank collaboration with serious detrimental macroeconomic and development effects. This article is normatively driven by the goal to avoid this scenario and instead enhance high-quality IMF–World Bank collaboration.

As such, we build off the nascent IO literature focused specifically on IMF–World Bank collaboration (Fabricus 2007; Marchesi and Sirtori 2011, 2015). The quantitative work of Marchesi and Sirtori (2011) establishes the impact of IMF–World Bank interaction on economic growth. Using panel data of 128 developing states from 1982–2005, they find that when the IMF or World Bank works alone in a country, per capita GDP growth rates do not increase. In contrast, countries with simultaneous IMF and World Bank programs show a significant and positive relationship with economic expansion. Fabricus (2007) operationalizes cooperation between the two institutions as the ability of staff to adopt and maintain consistent policies when engaged with recipient states. Based on data drawn from field research on four cases (Ghana, Pakistan, Peru, and Vietnam), the study finds that cooperation between IMF and the World Bank staff is enhanced when the institutions clearly establish and respect boundaries on each other’s operations (the so-called “domain consensus”) and when they operate in similar organizational styles. Marchesi and Sirtori (2015), drawing from Fabricus’ conception of domain consensus, demonstrate that decreased competition due to clear division of labor and increased knowledge sharing enhance the positive effects of IMF–World Bank simultaneous lending on economic growth.

Marchesi, Sirtori, and Fabricus provide an important foundation for the study of IMF and World Bank collaboration. However, their contributions also contain theoretical and empirical limitations. Fabricus defines collaboration as simply the ability of IMF and World Bank staff to maintain consistent policy positions when in negotiation with third parties. We, instead, argue for an operationalization of collaboration that broadens the concept and also delineates between high-quality and low-quality collaboration. We define high-quality collaboration as IMF–World Bank coordinated work that maximizes institutional comparative advantage to address macroeconomic and development needs of member states, enhances effective coordination on country issues, and supports creative problem solving. Second, Marchesi and Sirtori employ the interaction effect between IMF and World Bank loans on growth as a proxy for IMF–World Bank collaboration, arguing that “ceteris paribus, these institutions are more likely to cooperate when they are simultaneously involved with the same country” (Marchesi and Sirtori 2011: 299). While possible, effective collaboration is not simply a de facto result of more interaction. This framing of collaboration is representative of a broader underdeveloped understanding of micro-dynamics at play in IMF–World Bank joint work. In response, we maintain a more in depth analysis focused on organizational culture and interpersonal dynamics between IMF and World Bank staff is necessary to elucidate what factors produce high-quality versus low-quality collaboration.

Our analysis of IMF–World Bank collaboration, therefore, draws from the growing body of IMF and World Bank literature that fuses components of constructivism and organizational theory. This literature focuses on the internal workings of international organizations and lends itself to “fine grained” ethnographic and historical process tracing methodology. We argue, however, that a theoretical supplement is needed that specifically engages with our focus on inter-organizational collaborative dynamics. Drawing on concepts found in the business management literature, we hypothesize that cultural dissonance due to differences in organizational
“sociability” and “solidarity” impedes high-quality collaborative efforts between the two institutions. We posit that this dynamic is further reinforced by low inter-organizational trust and poor knowledge-sharing mechanisms. We test our hypotheses through evidence drawn from semi-structured interviews of IMF and World Bank staff involved in collaborative work in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mozambique, and Tanzania. This is supplemented by content analysis of IMF and World Bank policy documents and IMF and World Bank surveys of staff on questions of collaboration.

This article proceeds as follows. In the first section, we provide a historical overview of IMF–World Bank collaboration. In the second section, we draw from the constructivist and management literature and develop hypotheses that test what factors undermine high-quality collaboration. In the third section, we test our hypotheses. We summarize our major findings in the conclusion as follows. First, staff from both institutions highlight the importance of collaboration and point to cases where poor collaboration produced subsequently worse macroeconomic and development outcomes in member states. Interviewees also reported that cases of effective collaboration maximized institutional comparative advantage and facilitated creative problem solving on joint projects. Second, differences in organizational culture undermine high-quality collaboration in multiple areas. These include levels of efficiency in decision making, timeliness of reports, and shifts in policy positions during collaborative processes. Third, dynamics that produce distrust and undermine high-quality collaboration between IMF and World Bank staff are derived primarily from the differences in institutional mandates and business models rather than personal or professional bias. Fourth, trust building and the subsequent quality of collaborative work is enhanced primarily on an ad hoc and informal basis. And fifth, as witnessed by the 2009 reform of the FSAP program, which clearly divided IMF and World Bank responsibilities, clarity in institutional roles enhances efficiency in joint work. Less interaction between IMF and World Bank staff due to clear delineation of institutional responsibilities has not undermined the quality of collaborative work.

IMF–World Bank Collaboration: Historical Overview

When created in 1944, the operational lines between the two Bretton Woods organizations were clear. The fund focused on short-term balance of payments lending and managed the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system. The bank secured financing for reconstruction and development projects. The Bretton Woods framers also envisioned a strong presence of the institution in industrialized economies in the post-World War II era. This notion was quickly undermined by U.S. efforts to directly oversee the reconstruction of Europe through the Marshall Plan and limit World Bank involvement. A focus on industrialized states was further eroded in 1960 with the formation of the International Development Agency (IDA) within the World Bank Group. The IDA dealt specifically with the needs of poorer states and catalyzed a sharp increase in institutional attention on the developing world. By the early 1970s, less than 10 percent of total bank lending went to upper-income states (Kapur et al., 1997: 139–40). The IMF followed a similar trajectory toward developing states during this period. Starting in the 1950s, decolonization movements and Cold War political pressures resulted in an increase in institutional presence in developing states, particularly in Latin America. By the late 1960s, various fund programs focused on poor states were created, including the IMF Institute, the Central Banking Service, and the Bureau of Statistics (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 60–61).

As both the fund and bank focused their resources and attention on poor states, tensions between the institutions increased. A series of bank loans in Latin America and Asia in the early- and mid-1960s, for example, included conditions on exchange rate policies and macroeconomic initiatives. IMF complaints of bank mission creep into its area of expertise led to a formal agreement in 1966, which spelled out their respective primary responsibilities.

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2. Interviews used in this article took place at IMF headquarters in 2011 and 2012 and IMF and World Bank headquarters in 2014.
While the 1966 agreement produced a brief period of clarity in regard to institutional responsibilities, a series of events in the 1970s and 1980s once again blurred these lines. In 1973, with the breakdown of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system, a primary component of the IMF’s original institutional mandate was eliminated. A focus on chronic balance of payments issues in developing states helped fill this vacuum. In 1974, the fund created the Extended Fund Facility (EFF), its first concessional lending program designed to fill the gap between short-term IMF financing and long-term World Bank development aid in poor states. EFF loans included structural conditionality stipulations that pushed for substantial reform in national economies and their legal systems and linked these reforms to broader issues of development (Chorev and Babb 2009: 465).

An emphasis on structural reform was also formalized in the World Bank in 1980 with the introduction of Structural Adjustment Loans (SALs). In a radical shift for the bank, SALs expanded the scope of its institutional mission beyond discrete development projects. Stipulations for economic liberalization and policy reforms to improve balance of payment positions were tied into development lending. The bank’s creation of Sectoral Adjustment Loans (SECALs) in 1983 reinforced this trend. SECALs included conditionality requirements that pressured recipient states to liberalize and privatize specific sectors of their economies (Weinberg, 1988: 549).

 Fallout of the 1982 Mexican Debt Crisis further eroded institutional boundaries and pushed IMF and World Bank collaboration into unprecedented territory. From 1982 to 1985, the fund pushed poor states to implement a series of stabilization measures to battle severe inflation and balance of payment deficits common at this time. Following three years of severe recession across much of the global south, U.S. Treasury Secretary James Baker III unveiled the Baker Plan. For Baker, a return of private and multilateral lending to poor states required that they implement deep and broad structural reforms in order to facilitate liberal market development coordinated through IMF and World Bank collaboration. At the IMF, U.S. Executive Director Charles Dallara pushed the Baker Plan before the board, noting that any new facility should be “consistent with, but more specific on structural adjustment than the Fund’s usual Article IV,” and “should be developed and negotiated jointly by the Fund and Bank, and the member country” (IMF 1985: 39 as cited by Boughton 2001: 647).

Negotiations within IMF concerning its 1986 adoption of the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) highlight the unease IMF staff had in developing more formal coordination with the World Bank. Fund staff argued against strict fund-bank collaboration, concerned in part that “different working styles and requirements of the institutions” would make implementation difficult (Ibid.: 650–51). Staff instead pushed for a looser framework of collaboration between the fund and bank supported by the Japanese, British, and German executive directors (IMF, 1986a: 8, 9–11, 20). Poorer states also were concerned with issues of cross conditionality and pushed against formal bank-fund collaboration. In response to these concerns, IMF Managing Director Jacques de Larosière (1978–87) proposed a compromise Policy Framework Paper (PFP) as the guiding document for SAF implementation. De Larosière argued that the PFP “should not be overly precise” and would preserve the fund and bank’s “respective mandates and expertise” in coordinating the implementation of the new facility (IMF 1986b: 42). The PFP would also be employed in the fund’s Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF).

As noted by Boughton, increased negotiations between the two institutions on how to manage demands for coordinated policy response during the 1980s should not be interpreted as proactive attempts to increase and deepen collaboration. At its best, it instead kept the staff from the two institutions from “tripping over each other’s feet when they were responding to the same fire alarms” (Boughton 2001: 1003). At its worst, lack of communication and turf war tensions between the institutions periodically boiled over into public spats. This was most pronounced in 1988 when disagreements between the IMF and World Bank staff on lending requirements to Argentina made headlines. In this case, bank staff argued that their IMF
counterparts were unnecessarily stipulating severe financial austerity in loan negotiations that would undermine the bank’s ability to implement a series of structural reforms. Rather than resolve the issue with IMF staff, the bank forged ahead with loans that specifically outlined macroeconomic policies that the Argentineans were to implement. For fund staff and management, this constituted an egregious violation of the 1966 agreement giving the IMF priority over macroeconomic affairs and led to renewed efforts between the two institutions to clarify their respective roles (Ibid.: 522–23).

In 1989, IMF and the bank management announced the “IMF–World Bank Concordat.” In broad terms, the agreement reiterated the dividing lines spelled out in the 1966 agreement but included more specific guidelines around institutional responsibility. The IMF’s primary areas now involved “public sector spending and revenues, aggregate wage and price policies, money and credit, interest rates and the exchange rate.” World Bank areas included “development strategies; sector project investments, structural adjustment programs; policies which deal with the efficient allocation of resources in both public and private sectors; priorities in government expenditures; reforms of administrative systems, production, trade, and financial sectors; the restructuring of public sector enterprises and sector policies.” The agreement also emphasized how increased World Bank and IMF focus on structural-adjustment lending required greater mutual sensitivity to each institution’s area of expertise, as well as more formal procedures to manage disagreements. If conflict occurred between the bank and IMF around conditionality negotiations, “the institution which does not have the primary responsibility would, except in exceptional circumstances, yield to the judgment of the other institution.” In addition, the concordat called for increased inter-institution collaboration and spelled out various strategies to increase staff and management contact. This included a move away from ad hoc meetings between IMF and bank staff and management to a more formal schedule of meetings and greater information sharing (IMF 1989).

A decade later, critiques of structural-adjustment lending pushed by the fund and bank set the stage for increased formal collaboration between the two institutions in low income countries. A 1998 IMF commissioned external review of the ESAF strongly criticized the institution’s inability to monitor the impact of short-term conditionality requirements. In response, it called on the fund to directly work with World Bank staff in this endeavor (IMF 1998: 28). The same report also highlighted how the lack of cooperation and coordination between the IMF and bank undermined the effectiveness of fund initiatives. The report noted that while in principle “there is close Fund-Bank cooperation and liaison in policy advise,” in practice “the norm is for liaison to be seriously deficient” and that the “building of genuine detailed liaison would require major institutional change” (Ibid.: 34). This lack of meaningful coordination was particularly problematic in the growing cynicism of country officials around the PFP process. As noted in the report, while many had initially welcomed the PFP “as an instrument of a genuine three-dialogue between the government, the Fund, and the Bank, it has become a rather routine process whereby the Fund brings uniform drafts (with spaces to be filled in) from Washington, in which even matters of language and form are cast in colorless stone” (Ibid.: 36).

In 1999, the IMF replaced ESAF with Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) that required recipient states draft Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). PRSPs, designed by the member state in coordination with various domestic stakeholders and the bank and fund, outlined and identified specific policy areas that would be implemented to reduce poverty and promote growth. Implicit in the adoption of PRSPs was increased bank-fund coordination. Another area of increased collaboration built into the PRSP program was assessment. Here, IMF and World Bank staff co-wrote Joint Staff Advisory Notes (JSANs) in order to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of specific PRSP design and implementation.

Another key area of increased IMF-bank collaboration since the late 1990s, involves financial sector issues. In reaction to broad-based critiques of how the fund and World Bank
handled the Asian crisis, the two institutions created the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) in 1999. Until the 2008 crisis, FSAP was a voluntary program that assessed the stability and potential weak links in a member state’s financial sector. The IMF was given sole responsibility for developing FSAPs for advanced economies. In emerging and developing economies, tasks were and remain divided between the fund and bank. The IMF’s primary role includes issues related to financial stability, while the bank focuses on issues related to financial sector development and improvement. Coordination on the FSAP and other financial sector issues is reinforced through the Financial Sector Liaison Committee (FSLC). The FSLC, made up of six senior IMF and bank staff, is a permanent committee charged with oversight of the FSAP and other collaborative undertakings related to financial sector oversight and improvement.

Kicked off in 2007 and reviewed in 2010, the Joint Management Action Plan (JMAP) also developed a series of specific procedural reforms to further tighten inter-institutional coordination. The JMAP is an outgrowth of a 2006 external review of fund-bank collaboration initiated by then Managing Director Rodrigo de Roto and Bank President Paul Wolfowitz. Recommendations for greater collaboration between the IMF and World Bank from the external review (known as the “Malan Report”) were integrated into the JMAP. Three general areas were identified. They include the following:

1) Improving coordination on country work, including through new procedures for country team coordination; 2) Enhancing communication between staff of the two institutions working on common thematic issues, including by sharing information through new electronic platforms; and 3) Improving incentives and support for collaboration on policies, review, and other issues, including by taking collaboration into account in performance assessments (IMF–World Bank 2007b).

Assessment of the JMAP in 2010 highlights how the 2008 crisis further reinforced calls for coordination and institutional division of labor. In response to future global crisis, the IMF and bank agreed on the following:

[In the event of economic shocks or crisis, the Fund generally takes a leading role in responding to the macroeconomic effects of shocks, providing countries with liquidity to smooth macroeconomic adjustment, and coordinating closely with the Bank and other development partners to ensure that total budget and balance of payments financing are part of a consistent overall macroeconomic program . . . the Bank has a key role in ensuring that development spending and objectives in critical health, education, and infrastructure are maintained (IMF–World Bank 2010: 21).]

The 2010 assessment of the JMAP also highlighted that despite improved collaboration, several key areas require attention. These include greater information sharing and trust building, managerial attention to improve collaborative programs, and reforms to allow greater mobility between the two institutions (Ibid: 24).

A historical overview of IMF and World Bank policy coordination and cooperative efforts thus highlights two contradictory dynamics. At one level, the institutions are historically linked and complimentary entities charged with managing the global economic order and development outcomes. As such, we would expect an inter-institutional relationship that welcomes and actively promotes high-quality collaboration. However, as documented above, the evidence points to a more complicated reality. Despite an external environment characterized by increased global crises and pressure from management and key states pushing for greater proactive coordination between the two institutions, IMF–World Bank cooperation has not come easily. In the next section, we develop a theoretical framework that explains why high-quality collaboration remains elusive.

Theorizing Organizational Culture and Inter-Organizational Collaboration

As highlighted by Franke and Koch (2013), neo-realist and neo-institutional conceptions of IOs as epiphenomenal extensions of nation-states have historically undermined theoretical and empirical engagement with IO collaboration. Like Franke and Koch, we conceptualize IOs as entities with agency rather than reactive instruments of powerful states, a position found in the growing body of IMF and World Bank literature that fuses components of constructivism and organizational theory (Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 2004; Chwieroth 2008a, 2008b, 2010, 2014; Clegg 2011, 2014; Hibben 2015; Momani 2005, 2007a, 2007b, 2010; Momani and Lanz 2014; Moschella 2010; Park and Vetterlein 2010; Vetterlein and Moschella 2014; Weaver 2008). Constructivists frame their study of IOs as one that recognizes exogenous, systematic factors but also is consciously and primarily focused on internal, institutionally specific agency and variables of the IO under study. The agency of IO actors also is constituted and influenced by institution specific organizational culture. As outlined by Barnett and Finnemore:

IOs . . . are established to accomplish certain tasks. To do this, they develop general consensus around their understandings of their core mission and the functions of their organization; goals to be pursued; basic means to pursue those goals; and some way to measure results. Thus organizations create a shared discourse, symbols, and values for their staff. These shared elements, in turn, generate a group identity for the organization and structure interactions among those within it (2004: 19).

Maintenance and reproduction of organizational culture and identity is not a passive process. Staff members internalize particular frames of reference and also socialize new employees to adopt particular norms and routines within the bureaucracy. Organizational culture, therefore, is deeply embedded and serves as the frame of reference through which events and signals from the external and internal environment are cognitively processed.

This inside-out perspective methodologically draws from ethnographic and historical process tracing to capture “micro-dynamics” at play. However, we argue that a theoretical supplement is needed for our concerns related to inter-organizational dynamics. Like IO scholars who argue that organizational culture matters, organizational behavior studies in management and sociology are also useful to theorize how inter-organizational dynamics can impact collaboration. Borrowing and building upon arguments from management and organizational behavior literature, there is a strong view that the cultures of two organizations can determine the success or failure of any potential collaboration between them. We focus on three interrelated variables identified in this literature: cultural proximity, mutual trust, and shared knowledge.

Cultural Proximity

Cultural proximity is deemed necessary for effective collaboration; cultural dissimilarity can lead to hostility, apprehensiveness, and failed collaboration. We draw from the business management literature to more specifically identify variables that produce archetypical categories of organizational culture and apply this understanding to an analysis of IMF and World Bank collaborative efforts.

Goffee and Jones (1996) focus on the interplay between higher and lower levels of “sociability” and “solidarity” as the primary variables shape organizational culture. As outlined by Goffee and Jones, sociability is a measure of “emotional, noninstrumental relations . . . among individuals who regard one another as friends . . . that is valued for its own sake” (Ibid.: 134). Organizations with high sociability generally produce employees who are willing to work “above and beyond” formal requirements of their job descriptions not only to support colleagues, but also to make their community successful. The negative effects of highly social organizations include problems associated with calling out poor performance, too much emphasis on compromise at the expense of potentially better outcomes, and a pattern of identity formation that produces “cliques and informal, behind-the-scenes networks” that undermine formal institutional procedures (Ibid.: 134).
Solidarity, in contrast, refers to how well an organization functions efficiently and effectively regardless of personal feelings. High levels of solidarity in an organization are marked by an ability to quickly assess costs and benefits associated with a particular problem and then follow through with a decision. This dynamic produces a community that has clear roles and standard operating procedures and little behind the scenes dealings or special treatment. This builds trust over time within the organization as employees identify in the goals of the organization. Negative effects of solidarity can include high levels of conformity and lack of critical pushback against poorly made program decisions (Ibid.: 136).

The variations of sociability and solidarity produce four distinct archetypes of organizations: networked (high sociability/low solidarity), communal (high sociability/high solidarity), mercenary (low sociability/high solidarity), and fragmented (low sociability/low solidarity). Relative to our purposes, we focus on two of these archetypes that are characterized in part by high solidarity. In a communal organization, high solidarity is complemented with high sociability. This produces a dynamic where individual identity is often tied to organizational identity and results in a heightened sense of loyalty to peers, and in some cases an “us versus the world” mentality relative to outside critics or competition. Mercenary organizations differ in that lower levels of sociability produce a heightened sense of competition—both between individuals inside the organization and against outside forces that challenge it. High solidarity combined with low sociability also is correlated with more rapid decision making than is seen in communal organizations, and little patience for thinking “outside the box” or for work performance that does not meet standards of the organization.

Confidence (and Trust)
Another variable that shapes quality of collaboration is inter-organizational confidence and trust (Das and Teng 1999a, 1999b, 1999c). Confidence in the “other” is a key indicator of collaborative success and is reinforced primarily by increased trust (Aulakh, Kotabe, and Sahay 1996; Mayer, Davis, and Shoorman 1995). Trust, in turn, is produced when two organizations participate in risk taking activities, increase communication, and undergo inter-organizational adaption (Das and Teng 1999a: 503). Risk taking and trust are conceptualized as reciprocally related concepts. Without a process that involves risk taking, organizations are unable to assess the trustworthiness of the “other.” Successful trust building takes time, as repeated interactions are often necessary to demonstrate that the “other” will undertake challenging or controversial projects. Once a base level of trust is formed, future collaborative efforts that entail greater mutual risk have a greater chance of occurring (Ibid.: 504).

Trust and inter-organizational confidence is also positively correlated with increased communication. Three major reasons underlie this fact. First, a well-established pattern of communication lowers the potential for misunderstanding and serves as an avenue to resolve differences. Second, greater communication facilitates information symmetry and undermines the ability of one organization to use select knowledge to gain power in the relationship. Third, increased communication serves as the foundation for continued interaction. If this interaction is sustained, there are several scenarios where cultural proximity will increase. Most salient is that empathy of the actual participants involved in the collaboration increases for the “other.” New identities may also be formed among the participants involved in the collaborative effort itself. If high levels of trust and confidence are reached, organizations involved in coordinated programs can exhibit “interfirm adaption” (Heidi and John 1992). Under these circumstances, there is increased mutual flexibility and greater ability to coordinate and cooperate with the partner organization.

Forms of Trust and Knowledge Sharing
Levin, Cross, and Abrams (2004) also highlight the self-reinforcing relationship between knowledge sharing, trust, and successful collaboration. Here, two forms of trust are identi-
fied. Benevolent-based trust refers to the belief that others will not harm you or your reputation if given the chance. Competence-based trust involves a belief that others are sufficiently knowledgeable of the topic, particularly when they are complex. If two organizations share competence-based trust, knowledge sharing is expected to exist. Specific to our study of bank-fund collaboration, this can serve as a barometer of sorts that captures the relative interorganizational trust that exists at particular historical junctures. High levels of knowledge sharing signify periods of mutual trust while low levels point to increased mistrust. Levin et al., (4) also outline various factors that influence how individuals will rate the relative trustworthiness the “other” and subsequent willingness to share information. These include demographic similarity (age, class, and gender), organizational similarity, and high social capital (repeated interactions, shared values and goals, and shared language and terminology).

Testing Theories of IMF–World Bank Collaboration
This section tests the following hypotheses:

H1: Cultural dissimilarity between the IMF and World Bank reduces high-quality collaboration.

H2: Increased interaction and knowledge sharing between IMF and World Bank staff reduces distrust and increases high-quality collaboration.

