World Organization in Migration Politics: The International Organization for Migration

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In 2016, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) joined the UN as a related organization. IOM remains relatively understudied despite the fact that it had been founded and existing since the 1950s. IOM serves its now close to 200 member states with important advice and services related to migration, a challenge that is often considered internationally divisive. This article analyzes IOM’s role in world society and in “managing” world migration. In emphasizing that IOM is embedded in world society, we conceptualize IOM as a “world organization.” This includes its self-perception as part of world society, its internal relations that reflect how decisions are made and how IOM refers the world around, its interactions not just with states but with other IOs and NGOs active in migration politics, too, and finally, its contribution to global order in migration politics. Since the late 2000s, there has been a growth in the number of independent and critical studies on IOM and specific aspects of this organization and its activities. However, most of these contributions lack a reference to more general discussions and “mainstream” concepts in IR and IO studies. The perspective we propose in this article portrays the IOM as a unique example of an innovative world organization, by analyzing the interplay between IOM and its social world surroundings. The theoretical concept draws on an understanding of IOs as organizations in world society that aim to contribute to the emerging field of international political sociology.

Introduction

Whether the focus is on migrants and refugees arriving at European shores, refugee resettlement to Canada, or the improvement of border security in African countries, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) is always at the forefront of managing migration.1 Even though IOM is not a new international organization (IO), for a long time it was an unfamiliar organization to the public, academics, and even policy makers.2 One of the reasons for this was probably the IOM’s long absence from the UN system. Founded in 1951, the IOM, due to various reasons, remained outside the UN system and only recently, in the summer of 2016, IOM did decide to join the UN as a related organization to the UN.3

Very little academic research has been published and very little is known about the precise

1. See, e.g., www.cbc.ca/news/world/refugee-process-canada-turkey-jordan-lebanon-1.3353042. There has been an increasing media presence by the IOM’s Director General William Lacy Swing in recent years, see for example: www.cnn.com/videos/tv/2015/05/18/exp-i-desk-robyn-curnow-william-lacy-swing.cnn. An extreme wealth of information on the organization and its activities is provided by IOM itself, see, e.g.: its main web site www.iom.int and specific regional or country web sites: IOM Costa Rica, also the regional office for Central and North America, costarica.iom.int, or IOM Turkey: www.turkey.iom.int.

2. On the deficit of research on the IOM and the lack of academic and public awareness of the IOM’s role in migration politics in comparison to other international organizations (e.g., UNHCR or ILO) see Geiger and Pécoud 2014. See also Georgi 2010; Andrijasevic and Walters 2010; Ashutosh and Mounitz 2011.

interactions between the IOM, its member states, and its most important donor states. IOM however has emerged as a prominent actor on the global stage and in many countries. A general trend also lies in that IOM and other more widely known IOs, such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), are increasingly sought after not only by states needing advice and assistance, but also by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), other IOs, business organizations, and media outlets. In fact, IOs have gained importance in interpreting developments and (perceived) realities of migration (e.g., Pécoud 2013; 2015). Particularly as they report live and tell a global audience about the newest tragedies and migrant deaths at sea through traditional outlets, such as television and newspapers, but ever more frequently through social media, such as Facebook, Twitter, or video clips on Youtube (e.g., Heller 2014). Additionally, IOs in migration politics also provide tailored logistics and other operative support to states dealing with migratory inflows or affected by emigration and displacement.

IOM, in particular, boasts a long menu of migration management services, including health and background checks of migrants on behalf of states, and migrant worker recruitment for destination countries in the Global North (Dupeyron 2016; Kalm 2010) or emerging economies (e.g., Basok et al. 2013). IOM is even involved in managing the return and reintegration of irregular migrants, rejected asylum seekers, and other migrants through its voluntary assisted return and reintegration programs (Collyer 2012; Dünnewald 2013; Geiger 2013; Webber 2011). IOM has been accused of falsely convincing, disciplining, or coercing migrants into these programs that are supposedly more humane and efficient. IOM also has been criticized for explicitly selling contentious practices: for example, by supporting its donor states in fighting irregular migration, fortifying borders, and contributing substantively to the overall securitization of migration, or implementing information or deterrence campaigns to manipulate migrant behavior (Andrijasevic and Walters 2010; Georgi 2010; Kalm 2010; Pécoud 2010; Geiger 2013; Geiger and Pécoud 2017).

IOM perceives itself as a leader and standard-setter, supposedly responsible for the management of migration and mobility on a global scale (IOM 2016a). The IOM’s impact thus stretches beyond any simple conceptualization of a static inter-state system. Indeed, IOM takes both the geographic and social notions of the world quite seriously, as it reaches out to and profoundly impacts audiences and stakeholders beyond the state-system, including migrant organizations, transnational migrant networks, IOs (e.g., UNHCR, the International Labour Organization, ILO, the UN system), private corporations, and the global public at large. The reach of IOM differs greatly from many other IOs that are typically more bureaucratic, more centralized, and hierarchic than IOM. In the case of IOM, comparatively high levels of discretion and autonomy are granted and delegated downward to individual field or country missions and their chief of missions and project teams, while the oversight over these sub-state and state-level entities mostly rests at the level of specialized regional focal centers or sub-units with IOM. IOM individuals at the country level of actual implementation are often in a much more powerful position and profoundly influence local migration and border management strategies (Geiger 2010; Poutignat and Streiff-Fennart 2010; Caillaut 2012; Frowd 2014). Shedding light on these relations and implications, IOM is less engaged as a vehicle between states as the notion of an international organization would suggest—it is rather woven into a wider social context with various state and

4. For a first detailed inquiry into the relation between IOM and its most important member and donor states see Geiger (forthcoming). The focus of research in previous years has been mostly on countries where IOM implements certain activities on behalf of other states or international donors (including also the European Union), the interactions between IOM and local government and nongovernment institutions, see e.g. Geiger 2010; Caillaut 2012; Frowd 2014, or between states or regional entities (see, e.g., Korneev 2014 on the instrumental role of IOM in formulating readmission policy between the EU and the Russian Federation), while the inner world of the IOM and the relations between the IO and member states remain largely unexplored.

5. The role and activities of IOM in most parts of the world remain vastly unexplored. On labour migration in developing and emerging economies see, e.g. the IOM leaflet about its support in labour migration from Myanmar to the Middle East and Persian Gulf: www.iom.int/files/live/sites/iom/files/Country/docs/LM-FactSheet-Eng.pdf.

6. For a general overview see: www.iom.int/assisted-voluntary-return-and-reintegration.
non-state actors. In other words, IOM is embedded in world society (Kessler 2012).

This article analyzes IOM’s role in world society. What role does IOM play in organizing or (in the words of IOM) “managing” world migration, and does IOM contribute to world order? We conceptualize the IOM as a world organization by emphasizing IOM’s embeddedness in world society, its self-perception as part of world society, its internal relations that reflect how decisions are taken and how IOM refers to the world around it, its interactions not just with states but with other IOs and NGOs active in migration politics, and finally its contribution to global order in migration politics (Koch 2015b). This concept does not concentrate on state-IO relations, rather, it highlights the interrelations within IOs (such as between state representatives and bureaucracies) and between IOs and their wider environment, consisting of both state and non-state entities.

We use the theoretical concept of world organizations to understand and discuss IOM and its role in world migration. Since the late 2000s, there has been growth in the number of independent and critical studies on the IOM, specific aspects of this organization, and its activities (e.g., Andrijasevic and Walters 2010; Georgi 2010; Ashutosh and Mountz 2011; Dupeyron 2016). Most of these contributions however, lack a reference to more general discussions and mainstream concepts in IR and IO studies: namely, a solid, common, and combining theoretical perspective. Even though critical scholars have uncovered important facets and pointed out crucial issues, the perspective we are proposing in this article will bring at least some of the puzzle pieces together, helping us to more adequately capture and portray the IOM as a unique example of an innovative world organization. Herewith, we intend to analyze the interplay between IOM and its social world surroundings. This theoretical concept draws on an understanding of IOs as organizations in world society (Albert and Hilkermeier 2004; Koch 2015a) that aim to contribute to the emerging international political sociology of IOs (Koch and Stetter 2013).

The argument is divided into three parts. The first part deals with the theoretical concept of world organizations that follow the “organizational turn” (Ellis 2010) in the study of IOs and conceptualizes IOs as organizations in world society (Albert and Hilkermeier 2004; Koch 2015a). In the second part, we introduce the IOM as a very important IO in the field of migration politics that cannot merely be seen as an intermediary between states or state-led organizations as it interrelates with several non-state actors. In the third part, we apply this theoretical concept to analyze IOM as a world organization by focusing on the four dimensions introduced in the first part: 1) the IOM’s semantic self-description and relations to the world, 2) its inner world, such as its structures, processes, and participation in decision-making, 3) its environmental relations or external relations, as well as (4) the IOM’s role in generating world order. Finally, we revisit our analytical approach and take stock of our specific findings into IOM and the generalizations that follow. We argue that any current and innovative analysis of IOs must stretch beyond conventional discussions of IOs as inter-state bodies to deliver better and more accurate explanations; more specifically, in terms of their world semantics, their inner and external worlds, and their contributions to create world order.

The Conceptual Framework: International Organizations as World Organizations

Before developing our concept of IOs as world organizations that aim to contribute to the emerging international political sociology of IOs (Koch and Stetter 2013), we consider three important strands of discussion in IO studies and international relations (IR).

First, in a narrow and traditional perspective some studies continue to focus predominantly or almost exclusively on states, rarely taking other policy actors into account. This perspective is closely connected and follows directly from the formal definition of IOs as

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7. Future case studies will include the UNHCR, the International Labour Organization (ILO), the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

8. Exceptions include the discussion of IOs, including IOM, in the field of migration politics and their conceptualization with the help of fundamental concepts in IR and IO studies and with the help of the concept and discussion of “world organizations” as proposed in this article: see Geiger 2012; Geiger and Pécoud 2014.
an association of States, established by agreement among its members and possessing a permanent system or set of organs” (Virally 1981, 51). This and similar sounding definitions, emphasize the international character and simultaneously neglect the organizational character of IOs. Therefore, our analysis is part of the so-called organizational turn (Ellis 2010) on IOs.

A second set of discussions are concerned with the roles ascribed to IOs in IR theories. Within this expansive literature, the varying roles are located in a triangle, looking at IOs as instruments, arenas, and actors (Karns and Mingst 2010; Davies and Woodward 2014). Realism and neorealism see IOs as instruments for states, neoliberal institutionalism conceives of IOs as arenas in which states can negotiate, and global governance and social constructivism perceive IOs as actors vis-à-vis states. Even though IOs might have been designed by states to further their own goals (Koremenos et al. 2001, 762), they might develop in a way unintended by states (Nielson and Tierney 2003). Most IO studies—regardless of whether IOs are perceived as instruments, arenas, actors, or agents—emphasize the relations between states and IOs. These studies are interested in whether IOs act and perform in the way they should according to their design or the competences delegated to them. This state-centric perspective however, neglects to conceive of IOs as organizations in their own right, embedded in a larger environment that does not only consist of states (Hurd 2011). We are interested in how IOs relate to and interact with their wider environment and how member states and administrative members interact in decision-making processes within IOs.

Finally, a third strand of newer discussions points to the embeddedness of IOs in wider environments, as well as its political relevance (Tallberg and Jönsson 2010). It extends the reference point to a wider environment of states and non-state actors, including IO, NGOs, media, civil society, and the global public (Biermann and Koops 2016; Ecker-Ehrhardt 2014). In fact, this strand challenges past arguments and assumptions that states are firm principals and IOs mere agents at their disposal (Lyne et al. 2006 and Hawkins et al. 2006). Hence, both the interrelations of IOs with states and non-state actors need to be studied and vice versa. IOs and other non-state actors tend to simply matter more, for example, by contributing more prominently to the establishment of global order in various policy fields (Abbott et al. 2015 and Biermann 2015).