We define high-quality collaboration as IMF–World Bank coordinated work that maximizes institutional comparative advantage to address macroeconomic and development needs of member states, enhances effective coordination on country issues, and supports creative problem solving. Evidence to test these hypotheses is drawn from a variety of sources. These include IMF and World Bank policy documents, IMF and World Bank surveys of staff on questions of collaboration, and semi-structured interviews of IMF and World Bank staff who have engaged in IMF–World Bank collaborative work in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mozambique, and Tanzania.

H1: Cultural dissimilarity undermines high-quality collaboration
A mercenary organization characterized by high solidarity combined with low sociability exhibits rapid decision making, rigidity, and strict adherence to standard operating procedure in its daily work. A communal organization with high solidarity and high sociability demonstrates a greater willingness to engage in alternative ideas, moves slower in decision making, and is flexible. We find a prevailing theme of IMF–World Bank relations is cultural divergence due in part to differences in sociability and solidarity. This difference undermines high-quality collaboration.

Fundamental differences found in the institutional mission and organizational structure of the Bretton Woods twins produce lower levels of solidarity in the World Bank than in the fund and lower levels of sociability in the IMF than in the bank. The IMF consists primarily of elite trained economists and financial experts who almost all work at headquarters in Washington, D.C. The World Bank, in contrast, is made up of a staff from a diversity of professional backgrounds who work in over forty offices and 120 countries across the world. In comparison to the IMF, the bank is also larger (about 10,000 staff members as compared to 2,400 for the IMF) and is made up of two major organizations: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA), which are associated with the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), and the Multilateral Guarantee Agency. All else being equal, we should expect the larger and more heterogeneous World Bank to exhibit greater flexibility and inefficiency in decision making than the smaller and more homogenous IMF.

Along with differences in organizational structure, size, and professional diversity of staff, we find the respective institutional mandates of the IMF and World Bank produce and reinforce divergent modes of interaction and decision making. As noted by a 1994 IMF study, “The fundamental difference is this: the Bank is primarily a development institution; the IMF
is a cooperative institution that seeks to maintain an orderly system of payments and receipts between nations” (Driscoll 1994: 2–3). Anne Krueger (1998) also highlights that the cultural divergence found between the two institutions is tied to their respective responsibilities. IMF often deals with countries in crisis. In contrast, the World Bank provides loans to projects and is seen more as a “friend of developing countries” (Ibid.).

As noted in a 2001 joint bank-IMF study of collaboration, these respective core mandates produce differences in how the two institutions conceptualize the time needed for decision making and policy implementation (IMF–World Bank 2001: 5). The World Bank, with its focus on development, has longer time horizons. Bank staff thus may exhibit greater patience and willingness for the “best” solution to emerge rather than the most convenient. In contrast, the fund, with its focus on crisis management, brings with it a short time horizon. Quick action is prioritized and we should expect little patience from IMF staff for brainstorming, thinking outside the box, or overly process oriented formats when working with their bank counterparts.

Past studies of the IMF and World Bank thus maintain that differences in organizational structure and institutional mandates produce a comparatively disciplinarian, formal, hierarchical, and efficient IMF and an informal, inefficient, and decentralized World Bank (Polak 1994; Easterly 2002; Dreher 2009). IMF historian James Boughton describes this dynamic as follows, “[the Fund] is a tidy disciplinarian (both toward itself and others), physically small, nearly devoid of humor, and more interested in gaining respect than in being loved. The other [the Bank], of course, is a culture apart” (2001: 996). Or as Kapur, Lewis, and Webb have noted, the IMF is like the Catholic Church and the World Bank like a group of Protestant sects (1997: 622).

Our findings are generally consistent with this narrative. While individuals in both institutions strongly identify in their organization, the fund’s smaller and homogenous staff of economists focused on crisis management and surveillance consistently equates “IMFness” with the values of efficiency, objectivity, and data driven technocratic decision making. A broadly homogenous identity rooted in technocratic rationality contrasts with dynamics in the World Bank where a larger and more diverse staff is more open to process and multiple views. Another dynamic that produces less cohesion and homogenous identity for World Bank staff stems from the fact that there is competition within the institution for resources for development projects. A staff member who was interviewed highlighted this “entrepreneurial” element within the bank reinforces themes of decentralization and dissonance within the institution that undermines a broadly shared identity.4

These differences outlined above impact the quality of collaborative work in several dimensions. First, several of the IMF staff who had been interviewed insinuated that they were broadly effective in their work due to greater efficiency. As articulated by an IMF staff member who had served as a mission chief in Africa, “We are a lot more nimble than the World Bank. When we see a problem, we can move resources quickly and bring them to bear.”5 Another IMF staff member differentiated two modes of World Bank response time based on internal funding: “Sometimes the World Bank has a trust fund and they still have money available and then they can be responsive. . . . If that is not the case, then it is a huge bureaucracy. We have a lean and hierarchical system. If there is an issue that we think is a problem, we can mobilize a mission and response in no time.”6

The theme of efficiency also plays out when the fund and bank produce joint reports. IMF staff reported in interviews that the bank often falls behind agreed-upon deadlines.7 A 2007 IMF–World Bank survey supports what interviewees expressed (See Table 1 below).8 Only 53 percent of IMF staff surveyed noted that they received “pertinent and timely” information

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4. Author interview of IMF staff member from the Monetary and Capital Markets Department, Washington, D.C., November 2014.
5. Author interview of IMF staff member from the Africa Department, Washington, D.C., September 2012.
6. Author interview of IMF staff member from the Monetary and Capital Markets Department, Washington, D.C., December 2014.
7. Author interview of IMF staff member from the Monetary and Capital Markets Department, Washington, D.C., December 2014.
8. 98 IMF and 48 World Bank staff members responded to the survey.
from the bank “to a large extent” while 16 percent responded “not at all.” World Bank staff reported higher rates of receiving timely information from the IMF. Staff from both institutions reported a much higher rate of providing timely information.

Table 1: IMF–World Bank Staff Views on Timely Information Sharing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>To a large extent</th>
<th>Somewhat</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>IMF</strong></td>
<td><strong>WB</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent have you received pertinent and timely inputs from the other institution?</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent have you provided pertinent and timely inputs to the other institution?</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>2%</td>
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(IMF and World Bank, 2007a:31)

The World Bank’s greater patience for multiple viewpoints also sometimes undermines confidence in its work from IMF staff. A senior staff member in the IMF’s Research Department, for example, describes his joint meeting with Bank officials as follows:

The World Bank is not very coherent. For example, at a joint meeting, there were three people from the Fund and twenty-five people from the Bank . . . We had already had a view that we had worked out before the meeting. The Bank staff, with twenty-five people, had twenty-five and a half to twenty-six viewpoints.9

This lack of coherence is most salient during difficult points of collaborative work where underlying biases can emerge and even boil over. One fund staff member who was interviewed, for instance, expressed that during frustrating periods of work with bank colleagues, a sense of smugness can emerge where IMF staff member views their own work as more important than what the bank is doing.

From the World Bank’s perspective, a more rigid and procedural norm found within the IMF around resource allocation and information sharing can also bog down collaborative work:

The Fund rules for sharing information on technical assistance are a bit more restrictive than the World Bank. For instance, a counterpart at the World Bank asked if I could share our technical assistance report. I contacted the mission chief. He told me that once the country authorities get the report, they have sixty days to say “no” to sharing. Up until then, you have to wait. Sometimes I think the World Bank thinks, “Why can’t you just share it with us?”10

The theme of rigidity also plays out in perceptions of IMF staff as overly conforming and uncreative problem solvers. Seabrooke’s study of FSAPs, for example, found that client states preferred IMF staff to have less IMF work experience and more private financial market experience in hopes of circumventing the “IMF’s groupthink” (2012: 495). Bank staff also articulated the notion that IMF are sometimes too focused on rules rather than thinking “outside the box” to find the best solution.11

Another key difference highlighted by several IMF staff is the belief that the IMF’s policies are more consistent due to what was described as a “rules-based” internal culture. When working with the World Bank, IMF staff complained that agreed upon policy direction can quickly shift with individual World Bank staff turnover, particularly at the mission chief level. When this occurs, country authorities can exploit these differences and subsequently avoid reform:

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10. Author interview of IMF staff member from the Monetary and Capital Markets Department, Washington, D.C., December 2014.
We are less flexible, but I also think we are more consistent. My experience is that the World Bank is sometimes quite person driven. An example is our joint work in [an African country]. At the beginning we had all these coordination meetings, and we were speaking the same language. And I found it extremely important that we were speaking the same language, because we were addressing a structural problem that was very difficult and had a lot of vested interests and rent seeking. We wanted to increase transparency and accountability in the natural resource sector. . . . The World Bank was perfectly behind us until their country director changed. The new country director found that the approach we have in African countries was too heavy handed, and we were being too intrusive. . . . For us, we wanted to keep up the pressure for reforms for more transparency and accountability. . . . As reforms remained stalled, our program expired while the World Bank continued with their lending. I believe that what happened in this case with the World Bank with the arrival of a new mission chief would have been more difficult at the IMF.12

When asked if these divisions were exploited by country authorities, the fund staff responded that “they played us off each other.” The staff member also emphasized that when the IMF and bank “spoke with one voice,” significant progress was being made in reforming the natural resource sector.13 Since the breakdown of collaboration between the IMF and World Bank, difficult structural issues have not been addressed. In this case, cultural differences rooted in organizational structure undermined high-quality collaboration with negative consequences for macroeconomic and development outcomes.

H2: Increased interaction and knowledge sharing reduces distrust and increases high-quality collaboration

A 2010 IMF–World Bank survey conducted for the JMAP highlights that IMF and World Bank staff reported that for staff working in LICs, “71 percent of Bank staff and 53 percent of Fund staff reporting being in contact at least weekly” (IMF 2010: 35). Despite this level of contact, our interviews show distrust exists between the IMF and World Bank staff. We find that this distrust is primarily the product of different organizational structure and institutional demands rather than a sense of institutional, professional, or individual superiority. Trust building is tied to informal and ad hoc team building facilitated by mission chiefs and project leaders. Increased trust is not, however, simply the product of more interaction. When clear institutional roles are provided, staff interact less, yet trust more.

When asked how they viewed their counterparts, interviewees consistently responded that their counterparts were well-qualified experts and had similar goals. As articulated by IMF staff member, “There is this idea that IMF staff are better trained. I don’t know if that is true . . . It’s not that we are smarter. That is nonsense.”14 A senior IMF staff member who was interviewed, argued that the primary variable that undermines trust between staff is rooted in diverging business models. The World Bank ultimately must produce income through promotion of projects in its member states. The fund is under no such financial constraint. IMF staff members are wary of the fact that their bank colleagues are under pressure to be “helpful” to country authorities rather than stand at a consistently “objective” distance. In the context of FSAPs, for example, bank assessment of the financial sector and solutions for improvement often call for greater World Bank involvement in project development. This position is not always shared by fund staff. Bank staff question, in turn, the fund’s preoccupation with objectivity over building relations with country officials, and argue that an overly rigid and heavy-handed approach can ultimately undermine developmental progress.

13. Ibid.
Trust building is also hampered during collaborative projects such as FSAPs due to, in part, differences in how each institution makes up their teams. Specific to FSAPs, teams are in-country for a two-week period. While all the IMF staff remain in-country during this period, individuals on the World Bank’s side come and go. This sense of discontinuity is reinforced by the fact that IMF and World Bank staff rarely work together as the same team more than once. As articulated by a fund staff member, this undermines trust:

Trust has to be built through personal interactions. I think if maybe the same people were going on different missions, if they work together well, you can build more trust. If you are constantly getting different people, do you trust that the institution is giving you the best partner?

Given these dynamics, staff who were interviewed highlighted the importance of mission chief interaction and communication prior to and during field work: “The good coordination comes at technical level and the mission chief level where you sit together and you try to coordinate your mission. That is where the coordination really takes place.” This also helps facilitate an environment where teams “pull on the same string” and focus in on their areas of expertise.

Communication and interaction among mission chiefs and team leaders also can stimulate creative problem solving:

When I was in [an African country], the World Bank had two full-time staff who did outreach. They had a little library and they were organizing once per month a huge conference for all of the NGOs. But because it is in the mutual interest that the NGOs understand what the World Bank is doing and what the IMF does, they invited me to all of these conferences. And they said, “You take ten minutes and explain the IMF angle.” And in the library, they gave me one shelf where I could put IMF publications and report. I found that to be great. It was super low cost and high impact.

While individual cases of effective communication and interaction exist between IMF and World Bank staff, the evidence suggests that this occurs with little formal support. Interviewees highlighted the ad hoc nature of collaborative team building. The 2007 JMAP also notes “coordination between the Bank and the Fund is largely left to individual country teams” (IMF–World Bank 2007:36).

One exception to this informal approach is the Financial Sector Liaison Committee (FSLC) that proactively works on collaboration. A 2014 review of the FSAP highlighted the role of FSLC as follows:

Frictions sometimes arise in connection with differences in Bank and Fund institutional priorities . . . FSLC will continue to be the place where these issues will be managed at the staff level as they emerge (IMF 2014:22).

Both bank and IMF staff who were interviewed highlighted the uniqueness of FSLC in the context of proactively improving collaborative work. Some also suggested that the FSLC model could be proved useful in other joint programs including the Poverty Reduction Strategies initiative where no such coordinating body currently exists.

When organizations share competence based trust, we should expect a high amount of knowledge sharing. As noted above, complaints around the timeliness of information sharing is a common theme among staff. However, staff who were interviewed didn’t see this as the result of a lack of trust in the competency of their colleagues: “There is never this discussion of ‘let’s not talk to them because we are better,’ ‘let’s not give them documents.’” The 2007 IMF–World Bank survey reiterated similar themes. While staff in both institutions “most often identified information sharing as the area in greatest need of improvement. . . . There is also some evidence that insufficient sharing may be due partly to a lack of clarity on what documents can be shared” (IMF–World Bank 2007a:41).

15. Author interview of IMF staff member from the Monetary and Capital Markets Department, Washington, D.C., December 2014.
17. Author interview of IMF staff member from the Monetary and Capital Markets Department, Washington, D.C., December 2014.
Several interviewees also said that due to time constraints and the work load, too much information and time spent on unproductive collaborative work undermines the quality of joint projects. Senior staff members at the World Bank and the IMF involved with the FSAP emphasized how a 2009 reform that clearly separated institutional roles both reduced inter-institutional face time, but improved the quality of joint product. This suggests that simply more interaction and information sharing does not necessarily enhance trust and quality of collaboration.

Conclusion
A historical overview of IMF–World Bank relations highlights trends of mutual mistrust and periodic turf war flare-ups between the Bretton Woods twins. While inter-institutional joint projects have increased since the late 1990s, the quality of collaboration remains inconsistent. Drawing from constructivism and the organizational management literature, we theorized and tested why high-quality collaboration remains elusive. Evidence derived from staff interviews, policy documents, and surveys suggests that cultural dissimilarity undermines the quality of collaborative work in several critical areas. These include efficiency in decision making, timeliness of reports, and shifts in policy positions during collaborative processes.

A methodological focus on micro-processes of IMF–World Bank staff interaction reveals that inter-institutional distrust is not tied to personal or professional feelings of superiority. Rather, mutual distrust stems primarily from different institutional mandates and business models. We also found evidence that trust building between IMF and World Bank staff is primarily done on an ad hoc, informal basis. Evidence from interviewees also shows the importance of mission chief and team leadership in trust building. When mission chiefs and staff meet prior to negotiations with country officials, trust and confidence is enhanced. Informal contact and social time with colleagues also reinforces trust and the quality of collaboration.

This article also advances the literature empirically through documentation of staff “buy in” into collaboration. Interviewees didn’t see efforts by management to improve collaboration as a waste of time. Rather, they expressed that low-quality collaboration produces “real” detrimental effects on outcomes in member states. Staff, however, are wary of efforts that produce more but not necessarily better collaboration. They highlight the 2009 FSAP reform, which clearly delineated IMF and World Bank responsibilities, as a practical and positive measure to maximize institutional comparative advantage.

Future studies should develop and test more fully several theoretical concepts advanced in this article. We introduced and operationalized the concept of high-quality collaboration and provided evidence from a small sample of cases that cultural dissimilarity and distrust undermines the effectiveness of joint IMF–World Bank work. Variables including cultural proximity and trust provide a foundation for analysis and prediction of the extensity and quality of collaboration between the two institutions. A large N study that quantifies and measures over a broader sample of countries the relationship between metrics of high-quality collaboration relative to cultural dissimilarity and trust would serve as the next logical step in our research agenda.

REFERENCES


Designing Cooperation among International Organizations: The Quest for Autonomy, the Dual-Consensus Rule, and Cooperation Failure

by Rafael Biermann, University of Jena

Research on interaction among international organizations has identified several factors limiting the effectiveness of cooperation. This article discusses an institutional design factor prevalent in all cooperation projects: the dual consensus rule. It implies that cooperation can only proceed when consensus has been reached both within and among organizations. The article argues that the dual consensus rule is induced by the autonomy-maximizing approach of member states and international bureaucracies. The dual consensus rule acts like a narrow filter, allowing only those aggregated preferences that all actors can agree on to turn into joint decisions. Given the large amount of potential veto players when two or more organizations interact, dysfunctions might easily arise, in particular when preferences strongly diverge and some intransigent outliers block cooperation. The resulting cooperation failure invites strategies ranging from bypassing to outright unilaterism. The article advocates a modification of the dual consensus rule in the early institutional design phase of cooperation when this effectiveness-control dilemma becomes evident. The theoretical framework is tested by tracing the causes of cooperation failure in two cases: EU–NATO cooperation since 1999 and UN–NATO cooperation in Bosnia 1993–95.

Cooperation among international governmental organizations has become a defining feature of global governance. However, disillusionment is widespread. The frequent lack of substantial cooperation runs counter to the dire need to pool or share resources in order to effectively tackle refugee crises, world economic downturns, and international terrorism. Cooperation failure among international organizations is hardly a new phenomenon; however, it is gaining relevance as international organizations proliferate and increasingly overlap (for an overview see Cropper et al., 2008; Biermann 2011; Jørgensen et al., 2013; Biermann and Koops, forthcoming).

Scholars have identified multiple factors that help explain why international organizations often fail to cooperate effectively. Rationalist accounts stress resource dependence and insufficient environmental pressure (Biermann 2008, 2014; Brosig 2011; Gest and Grigorescu 2010; Lipson 2011; Harsch 2015; Biermann and Harsch forthcoming). Constructivist and psychological accounts point to a lack of openness to cooperate due to diverging organizational cultures (Liese 2009), incompatible identities and norms among organizations (Joachim et al., 2015), adverse legitimacy assessments (Biermann, forthcoming), antagonistic relationships (Schäferhoff 2009; Hendrickson and Kille 2010), and distrust (Schnitzer and Stephenson 2006; Brugger, Hasenclever, and Kasten, forthcoming).

1. Earlier drafts of this article were presented at the Annual Meeting of American Political Science Association 2008 in Boston, at the Annual Conference of the International Studies Association 2011 in Montreal, at the General Conference of the European Consortium of Political Science the same year in Reykjavik, and at the Pan-European Conference of the European International Studies Association 2013 in Warsaw. The author would like to thank all the discussants and especially the two anonymous reviewers for their challenging feedback.

2. See the long-standing debate about donor coordination in development aid and disaster management (Cox et al., 1973: 381–88; Riddell, 2009).
All these factors influence the formation of individual preferences of member states and international bureaucracies when deciding whether and how much to cooperate with other organizations. However, scholars have hardly investigated how these preferences are aggregated on the intra- and the inter-organizational level to produce joint decisions on cooperation. This process is shaped by institutional design factors, which have been neglected so far in the literature. This is particularly true for the institutional design factor discussed herein, the dual consensus rule, which implies that cooperation can only proceed when consensus has been reached both within and among organizations. This rule gains prominence when preferences on cooperation are aggregated in the process of collective bargaining, coalition-building, and decision-making within and among organizations. Individual preferences and the diverse causes of their formation mentioned above do play a role. However, this article is mainly concerned with aggregated preferences and, thus, with the distribution of preferences across organizations and how this preference structure constrains or enables cooperation.

My goal is to elucidate the effect of the dual consensus rule on the intensity of inter-organizational cooperation. I distinguish four intensity levels (modifying Biermann 2008: 165). Cooperation is strong when partners engage in joint decision-making on major issues, often involving ambitious projects with shared responsibility and division of labor. Cooperation is moderate when partners engage in joint decision-making but exclude essential issues. Cooperation of this level experiences ups and downs such as serious delays in decision-making. Cooperation is minimal when joint decisions are rare or nonexistent and cooperation is largely confined to occasional representation in joint meetings and inconsistent sharing of basic information. Cooperation is absent when partners who would profit from cooperation forego cooperation in favor of unilateralism.

Since all inter-organizational relationships basically follow the dual consensus rule, we have no variance on the variable we are most interested in. However, I argue that the intensity of cooperation depends on the interplay of preferences and decision rules. Here we do have variance, namely concerning the preference distribution within and among organizations. Only those preferences that all decision-makers agree on pass through the narrow filter, the dual consensus rule, and turn into joint inter-organizational decisions on cooperation. Thus, the dual consensus rule acts as a conditioning context variable that filters aggregated preferences and co-determines whether and how much organizations cooperate.

I proceed as follows. The next theoretical chapter will, in the first section, try to understand why organizations insist on dual consensus. I argue that the inclination of member states and international bureaucracies to guard their autonomy is the major motivation for institutionalizing the dual consensus rule. The second section will discuss the advantages and disadvantages of dual consensus, highlighting its dialectic nature, which enhances member-state control and the legitimacy of decisions but risks undermining cooperation. Cooperation failure might range from delays to blockage. This depends on the specific preference distribution among member states and international bureaucracies. An analytical framework will sum up the major theoretical argument up to this point. The first chapter will close with a section discussing how member states and international bureaucracies might react to the dysfunctions the dual consensus rule stimulates, ranging from acceptance to changing the rule. The second chapter will apply this theoretical framework to two cases: EU–NATO cooperation since 1999 and UN–NATO cooperation in Bosnia 1993–95. The case studies trace the evolution of cooperation intensity among the partners in phases and investigate the causal impact of the dual consensus rule. I will close with a case comparison, some theoretical conclusions, and policy recommendations.

A remark on case selection is warranted. Since the goal is a plausibility probe exploring the relevance of one variable, the dual consensus rule, most likely cases were selected that

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3. See Hylike Dijkstra (forthcoming) who discusses major design variables without, however, linking them causally to cooperation. He does not consider decision rules.
vividly demonstrate the impact of that rule. These are cases of apparent cooperation failure. Such cases point to the destructive effect the dual consensus rule can have, given adverse preference distributions. Nevertheless, there still exists useful variance on the outcome since both cases progress through stages of degenerating cooperation intensity and because final results range from minimal formal cooperation (EU–NATO) to outright unilateralism (UN–NATO).

The EU–NATO case has been widely studied as a case of cooperation failure, but the dual consensus rule has so far been neglected as a causal factor. Conversely, the UN–NATO case is hardly recognized by scholars studying inter-organizational relations, but the dual consensus rule figures prominently in the historical accounts that do exist. Apart from the extensive academic literature on that case, the EU–NATO study benefited from interviews conducted in 2011 with high-ranking NATO and EU officials in Brussels. The UN–NATO study is based on a UN evaluation of the crucial Srebrenica episode (Annan 1999), memoirs of major participants (Holbrooke 1998; Rose 1998), a U.S. Airforce study (Owen 2000), and the vast literature of the Bosnian war in general and UN–NATO relations in particular.

The Dual Consensus Rule in Inter-organizational Relations

Autonomy Concerns

When considering whether and how much to cooperate with another organization, member states and international bureaucracies have to reconcile potentially conflicting goals. The aim to solve problems jointly might conflict with the self-referential interest to guard one’s own autonomy against loss of control. Autonomy concerns, defined here as “to be not under the control of others,” are widely discussed in the literature on cooperation (Haftel and Thompson 2006: 255–56, referencing Robert Dahl). On the state level, realists, as well as rational institutionalists claim that states strive to retain their autonomy in an anarchic, self-help system in order to avoid the “vulnerability that high interdependence entails” (Waltz 1979: 106; also Keohane and Nye 1977). On the intra-organizational level, principal-agent scholars discuss how member states (the principals) guard their decision-making autonomy within international organizations by employing multiple mechanisms to control the international bureaucracies (their agents) and prevent agency slack (Hawkins et al., 2006). Institutional constructivists argue that international bureaucracies pursue their own autonomous preferences and agendas by diffusing norms and fixing meanings (Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 2004).

On the inter-organizational level, resource dependence scholars portray autonomy as the key to securing organizational survival. They perceive “a constant struggle for autonomy and discretion” (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003: 257) among organizations as they strive to gain access to critical resources held by others, while simultaneously minimizing their dependence on those others. Likewise, the literature on cooperation among national bureaucracies argues that government agencies “attach very high priority to controlling their own resources” and are “reluctant to undertake shared operations involving . . . other organizations” for fear of “interference” (Halperin 1974: 51–3; also Niskanen 1971).

Thus, it is not surprising that autonomy concerns loom large also in the literature on cooperation among international organizations (see Barnett and Coleman 2005; Gerspacher and Dupont 2007). Biermann (2008: 158–61) observes that organizations frequently avoid cooperation, because it entails compromising autonomy, i.e., adjusting to the preferences of partners. This confirms the findings of organization theory, which argues that organizations prefer “not be become involved” in inter-organizational cooperation unless they face strong incentives to do so (Van de Ven 1976: 28). Consequently, “the structure of inclusive decision-making is customarily very weak, with a minimum of authority, a high salience for self-orientation among parties, and a consequent difficulty in making concerted decisions” (Ibid.: 26, quoting Warren Roland; also Galaskiewicz 1985; but see Oliver 1991).

Empirical evidence strongly supports this argument. A high-level panel investigating coherence within the UN system bemoaned that “even when mandates intersect UN enti-
ties tend to operate alone with little synergy and coordination” (United Nations Development Group 2006). A report on coordination among international humanitarian organizations in refugee crises reports “a saying that ‘you cannot DO coordination to people who do not want to be coordinated’” (Porter 1999: 5), and security experts frequently refer to “stove piping” or “siloing” as a habit to cooperate hierarchically within the own chain of command but not horizontally with others (Biermann 2011: 176).

The major reason for autonomy concerns in inter-organizational cooperation is structural. When international governmental organizations interact, three levels of decision-making are involved: a national, an intra-organizational, and an inter-organizational level. Bargaining is complex and time-consuming, requires painful compromises, and increases uncertainty. Final decisions might diverge strongly from individual preferences for four reasons. First, in order to reach decisions bargaining must take place both on and between all three levels. Second, organizations are composite actors with multiple decision-making centres internally, which opens up a scenario of “diffuse accountability and division of responsibility” (Jönsson 1993: 464). Third, since the mode of decision-making among organizations is always voluntary and non-hierarchical, compromises have to be struck not only within but also between organizations, which reduces the control of governments over outcomes. Fourth, when international bureaucracies bargain on behalf of organizations, retaining control becomes even more difficult for member states.

The Dual Consensus Rule—Pros and Cons

The resulting autonomy-maximizing approach is reflected in the “dual consensus rule” (Kupferschmidt 2006: 26). It is an institutionalized control mechanism to guard the autonomy of member states and international bureaucracies when organizations cooperate.

Decision rules determine how decisions are made. They mediate between member-state preferences and organizational output and come into play particularly when preferences are aggregated within and among organizations. Decision rules range from unanimity to (qualified) majority voting to weighted voting (Rittberger and Zangl 2010: 68). Consensus rule is a soft variant of the unanimity rule. The UN Office of Legal Affairs defines consensus rule as the “adoption of a decision without formal objections and vote; this being possible only when no delegation formally objects to a consensus being recorded, though some delegations may have reservations” (cited in Klabbers 2009: 208).

When organizations cooperate, they usually agree on the need for consensus. Formal voting is avoided; informal consensus building is the rule. The resulting dual consensus rule implies that cooperation can only proceed when consensus has been reached both within and among organizations. Therefore, the dual consensus rule structures decision-making among organizations, limits the intensity of cooperation to what is agreeable to all, and impacts the capacity of organizations to solve problems jointly.

Since the mid-1960s, the consensus rule has gained prominence in international governance as a norm inspiring inclusive and participatory decision-making. It has three advantages. First, it protects state sovereignty and, thus, prioritizes member-state control. In contrast to majority rule, which allows outvoting, states are not bound against their will. The egalitarian thrust of consensus rule is especially valued by less powerful members. Second, consensus rule ensures broad-based support for decisions by enhancing their legitimacy—this stimulates compliance. Third, compared to unanimity rule, the absence of formal voting and the lower degrees of support necessary facilitate consensus-building. Advocates portray the consensus rule as the smart middle ground that avoids both the inefficiencies of unanimity rule and the legitimacy problems of majority rule.

However, the consensus rule is criticized for being “essentially a re-introduction of the unanimity principle” (Lindell 1988: 176). In reality, “each and every participant in the decision-making process retains the right of veto” (Klabbers 2009: 208). Critics argue that “the
large amount of negative power implicit in consensus procedures” (Buzan 1981: 345) poses a veto player problem similar to that prevalent under unanimity rule.

A veto player is “an individual or a collective actor whose agreement is required for a policy decision”; she can “block the adoption of a policy” (Tsebelis 1995: 293, 305). Within and among organizations, member states are the major veto players; further veto players might exist within member states. International bureaucracies may become de facto veto players. However, the willingness of the veto players to cooperate and compromise depends on the overall preference distribution, in particular on three factors: the number of potential veto players, the extent of preference heterogeneity, and individual preference intensity.

First, the larger the number of potential veto players, the greater the chances that one of them uses the veto to block decisions (Nielsen and Tierney 2003: 248). The number of veto players is determined by decision rules. Consensus rule maximizes their number (Rittberger and Zangl 2010: 68). When each member state can block joint decisions, this “may boil down to the rule of minority” and lead to “supreme conservatism” (Romme 2004: 706). As a result, many organizations have opted for qualified majority rule or weighted voting in order to avoid gridlock (Blake and Payton 2009: 23; Peters 2013). The trend within the EU to progressively increase qualified majority voting parallel to recent enlargements reflects this rationale. However, when cooperating with other organizations the same organizations stick to the consensus rule, even though the number of veto players is much larger. This holds even when we account for membership overlap (or what is called “dual members”).

Second, more important than numbers is the extent of preference heterogeneity within and among organizations. The more preferences diverge and partners disagree on whether or how much to cooperate, the more arduous it is to agree on joint action under the dual consensus rule. Most relevant are those member states or international bureaucracies advocating outlier positions at the extremes of the preference spectrum. We should expect veto players to form coalitions both within and across organizations with like-minded actors on the national, the intra-organizational, and the inter-organizational level.

Third, veto players vary in terms of their preference intensity, i.e., their commitment to the position they advocate and their willingness to compromise. This depends on perceived issue salience. We know from intra-organizational research that member states are less willing to relinquish control and compromise when issues are perceived as “high stakes” (Gould 2006: 281, 285; Hawkins et al., 2006: 27–32). The more veto players perceive an issue as highly salient and are, therefore, committed to their preferences, the less they are willing to compromise. Under the consensus rule, one such player can be enough to spoil cooperation.

Reaching joint decisions under the dual consensus rule is challenging. One other factor further complicates preference aggregation. It is the multilevel, bottom-up mode of inter-organizational decision-making, which is organized like a Russian doll. First, domestic actors have to agree on a national position, governments within each organization have to consent, and then an issue can be decided among partner organizations. Even though bargaining is often not sequential, the inter-organizational level is hostage to prior agreement on the other levels.

The dual consensus rule poses an effectiveness-control dilemma: it maximizes member-state control and legitimizes joint decisions but risks undermining the effectiveness of cooperation. It is particularly severe when the number of potential veto players is large, preferences diverge strongly, and some veto players are unwilling to compromise. The following diagram summarizes the main argument:

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4. Subsequently, the concept of Tsebelis is refined for our purposes.

5. See also Cox and Jacobson (1973: 386) on program and operational decisions.
Dysfunctions and Remedies

The selection of the dual consensus rule in inter-organizational relations has consequences for the intensity of cooperation and, therefore, the amount of problem-solving that is achievable. The veto player problem signals that governments have to pay a price for institutionalizing the dual consensus rule. According to Kupferschmidt (2006: 140), the scenario is “prone to disruption.” Four types of dysfunctions might occur: First, delays in decision-making due to diverging preferences that need to be reconciled; second, selective non-cooperation on particular issues where consensus cannot be achieved; third, lowest common denominator decisions that all partners can agree on; and fourth, blockage of an entire partnership when compromise on essentials cannot be achieved.

These dysfunctions may simply be accepted as inevitable. Alternatively, effectiveness-minded member states and international bureaucracies might devise strategies to enable the decisions they deem necessary. They can bypass vetoes by utilizing informal channels of cooperation, they can terminate cooperation altogether and fall back into unilateral action, or they can change the decision rule.

Bypassing replaces dysfunctional channels of cooperation with informal ones in order to work around vetoes. Thus, member states might form new fora that exclude the dissenters, they might create informal formats where decision-making is avoided, or they might allow international bureaucracies to take the initiative (Martin 2006: 153; Gould 2006: 292; Hawkins and Jacoby 2006: 225–27). Such strategies of informalization are ambivalent. Bypassing can be essential to keeping a relationship going. Some have called this “functional informality” (Mayntz 1998: 64, translation of the author) or “expedient illegality” (Luhmann 1976: 312,

6. The theoretical argument disregards that preference formation and preference aggregation do interact. They are in reality not two sequential phases. Actors might anticipate the overall preference distribution, prospective vetoes, and the necessity of dual consensus when determining their own preferences. Thus, preference aggregation might feed back into preference formation and vice versa. The blue arrow reflects this interdependence.
translation of the author), especially if formalization follows. However, bypassing is risky, opaque, and minimalist. It is an unpredictable *ad hoc* arrangement that depends on the ups and downs of personal relations and on the naysayers’ tolerance. “Decisions” lack accountability and legitimacy and remain nonbinding. Moreover, major decisions cannot be made.

Unilateralism signals unmistakably that cooperation has failed. It is more blatant and terminal than bypassing. In order to avoid such dysfunctions, the dual consensus rule itself might be modified. Within organizations, several measures have proven effective in overcoming the problematic side-effects of the consensus rule. First, majority voting is used in organizations, such as the WTO, if all efforts to reach consensus have been exhausted. Second, “active consensus procedures” are employed to inspire consensus-building, such as delegating responsibility to executive heads when speedy, operational decisions are necessary or negotiations have reached gridlock (Buzan 1981: 346; also Tsebelis 1995: 307–08). Third, a “consensus-minus-one rule” might be introduced. This is how in 1991 the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) preserved its capacity to act when former Yugoslavia disintegrated and Serbia frustrated all efforts at finding a compromise.

Case Studies
In order to test the plausibility of this theoretical framework, I explore and compare two cases: First, EU–NATO cooperation since the creation of the Common Security and Defence Policy in 1999, and second, the “dual key arrangements” between the UN and NATO in Bosnia from 1993 to 1995. The goal is to trace the interaction of the dual consensus rule and the preference distribution, in particular the number of veto players, preference heterogeneity and preference intensity, and their effect on the intensity of cooperation. Since both cases are cases of cooperation failure, albeit to varying degrees, both illustrate the extent to which these variables contributed to the adverse outcomes.

It is remarkable that the EU, the UN, and NATO were willing to enter into those ambitious projects requiring substantial joint decision-making and compromise, even though both projects were “high politics” cases involving security affairs where autonomy concerns traditionally loom large. Seemingly, ambition did not match reality. EU–NATO relations degenerated to minimal official cooperation supplemented by bypassing. Most political actors and academic analysts blame Turkey for what officials call the “frozen conflict” (U.S. Department of State 2008), while neglecting the dual consensus rule as the root problem. UN–NATO relations likewise degenerated, went through a phase of bypassing, and ended in hardly disguised NATO unilateralism. Here, the drawbacks of the dual consensus rule were hotly debated.

For each case, I first discuss the autonomy concerns that gave rise to the dual consensus rule. This part also serves to lay the foundation for the subsequent analysis. Then the interplay of the dual consensus rule and the specific preference distribution during the years of interorganizational cooperation are analysed, focusing in particular on the dysfunctional effects these causal factors had on cooperation outcomes. Finally, the case studies analyze the strategies of bypassing and unilateralism devised by member states and international bureaucracies to mitigate these dysfunctional effects.

The EU–NATO Impasse
Strong autonomy concerns predated the formation of the EU–NATO partnership.\(^7\) When the EU embarked on its Common Foreign and Security Policy in 1991, it had to establish itself in a domain hitherto occupied by NATO. Whereas the EU tried to guard the autonomy of its fledgling security dimension, the alliance—especially its non-EU members, such as the U.S.,

\(^7\) The following is based on confidential interviews with key officials from NATO’s International and International Military Staff, from the EU Military Staff and the Commission, as well as from national embassies at NATO and the EU in Brussels in February 2011. References are restricted to quotes.
and its Atlanticist members, such as Britain—were eager to limit the EU’s rise (Menon, Forster, and Wallace 1992).

Once the EU established its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in 1999, and the future relationship of the EU and NATO had to be defined, autonomy concerns began to dominate partnership formation. The EU lacked critical resources for planning and conducting its own operations, such as headquarters and strategic airlift, and had to rely on NATO to provide them without having much to offer in return. NATO was willing to assist but on its own terms. Thus, the EU decided—following the landmark St. Malo Declaration of December 1998—to pursue a dual-track approach, combining “autonomous” EU-only operations and EU operations based on NATO assets and capabilities. This was a political compromise between the French-favored autonomy track and the British- and U.S.-favored NATO cooperation track. Preferences were intense and diverged strongly from the beginning.

The negotiations on how to devise rules and procedures for EU-led operations based on NATO assets resulted in the “Berlin plus” agreements of 2002. Even though the agreements remain largely classified, the public discourse accompanying the negotiations signalled how strongly concerns about autonomy, control, and dependence shaped this most ambitious project of inter-organizational cooperation (Reichard 2006). Whereas the EU, as the junior partner, tried to guard its autonomy in operations relying on NATO assets, the non-EU members and the Atlanticists within NATO were eager to protect NATO’s Cold-War primacy and control CSDP (Howorth 2007: 135–77; Biermann 2009; Hofmann 2014).

Three years of arduous negotiations resulted in an agreement aimed at strong cooperation, including NATO resource provision, joint decision-making on high-stakes issues, and a substantial division of labor. It required dense interaction among headquarters and in the field in peace operations, even though other issues of functional overlap such as enlargement were not addressed. The EU accepted a deal that restricted its autonomy in three ways (Gourlay 2004; Dembinski 2005: 61–80; Reichard 2006: 147–70). First, NATO reserved the right to decide on a case-by-case basis whether to provide its assets for EU operations. It could recall them any time. Second, EU operations employing NATO assets would be planned and commanded by NATO’s second-ranking general (DSACEUR) out of NATO’s Headquarters in Mons (SHAPE). Thus, NATO had a considerable voice in the EU’s chain of command. Third, the EU initially agreed to respect NATO’s “right of first refusal.” It would undertake operations only “when NATO as a whole is not engaged,” i.e., when the U.S. decided not to become involved.

The formation phase of the EU–NATO partnership had two major results: The preference distribution among member states and international bureaucracies was largely pre-determined, with “Europeanists” and “Atlanticists” within and across both organizations disagreeing about the relative relevance of the organizations in future European security governance. The major rules and procedures for cooperation were fixed, including the dual consensus rule, which was introduced without much debate. Given the strong autonomy concerns and their high salience in security affairs, it is understandable that the strict unanimity rule within both NATO and CSDP was simply transferred to the inter-organizational level. No government should be outvoted when missions are planned or conducted.

The problem was the veto player potential this combination of the dual consensus rule and the specific preference distribution produced. The number of veto players (including single and dual members) rose from twenty-three in 1999 to thirty-three today, due to the Eastern enlargement rounds of 2004 and 2007 and Croatia’s accession in 2013. As we will see, one of those accessions, the one of Cyprus, considerably contributed to complicating EU–NATO relations.

Still, even in 1999 the extent of preference heterogeneity was considerable, with the U.S. and Turkey openly opposing CSDP and Britain and France upholding the fragile consensus of St. Malo. Not only were there the traditional poles of hard and soft (or civilian) power protagonists, but there were deep rifts within the EU and NATO about whether the EU should
rely on “Berlin plus” operations with recourse to NATO assets (many of them U.S. assets) or instead privilege its own autonomous operations (Howorth 2007: 146–60). The more the EU developed its own capacity to plan and conduct autonomous operations, the less it would have to rely on NATO and its hegemon. This “scope problem” (Yost 2007: 98–103) concerning the future role of CSDP and the extent of EU–NATO cooperation dominated the partnership, not the least due to the conflict about the U.S. intervention in Iraq 2003.

Consequently, joint decision-making experienced ups and downs. The combination of the dual consensus rule and the adverse preference configuration made consensus-building difficult. Still, the preference intensity of Europeanists and Atlanticists was not so rigid as to allow no compromises. On the one hand, preferences converged sufficiently to reach consensus on the “Berlin plus” agreements and on a dense schedule of regular official meetings, institutionalize joint working groups, and jointly initiate and conduct the first two military operations in Bosnia and Macedonia. On the other hand, cooperation experienced serious delays and became selective due to multiple vetoes by varying members of both organizations. Thus, a British veto has been preventing the EU from establishing its own headquarters separate from NATO’s since 2003. Some NATO and EU missions, such as in Darfur, ran parallel because member states vetoed joint action. During the “Berlin plus” negotiations, Turkish and Greek vetoes postponed the document’s signing for two years. Afterward, U.S. reservations delayed the handover of the NATO mission in Bosnia to the EU for another year (Kupferschmidt 2006). Major joint security concerns, such as fighting terrorism or proliferation, were hardly addressed.

Overall, the intensity of cooperation was modest. This was much less than originally envisioned but still acceptable as long as vetoes were confined to single issues. This changed once Cyprus entered the EU in 2004. Since that year, Turkey’s non-recognition of Cyprus and its commitment to strictly enforce this stance in NATO–EU relations has effectively blocked the partnership on the official level.

Turkey does not agree to official NATO–EU meetings with Cyprus at the table, and the EU, especially Greece, declines to meet without Cyprus.8 Official meetings on Bosnia (a project arranged before Cyprus entered the EU) are the exception, but NATO’s interest in Bosnia has become minor. Thus, missions where both organizations work side by side, such as in Afghanistan, Kosovo, or Somalia, are officially not discussed at all. Formal ministerial meetings have been abandoned altogether. The frequency of ambassadorial meetings has dropped to a bare minimum, as have the meetings of the Military Committees.9 Those meetings still taking place have become ritualistic.10 Even official information-sharing is strongly curtailed.

Therefore, official cooperation has become minimal—it is sporadic, inconsistent, and highly selective. The preference change of one NATO member, Turkey, sufficed to deadlock official EU–NATO relations across the board. Different from the first phase of cooperation, this veto player, perceiving the non-recognition of Cyprus as a high stakes issue, is playing a zero-sum game and is unwilling to compromise as a matter of principle.11 The trigger for this “participation problem” (Yost 2007: 92–6) was the accession of one country, Cyprus, to the organization, the EU, that imported the looming conflict between a NATO and an EU member state into EU–NATO relations. Within the EU, Greece and Cyprus reacted accordingly. Due to the dual consensus rule, one veto player took the entire EU–NATO partnership hostage.

All initiatives to overcome this deadlock failed, especially after France returned to NATO’s integrated command structure (Keohane 2009: 134–35). The major challenges the participation problem, the scope problem, and their interaction. Turkey is backed by those not

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8. The Turkish and Cypriot arguments are reproduced in Acikmese and Triantaphyllou (2012); Yost (2007: 92–6); and Missiroli (2002: 9–26).
9. According to an exchange of letters from January 2001, foreign ministers should meet at least once, ambassadors three times, and the military representatives two times per semester.
10. One official from the EU Military Staff characterizes these encounters as „phantom meetings reminiscent of Communist party congresses”; interview on 16 February 2011.
11. Turkey vetoes cooperation in many institutions once Cyprus is at the table, such as the UN Conference on Disarmament, the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) or the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Development (BSEC).
eager to see EU–NATO relations flourish. While “Berlin plus” is increasingly hollowed out, with no new joint missions having been mandated since 2004, the autonomization of CSDP proceeds. NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer (2007) publicly criticized these “well-known differences of opinion,” which put a “heavy burden on NATO-EU relations.” His successor Anders Føgh Rasmussen warned that “these problems have spread far beyond Turkey and Greece,” undermining missions such as those in Afghanistan, where both organizations cannot conclude agreements on mutual support.12 Whether new initiatives are more successful to overcome the deadlock following the Ukraine crisis since 2014 remains to be seen.

Actors, such as the UK and Germany, who are dissatisfied with the status quo, have attempted to “get things done” not by modifying the dual consensus rule but by working around the impasse. They have designed informal meetings, such as the “Transatlantic Dinners,”13 that avoid official agendas, minutes, communiqués, and decisions, and allow Turkey and Cyprus to sit at one table (Hofmann and Reynolds 2007: 4; Kupferschmidt 2006: 14). They have also allowed the respective bureaucracies to compensate for the dysfunctions. On the headquarters level, NATO secretaries-general and EU high representatives meet frequently to exchange vital information, encourage their staff to cooperate, and arrange member-state meetings on emerging crises (see Kupferschmidt 2006: 14–6). The last office-holders, Anders Føgh Rasmussen and Catherine Ashton, undertook several initiatives to improve cooperation. Joint capabilities development has been a chief concern.

In fact, the international staff have become the pacemakers of cooperation. “Reality forces us to cooperate,” explains a high-level official.14 This is facilitated by the common culture among the military and the long-standing military ties across both organizations. Those serving in one organization have frequently also served in the other, and some of the co-nationals have served together on the national level. As loyal officers, they take into account member-state positions when coordinating across organizations and try to keep their capitals “in the loop.” Seconded staff feed their own policy papers into national line ministries, which then table them as national papers in both organizations in order to maintain the façade of national prerogative and control. When major decisions cannot be made, authority is left to drift down to the commanders in the field. They have a vital interest in sorting out practical solutions for joint problems, such as delineating overlapping tasks (e.g., between police and military), coordinating rules of engagement, tracking staff on duty, or arranging “in extremis” evacuation in case of crisis. Sometimes, such as in Kosovo, commanders conclude a memorandum of understanding that is later endorsed on the political level. Often, such as at the coast of Somalia, parallel missions are coordinated without leaving a paper trail.