Our concept of IOs as world organizations draws on these discussions and argues to conceive IOs as organizations in world society. It takes on an open systems perspective (Scott 1992), which focuses on the embeddedness of IOs and their interrelations with world society. Conceptualizing IOs as organizations in a wider social environment is not a new concept but a rediscovery. In the mid-1980s, Jönsson (1986) applied a framework from interorganizational theory and network analysis to the interplay of IOs. Moreover, Ness and Brechin (1988, 248–52) attempted to bridge the conceptual gap between IR and organization studies by conceiving of IOs as organizations within international politics and defining their central characteristics (organizational environments, technology, structure, and goals). Barnett and Finnemore (1999; 2004) developed a more elaborate model to analyze IOs’ power and pathologies. The model treats IOs as bureaucracies, in a Weberian sense, and highlights their four sources of authority: rational-legal, delegated, moral, and expertise. Barnett and Finnemore (2004, 31) further identify three related mechanisms: “IOs (1) classify the world, creating categories of problems, actors, and action, (2) fix meanings in the social world, and (3) articulate and diffuse new norms and rules.” The power of IOs thus stems from their authority, knowledge, and the rules governing international relations.

One might argue that IOM is a perfect example for a bureaucratic organization as most decisions are either taken at the headquarters level or, more importantly, in the nine regional offices. Although Barnett and Finnemore (2004) offer an innovative model for IOs’ authority, their conceptualization of IOs as bureaucracies, as opposed to organizations, renders it applicable only to IOs with dominant administrations (e.g., the World Bank or IMF). The model is particularly difficult to apply to IOs that are not only driven by the bureaucracy at headquarters but also proactively forecast and rapidly respond to local developments or environ-
ments through field and regional offices (e.g., the operations of IOM and UNHCR during conflict situations or their regular everyday politics), which are never completely controlled or instructed by headquarters. Furthermore, Barnett and Finnemore’s (1999; 2004) perception of IOs as bureaucracies is not apt to study interrelations within IOs, such as between member-state driven and more administrative organs within an IO.

While, Barnett and Finnemore (2004) also study how IOs maintain their authority and autonomy vis-à-vis states, they do not conceive of IOs as embedded in a complex social environment. Brechin and Ness (2013) reevaluated this gap between IR and organization studies, claiming that it had narrowed substantially. They emphasize that further insights could be gained from differentiating the environments of IOs and exploring how IOs process external demands internally, gain legitimacy, interact with other organizations (including states but also many other actors) in their social environment, and contribute to global order (Brechin and Ness 2013, 32–34). To address these desiderata, a general organizational concept is needed that grasps IOs, their self-perceptions in world society, internal decision-making processes, environmental embeddedness, and contribution to global order (Koch 2015b).

From an open systems’ perspective rooted in organization studies, organizations are systems composed of a combination of different but interrelated elements (Scott 1992, 77). They can be distinguished from collective entities in that their elements are loosely coupled, which permits them structural flexibility and variability (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Weick 1979). An organization does not have a singular objective. Rather, the different organizational units pursue different sets of interests, develop their own logics of interaction and decision-making, seek to maximize their benefits, and form their own affiliations (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Simultaneously, organizations are embedded in and interact with their (world) societal environment. By using feedback loops, organizations react to changes in their environment and adapt their output accordingly (Scott 1992, 77ff). Moreover, organizations develop specific elements, resources, and functions to ensure their survival and legitimization by the environment. As environments are unstable and dynamic, organizations are forced to adapt routinely. The boundary between organization and environment is porous and variable, because 1) members of an organization are simultaneously part of the organizational environment, and 2) an organization is in permanent exchange with its environment (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Weick 1995).

This open systems perspective allows us to conceptualize IOs as embedded in a world societal environment. World society implies a global social context, which provides the framing conditions for any other social units and constitutes social organization in itself (Greve and Heintz 2005). As such, IOs and national states are “constructions of a common wider culture” (Meyer et al. 1997, 152) within a stateless world society (Meyer 1999). World society emerges from the institutionalization of rationalized world cultural models, which, “organized in scientific, professional, and legal analyzes of the proper functioning of states, societies, and individuals, are more cognitive and instrumental than expressive” (Meyer et al. 1997, 149).

Organizations as well as other actors are manifestations of world cultural models that lead to structural similarities (isomorphism) in world society. These isomorphic processes are a necessary consequence of a process of modernization and rationalization. World society only exists because world policy is enacted and in turn shaped by agents, be they states, IOs, NGOs, or scientific experts (Boli and Thomas 1999; Meyer et al. 2006; Meyer and Jepperson 2000). IOs are parts of world policy as they do not act in a narrow sense. As opposed to rational self-interested actors, IOs are “rationalized agents who function vis-à-vis organizing others” by “managing, but also constructing, the agreements among and long-run interests of true actors such as human beings, national states and organizations” (Meyer 1994, 47). The question is how and to what extent do IOs present themselves and act as world organizations? The perspective of open systems allow for the creation of four analytical dimensions—world semantics, the inner word, external relations, and the generation of world order (Koch 2015b):
1. World Semantics: World organizations are characterized by an explicit semantic reference to the world, for example, in their name and self-description, e.g., World Bank, World Trade Organization (WTO), or World Health Organization (WHO). Other IOs have an implicit reference to the world as part of their corporate identity, such as the International Labour Organization (ILO) that lobbies for worldwide labor standards. World semantics thus relate to the interdependence between IOs and their world in their organizational self-conceptions. They may provide insights, for example, into the function of IOs in world society or its contribution to identity construction (Albert 2005). The self-understanding and self-perception of IOs are arguably mirrored inside these organizations, their external relations, and their contributions to world order.

2. Inner World: IOs are non-monolithic, complex entities. Member states, individually and in coalitions, pursue their particular goals within and through the medium of IOs. The concept of world organizations sees member states (as the term suggests) as members of an international organization. Member states are an important part of many IOs as they are involved in decision-making processes. However, member states do not always play out as the central actors within an IO. Therefore, we suggest focusing on the inner world of an IO to scrutinize if and how decisions are taken and who is involved. The IOM, for example, is an IO in which the regional offices are very crucial for the organizational decision-making, whereas member states do not play a central role (see below). In addition, IO headquarters and top officials, administrative units, regional offices, and local missions may pursue their own interests or develop rationales for action and decision-making, thereby strengthening the organization’s autonomy and authority (Barnett and Finnemore 2004). This process may even occur without significant control, commitment, or awareness from higher levels of organizational leadership. The inner world of IOs also encompasses all decisions and actions particular IOs make in response to perceived external (environmental) challenges.