Turkey tolerates these workarounds as long as they are not raised to the political level, and it has consented to NATO’s Lisbon Summit Declaration (2010),15 which is interpreted by officials as a low-level active consensus measure endorsing the informal cooperation. Still, the exact threshold of Turkey’s tolerance is difficult to determine. Some papers that are deliberately left unclassified and anonymous are stopped by Turkey. Most cooperation is not mandated. Much depends on personal “chemistry” among boundary-spanners16 and their willingness to use the discretion granted by member states. The goal is to keep up low-key, day-to-day cooperation.

It should be noted that the role of member states and international bureaucracies we observe here contradicts early principal-agent assumptions, as well as the sociological stud-

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12. Rasmussen says strained Turkish-Greek ties affect NATO, South East European Times, 26 August 2009.
13. These meetings of NATO and EU foreign ministers plus the NATO secretary-general and the EU high representative take place once a year at the margins of the UN General Assembly.
15. Par. 11 reads: “We welcome the recent initiatives from several Allies and the ideas proposed by the Secretary General . . . [We] encourage the Secretary General to continue to work with the EU High Representative . . . .”
16. High Representative Xavier Solana, a former NATO secretary-general, cooperated closely with his first counterpart in NATO, George Robertson. In contrast, his relationship with Jaap de Hoop Scheffer was “non-existent,” even informed by “mutual disdain.” Relations between Catherine Ashton and Anders Føgh Rasmussen were again productive; confidential interview with a leading NATO official, Brussels, 14 Feb. 2011.
ies on dysfunctions and pathologies of international bureaucracies. The dysfunctions in NATO–EU relations are caused by “principal problems” (Thompson 2007), not by run-away, unaccountable international bureaucracies. Conflicting principals open up space for agent autonomy (see also Hawkins and Jacoby 2006: 225–27). Effectiveness-minded member states and international bureaucracies join ranks to mitigate these problems. Their goal is to see the NATO–EU partnership succeed and guard the reputation of their own organization (see also Elsig 2011: 495–517). This agency shift is a consequence of “intentional choice” (Martin 2006: 153; but see Gould 2006: 292) by effectiveness-minded member states. The resulting large amount of staff discretion in a “high politics” case is surprising.

To summarize, EU–NATO cooperation has experienced a downturn in two phases. In the first phase (1999–2004), conflicting preferences complicated joint decision making while permitting moderate cooperation. The extent of preference heterogeneity and the preference intensity of Europeanists and Atlanticists still allowed the organizations to reach a consensus, though not on all issues. During the second phase (since 2004), Turkey’s unrelenting commitment to take the dual consensus rule hostage to its national agenda has reduced the official partnership to minimal cooperation, which is offset by informal cooperation via bypassing. Overall, the case demonstrates the drawbacks of the dual consensus rule, when one intransigent member state with strong preference intensity is willing to take an entire inter-organizational partnership hostage for its national agenda. It is remarkable that no decision rule change has been advocated.

The Dual-Key Arrangements in Bosnia
In this case, autonomy concerns reach back to the founding years of NATO and the UN. During the Cold War, subordination under the UN Security Council, where Moscow has a veto, would have undermined the core purpose of NATO: a collective defense against a potential Soviet attack (Kaplan 2010: 6–25). NATO’s Charter refers only to Article 51 of the UN Charter, which affirms the right of individual and collective self-defense and avoids any mention of the Chapter VIII provisions on “regional arrangements”; this would require NATO to seek Security Council authorization for its operations and to keep the council fully informed.

Once the alliance engaged in its first peace operations after the Cold War and began to cooperate with the UN, NATO’s “aversion to explicit subservience” (Smith-Windsor 2011: 27) led to two models of cooperation. Under the “subcontracting model” NATO is requested by the Security Council to execute tasks within terms set by the council; this is the default model for the UN’s cooperation with all regional organizations. In contrast, under the “autonomy model,” NATO acts without UN authorization, such as in Kosovo in 1999 (see Leurdijk 2003: 57–74). NATO reserves the right to decide on a case-by-case basis which model to choose.

These conflicting preferences reached the operational level once both organizations started to cooperate in 1992 (Biermann 2014). Responding to a request by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who was in dire need of NATO’s robust military resources to implement the ambitious Security Council resolutions on Bosnia, NATO confirmed its preparedness to support UN operations. However, decisions would be taken on a “case-by-case basis and in accordance with our own procedures” (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 1992). Whereas Boutros-Ghali asserted that his “aim is to see that in any new division of labour, the United Nations retains its primacy . . . while its burden is lightened” (quoted in Leurdijk 1998: 458), NATO Secretary-General Manfred Wörner cautioned that “NATO cannot be regarded as an instrument or as a military subcontractor to the United Nations. . . . Both must retain the possibility to act independently” (quoted in Yost 2007: 40).

NATO initially accepted the subcontracting model. This clearly was a test case. NATO was not only willing to implement UN mandates but subjected its decision-making autonomy to a UN veto. NATO agreed to back up two UN resolutions with its air power: monitoring and enforcing the ban of military flights in the Bosnian airspace (UN Security Council 1993a)
and deterring attacks on the “safe areas” of Bihac, Gorazde, Srebrenica, Tuzla, and Zepa (UN Security Council 1993b). In these cities, which were besieged by Serb artillery, an undermanned and understaffed UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) desperately needed air support to deter a Serb conquest, protect the civilians, and keep corridors open for humanitarian aid. The result was a joint project aimed at strong cooperation with ambitious goals, substantial joint decision-making, and a clear division of labor in an issue area essential for both organizations.

Both resolutions required NATO to act “under the authority of the Security Council and subject to close coordination with the Secretary-General and UNPROFOR.” Thus, UN and NATO Headquarters had to reach consensus on the employment of NATO air power. The negotiations resulted in a written, still unpublished agreement, called the dual key arrangements, which was unanimously approved by the Security Council and the North Atlantic Council (NAC). It required prior consent of both organizations for any air strike. If the UN did not turn its “key,” NATO could not act. According to Richard Holbrooke (1998: 72), “the ‘dual key’ was a ‘dual veto.’”

NATO put aside its autonomy concerns to a surprising degree. There were some widely shared motivational factors at the time, such as the strong pressure to end the escalating Bosnian war and the desire to re-establish NATO’s legitimacy after the Cold War. However, accepting this deal was motivated by a more specific distribution of preferences. Actually, the combined number of eighteen veto players in UN and NATO was relatively limited. However, these veto players strongly disagreed about how much leeway NATO should have to use force. And this preference configuration led to the formation of a rare cross-organizational coalition. Within the Security Council, not only Russia and China but also Britain and France insisted on the dual consensus rule, which amounted to a “checking” role for the UN (Hendrickson 2006: 50). The major goal was to protect the British and French UNPROFOR troops and avert the massive air strikes the Clinton administration, which had no troops on the ground in Bosnia, pressed for. Within NATO, Britain and France took a similarly restrained position, which was supported by other troop contributors such as the Netherlands. Due to the strong commitment of all players to their conflicting preferences, this was highly controversial within the alliance. According to a U.S. official, the debate was “as bitter and rancorous a discussion as has ever taken place in the alliance” (quoted in Daalder 2000: 22).

However, convening the Security Council and the NAC each time an air strike was requested was impossible. Thus, approval authority was entrusted to the secretaries-general. They were closer to the realities on the ground, could react more swiftly, and communicate effectively with the partner organization. This active consensus measure reduced the number of veto players and greatly alleviated the drawbacks of the dual consensus rule.

The NATO secretary-general further relaxed control when he passed his approval authority down to the Combined Air Operations Centre in Vicenza, Italy. The commander in Vicenza decided whether NATO’s aircraft could take off for Bosnia and which targets to strike (Reed 2000: 399–402). In contrast, the UN secretary-general kept the “key” for himself. Requests from UNPROFOR local commanders for air strikes had to climb up five steps of approval. Each authorizing unit could veto the request. Thus, the UN secretary-general prioritized control: civilian control of the military, UN Headquarters control of the field mission, and UN control of NATO. Distrust that NATO might initiate air strikes too readily was a major motive.

The threat of air strikes posed a serious dilemma for the UN. Indispensable as it was for deterrent purposes, its execution would put UN impartiality into doubt, erode the Serb consent necessary for the peacekeeping mission, expose the UNPROFOR troops to Serb retribution, and undermine the humanitarian relief effort and the ongoing peace negotiations. This was the view of Boutros-Ghali personally, of most Security Council members, of the UN high com-

17. The sixteen NATO members at the time plus two of the P5 (Russia and China), which were not NATO members. This number disregards, due to their half-yearly rotation, the non-permanent Security Council members, some of which were NATO members.

18. The fact that NATO’s chain of command was “de facto all-American” facilitated this decision (Campbell, 2000: 91–2).
missioner for refugees, and of the troop-contributing countries. Boutros-Ghali, representing the Security Council, had to respect the preference heterogeneity among its members. Consequently, he favored a restrictive, minimalist interpretation of the air power option (Annan 1999: 26, 104). The critics of the dual key arrangements within NATO heavily criticized the UN chain of command from the outset.

The rules of engagement for airstrikes further strengthened the position of the dual key protagonists. They moved UN Headquarters into an agenda-setting role; military aircraft violating the no-fly zone would only be attacked as a last resort and after repeated warnings, whereas civilian intruders, helicopters, or ground installations could not be fired at even if NATO aircraft were attacked (Leurdijk 1996: 31). UN officials maintained “that they controlled the trigger mechanism for use of force” (Reed 2000: 425).

Cooperation was minimal from the beginning. The need for dual consensus largely blocked joint decision-making. It took almost one year before the first air strikes were authorized. Once the Serbs took UNPROFOR troops hostage and used them as human shields, the UN’s inclination to use air power further eroded until NATO’s air campaign in August 1995, when close air support was approved only three times (Leurdijk 1996: 53). NATO airstrikes to enforce the no-fly zone were even rarer; their impact was so limited that NATO officials called them “pinpricks” (Annan 1999: 39; Holbrooke 1998: 61; Reed 2000: 403–05).

Once frustration among the enforcement advocates mounted, mutual stereotyping commenced. With public pressure to stop the atrocities increasing, the enforcement advocates saw NATO’s credibility eroding. The UN was accused of making the Serbs believe they could act with impunity. Suspicion about secret deals between UNPROFOR and the Bosnian Serbs grew. Wörner personally pressed Boutros-Ghali to modify the rules (Hendrickson 2000: 62). Admiral Leighton Smith, second in the NATO chain of command, admitted later: “I hated the dual key. I thought it was the worst thing we could possibly have become involved in” (quoted in Smith 2004: 157; see also Kaplan 2010: 149). Conversely, the dual key advocates within the UN accused the critics of undermining the peace effort, leaving UNPROFOR “to pick up the pieces” (Rose 1998: 205, 234). Preferences also conflicted within UNPROFOR. Several commanders resigned stating that they were disillusioned by “a policy of endless appeasement” and called on the UN secretary-general to hand down his “key” to the commanders in Bosnia (Annan 1999: 32, 38; Giersch 1998: 248).

Once the effectiveness-control dilemma unfolded, the enforcement advocates within NATO, in particular the U.S. and the headquarters, began devising ways to bypass the UN. The alliance started to draw up contingency plans for a phased air campaign and issued unilateral ultimatums to stop the Serb conquest. This stimulated tense exchanges between the secretariats. UNPROFOR General Rose (1998: 204) saw “responsibility for what was happening . . . slowly but surely drifting out of the hands of UNPROFOR.” The more ethnic cleansing in Bosnia increased, the more the reservations in London, Paris, and New York were delegitimized, and the dual consensus rule came under pressure.

Srebrenica was the shock that triggered a decisive preference change. The massacre in July 1994 revealed dramatically the drawbacks of the dual consensus rule (Annan 1999: 53–84). According to a later UN report, the local Dutch UNPROFOR commander requested NATO close air support up to five times. Both organizations had four days to prevent the massacre. Some requests were vetoed within the UN chain of command. Others were deferred for later execution. Still others were passed on with long delays. The outcomes of some requests remain unknown today. The Serbs, who obviously did not plan the massacre beforehand, were emboldened by several ultimatums they ignored with impunity and multiple direct attacks on the UN troops that remained unsanctioned. When the UN secretary-general finally approved airstrikes, NATO’s planes came too late.

It is sobering to realize that the worst massacre in modern European history might have been prevented if the five requests for air power had not been blocked within the UN chain of command. The UN and NATO had reduced the number of veto players considerably when delegating veto power to their respective secretaries-general. However, the effectiveness gains of this active consensus measure were partly neutralized when the UN secretary-general introduced the commanders within his chain of command as new veto players. Had the UN installed a decision-making procedure similar to NATO’s, the UN commander in Srebrenica who had advocated air strikes could have authorized them autonomously.

After Srebrenica, not only did the U.S. position harden but the preferences of Great Britain and France changed, shifting the inter-organizational preference distribution markedly. Facing the choice of either accepting defeat in Bosnia and withdrawing UNPROFOR or moving from peacekeeping to enforcement, they opted for the latter. Consequently, preferences converged within the alliance and intra-alliance consensus was re-established. The U.S. now assumed a leadership role within NATO. However, the UN remained split, with Russia, China, and the UN Secretariat continuing to block the use of air power via the dual consensus rule (Kaplan 2010: 156).

NATO’s initial strategy to overcome the veto problem was bypassing but then moved toward unilateralism. Four steps were taken. First, NATO allies organized a conference in London, which warned that any attack on the next “safe area” would be “met with a substantial and decisive response, including the use of air power” (Gow 1997: 275). Internally, NATO agreed that Boutros-Ghali would have to hand down his “key” to the UNPROFOR commanders in the field in order to achieve a “more effective chain of command” (Leurdijk 1996: 77). Boutros-Ghali was brought around by “two firm phone conversations” with U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher (Daalder 2000: 78; also Kaplan 2010: 154).

Second, NATO agreed to interpret the London decisions widely: Attacks on all safe areas would trigger air strikes; Serb military preparations would suffice to initiate strikes; these would continue as long as the commanders deemed necessary; and an air campaign would cover large parts of Bosnia. Thus, the UN lost control over the initiation and scope of air strikes.

Third, even though the air campaign that followed was formally authorized by both the NATO and the UN commanders in Sarajevo based on joint contingency planning, this only kept up the façade of cooperation. Effectively, the dual consensus rule broke down. At this point, NATO shifted from bypassing to disguised unilateralism. The UN Secretariat learned about the air campaign only six hours later. It informed the Serbs that “the conduct of the current operations is under the control of NATO” and that UN officials “are not in a position to stop those operations” (Annan 1999: 95). NATO based its campaign on a questionable interpretation of the relevant Security Council resolution. Boutros-Ghali later spoke of an “insult” (quoted in Kaplan 2010: 163).

Fourth, not only did NATO relegate the UN at war’s end in Dayton to a minimal role. The alliance also insists, since that episode, on “unitary command and control,” i.e., full autonomy when conducting operations alongside other organizations, including a separate chain of command and rules of engagement devised in Brussels alone (Yos 2007: 47–53). Thus, NATO held the dual consensus rule responsible for what it perceived as a dramatic cooperation failure. The NATO secretary-general remarked that if NATO is not able to “set the rules of our military operations, they [the UN] will have to find other idiots to support peacekeeping” (quoted in Hendrickson and Kille 2010: 508). In the future, NATO would not accept any external veto (Yost 2007: 31–71; Biermann 2014).

Summing up, we can again discern two phases of decreasing cooperation intensity. UN–NATO cooperation started out with an ambitious agreement envisioning strong cooperation based on dual consensus. This contrasted with strongly conflicting preferences across the

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organizations about the utility of using force in Bosnia and the acceptability of the dual key arrangements. The result was a first phase characterized by a strict UN veto, a NATO split between enforcement advocates and sceptics, first attempts at bypassing, and the resulting minimal cooperation. Given the large amount of preference heterogeneity and the preference intensity, especially of the nay-sayers, the dual consensus rule effectively produced deadlock. The second phase, after Srebrenica, saw the shift from minimal cooperation to de facto unilateralism, or absent cooperation. It was triggered by the preference change of Britain and France, the re-established unanimity within NATO and its subsequent unwillingness to accept any longer the deadlock the UN veto produced. Throughout, the dual consensus rule was the focal point of conflict between and within the organizations. Due to member-state delegation, the secretary-general moved into lynch-pin veto player positions. However, even though this active consensus measure considerably reduced the number of veto players, it did not suffice to alleviate the dual consensus drawbacks.

Case Comparison
The two cases we looked at are disconcerting. Both reveal a similar, two-stage pattern of deteriorating cooperation. They started out with comprehensive agreements outlining strong cooperation based on joint decision-making, division of labor and frequent interaction in an issue-area both partners deemed essential. Considerable autonomy concerns motivated the partners to institutionalize the dual consensus rule. This was not publicly disputed in EU–NATO relations, but highly controversial in UN–NATO relations. It was risky in both cases since preferences within and among the organizations about the basics of cooperation were conflicting.

Once the partnership moved into the first operational phase, the effectiveness-control dilemma emerged and the drawbacks of the dual consensus rule materialized. In both cases, the strong initial ambitions faded. EU–NATO relations started with a phase of moderate cooperation, experiencing both significant achievements and serious delays and non-cooperation on essential issues due to multiple vetoes by various member states. Preferences among Euro-peanists and Atlanticists diverged, but preference intensities were not as rigid as to preclude finding compromise on many, though hardly all, issues.

In contrast, UN–NATO cooperation turned out much more limited, with UN vetoes of NATO use of force allowing only minimal cooperation in a few minor instances. The reason was not the number of veto players, which was not only more limited than in EU–NATO relations but further reduced when use of force authorization was delegated to the secretaries-general. It also was not primarily the extent of preference heterogeneity, which was substantial in both cases. What bogged down the partnership was the preference intensity of those member states (esp. Britain and France) and international bureaucracies (UN Secretariat) in both organizations opposing NATO use of force in principle for practical as well as normative reasons. They utilized the dual consensus requirement to block cooperation. Their preferences were largely fixed, constant, and uncompromising, which explains the less intense cooperation compared to EU–NATO relations. The struggle to uphold or undermine the veto seriously antagonized both camps, strained relations among and within the organizations, motivated attempts at bypassing, and prepared the ground for open confrontation.

Changing preference configurations triggered the second phase of both partnerships. The second phase of EU–NATO relations started with the Turkish preference change to veto all official interaction between both organizations regardless of issue area (except on Bosnia), once Cyprus entered the EU in 2004. The accession of a new veto player to the partner organization induced Turkey, which perceived the non-recognition of Cyprus as a high stakes issue, to make EU–NATO relations hostage to its national agenda. The result, minimal cooperation, mirrored the first phase of UN–NATO relations. Again, given strong preference heterogeneity, preference intensity was the most crucial variable. However, in this case one intransigent veto player (and not a group of like-minded veto players) derailed the partnership. Bypassing the
largely blocked official channels of cooperation via informal cooperation became the major way out. EU–NATO relations are kept alive by creative maneuvering around the Turkish veto. Obviously, this works reasonably well, both because Turkey allows some basic operational cooperation, and the Europeanists accept a largely blocked official cooperation channel. No actor has assumed sufficient leadership to move Turkey into cooperation or to change the decision rules.

In contrast, UN–NATO relations moved into unilateral NATO action in their second phase (after Srebrenica), openly defying the dual key arrangements. Again, preference change on the member-state level changed the intensity of inter-organizational cooperation. Whereas the Turkish preference change has triggered the blockage of official EU–NATO relations since 2004, the new willingness of Britain, France, and also the U.S. to use force against the Bosnian Serbs unblocked NATO, though not UN–NATO relations. It re-established preference homogeneity within the alliance, allowing NATO to regain capacity to act. Decision-making between the UN and NATO remained deadlocked, however, due to the continuing resistance of Russia, China, and the UN Secretariat against the use of force. Their strong preference intensity made achieving dual consensus unachievable. This motivated NATO to move beyond bypassing into unilateralism. Given the agonizing legacy of minimal cooperation before and the pressure to act forcefully in Bosnia, NATO renounced the dual consensus rule.

Conclusions
This article has tried to understand the causal impact of the dual consensus rule on the intensity of cooperation among international governmental organizations. It has argued that this rule gains prominence when preferences on cooperation are aggregated in the process of collective bargaining, coalition-building, and decision-making within and among organizations. The dual consensus rule filters aggregated preferences and co-determines whether and how much to cooperate. Only those preferences that all decision-makers agree on turn into inter-organizational decisions on cooperation. More specifically, it is the interplay of the dual consensus rule and the specific preference distribution within and among organizations that constrains and enables cooperation. Preference distribution has three components: The number of potential veto players, the extent of preference heterogeneity, and the preference intensity, especially of those pursuing outlier preferences.

Most of the inter-organizational studies explain varying cooperation intensity by pointing to the substance of individual or collective preferences and their causes, be they material (such as resource dependence) or normative (such as norm match). They ask what individual member states or organizational aggregates want and why. In our cases this would be Turkey’s motives for blocking EU–NATO relations, motives of other players such as France and the U.S. to veto specific EU–NATO action, such as the Berlin plus agreement, motives of the UN secretary-general to veto NATO airstrikes in Bosnia, and NATO’s reasons for acting unilaterally after Srebrenica. Thus, we arrive at idiosyncratic explanations varying across cases. Alternatively, scholars try to discern recurring patterns of factors, such as trust, which influence preference formation. However, we can also look at the macro level of preferences and discern preference structures: How many potential veto players are there? How widely do they differ within and among the organizations? And how strongly are they committed to these preferences?

It then becomes easier to recognize that the combined membership of two organizations generates a huge veto player potential, as long as the dual consensus requirement rules decision-making. It varies according to the aggregate number of members but grows with the rapidly increasing membership of many organizations in the last decades. These numbers themselves, though, are not necessarily problematic as long as preferences converge. More relevant is the extent of preference heterogeneity, which tends to expand with the number of veto players. The more preferences diverge, the more difficult it is to reach consensus, but even strong pref-
erence heterogeneity is manageable as long as the preference intensity of the various players allows finding compromise. The cases highlighted that the most dysfunctional outcome is due to a preference structure where outliers at the extreme ends of the preference spectrum, be they Turkey, Britain, France, or the UN Secretariat, are highly committed to their preferences, refuse to compromise and, thus, block cooperation in principle. This is more likely when partners aim at cooperation in high stakes issue areas. Preference change is pivotal both for entering such a scenario and for exiting it.

Based on the findings, I might discern three ideal type preference structures, which have varying impact on inter-organizational cooperation, given the dual consensus rule. Most functional is the optimal preference structure, allowing strong cooperation. It combines converging preferences across issues with the absence of committed outliers; this is easier to attain and preserve when potential veto players are few and ambitions for cooperation are limited. Similar organizational cultures, mutual resource needs, symmetry, and other factors facilitate preference homogeneity. The second type reflects the modest cooperation NATO and EU experienced until 2004. A NATO representative argues that such a cooperation intensity is “just normal” in inter-organizational relations. This average preference structure is composed of many veto players with diverging preferences, forming issue-specific coalitions within and across organizations, blocking some decisions while remaining flexible to compromise on others. The more ambitious the partnership goals, the more difficult it is to find agreement. Most adverse is a dysfunctional preference structure with multiple veto players, strong preference heterogeneity, and / or an outlier or outlier group of member states sustaining a veto over time, often due to perceived high issue salience. The second phase of EU–NATO relations and both phases of UN–NATO relations discussed here match this scenario.