3. External Relations: IOs are embedded in and part of a larger social environment in which they coexist with other organizations (other IOs, NGOs, multinational corporations, or states). The environment is defined as “everything outside the organization” (Mintzberg 1979, 267), which makes it possible to extend the focus beyond an IO’s relations with states and to include all actors and events that do not belong to the organization, and study their relations (as, e.g., Biermann 2008; Brosig 2011, Biermann and Koops 2016). IOs also maintain relations of various kinds with their environment. For example, they might act according to certain expectations of states, rival other IOs, or take the expectations of NGOs and other nonmembers into account. IOs also creatively develop organizational responses, statements, or actions in reaction to criticism from member states and nonmembers.

4. World Order: The open systems’ perspective connects with global governance studies in that organizations must cope and interact with a (highly) dynamic, and thus contingent and uncertain, environment. To reduce contingency and uncertainty, and to enable continued decision-making, organizations make corporate decisions regarding their structures and procedures. Thus, IOs must agree on principles, rules, and norms that serve as premises to subsequent decisions. Decision-making occurs in reference to the self-perception of an IO and the expectations of external actors. IOs’ decisions are in turn accepted by external actors, which increases their legitimacy. Herewith, IOs create order for both state and non-state actors (Ahrne et al. 2016).

IOM’s History and its Development in Migration Politics
The swift growth and increasing influence of the IOM conveys an impression of significant success of a now globally dominant IO. IOM membership expanded from sixteen member states
in 1951, to 166 member states in 2016; between 1998 and 2016 alone membership more than doubled (from sixty-seven to 166 states). At the same time, IOM also experienced a massive expansion as reflected in its annual expenditures (USD 242.2 million in 1998 to over USD 1.4 billion in 2015); field locations (400); staff (close to 9,000); and projects (approximately 2,400) (IOM 2015a/2016b/2016c/2017b).

Omnipresent today, IOM was not meant to be permanent, let alone global, at its founding. Established in 1951, its predecessor carried the programmatic and telling title of Provisional Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe (acronym: PICMME; Elie 2011). Fearing the Soviet Union’s and other communist countries’ influence on yet another UN agency, the U.S. and its allies founded PICMME outside of the UN System, where the organization operated for several decades. Evolving over the years into a quasi-permanent organization, with increasing activities outside of Europe, a rapidly growing membership, and influenced strongly and shaped by the U.S. and other leading Western countries, the organization was first renamed to Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) in 1952. As its global focus, membership, and activities expanded, ICEM underwent further name changes to Intergovernmental Committee for Migration (ICM) in 1980 and to its current name in 1989 (Perruchoud 1989; Georgi 2010; IOM 2016a; IOM 2016d; Elie 2011).

Migration, refugees, asylum, and other related policy areas are traditionally prerogatives of states and their governments. The growth and expansion of IOM and other international organizations (e.g., UNHCR: Loescher 2001) in these areas is thus particularly noteworthy, as they question and challenge these prerogatives and the very foundations of the nation-state concept and the global inter-state system. Until the 1990s, states avoided sharing or delegating responsibilities with other states, let alone non-state or inter-state actors such as IOs. Meaningful inter-state discussions and dialogues between states and IOs on migration are a post–Cold War phenomenon (starting 1989–90) with the exception of the European Community (Guiraudon 2000; Geddes 2003) where the notion of shared responsibilities in migration, border control, and the need for a common migration policy had emerged in the early 1950s.

The mid-1980s were a decisive moment for IOs, which saw their role and influence in migration and related policy domains quickly and significantly expand. This process began with the Intergovernmental Consultations on Migration, Asylum and Refugees (IGC 1985), an informal and nonbinding consultative process between key receiving countries in the Global North. The 1990s were subsequently marked by a significant increase in the number and frequency of regional consultative processes on migration, asylum, and borders worldwide (Thouez and Channac 2005). Migration was suddenly everywhere as Newland (2010) and Pécoud (2015) recall. Many states sought to engage with new bilateral and multilateral forums on migration, asylum, and borders. IOs grew to provide states with more migration-relevant information and expertise, as well as logistical support in fortifying border controls through training, policy advice, and tradeshows for technology procurement, information, and deterrence campaigns about the risks of migration, as well as return programs. Several case studies have pointed to the significant agency IOs can leverage and exercise in particular cases by, for example, running refugee camps on behalf of the international community in Kenya and other countries (UNHCR; e.g., Hyndman 2000), designing full-fledged national migration policies for specific countries, and even implementing these policies as quasi-governmental actors on the ground on behalf of international donors and foreign countries that pursued through IOM, UNHCR, and other organizations mostly restrictive approaches to migration and refugees (Geiger 2010; Caillaut 2012).

Existing and proliferating enormously outside the UN system, IOM in summer 2016 decided to follow up on the repeated calls of UN institutions, member states, NGOs, and other organizations to finally join the UN as a formal UN organization. Yet, the IOM negotiated a

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9. The other founding states were Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland, and Turkey (Elie 2011).
completely new and rather nebulous term and status for “related organization to the UN.”

Very little aside from rumors is known about this sudden rupture with IOM’s longtime and preferred existence outside the UN system. Instead of directly becoming a fully integrated UN agency, IOM (probably in a last effort to keep at least a substantial portion of its previous strong independence and autonomy) opted for the label and rank of a “related organization.” While, at the same time, IOM made a rather bold move and started to call itself the “UN migration agency,” following up on the UNHCR’s earlier move to call itself “the UN refugee agency.” In this sense it stressed parity with the UNHCR, a real UN agency, so as to leave no doubt that the IOM is as important as the UNHCR and so that the labeling of “related organization to the UN” would not be confused with a mere observer status or a subordinate entity in the UN—perhaps even subordinate to the UNHCR or the other migration agency, the longstanding International Labour Organization (ILO).