As explained above, case selection in this article was guided by the rationale to explore the potentially dysfunctional impact of the dual consensus rule. It was prudent to select cases of strongly ambitious cooperation and subsequent cooperation failure. Future studies might want to shed more light on cases reflecting an optimal or an average preference structure. The four phases explored here still showed significant variance in the dependent variable outcome, with one belonging to the second ideal type and the other to the third. They also diverged regarding the reactions to cooperation failure, ranging from bypassing (EU–NATO second phase and UN–NATO first phase) to disguised unilateralism (UN–NATO second phase). Still, they were not necessarily representative, as both involved high stakes security issues and figured NATO as a “hard security” partner organization.

However, arguments that these cases are exceptional should take into consideration that the deadlock in official EU–NATO relations was caused by Turkey’s non-recognition of Cyprus, whereas the deadlock in UN–NATO relations was caused by the preference heterogeneity within the UN Security Council and the position of the UN Secretariat. They should also keep in mind that future military, economic, social, or environmental transnational crises will require strong cooperation among international organizations. The challenges of global governance call for more than sharing of some information and reciprocal visits to headquarters. They require the pooling and sharing of resources, rapid joint decision-making and a problem-solving focus beyond parochial interests. The cases discussed here represent bold attempts to do so. The dysfunctions they produced upset our confidence that international organizations can rise up to the challenge.

The above analysis allows for some policy recommendations. The article discussed three strategies to mitigate the dysfunctional effects of the consensus rule, beyond simply accepting them: bypassing, unilateralism, or changing the decision rule. Bypassing might be most tempting. However, as the second phase of EU–NATO relations and also the first phase of UN–NATO relations demonstrate, bypassing only allows for minimal cooperation. It also

risks derailing a partnership completely. The radical alternative, unilateralism, is chosen when impatient members no longer accept dysfunctions. Leadership is needed to move intransigent members into compromise (e.g., via issue-linkage) if unilateralism is to be avoided.

In the end, member states choose the institutional design that pre-determines their decisions. The current design preference in inter-organisational relations maximizes autonomy and control at the expense of effectiveness. Unfortunately, it is exactly when the dual consensus rule is most problematic, i.e., that preferences diverge widely and members are strongly committed to these preferences, which member states insist on dual consensus. However, in such adverse settings, member states should instead consider modifying the decision rule or otherwise avoid cooperating altogether in the first place. Such a decision can be taken in the initial institutional design phase or, though more difficult, when cooperation falters. While introducing majority rule or weighted voting from the outset will likely not be acceptable in inter-organizational decision-making, all other options mentioned above should be explored sincerely: delegating responsibility to the secretariats as an active consensus measure, introducing the consensus minus one rule, or agreeing on majority voting when all efforts to reach consensus have been exhausted.

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The Vote of Brazil in the United Nations Security Council (1946–2011) and the Role of Elected Members in the Decision-Making Process

Eduardo Uziel, Instituto Rio Branco (Ministry of External Relations)

Conventional wisdom on the UN Security Council has it that the five permanent members decide and elected members abide by their decisions. This article argues that elected members follow their own policies in the council and work to influence decisions, even when these efforts contradict preferences of the permanent members. The voting pattern of Brazil, with its ten terms in the council, and some specific cases are considered to probe the behavior of an elected member. Brazil, as an elected member, has marked its disagreements with decisions, knowing the symbolic importance of its support. The article concludes that an elected member, such as Brazil, not only can contribute actively for council decisions, but also can modify the preferences of the P5, in certain occasions.

In his discussion on the relationship between permanent and elected members of the Security Council (UNSC), former Singapore Permanent Representative Kishore Mahbubani (2004: 258–59) stated that the body’s elected members are perceived as tourists, the last in an unspoken pecking order. Similarly, in his history of the UNSC, David Bosco (2009: 103) referred to it as the “great-power citadel.” Both statements—the first grudgingly, the second, matter-of-factly—reflect a widespread and deep-rooted understanding that elected members of the council hold their seats for two-year terms in order to rubber-stamp decisions taken by the five permanent members (P5)—after some de rigueur kicking and screaming.

The result of this assumption, held by many scholars and diplomats, is a persistent lack of interest in a systematic study of the behavior of the council’s elected members, coupled with some difficulty in explaining why they insist in presenting themselves for the post, regardless of the well-known setbacks it may bring. Even a seasoned practitioner and scholar like Malone (2000: 5–7) experiences some uneasiness in explaining why countries insist on submitting their candidacies. After dismissing the likelihood of a meaningful engagement with the P5, he attributes it to a search for prestige, vested interests, or the promotion of specific concepts.

A growing body of literature (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2010; Vreeland & Dreher, 2014) highlights the interest of the P5 in cajoling elected members to vote alongside their proposals. Although most authors admit that UNSC membership “offers nations an opportunity to shape international security policy” (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010: 672), they tend to emphasize the symbolic and informative role of elected members’ votes, in order to explain the efforts exerted by the P5 to gain their support (Vreeland and Dreher, 2014: 8–10). Recent research goes a step further and posits that elected members succeed in introducing their preferences into UNSC decisions apparently changing those of the P5 (Mikulaschek, 2014).

1. The opinions of the author are solely his own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Ministry of External Relations.

2. In a recent article, Bosco (2014) researches the usefulness of the UNSC for the P5 to concert their efforts. Although its conclusion reinforces the interest in studying the five permanent, it does not invalidate the interest in the elected members.
Breaking with the conventional wisdom on the Security Council and building upon these new paths, the present article is based on the premise that elected members can contribute to the decisions of the council, and they do so according to their own priorities, not necessarily following the lead of the P5. This assertion does not imply that elected members’ inputs are always significant or that most of these states, most of the time, elect to disagree with the P5, but over time it is possible to discern behaviors that indicate decision-making autonomy in face of the P5 and dissatisfaction regarding UNSC decisions. The text is divided in four sections: a discussion on the various forms of voting and their uses; why choose Brazil as a specimen of elected member3; the presentation of data on Brazilian voting since 1946 to argue that voting choices of elected members indicate strategies in the council; and an analysis of four cases that might be useful to understand Brazilian strategies and perspectives.

**Voting and the Uses of the Vote in the Security Council**

Opting to gain knowledge of the behavior of a UNSC member by analyzing its voting record is an attempt to benefit from advantages listed by James Todd (1969: 62): a) the vote makes explicit the attitude of a state towards a given subject debated by the council; b) voting takes place on a wide range of issues, allowing to map a country’s position across the agenda; c) the analysis of votes make it possible to identify alignments and trends in a country’s politics in the UNSC. The vote is a public statement of a country regarding a decision and the policies connected to it. As explained by Gelson Fonseca (2008: 53–4), voting in multilateral fora disciplines the differences amongst members, and dissolves national wills into a collective decision.

Recognizing the shortcomings of the vote as a yardstick is essential, and Todd (1969: 62) highlighted the inability to assess the intensity of a state’s attitude, the ambiguity of abstentions, and the uneven distribution of votes across the agenda. Robert Keohane (1967: 221–22) also criticized the studies on voting for not producing any information on the underlying political processes that resulted in a text submitted to a roll-call vote—compared the method to examining a turtle shell without being able to verify if the turtle actually exists. In the post–Cold War era, Keohane’s concerns are still justified, given “the statistics . . . cover only one formal layer of council activity, not the informal layers nor the vast underworld of its subsidiary bodies” (Security Council Report 2012). In particular, aggregated voting data, *per se*, confronts the analyst with the misleading impression that states take atomized decisions in yea-nay votes without having bargained the terms of a draft resolution in order to coalesce a myriad policy options into specific language. Here lies the difficulty in perceiving most of the potential influence of elected members: First, because the underlying bargains are often ignored altogether, and second, because it is unlikely there will be enough evidence on the negotiating success of each country for each agenda item.

Regardless of its limitations, the vote is still useful as a research instrument. In the absence of a thorough study of every single decision—unrealistic in the face of the secrecy of procedures and the enormity of the task—the positive features of vote-based analyses can be brought out and their shortcomings mitigated by drawing on statements of the voter to the UNSC and from the appropriate literature on the country’s positions in order to help place exemplary cases within a broader context.

In his game-theoretic discussion on how outside options help superpowers achieve favorable results in the UNSC, Erik Voeten (2001: 845–51) asserts that the U.S. establishes the Pareto frontier for council policies but cannot impose an outcome for the concrete negotiations, having to argue and compromise on the actions to be taken. Voeten formulates a series of models where any other member of the council positions itself in a one-dimensional con-

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3. The article does not attempt to demonstrate that Brazilian behavior is similar to that of other elected members, since that would require extensive empirical research on several other countries. The underlying assumption, however, is that there is some measure of similarity, even if elected members comprise a wide range of countries.
tinuum between the ideal points of the U.S. and a hypothetic veto-holding challenger. He contemplates the possibility of the veto-holding challenger expressing discontent without preventing the adoption of the decision (by abstaining).

In another discussion on the Security Council, the author (Voeten 2005: 542–44) argues that limiting U.S. power demands a complex coordination exercised by other countries, which can take place with the UNSC as a focal point. The body is understood as an elite pact that tries to neutralize threats to stability. Council decisions not only send signals to other countries, but also simplify to the U.S. internal public the meaning of foreign actions and foreshadow the degree of cooperation expected from the rest of the international community. Voeten briefly remarks that some high-profile, nonpermanent members are particularly insistent on UNSC authorization, in spite of their discomfort with current council structure.

Drawing on Voeten’s ideas is extremely helpful to gain understanding on why Brazil votes as it does—without formalizing a mathematical model. Extrapolating Voeten’s continuum, it is argued that UNSC decisions should be understood as a complex set of policies, pertaining to the preferences of the member states along several axes that could measure implications of the adoption of a decision, such as financial cost, contribution with troops, degree of involvement of UN entities in implementation, etc. Instead of a one-dimensional continuum, the positioning occurs inside a space defined by frontiers superimposed by the five permanent members, not just the United States. Any decision that stands a chance of adoption, being a complex policy, is a solid in this space not a point on a continuum. Likewise, one that fails to be adopted was outside the frontiers of one or more of the P5, at least partially. A few caveats are important at this juncture: (a) the frontiers are not always apparent to other members and sometimes not even to their formulators, which means that countries map them by trial and error, (b) the permanent members tend to have global commitments, which is not true for most elected ones, but it may happen that they are relatively indifferent to a specific conflict or policy, and (c) over the Cold War, as noted by Fancis Delon (1993: 53–64), there was no “P5” group, and the disputes amongst the permanent members were seen as an opportunity for the elected members to build bridges and advance their agendas—a phenomenon still conceivable today.

The elected members have their own preferences, but, being unable to veto, cannot define the space, only negotiate within it and position themselves, by means of their voting choices, in relation to the decision. For an elected member like Brazil, navigating Security Council politics means inserting as many features as possible in the decision, struggling to limit the aspects inserted by the P5 but seen as inconvenient and, in voting, signaling to other countries and to its own public if it is close to or far from the negotiated decision. It is essential to discuss the possible meanings of each voting option.

When taken by a permanent member, the negative vote is the most maligned path in UNSC voting. Once hailed as a mainstay of the UN architecture, the veto soon became a propaganda weapon in the Cold War, wielded against the Soviets, accused of blocking the council—an accusation proven to be false in the 1960s by Stoessinger (1966: 5–16) but still etched in most minds. A veto not only signals the language voted upon was outside a given P5 negotiation frontier, but it also embodies the frontier in effectively blocking council action. As for elected members, the function of a nay vote is less concrete. Except for the mythical sixth veto (an elusive collusion of seven or more elected members to block a decision), the negative vote of an elected member indicates a strong dissatisfaction, normally reserved for issues of extreme relevance to its foreign policy—unless the nay vote is cast alongside a similar manifestation by several members, knowingly dooming the draft to non-adoption for lack of a necessary majority (Bailey 1969: 26–63; Bailey and Daws 1998: 227–49; Todd 1969: 75–6; Wilcox 1945: 946–52).

4. Turkey (2009–10) exemplified a rare case of systematic nay voting by an elected member in all resolutions on Cyprus.
The positive vote might seem the clearest of paths, but it often conceals the disagreements in the political negotiations. Unlike the Cold War period, when drafts were often voted paragraph by paragraph to highlight opposing views, since the 1980s, the council has combined the consensus with informal consultations, i.e., members negotiate behind closed doors until an acceptable text is achieved. This procedure makes public meetings generally uninformative as compromises were already bargained (Bailey 1969: 10–1; Bailey and Daws 1998: 222–23; Smith 2006: 218; Teixeira 2003: 21–2; Voeten 2005: 547). An affirmative vote should be understood as signaling satisfaction. Yet, by its nature, the positive vote leaves unanswered the highly relevant question of how the decision became satisfactory: because some aspects were seen as indifferent, the country was pressured into accepting the language, or it was satisfied after including its preferred options.

Not enshrined in the charter, abstentions were conjured out of thin air by the Soviets in 1946 to signal a relevant level of dissatisfaction by a permanent member, without the need to veto a decision. They were, from inception, a function of expediency—to avoid causing unnecessary attrition—and a display of good sportsmanship—alleged proof that one wants the council to function. Their legality was never seriously questioned outside academic circles, and they were soon incorporated into council practice. During the early Cold War, the West began to get used to killing Soviet proposals softly with its abstentions. Elected members emulated their permanent counterparts in abstaining more often than voting negatively—although mathematically both choices have the same weight—to disagree without being seen as a naysayer (Bailey and Daws 1998: 250–57; Gross 1951; McDougal and Gardner 1951; Winter 1996). Brazil, since the early 1990s, follows the practice of abstaining instead of voting nay unless the issue at stake is of utmost importance to its foreign policy. In doing so, it signals a low level of dissatisfaction, with the language put to vote being considered mostly acceptable (Neves 2008: 101; Amorim 2015: 88–91).

5. Although published over fifty years ago, Lijphart’s article has the advantage of taking into account that abstentions signify a degree of disagreement. There is a clear arbitrariness in assigning the 50 percent weight, but some arbitrariness is inescapable. For the purpose of this article, the assumption is that the voting distance between a council member that votes yea or nay and another member that abstains is half as large as the voting distance between two states that vote yea and nay, respectively. The author wishes to thank Ch. Mikulaschek for this observation.
Inside and around the frontiers established by the preferences of the P5 is where the political process takes place. In Voeten’s (2005: 551) words, “Although the role of the UNSC in this conception depends entirely on the configuration of state interests, this does not make the institution epiphenomenal. There are many potential equilibria . . . and convergence on a particular (semi-cooperative) equilibrium has important implications.” Brazilian votes will be used as an instrument to highlight possible behaviors and strategies of elected members, based on the idea that the country, in deciding how to vote, not necessarily follows the preferences of the P5 but rather expresses its own positions regarding the language put to the council’s consideration.

**Brazil as an Elected Member of the Security Council**

Brazil is in a privileged, though not unique, position to serve as a seminal example. Briefly contemplated as a possible sixth permanent member and since the 1990s an active candidate to permanent membership, the country has served ten terms on the council (1946–47, 1951–52, 1954–55, 1963–64, 1967–68, 1988–89, 1993–94, 1998–99, 2004–05, and 2010–11), a number equaled only by Japan. With twenty years of participation, Brazilian votes have produced enough evidence to allow for comparisons over time and subject. Additionally, Brazil has predicated a significant part of its foreign policy regarding peace and security on participating in and strengthening multilateral fora (the nineteen years of absence from 1969 to 1987 being an exception related mainly to domestic factors beyond the scope of this article). This enduring preference and the literature strongly suggest that every decision to vote in the council is thoroughly assessed as an integral part of its international relations, a supposition corroborated by statements of high-level officials (Amorim 2007: 9–13; Bueno 1994: 59–144; Fonseca 2011: 375–79; Garcia 2011: 159–77; Sardenberg 1995; Sardenberg 2013: 85–97; Souza 2009: 99–104). This process, according to a senior Brazilian diplomat, comprises the consideration of each draft against the scenarios in the UNSC, in the UN in general, and globally (Sardenberg 2014).

In spite of Brazil’s belief in its own commitment to the UNSC and multilateralism, Stewart Patrick (2010) argues that there are strong misgivings in Washington about how much Brasília is willing to work within the current international order or to shoulder responsibilities beyond those bringing immediate benefits. In the same vein, after recognizing the relevance of multilateral institutions to Brazil, Jean Daudelin and Sean Burges (2011: 37–8 and 47–50) argue that Brazilian diplomacy is “hedging its bets . . . by playing a weak institutionalist game.” Regarding the UNSC, they clarify that the country advocates strict limits to international interference in domestic affairs—although with some flexibility of late—while participating actively in the council deliberations, recommitting frequently to the UN principles, and criticizing the council’s structure. The whole Brazilian policy is dubbed rebellious multilateralism. Although meant to enjoin Brazil to comply with Western tenets, these observations serve to confirm that Brazil does not act in the UNSC on its own terms (no actor does) but certainly strives to preserve a modicum of autonomy to make decisions and, in making them, first takes into consideration its own foreign policy goals rather than the preferences of the P5, contrary to the common opinion that elected members just comply with them.

In his recent work, Amorim Neto (2011: 171–73), after an in-depth review of the literature, emphasizes how Brazil’s search for autonomy in its foreign policy is mirrored by an increase in the divergence with U.S. policies, which he assesses by comparing voting data in the UN General Assembly. With extensive use of aggregated data, he concludes that from 1946 to 2008 there was a long-term distancing between Brazil and the U.S., leading to a universalization of Brazilian international relations, without sudden fractures with Washington. His emphasis on structural and bureaucratic factors suggests that a similar pattern of autonomization should be found in Brazil’s votes in the UNSC.
Brazil’s Voting Record in the Security Council and its Meanings

From January 1946 to December 2011, Brazil participated in 2,194 UNSC meetings, in which 1,114 votes were taken, 956 on substantive matters, and 158 on procedural ones. After the end of the Cold War, the number of substantive votes reached previously unthinkable heights—from the lowest point of six votes in 1954 to twenty-five in 1989, and the upper limit of ninety-five votes in 1993—with a corresponding drop in votes on procedure—practically zero after 1989.6

A perfunctory look at Brazil’s decisions (Table 1) indicates a majority of affirmative substantive votes in any year, with abstentions and negative ones amounting to 101 out of 956. An overwhelming majority (73 percent) of the non-affirmative votes are concentrated in the 1946–55 period, a particularly contentious moment in the council, when Brazil was closely associated with the Western group (Bosco 2009: 39–79).

Table 1. Brazilian Votes Disaggregated by Affirmative, Negative, and Abstention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Unanimous votes</th>
<th>Non-unanimous votes</th>
<th>Brazil affirmative</th>
<th>Brazil negative</th>
<th>Brazil abstention</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>63</td>
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<td>37</td>
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<td>25</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>39</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
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<td>215</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>316</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Instead of indicating that the low level of abstentions and negative votes mean a mechanical compliance with decisions previously taken by the P5, Brazil’s profile and the literature on its experience in the UNSC suggest that the country tries to contribute to decisions and

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6 For the period between 1946 and 1993, data were collected by reviewing the verbatim record of each individual meeting; from 1994 on, the data compiled by the Secretariat, with mild adjustments, were used (http://www.un.org/en/sc/meetings/). The data comprise all substantive votes taken during meetings (even if the required majority was not achieved or the issue vetoed) and all procedural votes in which there was a “show of hands” (what excludes the mostly automatic and consensual decisions to adjourn). For the substantive votes, in cases where the decision was taken “without a vote,” all votes were considered as affirmative; in case of absences, they were counted as abstentions. Votes on paragraphs or sentences were considered different votes, which resulted in very few amendments to the count of the secretariat. The tables with compiled data can be made available upon contact with the author.
votes in favor when reasonably satisfied. The overall picture is a mostly satisfied voter, especially in the five mandates since the 1980s, when only around 2.2% of the total votes were negative or abstentions. Taking out non-unanimous votes Brazil abstained or voted negatively in 32% of the time: 36% in those from 1946 to 1955, 40% in those from 1963 to 1968, and 18% of those in the five terms since 1988. Whereas, in the terms until 1955, Brazil’s votes were mostly associated with those of the United States. In the 1960s and in the post–Cold War period, abstentions and negative votes were limited in number, focused on those cases when the country held doubts on the limits of legitimate council action or on the effectiveness of measures taken. Abstentions were preferred over negative votes precisely to avoid being seen as a nay-sayer. As contended above, voting in the affirmative, however, may mask varying degrees of lesser dissatisfaction with the text before the council, but a finer assessment would depend on further research about critical explanations of vote or conspicuous refusal to co-sponsor a draft. The literature registers that Brazil seems to vote yea only when participating in the negotiations, normally by offering concrete language (Fonseca 2011: 392; Patriota 1998: 191–92; Sardenberg 1995: 124–25; Sardenberg 2014).

Two possible explanations for the instances where Brazil chose not to vote affirmatively since the 1980s must be briefly considered—geographic concentration and concerns over alluding to Chapter VII—and discarded. Brazilian abstentions and negative votes are not clustered around any geographic item of the UNSC agenda, straddling themes as different as Libya, Iran, peacebuilding, Sudan, Haiti, Lebanon, Kosovo, Rwanda, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The only clear sequence of abstentions is about Haiti, in 1994, meant to be a display of coherence. Since Brazil abstained on resolution 940 (1994) authorizing a U.S.-led multinational force, a need was felt to persevere in distancing oneself from the use of force in the Americas. Some have mistakenly argued that Brazilian non-affirmative votes are connected to a heightened adherence to sovereignty and to an alleged rejection of references to Chapter VII in decisions. This reasoning is deprived of any empirical basis, as Brazil has time and again voted in favor of resolutions making use of Chapter VII (Kenkel 2013: 347; Diniz 2006; Uziel 2014: 72–3).

Further insight can be gained by disaggregating the cases where Brazil decided to abstain or vote negatively and comparing to how other members voted in those instances (Table 2). Until the end of its third term, in 1955, most Brazilian non-affirmative votes joined the U.S. and the Western bloc to reject a Soviet-sponsored proposal. During the 1963–64, 19–1968, and 1988–89 mandates, there are more significant instances where Brazil’s vote diverges from the U.S. pattern, but Brazil always accompanies one or more permanent members in their vote. Not until 1994 will Brazil abstain without the company of any of the P5 (or any other member for that matter).

It was in 1968 that Brazil first abstained in a most significant manner, in resolution 255 (1968) on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Drawing on the ideas of Permanent Representative (and former minister of external relations) João Augusto de Araújo Castro, Brazilian diplomacy began to decry what was seen as a freezing of world power, with the U.S. and the USSR deciding on the relevant issues behind closed doors and expecting other countries to acquiesce. In Castro’s view, the NPT and its consideration in the council were clear expressions of this freezing and Brazil had to clearly distance itself from the text agreed to by the great powers in order to preserve the usefulness of the UN to middle and small powers. The abstention (alongside Algeria, France, India, and Pakistan) was a first instance of Brazilian linking its diverging choice of vote in the UNSC to one of its major principles in international affairs. The whole doctrine of freezing, however, had the unintended consequence of compounding the criticism to Brazilian membership in the council and helped keep the country out of the body until 1988 (Vargas 2013: 167–203; United Nations 1968: 3).

The preference for joining one or more permanent members in abstaining is not unexpected and derives from the very disparity of status in the council. Elected members tend to
seek cooperation with permanent ones, in order to mitigate the pressure from proponents of the resolution (Mahbubani 2004: 263; Teixeira 2003: 13–5). A brief analysis of the period from 1994 to 2013 shows that, in a total of 121 non-unanimous votes, elected members voted in company of one or more P5 in forty cases (33%), of another elected member six times (5%), and by themselves in nineteen instances (15%)—whereas the permanent members were themselves the dissenters on fifty-six (47%) occasions. The percentages are fitting to the political dynamics of the council, where the P5 do not shy away from disagreeing, while most elected members will prefer to disagree in the company of a permanent peer, and some countries will vote alone either because they are too close to the subject or adopting a maverick attitude. The coordination of elected members is more unusual, given the difficulties to conciliate purposes, but also because it is actively opposed as a sign of collusion against the frontiers established by the P5.

These data reinforce the proposition that the P5 define the limits of council negotiation, but the very existence of instances where Brazil and others abstain or vote negatively regardless of the P5 belies the perception that the text agreed upon by the permanent members will be automatically accepted. It further suggests that elected members, such as Brazil, may try to maneuver in the council to expand the frontiers established by the P5. A case in point is the negative vote on Iran in what became resolution 1929 (2010), mentioned below.

Equally important to understand, Brazil’s role as a council member is to assess how it expects its own vote to be a part of the result. In deciding how to vote, a country calculates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Negative alone</th>
<th>Abstention alone</th>
<th>Negative + P5*</th>
<th>Abstention + P5</th>
<th>Negative + elected</th>
<th>Abstention + elected</th>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>68</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tbody>
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*In this column and in the following, it does not matter if the other member voted the same as Brazil, only that it did not vote affirmatively.
how others will vote and if the preferred option has a chance to be reached (the implication being that some might prefer to be simply on the winning side in the absence of concrete interests). Most Brazilian affirmative votes contributed to the adoption of a resolution, even discounted the unanimous decisions. In a significant number of cases, Brazil’s yea vote did not result in the adoption of a resolution, mostly because one or more permanent members vetoed it. In such cases, a believable reading would be that Brazil took part in a concerted effort to exert pressure on those dissenters—and the year 1947 strongly suggests that toward the USSR.

In its first four terms, all Brazilian abstentions and nay votes served to defeat the drafts. In the Cold War context, this meant Brazil was part and parcel of the hidden veto mechanism, which allowed the Western bloc to prevent the adoption of Soviet proposals. Only after 1963 does Brazil start to abstain more often to signify disagreement with the majority of council members, hence, finding itself in the defeated group in face of an adopted resolution (Bailey and Daws 1998: 249–50; Stoessinger 1966: 13–5). In the post–Cold War period, Brazilian abstentions are knowingly cast without hope of defeating the draft in order to express dissatisfaction.\(^7\) It is possible to suppose that the preference for abstention would have prevailed in other cases, but the country decided to vote affirmatively not to be singled out as the only objector (Sardenberg 2014). The exceptions are: the 1993 abstention on Bosnia-Herzegovina (on 6/29/1993), and the 1999 negative vote with the intention to prevent the adoption of a draft on Kosovo (on 3/26/1999).

In December 2005, for instance, after a torturous negotiation, the Peacebuilding Commission was created by unanimous resolution 1645 (2005). The P5 then put to vote a draft that

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Affirmative adopted</th>
<th>Affirmative defeated</th>
<th>Abstention adopted</th>
<th>Abstention defeated</th>
<th>Negative adopted</th>
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\(^7\) During the Cold War, there were instances of Brazil abstaining when the U.S. voted yea, but they were very few.
ensured a permanent place for themselves in the PBC, which became resolution 1646 (2005). Brazil abstained and recruited Argentina to do the same, on the grounds that the draft departed from previous agreements and reinforced imbalances amidst UN organs (Neves 2008: 106; Sardenberg 2014; United Nations 2005: 11; Uziel 2012). The Brazilian-Argentinian vote was not meant to frustrate the adoption of the text but to signal their preference as partially outside the frontiers set by the P5.

The relation between Brazilian votes and the adoption or rejection of drafts corroborates the point made by Fonseca (2011: 378–88) that in its first terms in the UNSC, Brazil mostly followed U.S. policies but started to drift away in the 1960s, opposing what it perceived as a freezing of global power. Upon its return to the body in 1988, Brazilian strategies adapted to the new age but acted purposefully to maintain a level of decision-making autonomy and shape actively the institutional framework of the council, curtailing as much as possible what was seen as excessive P5 hegemony.

An important feature of Brazilian votes is what can be deemed an aversion to the veto. Over its twenty years in the council, Brazil witnesses eighty-one decisions being blocked by the veto. In only three of those cases did Brazil allow itself to assume a position closer to the vetoing power, by abstaining: in 1954, on a vote on Israel-Syria (United Nations 1954), in 1989, on a vote on Libya (United Nations 1989), and in 2011, on another vote on Syria (United Nations 2011). This preference for dissociating from vetoes may be attributed to two factors: 1. The veto is seen as a traumatic moment, the failure of negotiations, and potential instigator of friction among great powers, hence an impairment to the work of the council (Fonseca 2008: 56); 2) For a country regularly elected to the UNSC and coveting a permanent seat on it, it is essential to convey the idea of an autonomous decision-maker, which could be put into question by association with vetoes, an attitude seen as typical of satellite-states.

Brazilian concerns on converging with vetoes were somehow justified in 2011, in the vote of a draft on Syria, vetoed by Russia and China, with Brazilian, Indian, South African, and Lebanese abstentions. U.S. Ambassador Rice, in a media stakeout after the meeting, dramatically scolded those not favoring the resolution for having “slapped in the face” the people of Syria and for blocking the work of the council. While reserving some respect for Russia’s “sovereign choices,” she dismissed offhand Brazilian-Indian-South African concerns for a repetition in Syria of the mistakes of Libya as an excuse, an “effort to maintain solidarity in a certain group” (presumably BRICS) and, in the U.S. explanation of vote, dubbed those preoccupations a “cheap ruse” (Rice 2011; United Nations 2011: 8). Dissenters were seen as blockers of the council’s work and as proxies of a group that included two permanent members with alleged vested interests in Syria.

A final field to explore through the aggregate analysis of Brazilian votes is its relative distance from other members of the UNSC, Lijphart’s Index of Agreement (IA). The chosen reference points were the U.S.—a key country since 1945—and the USSR/Russia—until 1991 for its role as superpower, since then for its often adversarial relationship with Western tenets; the Brazilian tendency to vote alongside the arithmetic majority of the council was also assessed as a third reference point.

Regarding the IA with the U.S., the results are as expected and coincide *grosso modo* with the conclusions of Amorim Neto (particularly if one takes into account that the UNGA provides more complete and accurate data). A significant convergence in the first twenty years, never falling below 80 percent before 1968, is followed by a steep decrease in the late 1980s, a recovery in the 1990s, culminating with a rapprochement in 1998–99, falling again in the 2004–05, and 2010–11 terms (Amorim Neto 2011: 66–74). It is noteworthy that the lowest levels in the 1988–89 term are due to a passive disagreement, where a satisfied Brazil mostly votes yea, a strategy which diverged from a series of vetoes by disgruntled United States. In the 1993–94, 2004–05, and 2010–11 mandates, the fall in IA is due mostly to the Brazilian decision to abstain or vote nay when the U.S. voted affirmatively.
As for the USSR/Russia, the first years are as predictably marked by a low level of agreement, which improves significantly in the 1960s without ever reaching 70 percent. In the 1980s, it will reach its highest point, acquiring an irregular character after that but remaining above 75 percent, except for two years. The review of the voting disagreements shows the Brazilian preference not to converge with vetoes as well as substantive divergences, such as on the 1999 Russian draft on Kosovo, or the 2010 P5 and the Germany resolution on Iran. It is early to say if the advent of BRICS was responsible for the level of agreement during the 2010–11 term (Lijphart 1963: 912–13; Uziel 2012: 146–47).

The highest IAs for Brazil appear when its votes are compared with how the majority of the council voted. In nine out of twenty, there is a 100 percent agreement, and the IA only once falls below 70 percent. Only twice, in 1964 and 2005, the IA of Brazil and the U.S. is higher than the IA of Brazil and the majority, which never occurs with the USSR/Russia. These data strengthen the idea that an elected member aiming for autonomy in its decision-making may seek to reinforce its position by voting closer to the majority of its peers even when it means disagreeing from the superpowers—a proposition that cannot be proved here but is worth mentioning.

### Four Cases of Brazilian Vote

The four cases below were chosen because they encompass the whole range of possible voting positions by Brazil: affirmative, negative, and abstentions. The analysis focused on how Brazil identified the main concerned parties, the most contentious issues, and how it shaped its strategies to insert its preferences. The goal of the section is to briefly highlight some of the
main aspects of the political negotiations behind the votes and how an elected member may act to promote its own positions.

Resolution 1284 (1999) on Iraq

After the Desert Fox Operation in December 1998 when Americans and British bombed Iraq without express UNSC authorization, any consensus on the issue in the council seemed undone for good, and the fabric of dialogue in the organ was threatened. In January 1999, while chairing the organ, Brazil, alongside Canada, advanced new ideas on how to rebuild a negotiating process within the UNSC and avoid new unilateral actions. The three panels on Iraq, later known as the “Amorim Panels,” were established by exploiting the minimum overlapping in the P5 positions. Their final reports were far from pleasing all the main powers but opened the opportunity to negotiate a new inspections regime for Iraq and to restitute the council to the forefront in that context. From the beginning, Brazil had limited specific concerns but emphasized a broader aim to maintain the functionality of the council, building on a minimum of trust amongst its members (Fonseca 2011: 392; Padovan 2010).

Brazil was active in the debates about what would become resolution 1284 (1999), with positions on sanctions, humanitarian affairs, and the new inspections’ regime. Those efforts, seen dismissively as idiosyncratic and ancillary by some (Ross 2007: 165–86), were perceived by Brazil as part of the larger strategy to ensure the council would regain the helm on the subject on acceptable terms—alleviating the humanitarian situation without perpetuating the abnormal international status of Iraq. Brazil was part of a group of elected members consulted systematically by the P5 in order to support text negotiated elsewhere, since their endorsement was seen as essential to an acceptable decision (Fonseca 2015; Padovan 2010).

When the vote finally came, Brazil voted affirmatively but made an explanation of vote noting flaws both in the process of negotiations and in its final result. Brazil’s ultimate purpose with the Amorim Panels and the ensuing negotiation had been to promote a “healing diplomacy” (United Nations, 1999: 12–3), i.e., assist the conduction of the process in a manner that would rebuild a positive dynamics, allowing for a repositioning of the P5’s preference frontiers. In such context, the experience was a formative one, and the substantive contributions counted less than the resumption of negotiations (Fonseca 2015; Padovan 2010: 106–74).

Resolution 1542 (2004) on Haiti

In February 2004, the council authorized a multinational force to prevent further security deterioration in Haiti. Brazil, in its early months as elected member, supported the decision but was suspicious that the international presence would develop as the previous one. In 1993–94, in a moment of heightened U.S. assertiveness, Brazil made a point of ostensibly abstaining on resolution 940 (1994), seen as advocating a militarized and short-sighted international strategy for the Caribbean country (Gharekan 2006: 234–35). Ten years later, Brazilian diplomacy was afraid once more the UN would enter Haiti and deal with security without taking care of the underlying social and economic shortfalls of the country. In the early years of Lula da Silva’s presidency, Brazil was willing to make itself indispensable in the negotiations in New York, making clear that a prolonged and proactive Latin-American engagement would depend on enticing Brazilian political support. Negotiations on what became resolution 1542 (2004) were conducted with U.S. and Brazil as protagonists.

Brazil’s immediate interests were focused on restricting the rhetoric of use of force (that account for the circumscribed reference to Chapter VII only in operative paragraph 7) and inserting economic and social elements in the mandate (finally consubstantiated in weak references in operative paragraphs 13–15). The U.S., France, and, to a lesser extent, the other P5 were perceived as rejecting a long-term presence in the country and involvement with development issues. Brazil played two cards in this case: For the more indifferent P5, it made clear that losing face at this point would sour its presence in the UNSC for the remaining two years;
for the U.S., it evidenced that Brazilian troops would not be available unless the mandate of the mission was shaped to Brazil’s satisfaction—knowing that the failure to establish a long-term mission in Haiti could mean a refugee crisis in Florida (Fontoura 2015).

The text unanimously adopted in April 2004 fell short of both countries’ preferences, but they went along with it since both wanted a mission in Haiti. Brazil’s strategy was to work for the expansion of the U.S.’s preference frontiers in specific aspects, given its leverage as a potential troop contributing country that could attract political support and troops from others in the region. In the longer run, it intended to reinforce those aspects in successive renewals of the mission’s mandate (Fontoura 2015; Sardenberg 2014; Uziel 2015: 210–17).

Resolution 1593 (2005) on Sudan

In early 2005, there was near consensus in the UNSC about referring the case of Darfur to the consideration of the International Criminal Court, although members were divided into supporters of the court (Brazil, Argentina, Benin, Denmark, France, Greece, Romania, Tanzania, and United Kingdom), reluctant supporters of the referral but not of the ICC (U.S. and China), and those indifferent in varied degrees (Algeria, Japan, the Philippines, and Russia). A draft resolution on the subject, mainstreamed by France, was being negotiated, having as its main point of contention the possibility of exempting from ICC jurisdiction citizens of non-party countries in Sudan—prominently U.S. nationals. At the eleventh hour, the U.S. advanced alternative proposals that would further enfeeble the ICC’s jurisdiction or ignore it altogether by establishing an ad hoc tribunal.

In the broader picture, since 2004 an informal coalition of ICC supporters in the council, comprising permanent and elected members, had been struggling to convey to Washington a clear message that the blanket exemption achieved previously in resolutions 1422 (2002) and 1487 (2003) was not to be given again and that, despite the U.S. campaign against ICC, there was strong support for it in the council (Fontoura 2015; Uziel 2012, 2014).

This context suggested to Brazil that U.S. insistence on including in the draft an exemption for citizens of states not members of the ICC from being tried by it for acts in Sudan (paragraph 6) was merely a ruse to resume the campaign against the court. Attempts to suppress the text were unsuccessful, as the language was seen as a lesser evil in view of other proposals, and the price to avoid a U.S. veto. As a testimony of the bluntness of vote and ambiguity of abstention, Brazil abstained on resolution 1593 (2005) but so did the U.S., China, and Algeria, for diametrically opposed reasons. Brazil wanted to express its strong discontent with paragraph 6 while supporting the referral and the rest of the resolution; the other three were not members of the ICC and meant to underline that fact. In order to ensure clarity, Brazil made an explanation of vote emphasizing how its preferences differed from those of the U.S. and how it was not willing to accommodate the permanent member’s demands (Fontoura 2015; Romeiro 2015; Uziel 2012).

Resolution 1929 (2010) on Iran

In early 2010, Brazil started its tenth mandate in the UNSC and was engaged, alongside Turkey, another elected member, in negotiations with Iran to reach an initial deal on a nuclear fuel swap that could encourage the resumption of broader talks among Teheran, the P5, and Germany on the whole of the Iranian nuclear dossier. From the Brazilian perspective, a letter from President Obama to President Lula requesting support to deal with Iran was understood as a vote of confidence to seek such limited preliminary agreement. Although the P5 had indicated their intention to vote in the UNSC a new round of sanctions on Iran by then, on 17 May, President Lula, President Ahmadinejad, and Prime Minister Erdogan issued in Teheran a joint statement on nuclear fuel swap. Based on its 1999 experience with Iraq (described above), Brazil had an expectation that the deal would change the issue in the council and lead the P5 to renegotiate their positions (Amorim 2015; Fonseca 2015).
Yet, the day after the Teheran statement, the P5 circulated in the UNSC a draft resolution imposing new sanctions—indicating they would accept merely marginal contribution by the elected members to the text already agreed by them. Brazil saw the circulation as ignoring purposefully a serious diplomatic effort and decided to abstain from contributing to the negotiations. The U.S., in particular, and all permanent members were unwilling to explore the Brazilian-Turkish initiative by postponing sanctions (Amorim 2015; Moretti 2015).

Officially, the P5 argued that the statement was “too little, too late,” but the Brazilian perception in the UNSC was that the P5 were clearly concerned with the possibility that two elected members could upset a deal struck by the permanent members. When the vote came on 9 June, Brazil and Turkey voted against it (with Lebanon abstaining), and resolution 1929 (2010) was adopted. After the personal commitment of President Lula, Brazil felt “indignation,” which an abstention was not enough to express (Amorim 2015: 88–9). An attempt was made boldly to change the frontiers set by the P5, and they had to protect their privileges. Brazil, after clearly distancing itself from the resolution, made a point of internalizing its provisions swiftly in order to restate unequivocally that the authority of the council should be respected even when a member disagreed with the decision (Moretti 2015; Security Council Report 2010; United Nations 2010: 2–3).

Conclusion
There is admittedly limited understanding of the depths of council’s work behind closed doors. This study neither formalized a model nor was intended to prove one using quantitative data but rather was aimed at using the example of Brazil’s votes to explore new paths in studying the relevance of elected members in UNSC decision-making. The Brazilian case suggests putting aside the traditional perspective, which attributes complete decision-making power to one or the set of P5, but it cannot give a complete mapping of the role played by elected members.

As Brazil’s relative position in the international system changed, so did its attitude in voting in the council. Amorim Neto’s (2011; 171–73) research underscores a continuous search for autonomy toward a universalistic foreign policy, not only in the choice in disagreeing with the U.S. and other great powers but also in trying to contribute significantly to a growing array of issues. This tendency is also the result of a deeply ingrained commitment to multilateral politics, including in peace and security affairs (Fonseca 2011). In view of the data and examples cited, hardly could Brazilian choices in the council be attributable to systematically yielding to P5 whims. The point of reference of Brazilian decisions should be sought in its own foreign policy assessed against each concrete situation examined by the council.

In a large number of cases, Brazil maneuvers within the frontiers given by the P5 to find a semicooperative equilibrium that is closer to its own preferences. The case of resolution 1542 (2004) is evidence of how Brazil used a privileged position regarding the peacekeeping mission in Haiti to push the decision of the council towards its own preferences. Brazil’s willingness to contribute substantively to resolutions comes hand-in-hand with being more outspoken about unsatisfactory negotiations. The case of resolution 1593 (2005) underlines how the failure to achieve an acceptable text results in a clear expression of dissatisfaction—suggesting, a contrario sensu, that most affirmative votes could be interpreted, at least hypothetically, as displaying satisfaction. The whole process of referring Sudan to the ICC unveils how elected members actively engage in negotiations and alliance formation in the UNSC. Resolutions 1284 (1999) and 1929 (2010) could be understood as opposing examples of results in the attempt of an elected member to change the frontiers set by the P5, exploring the disagreements of the great powers when possible. In 1999, the Amorim Panels allowed for a protracted but successful negotiation on Iraq, building some margin for negotiations where there was none. In 2010, the Teheran declaration did not produce the same results, given the unity already achieved and valued by the P5. Brazil’s voting records and the examples studied suggest an evolution of its ability to preserve its autonomy, in part, as a result of its frequent
presence on the UNSC as an elected member and its ability to evolve within each mandate by learning from year to year (Voeten 2005: 551; Fonseca 2011: 389–90; Sardenberg 2014; Uziel 2012, 2014).  

Another feature of Brazil’s role in the UNSC is a limited degree of rebelliousness in its multilateralism. This means the country is willing to explore some risky paths, but with a strong concern for not endangering the functioning of the council as a whole. Even when strongly dissatisfied, Brazil made a point of swiftly implementing decisions against what it voted, such as resolution 1929 (2010). In Brazil’s calculations, having a UNSC whose decisions are heeded is preferable to asserting its own positions in each argument to the point of discrediting the organ.

In order to gain further understanding about the role of elected members, different paths could be explored, such as comparing the data on Brazilian votes with that available for other frequently elected members, such as Japan, Argentina, Colombia, Germany, or Pakistan. Additionally one could unearth new evidence of successful bargaining by elected members by conducting further in-depth interviews with diplomats involved in the negotiations. Better quantitative data can be sought on preferences and satisfaction based not only on voting but also on explanations of votes and co-sponsorship. Recent studies on the relevance of co-sponsorship to assess the role of coalitions in the UNSC certainly point in that direction (Monteleone 2014).

For the study of the UNSC, quantitative data on votes have limited meaning, but it does reveal something. The initial assumptions made on the relationship between permanent and elected members are essential to interpret the data. Both the quantitative patterns and the concrete examples given above suggest that the usual assumptions should not be seen as proved and that looking at the council’s decision from the point of view of elected members highlight new and interesting paths worth investigating.

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From Washington Consensus to Flexible Keynesianism? The International Monetary Fund after the Financial Crisis

by Susanne Lütz, Free University Berlin

The article examines the transformation of IMF lending policy in the wake of the recent financial crisis. The paper explores the feasibility of Peter Hall’s heuristic on policy learning for the study of the fund’s transformation, discusses its shortcomings, and analyzes the driving forces of change. The reshaping of policy instruments and their underlying ideas was driven by both IMF management and staff and by the member states. It is argued that a change of economic instruments, their setting, and the economic ideas underlying the use of instruments is heading in the direction of a “flexible Keynesianism” as an economic and funding philosophy. However, the shift toward a new paradigm is incoherent since it allows for differential treatment of member states and for flexible adoption of this economic philosophy. A movement toward a new paradigm is in progress, while a paradigm change has not yet materialized.

Introduction

Recent developments within the International Monetary Fund (IMF) show that crises not only produce losers but also winners. At the London summit in April 2009, the heads of the Group of Twenty (G20) nations decided to triple funds for the IMF to a total of US $750 billion. Thus, the IMF returned to its core business—providing liquidity to cope with external imbalances. The crisis also seemed to mark an ideological break with the past. Dominique Strauss-Kahn, then the managing director of the IMF, announced that anti-cyclical economic policy was the order of the day. British Prime Minister Gordon Brown called for a multilaterally coordinated policy of fiscal stimuli and declared that the Washington Consensus was dead. He thereby called into question the paradigm of free market fundamentalism as an economic policy, one that had influenced the work of international finance institutions in the 1990s (Williamson 1990; Babb 2013).

Five years after the announcements of a break with past, International Political Economy (IPE) scholarship tries to establish how much the fund has departed from the core of the Washington Consensus and what forces might drive organizational and ideational changes (cf. Grabel 2011; Clegg 2012; Güven 2012; Presbitero and Zazzaro 2012; Babb 2013; Joyce 2013; Ban 2015; Ban and Gallagher 2015; Broome 2015; Clegg 2014; Gabor 2015; Gallagher 2015; Lütz and Kranke 2014; Seabrooke and Nilsson 2015). Research has addressed a variety of topics, such as fiscal policy, financial sector policy, the substance of loan conditionalities, including social spending targets, political determinants of IMF lending and governance processes or the scope of the policy dialogues between IMF staff and domestic authorities while negotiating targets of lending programs. The authors of a recent special issue of Governance find the transformation of the fund’s doctrine and policy practice has been quite diverse depending on policy issues and different parts of the fund’s bureaucracy (for a summary see Ban and Gal-

1. Research for this paper was supported by the German Research Association (DFG Grant No. LU 867/2–1). I am indebted to Julian Dederke, Martyna Linartas, Sebastian Schneider, and Tim Schreiber for valuable research assistance and to two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments.
lagher 2015). Recent evidence suggests substantial doctrinal change, particularly regarding financial sector policy and the systemic risks posed by global banks but also with respect to fiscal policy, although scholarship is divided on this issue. While Daniela Gabor (2010) and Ali B. Güven (2012) state that the fund maintains an emphasis on fiscal consolidation, André Broome (2010), Ilene Grabel (2011), Susanne Lütz, and Matthias Kranke (2014) find a more flexible approach toward fiscal stability that allows for countercyclical fiscal policy and for more gradual fiscal consolidation. In line with this research, Liam Clegg argues the (almost universal) integration of social-spending targets into concessional lending arrangements contributes to a post–Washington Consensus shift in global economic governance (Clegg 2014: 754).