These observations relate to the main discussions in IO and IR studies taken as an embarking point in part 1; even in the distinct case of migration, the focus on states proves somewhat outdated, as both the absolute authority of states, as well as simplified understandings of IOs as organizations formed and controlled by states, are no longer adequate. It is important to observe and analyze the roles ascribed to IOs. Are IOs only the means for hegemonic states to maintain or increase their powers? Or do IOs, in their capacity as mediators and forum organizers embedded in world society, further the goals of non-hegemonic members, while also developing and pursuing their own interests and agendas? Are IOs by extension more than arenas or instruments? Have IOs gained agency and what is the quality and relevance of their actorness? What are IOs able to do, change, and influence in the field of migration alongside governments, and to what extent can their interests and policies contradict those of states, hegemonic, or otherwise?

The IOM’s field operations, for example, point to the organization’s close interactions and dependency on other service providers in specific program and country contexts. The latter not only includes local government partners but also nongovernmental organizations that are sometimes created by IOM as quasi-NGOs, IOs, and transnational humanitarian networks (e.g., church-led, e.g., Caritas), as well as control-oriented agencies and programs (e.g., police assistance missions of the EU to non-EU states, see e.g., Geiger 2010 and Geiger 2011 for empirical examples). At the same time, IOM demonstrates a remarkably high level of independence and autonomy that becomes visible at the local (grassroot) level of implementation where IOM activities are actively designed and configured by individual specialists in the country team and the local chief of mission, with a comparable low level of headquarter oversight and power (see, e.g., Geiger 2010; Caillaut 2012; Frowd 2014).

This combination of strong independence and high levels of (local) flexibility, while at the same time remaining strongly dependent on other local implementing partners (e.g., NGOs and local state governments), relates to the discussion on the embeddedness of IOs in wider environments and its relevance to IOs and their activities in the field of migration. Questions that arise are: To what extent can IOs in a common, non-exclusive, state-controlled environment, influence and decisively impact migration processes in partnership with other state, inter-state, and non-state actors? How does embeddedness matter and shape the agency’s response, and the IO’s actions in the field of migration? And to what extent can IOs create common narratives and orders with and within this environment?

**Analysis: The IOM as a World Organization**

In emphasizing that IOM is embedded in world society, we can differentiate four dimensions according to the theoretical concept introduced in the second section. First, we are interested in the self-perception of IOM as part of world society and its relations to the world. Second, we are analyzing the internal relations of IOM that reflect how decisions are taken, how the entities within the IOM interrelate and interact, and finally, how and to what extent member states influence the

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work of the IOM. Third, we are focusing on the interactions of the IOM not just with states but with other IOs and NGOs active in migration politics. Fourth, we are scrutinizing IOM’s contribution to global order in migration politics. Therefore, we are not only interested in the actual work of the IOM or the roles and regulations formulated by IOM, but also if the work of IOM serves as a role model or reference point for other organizations.

World Semantics

World semantics refers to an IO’s individual description of the world. The core interest is to reveal how world organizations understand and put themselves into context with the world. Is their world only comprised of states or does it include non-state actors? What political and social functions do world organizations fulfill in their (respective) world(s)?

Today, the IOM somewhat presumptuously declares itself the “leading intergovernmental organization” (IOM 2015b) in the field of migration and calls itself “the Migration Agency” and “the point of reference in the [supposedly] heated global debate [on] the social, economic and political implications of migration in the 21st century” (IOM 2015b). As mentioned earlier, in 2016, IOM finally made the move to become a UN organization and to relabel itself again, now becoming the “UN migration agency” (with UN finally in the title).

All these self-definitions and their historical evolvement suggest that IOM could indeed be portrayed as a world organization and that it reconsiders and (re-)employs its world semantics strategically. For example, to assert its position, differentiate itself within the world of migration, or to competitively stress its leadership among international organizations. IOM declares itself as “the Migration Agency” whereas UNHCR has begun to differentiate itself as “the Refugee Agency” and in omitting the UN label, the UNHCR seems to conceal an important aspect of its identity and position.

Then, years later, in the months that preceded the 2016 New York Declaration and the decision of UN member states to start developing two “Compacts”—one on refugees, with UNHCR as lead organization, and one on migration, with potentially IOM as lead organization—the IOM made the strategic move to join the UN family as a “related organization” and moving semantically into a “parity” position with UNHCR, labeling itself suddenly the “UN migration agency.” Despite operating for many years on the sidelines of the UN system, IOM already (before its 2016 formal accession to the UN) boasted a nearly global, universal membership (see part 1.1), very similar to the UN (the new mother organization) as a whole. It could be argued that the imminent Global Compact process at the UN level, together with an intensifying competition with UNHCR and ILO, finally moved IOM toward the UN system and to overcome it previous distance to the UN. While IOM has started to lead the UN Compact process on migration, UNHCR is leading the UN Compact process on refugees, while ILO was almost ousted from the process, which could have happened to IOM if IOM had not made this strategic move to become a “related organization.”

During the decades before (since the 1950s), IOM had imitated and created a world organization like the UN, and granted observer status to sixty intergovernmental organizations and UN bodies, and an almost equal number to (international) nongovernmental entities (IOM 2016e). It was only in 2016, after this desperate but strategic move, that the IOM gave up a substantial share of its decades-long independence and autonomy outside the formal UN system.

Even IOM’s web site address reveals insights into its identity as a world organization. The current address’ (www.iom.int) predecessor was exclusively Swiss for a long time (www.iom.ch). This decision was likely due to the organization’s Geneva-based headquarters, and as critical examinations have argued, a consequence of IOM’s pronounced interest in remaining under the radar and its reluctance toward being misidentified as a UN-type organization. A status that changed finally in 2016.

11. Today www.iom.int links to www.iom.ch and vice versa. Interestingly, the IOM seems never to have been interested and able to purchase the address www.iom.org from the Isle of Man’s James Family.
IOM’s web site also reveals what the world is to IOM, how it perceives itself in the world, and its embeddedness in world society. The IOM reaches out to and addresses each site visitor, like members of the global public. But this open and friendly appeal to their audience seriously contradicts the closed, state-centric reality of this inter-governmental organization, which is commonly accused of catering exclusively to the restrictive interests of Global North receiving states (e.g., Georgi 2010; Kalm 2010; Andrijasevic and Walters 2010; Ashutosh and Mountz 2011). The bottom of the web site’s landing page encourages visitors to “stay connected” by showcasing the access points to IOM’s Facebook, Twitter, Youtube, Flickr page, and RSS feed. Above these access points, links are emphasized that encourage visitors to subscribe, learn about IOM’s campaigns, report missing friends to the Missing Migrants Project, and donate to IOM via credit card. The entire web site of the IOM appears to have a deliberate strategy to catch each visitor’s attention, appeal to them as global citizens, connect them to IOM, and somewhat inevitably render them complicit in the IOM’s agenda and practices. Through donations, the global public and each individual citizen can become a quasi-member of the organization. IOM can thereby become the public’s organization and reference point in the world of migration.

IOM attempts to lead the global migration debate not only by stating its importance but also by offering visuals and stories on its web site that allow the global public to relate to and acquire a share in the issue. The landing page is covered with videos, maps, and heavily editorialized stories of migration and migrants. Campaigns on the landing page, such as “I am a Migrant” and “Migrant Heroes,” allow migrants to share their stories with the world, giving a platform for icons to be born. The IOM strategically reconstrues its account of the world of migration and communicates its own map of the migratory world when reaching out to migrants and its global audience who, based on the selection bias implicit in web sites, are likely already interested in seeking information on migration issues. IOM’s relationship with states, its real members, main donors, and party whose interests the IOM caters to, take a virtual backseat on the IOM web site.

While the UNHCR’s annual brochure is issued as “Global Appeal” (UNHCR 2016), the IOM’s counterpart “Migration Initiatives” (IOM 2014) stresses the IOM’s approach in taking leadership and responsibility for states, migrants, and global society at large. According to IOM the brochure lists the most pressing migration-related challenges. For almost every country, the publication catalogues a description of each issue, and designates a list of measures and solutions that are supposedly necessary. Each measure in turn has a price. The publication is in essence a public and open funding pitch for the world of co-managers and donors. It is important to note that these donors and potential clients also include other organizations and private actors, despite the prominence of states and regional entities as IOM donors, such as the European Union.

Inner World
Maps and other graphic representations both guide and represent the IOM’s internal structure and operational activities. IOM concentrates its activities and interventions along certain routes and at specific hot spots, like the current migration routes across the Mediterranean toward Europe. It thus conveys a preoccupation with the entire world, and a flexibility to shift focus and operations from one event to another through outstanding expertise and operational capability. The IOM organizes its world into four regions (see www.iom.int/countries) reflecting its perception of the migratory world and the close historical and/or migratory relationship between certain (sub-) regions: 1) Africa and the Middle East, 2) Americas and the Caribbean, 3) Asia and the Pacific, and 4) Europe and Central Asia (IOM 2016f).12

12. One could argue that the world perception of the IOM is reflected in its internal structure. Thus, the four dimension are not mutually exclusive but rather interfere with each other.
A distinct IOM geography is also evident in the organization’s highly decentralized approach to migration management as evident in its missions along key routes and hotspots, which seek to tackle challenges on site. While IOM’s Geneva headquarters is responsible for general policy making, top-level administration, and collaboration with states, IOs, and other actors, the real work seems shouldered by more than 150 country offices: “IOM’s structure is highly decentralized,” and in the words of IOM, “This has enabled the Organization to acquire the capacity to deliver an ever-increasing number and diversity of projects at the request of its Member States” (IOM 2016e). The existing research on IOM, the way it operates in countries of implementation and shapes local policy developments, clearly points to an almost unparalleled degree of independence and autonomy of IOM local missions versus IOM’s headquarters, and at the same time it indicates a high degree of independence and autonomy toward international donors and member states that are delegating and financing IOM activities (see, e.g., Geiger 2010; Poutignat and Streiff-Fénart 2010; Caillaut 2012; Frowd 2014). It seems that only in formal context and official headquarter statements and publications do member states really matter to IOM and take center stage, while the global public or civil society actors are left out. Although IOM strategically reaches out to the public and civil society community with the help of massive social media campaigns and is strongly dependent on local implementers from the civil society community.

The inner world of IOM is structured by a total of nine regional offices, which formulate regional strategies, plans of action, and provide support to the country missions and states in the regions. They are strategically placed in Dakar (Senegal), Nairobi (Kenya), Cairo (Egypt), Pretoria (South Africa), San José (Costa Rica), Buenos Aires (Argentina), Bangkok (Thailand), Brussels (Belgium), and Vienna (Austria) (IOM 2016e). Five country offices (in Canberra, Australia, covering the Pacific; Rome, Italy, covering the Mediterranean; Astana, Kazakhstan, covering Central Asia; and Georgetown, Guyana, covering the Caribbean; Bangkok, Thailand, covering South Asia) are assigned additional coordinating functions and responsibilities, which involves “ensuring that migratory realities within a defined cluster of countries are taken into account in programmatic activities of the region” (IOM 2016e) or in non-IOM language, monitoring and controlling all missions in the region and the specific regional segment of the migratory world simultaneously. Four other country offices (in Tokyo, Japan; Berlin, Germany; Helsinki, Finland; and Washington, D.C., U.S.) have been assigned so-called Resource Mobilization Functions, which include swift ad hoc support in fund-raising activities and contextualized advice on fund-raising policies, priorities, and procedures in the region. In addition, two so-called special liaison offices are located in New York and Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) to work closely with “specific multilateral bodies, diplomatic missions, and nongovernmental organizations” (IOM, 2016d) highlighting the relevance IOM attributes to other actors outside the realm of states. Two administrative centers in Panama City and Manila (Philippines) add to the peculiar features of IOM. Much like multi-national corporations, IOM has outsourced part of its administration to these two decentralized service centers. Thus, painting IOM as a bureaucracy may not depict its full reality. The whole organization is highly complex, decentralized, and differentiated. It is embedded deeply almost everywhere and at all levels of policy, including the inter-state and sub-state levels as some empirical investigations of IOM practices have demonstrated (e.g., Georgi 2010; Caillaut 2012).