This paper takes issue with the debate on the transformation of the IMF in the wake of the Great Recession by focusing primarily on the fund’s lending policy. This field is considered crucial for a study of policy change since lending conditions reflected the bundle of orthodox economic policies related with the Washington Consensus. In this article, the Washington Consensus is interpreted as a policy paradigm. Following Peter Hall’s heuristic on policy learning and social change, a policy paradigm is an enduring framework of related ideas and standards about policy that specifies both the instruments that should be used in a policy area and the goals the policy should be addressing (Hall 1993: 279). John Williamson, a Washington think tank economist, outlined ten policies that economists and policymakers around Washington, D.C., had agreed upon as a set of prescriptions for developing countries at the end of the 1980s. Williamson summarized the economic policies as “prudent macroeconomic policies, outward orientation, and free-market capitalism” (1990: 1). The core of the Washington Consensus was the practice of conditionality—providing loans to governments in exchange for policy reforms. Countries in financial trouble were to receive relief funds only if they agreed to strictly implement orthodox economic policy aimed at combatting inflation, cutting spending (particularly social expenditures), and pushing through comprehensive deregulation of labor and commodity markets. Following Sarah Babb, the Washington Consensus can be interpreted as a transnational policy paradigm produced by both intellectual and political forces. It was legitimated through economic scholarship but also embedded in the practices of bureaucratic organizations, such as the international financial institutions (IFIs) that had to encourage national governments to adopt the reforms (Babb 2013: 269).

Given that the Washington Consensus was deeply enshrined in the IMF’s organizational rules and practices, a potential paradigm-change should be seen in changing instruments, policies, and ideas. I draw on Peter Hall’s heuristic for the study of the organization’s transformational shift and discuss the driving forces behind recent changes. Following Hall’s approach, change in the work of the IMF is explored on the level of policy instruments, their settings, and the hierarchy of goals underlying their use. With regard to the lending policy of the IMF, it is argued that a process of change can indeed be observed on all three levels, thus indicating an ideological shift toward Keynesianism as an economic and funding philosophy. This shift is, however, incoherent, since it allows for differential treatment of member states depending on their individual economic conditions, such as underlying fiscal positions and public finances and also their preferences for economic policy instruments. A flexible adoption of this philosophy ensures countries deviating from this general shift (like Germany, Finland, or Netherlands) may be willing to join the overall consensus to prioritize investment over balanced budgets in order to support growth, demand, and job creation. The article argues that a movement toward a new paradigm is underway, whereas a paradigm change has not yet taken place.

The paper draws on both member state- and staff-centered perspectives to shed light on the mechanisms and driving forces of change. While the incremental reshaping of existing policy instruments has been driven by staff and the IMF management, the elimination, replacement and modification of policy instruments has been supported by the member states and corresponded with resolutions of the G20 or the IMF executive board. Finally, the ideological reorientation of the interpretative framework underlying the policy instruments was
predominantly supported by those dominant member states who were interested in stimulating their own economy through expansive fiscal policies. IMF economists have supported this programmatic reorientation by providing and disseminating their research expertise on the functioning of economic instruments in the expert community.

The following section outlines Peter Hall’s framework for the study of policy learning and elaborates on the theoretical approaches to explain the possible amount of organizational change. Following this is a depiction of the alterations that have occurred regarding the instruments of policy and the interpretative framework upon which they are based. A discussion of the dynamics and driving forces of transformation follows. The contribution concludes by discussing the feasibility of Hall’s concept and the issue of a paradigm change.

Analyzing Organizational Change at the IMF

Peter Hall embeds his analysis of macroeconomic policy making in Britain over the 1970–89 period in the study of social learning. “We can define social learning as deliberate attempt to adjust the goals or techniques of policy in response to past experience and new information. Learning is indicated when policy changes as the result of such a process” (1993: 278). Hall assumes that the learning process may take different forms, depending on the kinds of policy changes involved. First-order change was attributed to the levels (or settings) of basic instruments of economic policy and happened while the overall goals and instruments of policy remained the same. Second-order change was reflected in altering the basic techniques of policy in response to past experience even though the overall goals of policy remained the same. Third-order change was marked by a radical shift in all three components of policy: the instrument setting, the instruments themselves, and the hierarchy of goals behind them. First- and second-order change can be seen as normal policymaking, a process of incremental policy adjustment that shifts toward more strategic action in case of second-order change. Both forms of incremental change do not automatically lead to third-order change. Third-order change reflects a different, more disjunctive process, marked by radical shifts in the overarching terms of policy discourse associated with a paradigm shift.

Hall does not present a coherent theoretical model to analyze driving forces and preconditions for policy change. However, he depicts several driving mechanisms in his study of alteration from Keynesianism to monetarism in British economic policy that we can draw upon. The movement from one paradigm to another that characterizes third-order change would involve the accumulation of anomalies within the terms of the paradigm, and, subsequently, experimentation with new forms of policy that gradually undermine the intellectual coherence and precision of the original paradigm. While instances of policy experimentation will be accompanied by contestation of experts, a shift from one paradigm to another would require a shift in the locus of authority over policy, thus initiating a wider contest between competing paradigms spilling beyond the boundaries of the state itself into the broader political arena. The movement toward a new paradigm will end “when the supporters of a new paradigm secure positions of authority over policymaking and are able to rearrange the organization and standard operating procedures of the policy process so as to institutionalize the new paradigm” (Hall 1993: 280–81).

According to Peter Hall, experts, bureaucrats, politicians, the media, voters, and also the wider public may spur policy change. With regard to an organization, such as the IMF, two types of actors in particular are most likely “change agents”: member states on the one hand and IMF management and staff on the other hand.

From the perspective of state-centered approaches, changes in policy instruments or changes of economic policy paradigms result only to the degree that states permit and authorize this. The realist strand of IMF research sees state preferences determined by political power plays. As a result, a major role in determining lending policy of the IMF is attributed to the U.S., as the member with the largest vote share and veto power in the internal decision-making bodies.
of the IMF, and also to the five largest member states as a group, meaning Germany, France, Japan, Great Britain, and the U.S. (Thacker 1999; Stone 2002; Copelovitch 2010). According to this interpretation, the U.S. uses its influence within the IMF to channel financial support to countries it favors for political or geostrategic reasons. A liberal-intergovernmentalist shade of argument would stress that states represent the dominant economic interests of their country, which in this context are mostly those of their banks (Moravcsik 1997; Broz and Hawes 2006; Breen 2014).

An alternative perspective does not view the IMF as a unitary actor, but addresses the latitude available to its research experts and management staff in certain activities, such as providing research expertise, surveilling member states, or conceiving and implementing lending programs. Rationalist principal-agent models point to the “slack” given to agents commissioned with certain tasks by governmental principals (Nielson and Tierney 2003; Hawkins et al. 2006). Such slack arises from information asymmetries between agents and principals and, in cases where there are several principals, in part also from differences in opinion over the goals to be pursued. Basically, it is assumed that both the research staff and the management of the international organization are interested in expanding their own domains and the available resources linked to these and that these interests also influence their behavior. A constructivist interpretation understands inter- and supranational organizations as bureaucracies that, the longer their work continues, develop a life of their own, including the creation of their own norms, ideas, and belief systems (Babb 2003; Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Chwieroth 2010). On the one hand, routines and bureaucratic pathologies can result that hinder the international organization from changing and adapting to altered environments. On the other hand, the chance exists especially at the operational level, for example, to learn from past experiences in handling crises and to reinterpret the vaguely specified mandate of the international organization in the light of its own experiences (Lütz and Kranke 2014).

The Change of Policy Instruments and Ideas

First-Order Change: Re-adjustment of Existing Policy Instruments

Even before the financial crisis of 2007–08, IMF had initiated changes to the settings of existing financing instruments. In essence, this change sought to enhance the flexibility of the conditionality linked to debt relief. Incremental change of this kind was predominantly driven by the IMF managing director and IMF staff and later underpinned by member state resolutions. Especially after the Asia crisis, IMF had been criticized by the recipient countries about its “one-size-fits-all” policy that, independent of the national context or economic problem, imposed upon the borrowers a number of structural performance criteria that deeply interfered in national economic policy yet did not contribute to short-term economic recovery. These crisis experiences prompted IMF management and the experts involved in implementing national programs to rethink the principles for lending. Thus, IMF experts based reforms in the modus of “lagged learning” (Moschella 2011: 131) on learning processes introduced earlier.

Starting in 2000, under Managing Director Horst Köhler, a policy of streamlining was introduced that aimed, among other things, to instill an awareness of “ownership” within the countries participating in the program, meaning to take greater responsibility themselves for implementing reforms. The new principles for enhancing the adaptation of a national program to the conditions of the recipient country were specified in the revision of the “Guidelines on Conditionality” in 2002. However, the strategic shift toward focusing on more macro-critical conditionalties progressed rather haltingly prior to the financial crisis. A report by the IMF internal Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) pointed out that, until 2004, the number and extent of conditions linked to bailouts had been pronounced, and the conditions did not inevitably correlate with the success of a program (IEO 2008).

Dominique Strauss-Kahn assumed the position of managing director at the IMF in November 2007 and introduced a policy of flexibility in the conditionality framework, a
broadened scope of surveillance, and, last but not least, a Keynesian-inspired evaluation of macroeconomic problems and their solutions (Joyce 2013; Ban 2015). At the meeting of the IMF executive board in March 2009, the member-state representatives gave IMF the go-ahead for a diversification of the lending toolkit, in conjunction with increased flexibility in the lending conditions (IMF 2009a). The London G20 Summit in April 2009 affirmed the intended reform; means had to be made available to rapidly overcome crisis, particularly in developing countries and emerging markets, while enabling countries to maintain social protection (G20 2009a). The strategy paper “Modernizing Conditionality” from May 2009, indicated a readjustment of existing policy instruments toward flexible conditionality polices (IMF 2009c). Among the most important changes with regard to setting policy instruments was the elimination of the structural performance criteria and the introduction of softer benchmarks, a greater emphasis on ex-ante as opposed to ex-post conditionality, a relaxation of monitoring requirements, a doubling of the maximal loan access limits (annually to 200 percent of quota and cumulatively to 600 percent of quota), an extension of the repayment period, and a simplification of repayment schedules. The introduction of a new category of “social conditionalities” was of particular importance to Strauss-Kahn. It was meant to insure that cutbacks would be accompanied by targeted social investments, meaning specifically that budget cuts would not endanger the sustainability of social nets. The re-adjustment of conditionality aims to give greater weight to measuring the success of a national program overall and less significance to monitoring compliance to specific program conditions. Basically this means that management, experts, and eventually the recipient nation receive greater leeway to evaluate the effectiveness of a program (Moreno 2013: 105; Clegg 2014: 755).

Second-Order Change: Change of Policy Instruments
Change of policy instruments was initiated by both IMF staff and the member states. On the one hand, it is clear that IMF experts were following patterns of incremental adaptation long established within the organization, because they had repeatedly modified and diversified their lending toolkit in the previous six decades (Bird 2003: 231–35). On the other hand, the restructuring of the lending toolkit has also been flanked by the member states. State engagement differed, however, depending on the respective state of economic development, lending needs, and individual experiences with certain economic instruments: Low-Income Countries (LICs) were seeking flexible access to credit, preferably without any conditionalities. Emerging countries built on their positive experiences with capital controls while continental European countries hesitated to introduce lending instruments not linked with conditionalities (Moreno 2013: 113).

In the course of the financial crisis, infrequently used facilities were discarded, new ones introduced, and the extent of the means available through the IMF expanded successively.\(^2\) Between 2007 and 2011, the total number of national programs supported by the IMF using all types of lending went from thirty-six (2007) to fifty-six (2011). By the spring of 2013, this number had already sunk once again to forty-one (IMF 2013a).

The reform of the financing instruments was prompted by the desire to establish facilities to prevent crisis and not just to master it. Three characteristics stand out:

a) The differentiation of facilities according to the type of recipient nation and its economic problems
b) The reduction of ex-post conditionalities and the introduction of ex-ante conditionalities
c) The re-evaluation of the instrument of capital controls.

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\(^2\) Among the discarded facilities were the Precautionary Credit Line (replaced by the Precautionary and Liquidity Line), the Rapid Access Component of the Exogenous Shocks Facility and components of the Emergency Natural Disaster Assistance and the Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance (all three of which were replaced by the Rapid Credit Facility); see IMF (2009c); IMF (2009b).
THE DIFFERENTIATION OF FACILITIES

Three facilities are tailored to LICs, to whom concessional “soft” loans are granted at basically zero-interest-rate conditions without explicit ex-post conditionalities: Extended Credit Facility (ECF), Standby Credit Facility (SCF), and Rapid Credit Facility (RCF). Four other facilities are geared more toward developed countries: Stand-By Arrangements (SBA), Extended Fund Facility (EFF), Flexible Credit Line (FCL), and Precautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL). These facilities offer “conventional” interest-bearing loans, however, at altered conditions. As the IMF’s oldest lending instrument, stand-by arrangements can also be used as High-Access Precautionary Stand-by Arrangements (HAPAs), if needed; the advantages are a greater lending volume, the possibility to access loans of greater size at the start of a program (frontloading) in order to prevent crisis, and flexibility in tailoring the conditionalities to the needs of the borrower. The EFF is designed to offer longer term assistance than the SBAs and to support countries whose balance-of-payments difficulties are due to structural weaknesses in the economy. Accordingly, the conditions attached to EFF strive to achieve macroeconomic stability and to implement structural reforms. In return, the EFF offers loans that mature up to a maximum of ten years (IMF 2015a).

THE REDUCTION OF EX-POST CONDITIONALITIES AND THE INTRODUCTION OF EX-ANTE CONDITIONALITIES

The Flexible Credit Line (FCL), introduced in March 2009, replaces ex-post conditionality with ex-ante conditions in granting financial support. The recipient countries that qualify for such support exhibit solid fundamentals, have access to capital markets, and have demonstrated reliability in implementing reforms in the past (Grabel 2011: 823). Borrowers can access credit flexibly within a two-year period without having to comply with any other conditions. So far, few countries (Mexico, Poland, and Columbia) have used this facility. In addition to FCL, IMF also introduced the Precautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL), which replaced the Precautionary Credit Line (PCL). PLL combines ex-ante and ex-post conditionality and is geared toward countries where FCL is not available, but the countries can demonstrate, despite economic problems, “sound economic fundamentals and institutional policy frameworks” and “a track record of implementing—sound policies” (IMF 2015b). After the funds have been allocated (to date only to Morocco and Macedonia), the program is placed under surveillance in order to review over the course of time the criteria and the access of the country to international capital markets, its fiscal and monetary policies, and the stability and monitoring of its financial sector. Both FCL and PLL are designed explicitly for the prevention of liquidity crises caused exogenously.

The Final Declaration of the G20 Summit in Cannes in November 2011 once again underscored the relevance of PLL in particular and of IMF financing instruments and facilities in general that insure against exogenous shocks and provide non-concessional financing in cases of such unpredictable and disruptive events as natural disasters (G20 2011). Within the executive board of IMF, the introduction of the Flexible Credit Line was contested. Representatives from the continental European countries were particularly the ones who emphasized the danger of encouraging “moral hazard” they felt was inherent in a financial instrument lacking conditionality (Moreno 2013: 113). It is not by accident that no mention of FCL can be found in the G20 declaration.

THE RE-EVALUATION OF THE INSTRUMENT OF CAPITAL CONTROLS

Among the most prominent changes in the policy toolkit of IMF is its increasingly flexible approach toward the use of capital controls (see Gallagher and Ocampo 2013; Grabel 2013). After the Second World War, capital controls were instruments of macroeconomic management deployed by Western industrial nations and accepted by IMF. In the neoliberal era of the Washington Consensus, IMF pursued the policy of a far-reaching deregulation of
financial markets and of the movement of capital. During this phase, developing countries like Chile, Malaysia, India, China, Columbia, or Thailand continued to maintain capital controls for a while and thus drew the harsh criticism from IMF. In the wake of the Asia crisis, IMF management and economic experts developed an increasingly accommodating attitude toward the use of capital controls. The latter was accepted in so far as they were aimed at capital inflows and were used only for a limited period of time, and if the economic fundamentals of the country could be said to be sound (Grabel 2011: 813). When Iceland turned to IMF in the autumn of 2008 as the first country during the most recent financial crisis to request financial aid, the fund’s new assessment of the instrument of capital controls became obvious. IMF proved to be a strong advocate of the instrument and adopted provisions on the use of strict capital controls to the provisions of Stand-By Arrangements. Between 2008 and 2010, a total of eighteen emerging and developing countries (including Brazil, Argentina, China, and Russia) imposed various forms and types of capital controls. Dominique Strauss-Kahn commented on Brazil’s decision to control capital inflows by noting that “I have no ideology on this”; capital controls are “not something that come from hell” (cited Grabel 2011: 816). Beginning in 2010, IMF staff wrote background research papers that legitimized capital controls as a means to prevent crisis and placed techniques of “capital flow management” in the same spectrum of instruments as the tariffs and regulatory measures used to secure financial stability (see Ostry et al. 2010; Ostry 2012). In preparation for the G20 Summit in Cannes in November 2011, a sub-working group of the G20 dealt with possible conditions for imposing capital controls. It appears that no concrete stipulations were drawn up at the time because the final declaration of the Cannes Summit does not include anything specific on the topic. Still, former French President Nicolas Sarkozy stated in his closing address at the summit that capital controls were now an acceptable instrument of stabilization (Gallagher 2011). In December 2012, the IMF executive board finally issued an “institutional view” on the topic, which addressed the risks that free flows of capital and premature liberalization posed to developing countries and emphasized the right of member states to limit cross-border flows of capital (IMF 2012). In April 2013, specific guidelines were issued to the staff on how to implement this view in the financial surveillance of IMF member states (Gallagher 2015).

Third-Order Change: Change of Hierarchies of Goals and Ideas

Finally, changes are also evident in the conceptual or interpretative framework upon which the use of policy instruments is based. Macroeconomic policy is considered fundamental for the creation of growth and jobs on the one hand and a prerequisite for the stability of the global financial system on the other. The cornerstones for this re-orientation were defined at the respective G20 summits. At the London G20 Summit in April 2009, the government heads agreed on a policy of coordinated fiscal stimuli aimed at boosting demand, growth, and job security (G20 2009a). These topics were introduced into the debates particularly by the U.S. and Great Britain but also by emerging markets like Argentina, which had experienced sharp declines in demand and in the level of exports (White House 2009). In order to stimulate demand, the available IMF funds were tripled, the Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) were redistributed, and last but not least, national stimulus packages were passed, the conditions of which remained at the discretion of each of the member states. Germany and France were thoroughly skeptical of an expansive fiscal policy but, in turn, managed to have their wish for a greater regulation of banks, hedge funds, and tax oases included in the leaders’ summit agreement (Baldwin 2009). At the G20 summit in Pittsburg in September 2009, the participants reaffirmed their commitment to a framework for “strong, sustainable, and balanced growth.” In part, this framework was to be made up of macroeconomic policies that boosted global demand and reduced the imbalances in development, while at the same time remained consistent with the
aim to maintain price stability. Furthermore, it was emphasized that fiscal stimuli were not to be ended too early, and the timing of exit strategies needed to be coordinated among the member states. Overall, the objective of fiscal, monetary, structural, trade, and regulatory policies was to produce sustainable and balanced growth. IMF was to advise and support these policies through its bi- and multi-lateral surveillance. Even at the subsequent summits right up to the G20 summit in Brisbane in November 2014, the government heads reaffirmed their commitment to the path taken: “Raising global growth to deliver better living standards and quality jobs for people across the world is our highest priority. . . . The global economy is being held back by a shortfall in demand, while addressing supply constraints is key to lifting potential growth. . . . We will ensure our macroeconomic policies are appropriate to support growth, strengthen demand and promote global rebalancing. We will continue to implement fiscal strategies flexibly, taking into account near-term economic conditions, while putting debt as a share of GDP on a sustainable path” (see G20 2014).

The economists on the IMF research staff have supported this programmatic reorientation toward a flexible Keynesianism and outlined new objectives, primarily with regard to the areas of monetary policy, fiscal policy, and regulation (Blanchard et al. 2010; Blanchard et al. 2013). In their view, monetary policy consists of more than mere anti-inflationary measures; it includes aspects that monitor growth and financial stability. Although a stable inflation rate is necessary, it is not seen as a sufficient condition for economic growth. Instead, the point is to weigh the costs and benefits of a higher inflation target. Central banks are attributed a fundamental role in the system that can include the provision of liquidity to governments and businesses in times of crisis. Respectively, the quantitative easing of monetary policy by way of low-interest policy, and the buying up of private and public bonds is viewed as a legitimate instrument of an anti-cyclical economic policy. As late as October 2013, IMF warned the U.S. Federal Reserve against ending its quantitative easing prematurely. Otherwise, negative spill-over effects would threaten developing countries and emerging markets in the form of limited flows of capital (Wigglesworth 2013). To combat speculative bubbles and speculative attacks against currencies, it is recommended that capital controls be imposed.

Fiscal policy is basically seen as an instrument of macroeconomic management. In the case of crisis, IMF argues in favor of fiscal stimuli, especially when instruments of monetary policy to boost the economy have been exhausted. At the same time, IMF economists emphasize the importance of reducing budget deficits “under normal conditions,” not the least so that it will be possible to build fiscal buffers against economic shocks. However, austerity is no longer seen necessarily as the means of choice on the path to growth and jobs. The pace of reducing national debt should be left up to each country to determine for itself, dependent on the state of its own public finances, the economy, and also the pressure of the financial markets (Blanchard et al. 2013; Giles 2013a; Giles 2013b).

Regulation of banks and financial markets, like monetary policy, should also reflect an awareness of the systemic and macroeconomic implications. Therefore, in the future, central banks should assume regulatory tasks while maintaining their independence from politics.

Dynamics and Forces of Change
On all three levels—that of economic policy ideas and hierarchies of aims, of economic instruments, and of their setting—it is evident overall that change is heading in the direction of a flexible Keynesianism, one which seeks to balance the needs to promote sustainable growth and to stabilize the financial system for the purpose of preventing crises. The latter manifests itself primarily in the introduction of new financing facilities geared at crisis prevention, the increase in the lending volume, or even the reassessment of the value of capital controls as instruments in preventive capital flow management. However, the movement

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toward this new economic philosophy is uneven since it allows for differential adoption. Instruments of fiscal policy are used pragmatically according to the economic situation in each country to revive demand, boost the economy, or to combat inflation. The interests of developing countries and emerging markets are acknowledged through the introduction of non-concessional facilities or new “social conditionalities.” The use of the Washington Consensus repertoire is not excluded but is made dependent on the individual economic situation of each country and its integration in the rest of the global economy.