The two mentioned service centers’ locations in low-wage countries (Manila and Panama City), as opposed to Western Europe or North America, also indicate IOM’s business acumen and emphasis on cost efficiency and consequently in spreading the organization out, exploiting saving factors (here wages) that exist at specific locations outside the world of IOM headquarters. The IOM uses the method of projectization where allegedly all staff and office costs are linked to the implementation of specific projects and their time allocations. The IOM web site proudly declares a “lowest rate of administrative support” at 7 percent of total project costs to cover administrative support and “prioritizes cost efficiency in the implementation of
projects” (IOM 2016d). How IOM structures itself is thus linked to its internal differentiation, including activities, organizational development, and staff selection, as well as the other three dimensions of the IOM as a world organization.

External Relations

Seeing IOM as a world organization means to perceive IOs as part of a larger social environment, in which they maintain relations in different forms and to varying degrees. It is nearly impossible to reduce the circle of partners and addressees of world organizations. The communication and other strategies of world organizations are particularly important, as they place and stress their acquired or assumed position within this complex environment and allow them to address a world that is far more entangled than a distinct list of partners, addressees, opponents, and critics. Additionally, the analysis of IOM’s external relations refers to both its world semantics and its inner world.

As is evident in the case of IOM and its activities, depending on the issue, events, or scenario (crisis), specific groups of actors may shift to the foreground. In their status as world organizations, IOs must also creatively and productively respond to criticism from member states, media, the public, and other actors. In order to preempt critique, organizations have developed forms of cooperation with external actors, other than formal observer status, which involve other IOs, NGOs, or representatives of civil society in some decision-making through formal and informal advisory processes. These forms of cooperation can assume the function of a boundary spanner (Ansell and Weber 1999).

In many ways, IOM assumes the role of a boundary spanner, counting its own civil society actors or so-called quasi-nongovernmental organizations (QUANGOS) in numerous countries (Geiger 2011; Caillaut 2012). They support IOM in providing shelter to victims of trafficking and in returning irregular or stranded migrants to their home countries. In cases where they are not the direct product of IOM and its local employees, these civil society counterparts are heavily subsidized by IOM and donor organizations, such as USAID, which use the IOM as an intermediary or selector. The IOM also acts as a boundary spanner between these donors, powerful states with a geopolitical stake in the target country, local government institutions, and other actors. In most country cases analyzed over the last years, IOM has been described as a proactive organization that frequently transforms into a (quasi-) local institution or quasi-governmental body assuming far reaching local autonomy and agency, which may also include the design and implementation of national policies (e.g., Geiger 2010; Caillaut 2012). IOM strongly depends on a successful, proactive, and creative exploitation and management of external relations to other policy actors. Close cooperation with civil society organizations or QUANGOS, conveys the impression of genuine IO partnership and embeddedness in social relations. It is a strategic tool to mitigate (potential) opposition from non-state audiences and allows for strategic, or perhaps merely symbolic, artificial representation of civil society. Simultaneously, the involvement of IOM as a local henchman, as opposed to true NGOs and local players, mitigates the risk of provoking governments in implementation countries, while potentially increasing cost effectiveness and the sustainability of policy approaches.

As mentioned, the IOM pursues an active communicative strategy by not only addressing member states but also global public and non-state actors, such as migrant organizations or diaspora groups. Since the mid-1990s, the IOM has founded its ideology on the premise that migration can be managed to the benefit of all such that the interests of receiving states, sending states, and migrants are accommodated in a harmonious, balanced process: “IOM is committed to the principle that humane and orderly migration benefits migrants and society. As the leading international organization, IOM acts with its partners in the international community to assist in meeting the operational challenges of migration management, advance understanding of migration issues, encourage social and economic development through migration, and uphold the human dignity and well-being of migrants” (IOM 2015b).
Interpreting IOM’s longstanding slogan, “Managing Migration for the Benefit of All,” and its more recent slogan, “Migration for the Benefit of All,” reveals a lofty goal that promises universal prosperity. The IOM sees dignified, safe, orderly, and development-promoting migration as a beneficial process for which there is a common understanding and universal demand. The IOM’s world and its external world relations, in consequence, cannot be limited to the community of states or to inter-state relations alone, particularly considering the organization’s claim to serving all states, societies, and migrants.

Nevertheless, IOM, along with the EU’s Frontex agency, have perhaps attracted the greatest degree of criticism among organizations worldwide. Even members of academia, partially organized in scientific networks, NGOs (e.g., ProAsyl, Human Rights Watch), and migrants themselves have opposed specific IOM approaches to migration management, like the protests of the sans-papiers and no-border activists at the 2003 G8 Summit in Switzerland. In fact, communication between IOM and the global public has become two directional; as the IOM pushes its confident self-depictions and gains significant political recognition and capital, other actors have begun to formulate demands that are difficult or impossible to satisfy. One example is the demand that IOM ought to fight for a world migration order that is more just, and that it in fact should be “managing migration for the benefit of some” (Georgi 2010). Thus, IOM’s alleged universality is also its Achilles heel. Its status as a world organization renders it much more susceptible to criticism and contradictory demands, than it would have had to anticipate in dealing only with its member states.

**World Order**

Through its communications and field activities, IOM is involved in a dynamic process where global migration problems, challenges, location, and appropriate solutions are periodically developed, revised, or reframed (see country portraits and listed suggested activities, e.g., in: IOM 2014). While IOM collects, assembles, and disseminates knowledge (statistics, interpretations etc.) and is involved in constructing the world of migration, it also contributes to the creation of a world order aiming to influence, regulate, and order mobility and migration.

To an extent, the IOM’s success, influence, and reputation result from innovations in international migration policy. Since the early 1990s, IOM has contributed to the creation of a new “global migration narrative” (Pécoud 2015), on how international migration and mobility can and should be managed in the 21st century (Ghosh 1993; Ghosh 2000; Geiger and Pécoud 2010). For several years, the IOM lobbied for a far less control-obsessed and more liberal approach to migration, often in opposition to its member states and donors. Its catchphrase “Managing Migration for the Benefit of All” (see, e.g., Swing 2012) holds a humane, ethical, and universal view of migration. The migration management concept, however, is still highly pragmatic; effective migration policy is grounded in a balanced approach and regulated openness. If managed properly, migration and mobility can potentially benefit origin countries, destination countries, and migrants (the so-called triple win). Regular migration should thus be encouraged and facilitated in order to realize its positive economic and social impacts. Irregular migration, on the other hand, is framed as less beneficial or detrimental. It is by extension unwanted and should be prevented not only to protect migrants from exploitation or death, but also to shield states, societies, and economies from the negative effects of unmanaged flows (e.g., “brain drain” in origin countries, xenophobic backlashes in receiving states).

The narrative that migration can be rendered positive, combined with the message that IOM can effectively assist states in dealing with their migratory challenges, partly reduces the issue’s element of uncertainty and complexity for IOM member states. No international regime on migration or convention comparable to the Geneva Refugee Convention exists in the field of migration, apart from the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, which was lobbied for by the ILO and the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and enjoys limited
ratification (UN 1990). Yet the IOM has been arguably successful at conveying the impression of managing migration and keeping it orderly and controlled in its joint operations with states and other actors. The IOM would have otherwise not experienced such an impressive growth in donor funding, member states, activities, and staff since the mid-1990s.

While some publications, such as the “Essentials of Migration Management” (IOM 2004), directly support the propagation and transfer of norms, best practices, and policy models, others, such as “Migration Initiatives,” also disseminate a particular message to states that migration is a common good, certain measures have proven effective in other countries, and IOM’s expertise and knowledge of all challenges, as well as its capacity to tackle each. In some cases, the IOM goes as far as construing or even constructing the very problem, which are rarely corroborated by third-party publications. It then somewhat prescribes a set solution to such “imagined” problems, promising states, donors, and the global public to implement them for funding. In this strategy, IOM offers a particularly interesting empirical example for the fourth dimension of world organizations and world order.

Conclusion
The IOM offers a perfect example for the increasing relevance of IOs in migration politics, despite its history of operating in the shadow of states, non-state actors, and other IOs, which were more visible in dealing with migrants. The IOM and its efforts in managing migration and dealing with the migration crisis have been frequently addressed in recent academic and public debates. Against this background, we sought to explain IOM’s growing role in world society. IOM cannot be adequately perceived as an inter-state organization, particularly due to its relations with non-state actors, such as NGOs, other IOs, civil society, and migrants. While formally an IO, IOM plays a global, as opposed to inter-governmental, role in migration politics, as it is embedded in and influenced by a wider social environment, that is, world society. To grasp IOM’s role in world politics, we propose a conceptualization of IOM as a world organization that differentiates four dimensions: world semantics, inner world, external relations, and world order.

In conceptualizing IOM as a world organization, we are less interested in its relations with states or if and how states as principals delegated certain competencies and tasks to the IOM as an agent. To determine whether the IOM is positioned as an instrument, arena, actor, or agent vis-à-vis states or whether it carries out certain functions and manages migration as a bureaucracy is not the analysis’ aim. We are following a different conceptual path using insights from organizational sociology to conceptualize IOM as part of world society. We are then interested in how IOM as a world organization is embedded in world society. Therefore, we differentiate four different, but interconnected, dimensions of world organizations instead, revealing how the IOM is embedded in its social context and functions as a world organization.

The proposed heuristic concept of world organizations holds potential for the analysis of IOs in general, including of course, similar IOs in the field of migration politics. First, our concept implies that the explanatory focus is laid on the organization as a social object embedded in its world societal environments, as opposed to inter-state relations. In doing so, the emphasis lies on relations between world organizations and their environments, which are not constituted ex ante and are not only comprised of states. For instance, the IOM interacts with a variety of actors, including state, IOs, and non-state actors, such as individual migrants, migrant groups, as well as the general global public. IOM is more than an intergovernmental organization and should thus be analyzed in its wider social context.

Second, the term “world” further clarifies the organization’s conception of the world and its self-conception within the world, which are subject to the analysis. IOM, for example, works in a migratory world, which it simultaneously constructs and differentiates. Through engaging and interactive portrayals, the organization helps other entities better understand this
migratory world. The IOM simultaneously assists states and other actors in obtaining the right tools and approaches to shape migratory flows, policies, and outcomes, which in turn powerfully shape the IOM’s self-perception of IOM in its world, as well as its inner world of sub-entities and region/activity-specific centers around the globe.

Third, self-conceptions, inner worlds, and external relations can be studied by analyzing the decisions and decision-making processes within IOs, which can be drawn from documents, treaties, working and mission statements, etc. IOs make decisions based on observations of their environment. As organizations manifest their perception of the world, they refer to relevant information that is then included in internal decision-making processes. The IOM proactively explores other actors’ knowledge gaps and implementation needs, which are then successfully integrated into its design and marketing of tailored policy solutions, tools, and services.

Fourth, the generation of world order is visible in world organizations’ influence on binding frameworks of reference that guide not only states but also non-state actors. Furthermore, the perception of uncontrolled migration contributes to the construction of global problems that require solutions—even if the identified problems affect only a particular part of the world. The IOM has designed and promoted its own powerful understanding and action-oriented concept of migration management, which is often described as technocratic, pragmatic, and apolitical. Yet it caters mostly to restrictive, hegemonic interests and approaches on migration in destination countries in the Global North.\\footnote{For a critique of the neoliberal attitude of the IOM and its service to restrictive states in the Global North see, e.g., Georgi 2010; Kalm 2010; Georgi and Schatral 2012.}

A study of IOs through the world organizations concept not only offers a systematic analysis of IOs, it also allows for a diachronic and a synchronic comparison of IOs. A comparison, along the four categories generates insights on the world semantics and the differences among world organizations’ worlds (see for example the worlds of IOM and UNHCR). Further, it becomes possible to analyze which IOs and actors participate in the decision-making process, how they participate, and with what authority. Organization-environment relations also lend themselves to careful study and systematic comparison. Are they dominated by states, or do they involve non-state actors? What kind of non-state actors are primarily addressed? What roles do non-state actors play and how does the organization relate to them? How do IOM, the UNHCR, the ILO, etc. reflect the interests and concerns of migrants and refugees within their work? Last, the concept allows for comparison of the different impacts of IOs on migration politics. This is particularly interesting in cases where two or more organizations hold a similar mandate but pursue different strategies.

In analyzing the growing role of IOM in migration politics, this article seeks to highlight the potential that world organizations as a new concept poses to the study of IOs. For this purpose, the initial categories presented here require further differentiation, refining, and extension.

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