Organizational transformation was spurred by both IMF staff and member states. The experts pushed processes of “first- and second-order change” relatively autonomously. They relied heavily on their experiences in handling past crises when they re-set existing instruments of policy and invented new guidelines. IMF’s mandate is predominantly technical, which has allowed its staff and the IMF executive director substantial autonomy to gradually overhaul the conditionalities related to country lending (Lütz and Kranke 2014). At the same time, the member states were crucial to spur processes of “second- and third-order change.” Member states’ preferences to redesign lending instruments are shaped by their own state of economic development and need for capital injection, and by their experiences in handling certain policy instruments such as capital controls. Moreover, a state’s ideological openness toward demand-based policy instruments will also determine its willingness to expand the policy repertoire. In general, preferences of developing, emerging, and developed countries in the wake of the financial crisis have triggered the differentiation of lending instruments described before. Third-order change of the underlying conceptual framework toward a flexible Keynesianism was particularly driven by the U.S., Great Britain, and the emerging markets. Continental European countries like Germany, with a highly regulatory and (price) stability-oriented economic philosophy and, in addition, an export-oriented economic model, are extremely skeptical of a policy of stimulating demand, possibly at the cost of higher wages and prices. This position has led to conflicts within the executive board time and again in recent years.  

These findings echo other observations that Keynesian pragmatism and discretion are still alive in Britain and the U.S. but not in continental Europe. George Osborne, the UK chancellor after 2010, did not reverse the major stimulus and the bailouts that rescued the British financial system in 2008. Barack Obama went further in adding to the stimulus, but neither government offered an intellectual defense of its unwillingness to match the neoliberal rhetoric with policies to deliver it. In the Eurozone, a more Hayekian or ordo-liberal policy has been followed and supported by Germany, being reflected first and foremost in the fiscal compact. It reflects a stricter fiscal conservatism that imposes an unreachable set of fiscal rules on permitted deficits on the Eurozone members, implying a deeply deflationary policy of austerity. According to Andrew Gamble, it is exactly this divergence between interpretations and practices of neoliberalism that demonstrates its flexibility and resilience (Gamble 2013: 72–5). I would argue, conversely, that G20 summit decisions leave room for some deviation in national solutions leading to a “flexible Keynesianism.” Since the commitment to expansive macroeconomic policy is coupled with deals in other areas, then those skeptical member states will be willing to join the general consensus.

All in all, both staff- and state-centered perspectives are of explanatory value here. Constructivism would interpret the latitude and the learning processes of the research experts as important factors driving incremental change within the organization. According to rationalist principal-agent models, IMF management and staff benefit from informational advantages and partly heterogeneous preferences of its member state stakeholders. Thus, organizational slack and learning experiences would allow the fund’s bureaucracy to redefine the organization’s toolkit of instruments and ideas. At the same time, third-order change would not have been possible without the active support of the member states. The G20 decision to increase

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4. See interview with Germany’s representative on the IMF Executive Board, 8 September 2009.
IMF resources threefold in 2009 created the prerequisite for the further enlargement of the fund and, thus, a type of opportunity structure for learning processes. To focus here primarily on the U.S. or the G5 nations would, however, narrow our view far too much. Besides the U.S. and Great Britain, it has been the emerging countries like Brazil, India, or Argentina who have favored a policy to boost demand, growth, and job security with the help of fiscal stimuli. The greater weight of the emerging and developing countries in the decision-making processes of IMF is also evidenced by progress in the protracted efforts to reorder the distribution of votes and reform internal governance structure of the IMF (a topic that cannot be addressed extensively here).  

### Conclusion

In general, the overall findings of this paper echo recent post-crisis research on reform politics emphasizing that incremental change prevails although the global financial crisis has truly confronted actors with an exogenous shock (Moschella and Tsingou 2013: 3; Vetterlein and Moschella 2014). In line with arguments brought forward by historical institutionalists (Streeck and Thelen 2005), it is argued that paradigm change is associated with incremental, endogenously driven dynamics. Radical transformation may, therefore, build on former experiences or even policy legacies and will result from the cumulative effects of small and incremental policy changes. With respect to IMF lending policy, we find a recalibration of funding instruments (Hall’s first- and second-order change) and a changing hierarchy of goals behind the use of instruments (Hall’s third-order change), all of which points toward a new economic paradigm. Despite this, I would argue this new paradigm has not been institutionalized in a way to establish new standard operating procedures (Hall 1993: 280–81) nor has it replaced the former Washington Consensus as economic philosophy and policy framework.

As has been shown, even on the programmatic level, a third-order change of economic ideas has been uneven and incoherent, since it allows for differential treatment of IMF member states and also for adoption of the Washington Consensus where it is considered appropriate (like in the Eurozone).

Hall’s conceptual toolkit allows us to study dimensions of change (instruments, settings of instruments, and ideas behind them) that are in principle also applicable to an institutional environment such as an international organization. Hall was also correct to point out that first- and second-order change much relied on technocrats, whereas third-order change in Hall’s case of British macroeconomic policy was promoted by politicians and societal actors, such as media and think tanks. In our case, it was primarily the technical expertise of IMF staff that allowed for gradual recalibration of policy instruments, whereas state decisions paved the way for ideological, third-level shifts.

However, Hall’s analytical frame of reference provides shortcomings with regard to three dimensions: First, a proper assessment of organizational transformation would require studying several areas of IMF policy and activities, their potential interlinkages, and also the changing priorities among them. Andrew Baker, while applying Hall’s framework to the macroprudential ideational shift in financial market regulation emphasized for instance the linkages between changes in different policy domains (such as macroeconomic policy and financial regulation) that might enhance each other or could be driven by different dynamics (Baker 2013). This paper has explored the field of lending policy as a crucial case for a potential paradigm shift, but further research on technical assistance, surveillance, and the range of related economic policies is needed.

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5. Following the 2010 decision by the IMF Executive Board to introduce (as yet unimplemented) reform, the quota share of over- and under-represented countries would shift by 6 percent and the basis for calculating quotas and vote shares would also change. China, whose vote share would double to 6 percent, or even Brazil, whose vote share would lie at 2.2 percent, would profit from this. Following the implementation of the decisions, the developing countries, taken together, would have a vote share of 37 percent, which would greatly exceed that of the United States (16.5 percent) or that of the entire G7 nations (ca. 24 percent). Among the losers of the reform would be the European countries, which are thought to have been overrepresented until now, see IMF (2010).
Second, Hall’s approach assumes a doctrine will also be practiced and there is no gap between the programmatic and the operational level. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to study organizational practice and the implementation of flexible Keynesianism across different lending programs, current research on the fund’s post-crisis operational behavior points in different directions. A skeptical view stresses that, in implementing lending programs, the fund continues to focus on fighting inflation by means of restrictive monetary policy and on cutting government spending in order to create fiscal stability (Ramos and Roy 2012; Wayenberge et al. 2013). An interpretation would understand programmatic change as an initial step in the sweeping realization of the new paradigm also in the lending practice. The lending programs for European countries consist of familiar recipes for a pro-cyclical, macroeconomic adaptation of policy, including commitments to budget and spending cuts, the deregulation of job markets, or the privatization of the infrastructural sectors (Grabel 2011: 821). However, the conditionalities for the European countries are now determined in negotiations between the IMF, the European Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB), and the recipient countries. Time and again over the course of a country’s program, IMF has demonstrated it is willing to grant the borrowing countries greater flexibility to achieve their subgoals than have the European Commission and the ECB. In the program for Latvia, IMF opted for temporarily higher deficit targets, for a longer transition period to consolidate budgets, and for the introduction of the Euro without immediate compliance to the Maastricht convergence criteria. On the other hand, the European Commission and the ECB demanded the adherence to orthodox austerity policy and proved to be the “rescuer of the Washington Consensus” (Lütz and Kranke 2012; Lütz and Kranke 2014).

Third, the reinforcement and institutionalization of a new paradigm would, according to Hall, require shifts in the locus of authority over policies. However, Hall does not specify where the authority needed for paradigm changes should be located. In our case of a transnational paradigm, transformation would need to be cultivated beyond the walls of the international organization in the broader political arena, in different global economic governance institutions or in professional networks. Ilene Grabel for instance, observes an increasing acceptance of heterodox concepts in the American field of economics, which could help diffuse this idea at American business schools and eventually also strengthen those economists at IMF who favor a heterodox approach to their field (Grabel 2013: 20–7). A study of the fund’s interorganizational linkages and of its embeddedness in the broader organizational arena could shed light on the “speed and scope” (Vetterlein and Moschella 2014: 161) of its cultivation activities. So far, a movement toward a flexible Keynesianism is in progress while a paradigm change has not yet materialized.

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Reviewer: Bob Reinalda, Radboud University Nijmegen


Some of the many books on intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) that are being published catch one’s attention more firmly than others. Having read these books one is aware that one will consult them again and knows where to find them on the bookshelves or in the computer. Grigorescu’s book is such a special one, because it shows and explains several trends occurring within IGOs over a lengthy period of time. The question mark in the title of his book: “Democratic Intergovernmental Organizations?” is correct, given the generally skeptical attitude toward connecting IGOs and democracy. As Robert Dahl (1999: 19) once argued: “An international organization is not and cannot be a democracy.” However, Grigorescu’s systematic approach and well-organized empirical data help us to understand how for more than a century IGOs have actually been altered in response to calls for greater democracy. The book’s eye opener is that in this respect long-term change and evolution are stronger than often is supposed.

Democratic Norms
The book’s main issue is how democratic norms have shaped IGO decision-making rules. Grigorescu discerns five democratic norms. The first two, “fair state participation” and “fair voting,” focus on the degree that IGOs promote equality among states: who decides and how? The third norm is “transparency,” in particular the information flows from IGOs to the public, given that public access to information is essential for accountability and responsiveness. The fourth norm is “participation of actors other than governments,” based on the idea that the more of such actors can participate freely in the political process, the more democratic the system is. The last norm is “transnational parliamentary oversight” as a means of democratic checks and balances. I will come back to these norms.

While power considerations and effectiveness are recognizable in the design of IGOs, Grigorescu argues that normative pressures deriving from domestic democratic analogies have also shaped IGO rules over time. Normative pressure is a matter not only of actors promoting reform of organizations by referring to a democratic norm but also of reaction to such pressure from other member states. In practice, it takes a long time before democratic norms reach
IGOs, and in order to become effective, these norms need to become strong among multiple member states. Secondary actors, such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), IGO secretariats, members of parliaments, and media, support the cause of reform; however, actual change remains a matter of battles among states over framing norms and their implementation. These views of action and reaction as well as battles among states are appealing.

The likelihood of democratic norms having an impact on specific IGO rules depends not only on the norm strength but also on events that trigger feelings about the lack of conformity to the norm. Grigorescu, who once worked in a physics laboratory, derives the latter argument from physics, where pressures are greater when the force is strong and concentrated on a very small surface. He looks for moments when there is a concentration of normative efforts, which usually happen when the status quo is seen as departing substantially from what is expected on the basis of the norm (p. 23–4).

With regard to the battles among states, Grigorescu focuses on ways to alleviate the pressures (as in physics: finding the “pressure valve”) and argues that attempting to alter the interpretation of the norm, or its implementation, can reduce pressures. Here he discerns three strategies: “challenging,” which includes a rejection of the appropriateness of the norm or the ability to apply it; “narrowing,” which entails accepting not all but only some interpretations of the norm and only some of the actions; and “broadening,” which implies promoting additional norms and actions. The likely outcomes of these actors’ strategies are, respectively, “no change” to IGO rules, “partial changes,” and “alternative changes.” The strategies and possible reactions to normative pressure deriving from a specific norm to take a certain action are clarified in a table and a figure (both 2.1, p. 31–2), which is helpful when reading the book chapters. The author provides visual support elsewhere also, as he likes illustrative schemes and has put much effort into quantifying data and providing figures in every chapter to illustrate the trends he is discussing and explaining. It may not be obvious immediately, but these simple figures cover many calculations, e.g., regarding the strength of normative pressures.

Each of the five empirical chapters focuses on one of the democratic norms mentioned above and follows the evolution of their application across time. The cases are six major IGOs (including predecessors) that were established in three major time periods: two after the First World War—the League of Nations and the International Labour Organization (ILO); two after the Second World War—the United Nations (UN) and the World Bank; and two after the end of the Cold War—the European Union (EU) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Methodologically, Grigorescu considers the critical junctures when decision-making rules were first adopted and when there were significant pressures to change them. He applies process tracing, based on primary sources as much as possible, and also assesses counterfactual arguments (different outcomes or likely outcomes in case of the absence of democratic pressures). Grigorescu has brought to light relevant older documents and texts that inform about changes or continuities at the time. He assumes that important national security and economic interests were the main factors shaping the original decision-making rules of these organizations but found that all five norms have had an impact on the rules of virtually all organizations across time. Although we cannot characterize these IGOs as democratic by domestic standards, the general trend over more than a century contradicts Dahl’s view, as it has taken the organizations closer to domestic democratic models.

**Fair State Participation**

Let me examine a few of Grigorescu’s cases. The norm of “fair state participation” illustrates the nuanced trends he reveals well. During the nineteenth century Concert of Europe the normative arguments of small states were based originally on the norm of “sovereign” equality, i.e., that states should not decide the fate of other states not on domestic democratic analogies. By the 1907 Hague Peace Conference, however, most small states seeking participation in international decision making had turned to the norm of “fair” (i.e., equal) participation, which the great powers had allowed in the more technical public international unions that were set up
during the second half of the nineteenth century. When the League of Nations was designed in 1919, the great powers initially “challenged” the norm of equal participation as unpractical but given the revolt of small states against the background of Woodrow Wilson’s ideals of inclusiveness and openness they changed to a strategy of “narrowing” the application of fair participation. This resulted in partial changes, as they made some concessions by adding initially two, and then four, council seats for small states alongside those for the great powers, which resulted in a balance between “perceived effectiveness of exclusive great power decision-making” and “acceptance of the norm of fair participation” (p. 61). This happened at a time of strong domestic democratic norms and coincided with the peak of Samuel Huntington’s (1991) first wave of democracy.

During the Second World War, the great powers promoted “sovereign” equality again (also mentioned in article 2 of the UN’s charter) but accepted six seats for small states on the Security Council. During the debates about enlarging the council in the 1950s, the great powers once more used the strategy of “challenging” fair participation, by questioning the applicability of domestic norms to international relations (resulting in no changes). This seemed sufficient to stave off the impetus for reform for a while (although the six seats for small states became ten in 1965), but Grigorescu (69) argues that in order to defuse the normative pressures from small states at its founding, the great powers had used a “broadening” strategy (resulting in alternative changes) to allow application of the norm of “fair” participation in UN bodies other than the Security Council, including increases in membership of the Economic and Social Council in 1965 and 1973.

During the later and still ongoing debates about Security Council reform, the strategy of “narrowing” the application of the fair representation norm was used, which resulted in informal arrangements, such as informal consultations with states outside the council and with NGOs (the so-called Arria formula). In this context Grigorescu (75) also mentions the informal “Green Room” consultations of GATT and later WTO, which he discusses in the context of inclusiveness. This, however, may be questioned, as GATT Executive Secretary Eric Wyndham White invented these consultations as a way of brokering disputes rather than allowing greater participation. Once Wyndham White sensed the possibility of rapprochement, he summoned delegates to small group meetings in the so-called Green Room, where entrenched positions were broken down in all-night negotiations (see McKenzie 2012: 4).

Fair Voting
The remarkable trend with regard to voting rules is the general move away from unanimity (linked to the traditional concept of sovereignty) to majority voting, a trend that could already be seen in the oldest IGO, the Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine of 1815, as well as in the League of Nations (where unanimity is the rule, but differentiated systems of voting are also in use) and the United Nations (where majority voting is a rule, but exceptions, such as the veto privilege in the Security Council, can also be observed). Grigorescu (105–06) found that the domestic analogy to democratic institutions was used far more often at the 1945 San Francisco Conference than at Versailles in 1919. The advantage of his historical approach is that it also shows what was lost in comparison to the interwar period, such as the elimination of the League Council’s rule that a state involved in a conflict was not allowed to cast its vote and the actual veto power of small states, which could single-handedly block resolutions. In 1945, the great powers enhanced their position by abolishing these rules.

During the Cold War, there were no major changes in voting rules in the IGOs that are discussed in the book, although in the Bretton Woods institutions and regional development banks voting weights were adjusted as a result of a “narrowing” strategy, resulting in partial changes. In the post–Cold War era, however, the voting power of small states in the Bretton Woods institutions declined compared to that of the great powers. While small states used a “broadening” strategy vis-à-vis the UN Security Council in the 1990s by discussing both its
voting system and membership, hoping to get partial results, the great powers used a strategy of “narrowing” in order to reduce the normative pressures for membership reforms, but they did not link this to the veto system but rather to more transparency (113).

**Transparency**
The transparency chapter is also relevant for people in Communication Studies, given its information about relations between IGOs and the media or close relations between journalists and foreign ministries. Once again, a figure (5.2) clarifies the various flows of information from IGOs to the public: direct, through member states, or via NGOs. While the press at the time often did not have access to national parliamentary assemblies, it was given extraordinary access to league meetings, receiving all documents that were circulated. In 1926, 333 newspapers and 28 agencies received press accreditations to the League Assembly, while the league’s information section offered some 200 communiqués per year. Because not all council meetings were open, small states applied normative pressure to achieve both an increased representation on the council and more transparency. Grigorescu (143) argues that this combination, rather than placing the two norms under the broader umbrella of democracy as was done in the UN in the 1990s, explains why the expansion of council membership in 1923 only added two more members for small states, as the great powers used the increase in transparency as a way to defuse pressure for even greater enlargement of membership. This was also the case in the early 1930s, when transparency was augmented again in response to (unsuccessful) pressure for increases in membership. Grigorescu (173) emphasizes rightly that “broadening” strategies imply that various aspects of democratization of IGOs need to be studied simultaneously, as they often affect each other.

His (148) thesis about a “broadening” strategy is less convincing in the 1980s, when Security Council transparency improved during a period with no formal reform efforts, but he correctly shows that IGOs struggled with the application of the transparency norm, including a culture of secrecy at the Bretton Woods institutions that could not withstand heavy criticisms. Despite resistance of both IGO staff and government representatives, transparency policies and practices increased, mainly as a result of visible scandals at national and international levels (e.g., Oil-for-Food at the UN) but also because governments sent transparency signals to IGOs. Here the rise of national Freedom of Information Acts and the impact of the new right of access to public documents played a role.

**Participation of NGOs**
NGO access to IGOs is a more familiar topic in international studies (e.g., Charnovitz 1997; Davies 2013) than the previous norms, but the topic’s understanding is mainly based on the usefulness of NGOs in resolving collective actions, rather than on linking NGO activities with the democratic character of IGOs in the sense of checks and balances. Grigorescu’s analysis, therefore, focuses on the clash between those promoting increased NGO participation in IGO work and those opposing this. Compared to the broader practice of the League of Nations, the great powers in 1945 used a “narrowing” strategy by restricting NGO inclusion to the UN ECOSOC and replacing the original charter wording of “participation without a vote” with “consultation.” There were no references to “democracy” in this respect, neither in the league nor in the UN.

Although generally speaking the number of NGOs having consultative status in the UN system has continued to rise, Grigorescu’s approach reveals what he (189) calls a “cooler relationship,” resulting from the fact that Cold War tensions had led both superpowers to use NGOs for their own purposes. In 1967, this created greater control and limitation of NGO participation in UN activities. According to UN expert Pei-heng Chiang (1981: 161), the UN preferred to accept those NGOs that contributed technical experience and disseminated information about UN policies, rather than those that would want to intervene in the formulation
of UN policies or to criticize UN policies and actions. The experience of human rights NGOs, now generally accepted but not in the beginning, illustrates Chiang’s point. Another example discussed by Grigorescu (194) are the grassroots movements that began to criticize the lack of information and ability to influence plans for World Bank projects in the mid-1980s, resulting in pressure for NGO access and voting changes under the umbrella of “democratization” of the Bretton Woods institutions in the 1990s and 2000s.

Grigorescu (197) qualifies the ECOSOC debates in 1996 as a compromise between those supporting a greater role for NGOs in the UN system and those opposing it. Resolution 1996/31 included two references to “democracy,” telling NGOs to be organized and to reach decisions in a democratic fashion. His interpretation is that of a “challenging” strategy, used to defuse normative pressures for greater active participation by linking NGOs, but not states or the UN itself, to democratic decision making.

On a more critical note, Grigorescu’s (191) thesis that the European Economic Community’s first real consultations with NGOs took place in the environmental realm can be questioned, as he does not mention the consultative committees of the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Economic Community, which engaged not only employers (that he mentions), but also workers, consumers, and traders. The early engagement of several key economic actors was meant to build transnational coalitions in support of European policies and allowed the nongovernmental actors to take initiatives (Milward 1995).

Presence of Parliamentary Bodies
The topic of transnational parliamentary oversight is illustrated by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (created in 1889), which promoted parliamentary oversight from outside IGOs, and the parliamentary assemblies of the Council of Europe and the European Union, with democratic normative pressures to alter IGO rules within the two European institutions. Grigorescu reminds us of the ways in which the British government opposed Winston Churchill’s efforts to set up the Council of Europe in 1949 by first using a “broadening” strategy (unrealistically suggesting a study of the possibility of a global parliament), followed by a harsh “narrowing” strategy, with the British doing all they could to erode the institution’s power. Grigorescu then shifts to the impressive development of the European Parliament, which eventually gained co-decision powers within the EU, to a large extent as a result of its own performance and the use of windows of opportunity.

Grigorescu’s jump from the early Council of Europe to the later EU developments may leave the impression that the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly has remained a lame duck. However, Jill Lovecy (2004) showed that soon after its establishment, the Parliamentary Assembly developed into a policy entrepreneur in its own right, successfully proposing common actions across a whole range of policy fields, especially human rights. Elements that explain this unexpected outcome are the assembly’s use of the council’s dominant policy frame, centered on marrying democratic institutions and enforceable human rights, the assembly’s exercise of its right of policy initiative in a modest way, and the fact that a high proportion of the assembly’s early members was drawn from the ranks of the European Movement. Often they were better informed than the ministers and had solutions that were difficult to ignore.

Conclusion
It is to be appreciated that, after publishing several articles on different facets of democracy and IGOs, Grigorescu decided to assemble his insights into a monograph. This draws attention to what has happened over longer periods of time and allows the assessment of developments in a way different from the skeptical view, as expressed by Dahl, even if IGOs incorporate domestic democratic norms only slowly and partially. The historical approach makes it possible to pay closer attention to specific organizations, including predecessors, and often provides comparative views as other IGO examples are also mentioned. All chapters and the book itself
end with a similar set of questions that summarize and assess the developments systematically, with strong tables and figures.

As highlighted herein, Grigorescu’s is a clear analysis presenting general trends occasionally open to criticism. Some of the issues he raises could have been elaborated in greater detail. For example, the interrelationship between the five normative pressures, the extent that nongovernmental actors do indeed provide checks on IGO executive bodies (rather than only have consultative participation), and whether transnational parliamentary bodies actually furnish the suggested correcting oversight. Nonetheless, while the debate on democratic intergovernmental organizations will undoubtedly be continued, Grigorescu’s volume will offer a new point of departure.

REFERENCES


